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Abstract 
This study analyses renewable energy policy in hydrocarbons-wealthy Arab states. In-
tegrating elements of energy policy analysis, Middle Eastern studies and socio-
technical governance theory, the thesis contributes to the understanding of renewable 
energy policy in this region as well as to the question of transferability of governance 
concepts. 
The thesis is structured in three parts. Part A discusses relevant research literature and 
presents the multi-level-perspective which structures the policy analysis. Additionally, 
the policy design model of transition management that closely interacts with the multi-
level-perspective is presented. Then, the material content of renewable energy policies 
in hydrocarbons-wealthy Arab states is discussed and the research questions devel-
oped. A methodological discussion concludes Part A. 
Part B applies the analytical categories developed to two case studies, Algeria and the 
United Arab Emirates. The two countries represent the main types of Arab oil and gas 
wealthy states (large territorial and small city states) and two relevant regions (North 
Africa and the Gulf States). In addition to domestic renewable energy policy, the thesis 
also discusses the Desertec project, as well as Abu Dhabi’s Masdar Initiative as case 
studies within the larger country case studies. 
In the last part of this study, a cross-case analysis highlights common regional features 
and particularities in terms of renewable energy policy in the target region and formu-
lates policy recommendations deriving from its critical use of the transition manage-
ment approach. Lastly, it addresses theory-related outcomes of the case studies with 
regards to the transfer of Western policy design models to hydrocarbons-rich Arab 
states.  
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Part A: Introduction, Theory, Technology and Policy As-
sessment  
Figure 1: Map of the Arab World 
 
© 2013 Google MapLink, Basarsoft, MapIT, ORION-ME. 
1. Introduction, research objectives and thesis structure1 
“The recognition that oil is an energy resource limited in life span has prompted strong 
interest in the development of alternative sources of energy. We as oil producing coun-
tries naturally share this interest as a means of diversifying our energy sources for the 
day when the oil wells run dry.” (Ali Ahmed Attiga, OAPEC Secretary General, quoted by 
Kettani & Malik, 1982) 
In recent years, the search for non-fossil ways of power generation has become a 
global endeavour for various reasons: while climate scientists and environmentalists 
argue that large-scale renewable energy power production will play a key role in com-
bating global climate change,2 researchers in development studies stress the potential 
of off-grid solar energy cells in rural communities. Financial institutions have started to 
offer clean investment funds, and countries with a strong national engineering tradi-
tion such as the United States or Germany view renewables as a major opportunity to 
                                                      
1
 This thesis will number both figures and tables consecutively. 
2
 Cf., among the multitude of studies, Stern (2008), UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme, 
2003), or IPCC (2007b). 
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diversify their export portfolios. Certainly, renewables have become a profitable busi-
ness in OECD,3 and increasingly in the BRIC states (Brazil, Russia, India, and China).  
However, the situation in other regions still lags behind, most notably due to insuffi-
cient investment capital and regulatory frameworks, technological underdevelopment, 
political instability and little capacities for fast-tracking the technology innovations 
needed to meet the environmental challenges of the twenty-first century. The Arab 
countries of the Gulf and North Africa are a perfect example of this case. Although ef-
forts to increase the role of renewables in the region started as early as in the 1970s4 
and despite the region’s high sun and significant wind potentials, the spread of renew-
able energies still lags behind compared to global standards. In 2009, merely 2.5% of 
the global investment in renewable energies of US$ 162bn (= US$ 4.05bn) were invest-
ed in the region (United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) & Bloomberg, 2010, 
p. 19). 
Economically, the Arab states can be divided into three groups. First, there are a sizea-
ble number of comparatively poor and institutionally weak states that lack substantial 
resource income from hydrocarbon rents. These states in North Africa, the Levant, as 
well as in parts of the Arabian Peninsula are characterized by a lack of domestic natural 
resources that can fund a strong national economic development. Some states of that 
category, such as Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia or Lebanon have been able to lift large 
numbers of the domestic populations above the poverty line through industrial devel-
opment, trade and successful higher education programmes. 
                                                      
3
 In recent years, new investment in “clean” energy industries like wind and solar power rose sharply to 
a peak of US$ 173bn in 2008, with US$ 162bn in 2009 (United Nations Environment Programme 
& Bloomberg, 2010). Analysts expect renewable energies to be 70 per cent of the global energy market 
by 2030 (AMEInfo, 2009b). 
4
 Already in 1978, the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) launched a study on 
renewable energies in the region. According to that report, research on that topic started in the Arab 
world in universities in Sudan and Tunisia in the last 1950s and 1960s. “Arab professors struggled for 
years to promote solar energy despite the general indifference of the policy makers and the public. It is 
only when interest in solar energy emerged in the West that official interest followed in Arab coun-
tries…The different efforts resulted in many activities which are most often uncoordinated not only 
between Arab countries, but also between different departments in the same country” (Kettani & Malik, 
1982, p. 12). 
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A second category is constituted by hybrid cases, such as Egypt, Syria and Bahrain. 
While these states possess hydrocarbon reserves and are partially still members of 
Arab oil governance bodies like the Organisation of Petrol Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
or the Organisation of Arab Petrol Exporting Countries (OAPEC) their reserves are rap-
idly dwindling, hydrocarbons are no longer the key source of national income and 
these countries have become net importers of hydrocarbons (or are on the threshold 
of becoming so). Yemen is a case in point: while still a net exporter of oil, it struggles to 
secure minimum levels of subsistence for the majority of its population, and is, moreo-
ver, characterized by growing areas of limited statehood. While the future of the other 
states might arguably not be as bleak as that of Yemen, the resource economic issues 
remain strikingly similar. Thus, in spite of fulfilling the formal criteria of oil states, a 
comprehensive economic assessment shows that these instead show typical features 
of category 1. 
Third, there are those Arab states that have come to benefit from the substantial oil 
and gas reserves on their national territories (see Figure 2 and Figure 3). 
Figure 2: World natural gas reserves by country as of January 1, 2010 
 
Source: US Energy Information Administration, 2010, p. 57. 
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Figure 3: World oil reserves by country as of January 1, 2010 (bn barrels) 
 
Source: US Energy Information Administration, 2010, p. 37. 
In addition to Libya and Algeria, this group of states consists of the oil states of the 
Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula, including Iraq, Saudi-Arabia, the United Arab 
Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman. These countries’ hydrocarbon resources were 
largely discovered in the first half of the last century5 and continue to fuel their nation-
al economic development until the present day (see Table 1).  
Table 1: Resource-rich economies – GDP share of mining and other indicators (selection) 
 
Source: Michaels, 2010, p. 57. 
Looking at the resource-rich Arab states in greater detail it becomes evident that these 
countries fall into two sub-categories. The first sub-category is the small city states of 
                                                      
5
 Among the multitude of publications on the history of oil discovery and politics cf. Yergin (2003) Citino 
(2002) and Mejcher (1980; 1990) for detailed accounts of that period. 
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the Gulf region, such as Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Economi-
cally, they are characterized by a large non-native work force and a high GDP-per capi-
ta-ratio (see Table 2). On the political level, these states have been most active in re-
forming their traditionally weak governance structures by an on-going (albeit at times 
symbolic) reform process. Due to the small national populations hydrocarbon rents can 
be generously distributed, resulting in high human development indices (Henry & 
Springborg, 2001, p. 2). 
The second sub-category of hydrocarbons-wealthy states includes the territorial states 
of Iraq, Libya, Algeria and Saudi Arabia. In spite of their major oil and gas reserves, this 
wealth needs to be distributed between much higher numbers of nationals on a major 
national territory6 making these states upper- or even lower middle-income states. 
These factors, as well as the at times turbulent interior dynamics of these states, have 
generated entirely different governance structures than in the Gulf sheikhdoms, result-
ing only in “medium human development” values alongside many other non-resource-
rich Arab states. 
Table 2: GDP per Capita (PPP) and HDI in select hydrocarbons-rich Arab states 
 
Sources: GDP per capita: CIA World Factbook (2009); Human Development Indices (HDI): Hen-
ry/Springborg (2001), p.3.
 7
 
As noted below in Section  3.2.1, the resource-wealthy Arab states display classical 
characteristics of a rentier state (Beblawi & Luciani, 1987): the social contract is mainly 
based on the state allocating wealth to its citizens while at the same time autocratic 
rulers remain the dominant force, largely unchallenged by civil society groups, if so 
only by conservative representatives of political Islam. Having derived most of their 
                                                      
6
 The migrant labour populations in these countries are significant as well, but they do not amount to 
such high percentages of the population due to the large national populations. 
7
 The HDI includes education, literacy, and life expectancy as well as per capita income. 
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countries’ wealth from the extraction of hydrocarbons, stakeholders in many of these 
countries were keen to introduce national diversification strategies in order to achieve 
long-term, economically sustainable growth. 
In the field of renewable energy policy, noticeable changes have occurred. In most 
hydrocarbons-wealthy Arab states, national renewable energy strategies have been 
developed. Starting from the east, Oman has expressed its interest in developing a 
meaningful renewable energy strategy and launched a major exploratory study in 
2008. Moreover, the UAE’s efforts to become a landmark in that field by launching the 
Masdar Initiative and hosting the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) are 
publicly known and will be analysed below in greater detail. In North Africa, Algeria has 
launched significant renewable energy programmes that have, however, largely gone 
unnoticed in Europe. So far, however, no systemic breakthrough or a change in the 
domestic energy production regimes is imminent. Judged by their high potential, hy-
drocarbons-wealthy Arab countries still underperform in that field. 
This work analyses renewable energy policies in resource-wealthy Arab states and will 
attempt to answer the question of why there exists such a significant renewable ener-
gy-related underperformance in this group of states. In a second step, this study exam-
ines to what extent policy design models, which have been developed in the European 
context, can be applicable to the governance situation in hydrocarbons-wealthy Arab 
states. Having chosen a case study approach, the work analyses renewable energy pol-
icy models for the United Arab Emirates and Algeria as representatives of the two 
types of hydrocarbons-wealthy Arab states identified above. It thus represents an at-
tempt to close a gap in renewable energy-related research literature on the Middle 
East. 
As will be shown in Subchapter  2.2, the standard scholarly literature on political sys-
tems or Middle Eastern studies research does not provide a comprehensive analytical 
framework to analyse why this significant underperformance occurred and how re-
newable energy transitions could be triggered. Furthermore, this literature does not 
significantly contribute to understanding policy and technological aspects of renewable 
energy policy. Instead, for reasons given below, this work turns to multi-level govern-
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ance theories and the Transition Management (TM) approach to provide the core ana-
lytical tools of the thesis. Developed by authors such as Kemp, Loorbach, Geels and 
others, the multi-level perspective (MLP) provides the overall analytical framework for 
this thesis.  
The MLP suggests that in order to understand technology transitions, developments 
need to be understood on three levels (micro-, meso- and macro-level). Interactions 
between these levels are represented by the image of a nested hierarchy (Figure 4). 
Figure 4: Multiple levels as a nested hierarchy 
 
Source: Geels (2002), p. 1261. 
On the smallest scale, the niches are the level from which radical (or incremental) 
technology innovations usually emerge. Protected from standard market forces, niches 
can serve as “incubation rooms” for new technology developments. These niches are 
classically supported by subsidies or grants or are in other ways protected from the 
fact that the initial low performance of technology innovations makes them commer-
cially less attractive than the standard production pathways of a given good. In terms 
of national energy systems, the development of alternative forms of power generation 
can be regarded as such a niche. 
The meso-level of the MLP forms the heart of this analytical system. It is constituted by 
a socio-technical regime in which most regime-relevant decisions are made. It consists 
of social groups and actors, formal and cognitive rules of a society, as well as the mate-
rial and technical elements relevant to the respective case. Typically – energy systems 
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are no exception – ruling regimes are characterized by path dependencies and tech-
nology lock-ins as stakeholders have vested interests in the continuation of these sys-
tems and existing standards, rules and physical infrastructure favours a path depend-
ent development that is unfavourable to radical system innovations. 
The macro-level of the MLP is the socio-technical landscape forming an “exogenous 
environment that usually changes slowly and influences niches and regime dynamics” 
(Verbong & Geels, 2007, p. 1026). Landscape level developments are key variables that 
cannot be influenced by particular inner-systemic actors. In terms of national energy 
policy, such developments are regional socio-economic or political developments such 
as oil prices or EU regulation, but can also include more material issues such as wars or 
climate change. 
It is important to note that MLP authors assume that the power to change system de-
velopment pathways is distributed among a variety of actors. There is no single actor 
at any level that can successfully trigger changes on a unilateral basis.8 However, while 
the regime level is by far the most dominant layer in terms of analysis of the current 
circumstances, most genuine systems innovations stem from the niche levels. The rea-
son for that is that usually existing regimes are entrenched and stabilized by the rules 
they have given to the system themselves. The likelihood of success for the niche-
based innovation, however, depends on the interplay of variables and generally fa-
vourable conditions on both the regime and landscape levels (Geels, 2002). 
In terms of energy policy design, proponents of the MLP stress the vital importance of 
niches in order to trigger innovation. The policy design model of TM represents an at-
tempt to foster niche-based developments and to feed their innovations back into the 
socio-technical regimes under which they operate. This approach is a theoretical over-
lap with more analytically-oriented Gulf studies literature. According to Hertog’s analy-
sis (Hertog & Luciani 2009), a similar innovation model has often been applied in prac-
tice to the Gulf States: although large parts of the Gulf bureaucracy tend to be slow 
and opaque, by using self-contained economic enclaves such as Masdar City or ones in 
                                                      
8
 See Meadowcroft (2007) for a discussion of agency question in governance systems. 
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the petrochemical industry sector, Gulf rulers have established “islands of efficiency” 
in their regimes. Those zones are characterized by insulation from political predation 
and rent-seeking through the special protection of the ruler; a handpicked, often ex-
patriate leadership and special regulations that have allowed these institutions to by-
pass the inefficiency of the countries’ administration. In place since the 1970s, these 
enclave-based programmes of innovative diversification have generated large reve-
nues for these states. A key criticism expressed by Hertog, however, is that innovation 
is often locked in these systems and is not allowed to feed back into Gulf societies. 
Phrased using MLP, niche-based innovation attempts have been unsuccessful.9 
This thesis therefore sets out to analyse why, given the abundant renewable energy 
resource potential and the availability of finance and (partially) technology, renewable 
electricity production has still not caught on in a major way in hydrocarbons-wealthy 
Arab states. By adopting an interdisciplinary approach informed by socio-technical 
governance theories, Middle Eastern studies literature and material energy policy this 
thesis tests how far the MLP approach can produce a valid analysis of the situation and 
whether TM as related policy design models can be applied to a non-OECD country, 
exemplified by the particular governance situation of hydrocarbons-wealthy Arab 
states. It is the goal of this thesis to contribute to the question of the applicability of 
governance theory through space in its theoretical dimension, as well as to produce 
renewable energy governance that is fairer and better adapted to the respective coun-
tries’ needs on the normative-managerial level.  
This study limits itself to the various applications of solar and wind technology for 
power production. Other renewable energy sources such as geothermal energy or bi-
omass have not been included as they currently have little commercial significance or 
potential in the MENA region. Also, hydroelectricity is not examined in this thesis since 
there are few large MENA hydropower potentials already in use and no further large-
scale development in the region can be expected from that means of power genera-
                                                      
9
 In the area of eco-cities, this has also been the case with other projects; see for instance the Chinese 
eco-city of Dontan, after which Masdar City has partially been modelled, cf. Interview no. 66 – private 
and public investor, Gulf States, and Pentland (2011). 
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tion. In addition, the focus of this study is on large-scale, usually on-grid electricity sys-
tems. The spread of off-grid renewable systems is more closely connected to questions 
of local economic development, less so to national energy policy. The spread of these 
systems follows different agendas and has different methodologies and stakeholders. 
Consequently, these issues have only been covered insofar as they were relevant for 
the large-scale uptake of renewable electricity production. 
 
As graphically represented in Figure 5, the study has the following research aims: 
Part A 
- To provide a summative overview of existing literature in the related fields of 
Middle Eastern, Gulf and renewable energy studies, as well as socio-technical 
transitions literature. 
- To develop a multi-level framework of analysis and MLP-related policy design 
models for technology transitions. 
- To analyse key material dimensions of renewable energy policies in hydrocar-
bons-rich Arab states under the MLP approach. 
Part B 
- To analyse the energy systems of Algeria and the UAE, within the MLP analyti-
cal structure. 
Part C 
- To test the applicability of TM to this group of countries by drafting renewable 
energy strategies for both case studies using these policy design models. 
- To offer case-specific and general conclusions on: (i) the reasons for the slow 
spread of renewable energy technologies in resource-wealthy Arab states, and 
(ii) the applicability of Western energy governance concepts to non-Western 
governance structures. 
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Figure 5: Research aims and steps of the thesis 
 
In greater detail, the thesis is structured as follows: Part A sets the context for the 
analysis of the case studies of Part B. In Chapter 2, Subchapter  2.2, the relevant litera-
ture addressed in this thesis is discussed (Middle Eastern studies literature, energy 
governance theories, and energy policy studies). This is followed by a more in-depth 
discussion of the analytical framework chosen for this study; the multi-level perspec-
tive (Subchapter  2.3), as well as the policy design tool of TM (Subchapter  2.4) that is 
applied to the case studies in Part B. 
Chapter  3 contains an extensive introduction to the policy context for renewable ener-
gy policy in resource-rich Arab countries, through the lens of the chosen multi-level 
perspective. Structured by the three layers of the MLP (landscape-, regime-, and niche-
level), a select number of aspects will be presented that are essential in scoping the 
research questionnaire. Among them are issues such as climate change and political 
systems, economic diversification measures and key regional organisations (landscape-
factors, Subchapter  3.2), national energy markets, as well as legal and financial aspects 
for the uptake of renewable energy technologies (regime-level factors, Subchap-
ter  3.3), and finally technology developments and the related topic of industry struc-
tures and technology transfer (niche-level factors, Subchapter  3.4). In Section  3.4.2, 
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Methods
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the research questionnaire for the case studies has been developed by collating the 
individual research questions that concluded the sections of Chapter 3. 
Building on the theoretical discussions of Chapter  2 and the material policy aspects of 
Chapter  3, Part A’s final section, Chapter  4 further develops the methodology for the 
thesis. Subchapter  4.1 provides a methodological rationale for the discussed aspects of 
the case study approach and the use of elite interviewing. Lastly, Subchapter  4.2 de-
fines the four different groups of interviewees identified, which structured the 94 ex-
pert interviews conducted for this thesis. 
After a brief introduction, Part B focuses on the United Arab Emirates (Chapter  5) and 
Algeria (Chapter  6), the two case studies of this thesis. This part discusses the energy 
policy situation with the analytical tools that have been developed in Part A of the the-
sis and with the same analytical categories of multi-level governance theory. Further-
more, two “case studies within the case study” will shed light on developments that 
are of particular importance to the energy policy situation in the respective country 
(Subchapter  5.7: the Masdar Initiative for the UAE case and Subchapter  6.7: Desertec 
and further trans-Mediterranean renewable energy schemes for the Algerian case). In 
order to provide a systematic overview of the respective results, each case study ends 
with reiterating the key analytical highlights of the respective national renewable en-
ergy system as analysed under the MLP perspective. 
Having analysed the broader energy policy framework by means of the multi-level per-
spective, in the final section, Part C, renewable energy policy designs for the respective 
case studies will be drafted by means of the TM policy design model discussed in Part 
A. This informs the assessment of the applicability of this theoretical approach to the 
countries at hand, as well as generates material energy policy suggestions (Chapter  7). 
This is followed by a concluding discussion of the study’s analytical and empirical out-
comes from a comparative perspective (Chapter  8). Moreover, this chapter assesses 
how far the multi-level-governance approach is an appropriate analytical tool to assess 
energy policy in resource-rich Arab states and to what extent related policy design 
models can be applied to this particular governance context. The thesis ends with final 
conclusions and a sketch of further research areas (Chapter  9). 
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It is the aim of this thesis to contribute to theory building in the field of international 
renewable energy governance. By using the MLP in resource-rich Arab countries as an 
analytical tool and TM as a policy design model, this work attempts to innovate energy 
governance concepts and policies with regards to the named group of states. As is 
most evident in Part C of this work, the approach is thus always guided by a theoreti-
cally-analytical, as well as by an empirically-heuristic research interest. Focusing on 
only one of these two aspects would have appeared to be a non-exhaustive treatment 
of the topic of the thesis. 
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2. Literature review and development of the analytical frame-
work  
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter begins with a discussion of available research literature relevant to the 
previously stated objectives of the thesis. Divided into three subchapters, Subchap-
ter  2.2 will show that although Middle Eastern Studies approaches and energy policy 
analysis have much to contribute to the analytical and material elements of this thesis, 
they do not, in and of themselves, offer a comprehensive framework for the analysis of 
renewable energy policies in hydrocarbons-rich Arab states. As will be argued, this is 
most adequately captured by the multi-level governance perspective (MLP), whose 
function as an analytical tool for this thesis will be presented more closely in Subchap-
ter  2.3. 
Lastly, TM, a policy design model to trigger and steer innovation in national energy 
systems, will be discussed in Subchapter  2.4. TM will thus finalize the analysis conduct-
ed with MLP. 
 
2.2. Renewable energy policy in hydrocarbons-rich Arab countries: rel-
evant research literature  
This work begins by addressing the conceptual framework informing the study. By es-
tablishing interlinkages between regional studies, transition studies literature, as well 
as renewable energy policy analysis; this study aims to contribute to the three follow-
ing overlapping research strands in an interdisciplinary approach: 
First, by the regional focus this study takes, it is located in the broader area of Middle 
Eastern studies10 attempting to further knowledge about the region, its systems of 
                                                      
10
 The most appropriate term to use for the study of culture, religion and societies between Morocco 
and Iran is debatable. In this thesis, the term “Middle Eastern studies” used to describe the entire field 
of related regional studies; the terms “North African” or “Gulf Studies” will be used to describe research 
specific to the respective subregion. 
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innovation and political economy. As will be shown in Section  2.2.1, this literature 
strand does not offer specific contributions to renewable energy in a sufficient quanti-
ty and quality to exclusively utilize its conceptual approaches. It is, however, instruc-
tive to analyse the general setting of Middle Eastern societies, and their political sys-
tems – landscape level factors according to the MLP analysis – and is thus relevant for 
this thesis. 
Second, in its attempt to understand and – to a certain extent – contribute materially 
to questions of renewable energy policy design this thesis discusses the more technical 
aspects of energy policy regarding the region. However, as will be highlighted in Sec-
tion  2.2.2, the scholarly character of policy-related renewable energy publications is, 
by and large, poor. Mostly, such studies are the result of consultancies funded by vari-
ous national, regional or international organizations with a stake in the matter. While 
these studies offer the most recent updates on the topic at hand, their theoretical lev-
el and analytical content is usually poor and thus, although are invaluable sources of 
data, their explanatory value is low and their impartiality questionable.  
Third, the most comprehensive analytical frameworks for the interplay between tech-
nological developments, energy policy and political systems are studies broadly origi-
nating in the field of sustainability (governance) studies discussing social-technical sys-
tems and innovation theory. Although these studies considerably inform this thesis, 
their key limitation is a lack of application to non-Western regions, particularly the 
greater Middle East area, as will be made evident in Section  2.2.3. 
In order for the thesis to produce a comprehensive analysis it necessarily engages with 
all three strands of literature that rarely interact with one another. It is in this very in-
teraction of various strands of theory by which this thesis seeks to make its main scien-
tific contribution as only a trans-theoretical approach can provide a multi-factorial 
analysis as this thesis does. The chapter will proceed by discussing the three afore-
mentioned research strands in the same order. 
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2.2.1. Middle Eastern Studies literature  
The first literature strand – the broader field of Middle Eastern studies – focuses on 
various aspects of the respective political histories and current realities of the states at 
hand, including regional dynamics and the socio-economic problems these states face. 
An increasingly important and growing part of this research is concerned with econom-
ic (Hakimian & Moshaver, 2000) or regional security issues (Spencer, 2009). In the case 
of Algeria, one of the two countries analysed in this work, many publications deal with 
Algeria’s past and the phase of civil strife in the 1990s (“The lost decade/Les années 
noires”), as well as with the attempts to stabilize the country in the post-war era 
(Tlemçani, 2008; Bouatta, 2009); see Ghettas (2010) for a most recent assessment of 
the Algerian political system and Sonatrach corruption scandal. Here, a particular focus 
is placed on civil and military elite research (Werenfels, 2007; Cook, 2007); other au-
thors, like Algeria’s eminent historian Mahieddine Djender (2006), however, focus on 
the traditional areas of historical research, particularly the political history of Algeria 
and its leadership. In the case of the Gulf, the questions of inter-regional cohesions, 
the on-going territorial disputes with Iran and the security dynamics on the Arabian 
Peninsula are well covered by the extant literature (Davidson, 2008, 2009; Coates Ul-
richsen, 2009; Hvidt, 2009; Krane, 2009). A further sub-trend of this literature empha-
sises resource economics, the (re)distribution of wealth in oil-rich states and invest-
ment strategies for re-investing the income generated through sovereign wealth funds 
and other investment vehicles (Behrendt, 2008; Saif, 2009). While there is compara-
tively little written about this issue in North African oil states such as Libya and Algeria, 
a large amount of literature has been produced about the situation in the Gulf States. 
These studies, therefore, do not have as their main focus energy policy, which only 
attracts researchers’ attraction when it interlinks with a nations’ broader policy or 
economic system. Instead, they take energy policy results such as hydrocarbon export 
revenues as a socio-economic variable for the political system as a whole and attempt 
to gauge its role for the broader policy agenda. 
Furthermore, if this literature strand discusses energy (policy), the focus is usually on 
fossil fuels. The Masdar phenomenon aside, renewable energies are rarely taken into 
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account. Yergin’s works are a case in point (Yergin, 2003): his narration of the history 
of the modern Middle East focuses on the story of oil, its discovery and economic im-
pacts. Very little attention is given to other factors shaping the region’s history and 
current politics, such as religion, Arab nationalist and anticolonial ideologies, the Pales-
tine issue, among others.11 In conclusion, while it is evident that this strand of broader 
Middle Eastern studies literature is key in highlighting long-term regional (MLP: “land-
scape level”) trends and needs to be taken into account to obtain a complete picture 
of Middle Eastern affairs, the literature’s insufficient focus on renewable energies pre-
vents it from being the sole theoretical background for this thesis. 
In order to conceptually capture the knowledge gained through Middle East studies 
research, theoretical considerations and regional categorisations generally play a ma-
jor role. While game theoretical approaches such as Putnam’s (1988) and the applica-
tion of his thought to the Algerian-Moroccan context by Boukhars (2001) are very in-
structive for the analysis of international climate negotiations, they are of only limited 
relevance to this thesis, as arguably the most decisive (renewable) energy policy deci-
sions are taken at national policy regime levels. An influential approach for this thesis, 
however, is Henry’s & Springborg’s (2001) conceptual division of Arab states into 
“praetorian republics”, “bunker states” and “globalizing monarchies”. These categories 
capture the analytical approach of this thesis with its diagnosis that Middle Eastern 
countries are divided between the economically well-to-do Gulf monarchies whose 
rulers have gained legitimization by the sheikhdoms’ economic success and the eco-
nomically underperforming North African “republics”, formal democracies devoid of 
any form of true mass participation and generally held together by an authoritarian 
security regime. This is not to say that Gulf states have unchallenged, smoothly run-
ning governance systems; however, the current rulers of these states seem to be more 
capable of long-term economically successful planning than their North African coun-
terparts.12 Two researchers who follow similar research agendas are Cook (2007) in his 
                                                      
11
 While his latest work also discusses alternatives to oil as the key source of global energy, he continues 
to present the Middle Eastern context as strongly oil and gas dominated (Yergin, 2011). 
12
 For a further discussion of this concept see Section  3.2.1. 
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book “Ruling but not governing” and Salamé’s edited volume (1994). Cook’s analysis of 
the power structures within Middle Eastern societies, which are dominated by a politi-
cally active military apparatus, is instrumental to understanding the Algerian situation. 
Meanwhile, Hermassi (1994), in Salamé’s volume, defines the concept of “authoritari-
an liberalism” as an outcome of the mixture of the military-political elites and the 
business world.  
This leads to the key question of rentier state theory, namely if there is a link between 
the prevalent governance structures and oil/gas as the predominant factor of national 
income. In this research area, the classical volume by Beblawi/Luciani (1987) still sets 
the standards for socio-economic analysis within this framework. While various works 
honed this theoretical system in terms of state-non-state actor interaction, the effect 
of (lacking) taxation on regime survival (Moore, 2002; Smith, 2004) is arguably still con-
tested. While some remain critical, Davidson, Krane and others affirm the link between 
the two using Davidson’s term “ruling bargain”. Meanwhile, Waterbury, in Salamé’s 
volume, disputes the prevalent notion of “no representation without taxation”, argu-
ing that “neither historically nor in the twentieth century is there much evidence that 
taxation has evoked demands that governments account for their use of mon-
ies...there has been no translation of tax burden into pressures for democracy” (Wa-
terbury, 1994, p. 29). While the debate about this suggested causal nexus itself is of 
only secondary interest to this study, this assumption should not be underestimated. 
As will be discussed in Section  3.2.1, providing citizens with abundant and heavily sub-
sidized electricity thereby meeting their citizens’ expectations is regarded by many 
scholars as one key barrier to the spread of renewable energy capacities in the region. 
Krane, for instance, argues that electricity prices reflecting the actual power genera-
tion costs, let alone wholly unsubsidized market prices would essentially be a form of 
government taxation, diametrically opposed to the key “ruling bargain” of the rentier 
states and thus politically untenable (Krane, 2010a).13 
                                                      
13
 A recent publication on Algerian energy policy confirms the sensitivity of this issue for the Algerian 
context as well (Cross-border information, 2011, p. 16). 
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Thus, while the link between participatory structures and increased taxation is not yet 
a generally accepted assumption, the uneasiness with which political rulers address 
energy pricing has been confirmed by the author’s research interviews and review of 
energy studies literature. It is integrated into the analysis below as one of the reasons 
of renewable energy-related underperformance in the target countries.14 Further-
more, Hertog’s work on Saudi Arabia (Hertog, 2008, 2010a, 2010b) and his paper on 
sustainability issues in the Gulf (Hertog & Luciani, 2009) can also be positioned within 
the broader framework of rentier state theory, to which he introduces the “islands of 
efficiency” concept to describe the phenomenon of innovation lock-in in Gulf States. 
While not addressed to the region, there is a parallel here with the geographer Timo-
thy O’Riordan’s argument that innovation can become the “handmaiden of control of 
the elites” instead of the force of wealth-production and social renewal (O'Riordan, 
1981). 
In addition to the rentier theory-related publications, another influential strand of po-
litical science literature exploring the linkages between many countries’ resource 
wealth and violent conflict, weak governance standards, and poor or negative econom-
ic growth (Rosser, 2006; Omeje, 2008) is resource curse theory. Although this work has 
not focused on the oil and gas-wealthy Arab states, its brief consideration seems war-
ranted here as resource curse literature comes to a very different set of conclusions 
(Al-Batrani, 2005; Basedau & Lacher, 2006). Algeria can serve as a case for resource 
curse theory, as the negative effects of hydrocarbon wealth on governance structures 
and the entire political economy of a country, the main tenet of resource curse theory, 
is palpable. Shabafrouz (2010), for instance analyses the outbreak of violence in Algeria 
by attempting to establish a context-sensitive matrix within the resource curse frame-
work. Her goal is to refine the methodological toolbox resource-based violence re-
search by being able to take into account other non-economic factors, such as political 
movements and ideology. This commendable publication, however, is too focused on 
the resource curse paradigm and fails to take historical reasons sufficiently into ac-
                                                      
14
 See also the paper by Patlitzianas et al. (2006) which has a similar analysis of the situation. 
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count. Approaches such as the mentioned Henry/Springborg model fittingly capture 
the current situation (“bunker state”). The authors also integrate the historical dimen-
sion in their model stating “while tracing the connections between Algeria’s oil wealth 
and its slide into the disasters of 1990s, [I] will argue that the original sin was a primi-
tive form of French colonialism, not hydrocarbons” (Henry, 2004).  
Integrating Henry/Springborg’s model, this thesis will use a rentier theory approach for 
its further analysis of the landscape-level situation as the combination of these two 
approaches has greater explanatory value for the analysis of Middle Eastern energy 
systems than the resource curse theory can offer. However, since this literature strand 
neither sufficiently discusses (OAPEC) renewable energy politics nor is a strong con-
tributor to concepts of sustainability steering approaches, two further literature 
strands need to be taken into consideration as well. 
 
2.2.2. Energy Studies 
The second research strand to be considered relates to the field of energy studies. 
Much research has been conducted in this area, with particular attention being given 
to renewable energies in the past two decades. Inspired by the rapid deployment of 
renewable energy power generation in some European states such as Spain and Ger-
many, many publications discuss the most effective legal, financial, and technological 
instruments to promote renewable electricity production. To some extent outside the 
classical fora of academic literature, a plethora of scientific studies, government pa-
pers and non-academic research examines aspects of grid systems, renewable energy 
finance, technology assessments, the question of systemic competition between fossil-
based, nuclear and renewable energy carriers and the economics of RE-based power 
generation. Generally, this strand of literature varies in its comprehensiveness, quality 
and (energy-) political bias. However, it is highly relevant to this thesis since it provides 
the most specialized and up-to-date information.  
Although the majority of these works deal with political, economic and technological 
issues within developed western-style democracies, many of the results these studies 
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yield – especially on the technological side – can also be used for the OAPEC context. 
Examples of these Euro-American studies are UCTE’s (Union for the Co-ordination of 
Transmission of Electricity) report on European grids and transmission systems (2008) 
or a recent study on clean energy in the G20 states (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2010) 
which outlines current challenges for the world’s most advanced renewable electricity 
markets. Moreover, various studies on Germany and Spain, the two leading European 
nations in terms of renewable energy production (Reiche, 2004; Federal Ministry for 
the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, 2009), as well as on gov-
ernance and security aspects of renewable energies (Tänzler, 2007; German Advisory 
Council on Global Change, 2007) present the world’s best performers, assess their 
technology, and analyse the regulatory decisions taken (Butler & Neuhoff, 2004; DENA, 
2007; Lecoufle, 2009). Most studies conducted from a financial background discussing 
risks and opportunities of large- and small-scale renewable energy investments (KfW 
Entwicklungsbank, 2005; Deutsche Bank, 2008) and Bloomberg/UNEP’s most recent 
renewable energy report (United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
& Bloomberg, 2010) belong to this category. A financial perspective that is more fo-
cused on the Middle East region has been published by the European Investment Bank 
(2010). This study critically highlights the strong gap between political renewable en-
ergy announcements and actual funding and will be discussed in greater detail in Sub-
chapter  6.7. 
In the renewable energy field, Mason and Mor (2009) provide a comprehensive selec-
tion of conference papers on Middle Eastern renewable energy issues; also Mason and 
Kumetat’s edition of papers on energy policy in North Africa shed light on several rele-
vant details of the issue (Mason & Kumetat, 2011). Apart from the large compendia of 
oil companies and international organizations (OPEC Secretariat, 2006; ExxonMobil, 
2007; REN21, 2010; US Energy Information Administration, 2010; International Energy 
Agency, 2011), OME’s Mediterranean Energy Perspectives serve as an in-depth source 
of energy (policy) data on Algeria (Observatiore Méditterranéen de l'Energie (OME), 
2008). Alnaser and Alnaser’s work (2009), and two recent German studies on MENA 
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energy systems (Supersberger et al., 2009; Fritsche, Schmidt, & Loy, 2008) contribute 
further details to the analysis. 
Among the number of publications that directly focus on energy policy in the Middle 
East, two research trends can be identified revealing a research agenda that is slightly 
different from that of this study. First, much of the Middle East-focused energy litera-
ture [e.g. (United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) & Federal Ministry for the 
Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, 2007)] is situated in the context 
of local area studies and development, discussing questions of rural electrification, 
solar cooking, or solar thermal water heating in the comparatively poorer, resource-
lacking Arab states. Although a relevant topic for the development debate, many of 
the subsequent recommendations are not useful when addressing the entirely differ-
ent situation in resource-wealthy Arab states thereby leaving the question of large-
scale power production policy unanswered. Also, publications focusing on capacity 
building and regulatory effectiveness of electricity regulators in developing countries, 
such as the works by Cubbin & Stern (2006) are informative studies that contribute to 
the wider landscape of energy policy research, but again are only minor sources of 
information for this thesis. 
The group of MENA-oriented publications that essentially deal with problems of ener-
gy policy relevant to the group of states this thesis focuses on are, however, mostly 
concerned with carbon-based energy carriers – an unsurprising phenomenon given the 
fact that hydrocarbons-rich Arab states generate substantial shares of their national 
incomes by immediate oil/gas rents or revenues from carbon-related products.15 This 
often rather technical research strand discusses implications of oil price rises for their 
economies, as well as how to reach higher levels of the oil-products production chain 
within the country in addition to questions relating to oil field depletion (Fattouh, 
2007, Kazim, 2007; Höök, Hirsch, & Alekett, 2009) thus implicitly addressing the issue 
of peak oil (Sorrell, Speirs, Bentley, Brandt, & Miller, 2009) and energy security more 
broadly. It is worth noting that in this field of technology-oriented publications, Arab 
                                                      
15
 See Section  3.2.4 for a broader discussion of these issues.  
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researchers are the most vocal compared to the other areas discussed. The case can 
be made that local researchers have decided to focus on scientific areas with compara-
tively little political exposure. This hypothesis could also help understand why, with the 
exception of researchers such as Entelis (1999), only a few international (and even 
fewer local) researchers have chosen or were able to penetrate governance structures 
in the carbon-based parastatals such as Algeria’s SONATRACH (Société Nationale pour 
la Recherche, la Production, le Transport, la Transformation, et la Commercialisation 
des Hydrocarbures), SONELGAZ (Socièté Nationale de l'Electricité et du Gaz), Kuwait’s 
KPC (Tétreault, 1995) or Abu Dhabi’s ADNOC (Abu Dhabi National Oil Company). 
Somewhat notable exceptions are the works of Rebah (2006) giving the most recent 
history of this company and Marcel & Mitchell (2006). Rebah’s work, however, is not a 
critical appraisal of SONATRACH’s policy over the past decades but rather an official 
history of the company since its foundation in 1963.  
In the broader field of Algerian energy policy, many publications focus more strongly 
on conventional forms of energy production (Mattes, 2007) or energy security (Witton, 
2010). There is, however, a noteworthy number of renewable energy-related works on 
Algeria, such as Himri et al.’s energy potential assessments (Himri, Himri, & Boudghene 
Stambouli, 2009), Boudeghene Stambouli/Khiat’s paper on energy pluralism on the 
national Algerian level (Khiat, Flazi, & Stambouli, 2007), Fekraoui’s paper on geother-
mal sources (Fekraoui, 1988) or a more general renewable energy review papers (Him-
ri, Malik, Boudghene Stambouli, Himri, & Draoui, 2009). Also, the more technical pa-
pers on the effects of sand storms on the solar panels – a product of local research 
from as early as 2000 – are noteworthy. From the international angle, a British-Spanish 
paper by Ghilès (2009) argues that the current Algerian energy policy situation is by no 
means a viable way forward and ought to be changed instantly, also in the interest of 
Europe’s energy security agenda. Further, the German Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry in Algiers has recently produced a comprehensive renewable energy indus-
try/business assessment for that country (2009), and a similar, although more analyti-
cal and policy-relevant publication has been produced by Marks et al. (Cross-border 
information, 2011). The afore-mentioned publications, however, generally cater to 
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international industry needs and, while useful for the gathering of up-to-date infor-
mation, are weak from a research point of view. 
Finally, a large variety of further studies on renewable energies-based desalination 
have been produced by Algerian researchers (cf. Mahmoudi, Abdellah, & Ghaffour, 
2009 or Bouchekima, 2002). These do not focus on power production in the narrower 
sense, but since water desalination is a highly energy intensive process and desalina-
tion will be increasingly extended in the entire MENA region, this is a key side-aspect 
of the work and can help in devising solutions that make relevant contributions for 
future OAPEC energy policies.  
Meanwhile, the studies conducted by the German Aerospace Center (DLR) on the ex-
port potentials of renewable energy and concepts of energy innovation, particularly 
from the Maghreb to the EU, have been instrumental to this research (German Aero-
space Center (DLR), 2005; 2006a; 2006b; 2009). In addition to that, the publications by 
the Euro-Mediterranean Energy Market Integration Project (MED-EMIP) (2010b), Ernst 
& Young & Fraunhofer Institute (2011), as well as an Algerian-German research project 
on export potentials from Algeria to the EU (Supersberger, Abedou, Brand, Ferfera, 
Kumetat, & Hammouda, 2010) demonstrate the growing international interest in that 
field. This is also reflected by a small but growing number of related products of British 
academia such as the paper by O’Brien et al. (2007) and two recent Master’s theses 
(Hamiane, 2009; Reinisch, 2009). O’Brien et al. analyse Abu Dhabi’s environmental 
framework and attempt to identify a newly emerging paradigm in environmental poli-
cy-making in high-income developing countries. Unfortunately, the authors focus on 
concepts of ecological modernization, granting only limited attention to energy policy, 
and not even mentioning the Masdar complex. Reinisch and Hamiane, on the other 
hand, present original, highly instructive, studies about Masdar city and energy in Abu 
Dhabi as well as barriers and potential drivers of the introduction of solar energy in 
Algeria. 
The numbers of publications on both regions covered in this thesis (the Gulf and North 
Africa), however, are expected to rise in the near future since Masdar and Desertec are 
mega-projects, attracting both media and research attention. As shall be analysed 
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more broadly in the corresponding Subchapter  6.7, numerous research studies have 
been published about Desertec and transcontinental power networks between Europe 
and North Africa in the last 18 months (Kemfert & Schill, 2009; Schinke & Klawitter, 
2010; Werenfels & Westphal, 2010). While many papers add little value for experts, 
more weight is carried by studies on the framework conditions of solar thermal energy 
in MENA (Abdel Gelil, 2007), investment risk assessments (Kurokawa, 2006) or at-
tempts to draft road maps (PriceWaterhouseCoopers & Potsdam Institute, 2010). Also, 
Pfluger et al. (2009) reported important results on the impact of North African electric-
ity imports on the Italian power markets and Trieb’s et al. global CSP assessment (2009) 
and their studies on CSP import corridors from the MENA region (German Aerospace 
Center (DLR), 2009) belong to a more innovative category. Again, taking a closer look 
at these studies, it is striking that apart from Werenfels & Westphal (2010), very few 
address conceptual questions of energy governance and problems of triggering, steer-
ing or managing innovation as discussed in Section  2.2.3 of this chapter. 
The fact that landscape and regime-level energy policy situation in the Gulf States 
strongly resembles those in Algeria is also reflected in the research literature: again, 
most studies focus on fossil fuels, where a strong interest in natural gas markets and 
policy can be identified (Dargin, 2008). A related issue in Gulf energy politics are the 
frequent power cuts and undersupplies. Unfortunately, the demand issues are rarely 
treated systematically through open-access publications. Instead, they are often mere-
ly mentioned by journalistic articles (Hariharan, 2009; Naylor, 2009) or in pieces focus-
sing on energy efficiency, such as two recent Gulf energy policy papers by Krane 
(2010a, b) or a major Japanese energy efficiency study focusing on Saudi Arabia (Japan 
International Cooperation Agency, 2009).  
Also, it is primarily the Gulf region, where issues of regional cooperation through the 
newly created GCC grid are discussed (BusinessIntelligence Middle East, 2009b; Al-
Asaad, Al-Mohaisen, & Sud, 2007), and the same is true for the other key alternative 
energy option MENA stakeholders take an interest in: nuclear energy. A study by the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (2008) analysing nuclear programmes and 
proliferation potentials in all Middle Eastern states can be regarded as a key publica-
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tion in the field of nuclear energy and strategic studies. Regarding the nuclear power 
sector, Jewell’s two papers instructively assess the nuclear energy aspiration of Arab 
states from a historical perspective (Jewell, 2011a, b) Moreover, the study lead by 
Schneider (2009) provides a relevant data source for the worldwide nuclear energy 
industry, while a recent Citibank analysis casts its doubts on the economics of nuclear 
energy developments (Atherton, 2009) that are also of more general value for the 
North African and Gulf states’ nuclear energy aspirations. As mentioned, Abu Dhabi 
also has a published nuclear energy strategy (Government of the United Arab Emir-
ates, 2006). 
Unsurprisingly, the Masdar complex takes the prime position regarding renewable en-
ergy developments on the Arabian Peninsula. This initiative is the subject of several 
recently published research articles (Reiche, 2010a, b). While Reiche’s brief article on 
Masdar does not add much new information to the debate and by and large reproduc-
es well-known facts, in his most recent paper, he analyses the (limited) possibilities of 
renewable energy policy in the GCC rentier states in the larger framework of “ecologi-
cal modernization”. Unfortunately, however, the author remains strongly in the field of 
climate policy16 and gathers most of his data from international governance indices 
without obtaining too many energy-specific regional data. Regrettably, Masdar’s plan-
ners themselves have not published any conceptual work exceeding the level of adver-
tisement brochures. Also the recent postponement of the project completion was only 
announced through the media and with little information given (BusinessMaktoob.com, 
2010). 
Focusing on the Gulf region, there are hardly any renewable energy studies exclusively 
focusing on Abu Dhabi and the UAE. In Supersberger/Tänzler’s study (2009), a large 
                                                      
16
 For instructive works on OAPEC’s role in international climate governance see Luomi (2010) and Bar-
nett (2008). The quickly growing amount of climate change literature often treats renewable energy 
policy only as a subordinate problem. However, an instructive risk assessment of electricity infrastruc-
tures in the face of climate change can be found in Paskal (2009). The related question of Arab sustaina-
bility concepts have unfortunately rarely been treated outside the realm of Islamic studies and the con-
cept of “biah” (environment). Yousri (2005) has presented a contribution on Muslim concepts of sus-
tainability that is unfortunately below academic par. Although not focusing on a region, Evans et al. 
(2009) work in which he attempts to identify sustainability indicators for renewable energies is most 
enlightening. 
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section can be found about principles of UAE energy policy in a comparative perspec-
tive with Iran and Algeria. This study also contributes strongly – albeit also on a non-
academic level – to the inter-OAPEC comparison of energy policy. Apart from that, Al-
naser & Alnaser (2009) and Woertz (2008) cover the Emirates in their overview papers, 
while Raouf’s works on climate change threats and water issues (Raouf, 2009, 2008) 
slightly overlap with the genuine energy policy debate. One of the few more detailed 
pieces of renewable energy multi-level governance research is al-Saleh’s (2010) UK 
doctoral thesis, which only covers Saudi Arabia. Also, his scenario approach employing 
the Delphi method of reiterating rounds of expert interviews does not add too much 
value to the renewable energy policy research carried out here. This also holds true for 
Supersberger’s doctoral thesis (Supersberger, 2007), in which the author conducted an 
energy systems analysis with a suggested energy diversification scenario in Iran.  
As has been shown in this section, the renewable energy literature focusing on the 
Middle East presents itself as a rich research landscape. It represents the key source 
for this thesis for up-to-date technical data and policy information on the subject mat-
ter, information that is usually too specific to be found in the classical Middle Eastern 
Studies literature. However, the key problem remains: while the studies presented 
here offer invaluable data about the energy (policy) situation in the countries analysed, 
they usually exclusively focus on technical, economic or engineering aspects of renew-
able energy; only a few have a precise policy focus, and even fewer interact with socio-
technical steering literature or broader social science theory. Additionally, those stud-
ies are usually weak on the political system analysis front, which is essential to under-
standing systems of governance in the Gulf and in Algeria. Thus, a third group of publi-
cations that focuses exclusively on these aspects needs to be taken into account in 
order to fill this gap identified in the previous two sections. 
 
2.2.3. Governance theories and concepts of socio-technical change 
This third research strand is largely unrelated to regional studies, but is instead driven 
by a focus on theories of socio-technological change and related problems of innova-
tion, the development of policy processes and agency in a more general sense. This 
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section is divided into a brief discussion of literature informing the conceptual research 
agenda and those regarding more substantive energy policy questions. 
On the analytical side, many publications begin with the very basic question of how 
systemic change can be analysed and whether social systems can indeed be steered 
into certain trajectories. Most authors of this research strand agree that the positivist-
rationalist notion that whole societies can be steered by any type of supreme, quasi-
omniscient institution or actor is obsolete and that new analytical models need to be 
found. This is taken into account most thoroughly by works of Albert, Kiel and Wimmer 
(Albert, 1995; Kiel & Elliott, 1996; Wimmer & Kössler, 2006). While the works of the 
first two innovatively explore the interrelations between chaos theory and social 
change, the latter has collected a broader range of theories of change in his edition. On 
a slightly different level, Voß et al. (2007) deal with the general problem of uncertainty 
within steering theory in sustainability transitions. In their paper, they develop govern-
ance designs that try to tackle the three problem dimensions of uncertainty, goals am-
bivalence and distributed power by introducing a matrix of steering situations. This 
matrix facilitates decision-makers and analysts to find a matching steering theory for 
different problem sets. This system, which has been developed further in Voß’ doctoral 
dissertation (2007), combines the methodological and theoretical problems of steering 
theory while at the same time contributing to actual decision-making processes. 
However, since Voß does not have a regional focus, his work lacks a dimension that 
forms a central part of the conceptual innovation of this study: the question of the 
transferability of governance concepts to other world regions. This touches upon the 
fundamental problem of whether a concept of any kind – as long as it subscribes to the 
principles of Aristotelian logic17 – inherently contains cultural biases or whether scien-
tifically founded theories can indeed claim global validity. In the globalized world of 
the 21st century, it can be argued, this issue is more relevant than ever as it touches 
the core of multinational governance concepts and cultural relativity.  
                                                      
17
 Even the concept of Aristotelian logic can by no means be accepted as universal; the Indian and the 
Chinese systems of formal logic suggest solutions of logical problems that differ substantially from the 
Greek model, cf. Matilal et al. (1998) or Mou (2001). 
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By applying TM to Middle Eastern governance contexts, this thesis aims to contribute 
to this discussion. The question of the transferability of governance concepts has been 
explored in depth by the works of Risse et al. The authors convincingly argue that 
many recent governance concepts have been conceived with the implicit assumption 
of a democratic, high-income country as standard model for their work. This is an issue 
as states “located outside the OECD world…differ structurally from modern Western 
nation-states with regard to cultural and religious aspects as well as concerning con-
figurations of actors and modes of action” (Risse, 2007). Although the named authors 
focus on areas of limited statehood and not on hydrocarbons-wealthy Arab states; this 
quote serves as a guideline for the conceptual research of this thesis. Meanwhile, Be-
necke et al. (2008), other authors from the same Berlin-based research cluster, at-
tempt to identify governance concepts that transcend their “methodological national-
ism”. Magen et al. (2009), who are also part of the same research cluster, illustrate 
their point by analysing the phenomenon of American and European efforts of “de-
mocracy promotion”. However, these studies have only few contributions relating to 
the Middle East, which do not focus on the field of energy governance or socio-
technical steering theory. However, what remains relevant is their concept of “govern-
ance spaces”. Following Benecke et al.’s argument, governance spaces can be regarded 
as collective terms for a multitude of contextual factors, laws, ethics, power constella-
tions and discourses which if taken together, shape the framework conditions in a cer-
tain field of governance (Benecke et al., 2008, p. 23). This concept, which is very similar 
to the MLP analytical model to be discussed further below, attempts to give analytical 
structure to an amorphous and in many ways inconsistent field. However, while the 
approach “governance space” appears compelling, it does not offer such a large and 
comprehensive system of analysis as the MLP model offers. It is for this reason the 
MLP model was selected for the purpose of this thesis.  
Moreover, the authors stress that the discipline of social sciences has experienced a 
spatial turn in recent years. This notion takes into account that space – here: the na-
tional energy system – as a “governance space” is not a “neutral container” (Benecke 
et al., 2008, p. 15), which can be filled with any arbitrary (governance) content and still 
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be expected to perform well. While a spatial turn-inspired researcher would naturally 
refute this notion, it is much harder to characterise what could in fact fill this gap. This 
thesis regards itself as part of research in the wake of the “spatial turn”. Yet, while the 
applicability of governance concepts to world regions, in principle, is frequently dis-
cussed, there is very limited material tackling this question from the point of view of a 
sustainability transitions policy in the governance context of Middle Eastern states – 
let alone an even more restricted sub-field (hydrocarbons-wealthy states) within this 
spectrum. The only instrumental regional studies with a similar research agenda can be 
found in research exploring sustainability transitions in Asia (Berkhout, Angel, & 
Wieczorek, 2009; Angel & Rock, 2009), where governance structures are somewhat 
comparable those in resource-rich Arab states. These authors maintain that in many 
Asian states, environmental standards had been initially induced by the states consum-
ing Asian export articles and argue that this might be a potential way to trigger more 
comprehensive socio-technical changes. Unfortunately, this aspect cannot be adapted 
for the states analysed here given that this has no or little meaning for their fossil ex-
port products. 
In terms of socio-technical steering theory for (renewable) energy technology and poli-
cy for the material conclusions of the thesis, various meta-studies on overcoming inno-
vation barriers have been published recently, such as the publications of the IAE 
(Kofoed-Wiuff, Sandholt, & Marcus-Møller, 2006), the German Wuppertal Institute 
(Fischedick, 2010) or, most recently, the World Economic Forum (2011). While these 
studies follow a comprehensive approach, in-depth studies on individual aspects such 
as carbon lock-in (Unruh, 2000) or the role of institutional roadblocks (Myers & Kent, 
2008) they identify structural deficiencies in support of investment policies. In essence, 
this literature is closely interlinked with research analysing the conditions for a diffu-
sion of (regulatory or technological) innovations in socio-technical regimes. The large 
body of work on history and present validity of technology transitions by researchers 
such as Geels (2002, 2004) and Loorbach (2007) have set ground-breaking marks for 
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transition research under a multi-level governance perspective.18 While Kemp et al. 
(1998) focuses on the development of niche-based innovation strategies, others have 
explored the historical dimensions (Geels, 2005; Verbong & Geels, 2007; Schot, 2010) 
of socio-technological transitions or have examined announced technological devel-
opments predictions that have eventually never materialized (Geels & Smit, 2000).  
Furthermore, Smith and Stirling (Smith, 2007; Smith & Stirling, 2007) and particularly 
van Bergh and Bruinsma (2008) have applied TM to renewable energy policies. The 
authors of both works, however, are very much focused on Europe and the UK, much 
like Kemp, Loorbach, Smith and Kern (Kemp, Loorbach, & Rotmans, 2007; Smith & 
Kern, 2009) who evaluate the experiences of TM in the Dutch energy system.19 Alt-
hough the energy policy situation in the Netherlands differs substantially from the pol-
icy context of the case study examples discussed here, the general theory strand re-
mains relevant to this thesis. Its multi-level governance perspective combined with 
evolutionary innovation theory elements lends itself to the thesis as it offers the most 
comprehensive and systematic perspective on governing socio-technical transitions. 
Both the multi-level-perspective and the transition management approach will be dis 
cussed in the following two subchapters. In addition to an in-depth presentation of 
these tools, the discussion of possible limitations of these models as well as on the 
applicability of these models (especially TM) to Middle Eastern policy contexts will be 
emphasised. 
 
To conclude Subchapter  2.2, three strands of literature that are instrumental for this 
thesis have been identified: 
- Middle Eastern studies literature as a regional focus 
- (renewable) energy studies and related works 
                                                      
18
 One of the most notable works about the entire strand of literature is the publication by Markard, 
Raven and Truffer (2012), who give a summative overview of sustainability oriented transitions litera-
ture and also provide a bibliographical analysis of 540 titles thereby demonstrating the impact certain 
researchers such as Rotmans, Smith, Kemp, Rip, Geels and Schot have had on the field. 
19
 See also Kern’s recent doctoral dissertation (2009). 
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- literature focusing on governance theories and the transferability of these con-
cepts to other world regions 
In spite of the wealth of specialized literature on various aspects of the topic, there is a 
lack of comprehensive research literature focusing on energy transitions within re-
source-rich Arab states. It has been established that while most works are strong in 
one of these areas, they lack depth in the other two fields, which are equally important 
to the research aims of this thesis. 
Since the internal logic of essential sub-systems such as the political framework, ren-
tier economy, or the market conditions for renewable energies differs substantially 
and needs to be understood in different categories, a multi-level perspective offers 
itself as the most appropriate analytical tool for this thesis. Only this can adequately 
analyse the complex interplay of multiple socio-technical layers within and in between 
the three analytical levels that seem appropriate for this thesis. However, since the 
MLP as analytical tool is not instrumental in policy design, TM has been chosen as an 
appropriate tool in order to test whether such models can effectively be used in the 
context of resource-wealthy Arab states. 
This combination of MLP and TM has thus been selected as a suitable arrangement to 
satisfy the stated research aims of 
- Developing a comprehensive framework for renewable energy policy system 
analysis in resource-rich Arab states and identifying a model of policy design of 
these countries (Part A) 
- Applying these elements to two major states of this region by case studies with 
both analytical and policy design elements (Part B) 
- Drawing comparative conceptual conclusions from the results of the two case 
studies and the test of the MLP as analytical and TM as policy design tools for 
this region (Part C) 
In line with these aims, the following subchapters shall discuss multi-level governance 
theories (Subchapter  2.3) as an analytical tool and TM as policy design models (Sub-
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chapter  2.4). Then Chapter  3 – using the structure of the multi-level-perspective – will 
focus on the analytical categories for this thesis. 
 
2.3. The multi-level perspective as an analytical tool  
As discussed in the previous subchapter, the multi-level governance perspective can be 
regarded as the most appropriate analytical tool for this thesis in that it is both more 
comprehensive and more developed as a theory than, for instance, the “governance 
space” approach. The following section will first discuss the MLP in greater detail (Sec-
tion  2.3.1) and will then proceed in Section  2.3.2 to apply the analytical categories to 
renewable energy policies in resource-rich Arab states. This categorization will struc-
ture the more in-depth MLP analysis of Chapter  3 as well as the analysis of the case 
studies. 
 
2.3.1. The MLP concept  
Multi-level governance theory aims to provide an analytical tool to capture socio-
technical transitions. First developed by Rip and Kemp (1998), it has been described 
more extensively by Kemp et al. (2001) and various publications by Geels and his col-
laborators (Geels, 2002, 2004, 2005; Geels & Smit, 2000; Schot & Geels, 2008; Verbong 
& Geels, 2007; Geels & Schot, 2007). 
The MLP takes into account the distributed character of power in societies by an ana-
lytical division of societal processes in separate layers and actor groups. One key as-
sumption is that socio-technical transition processes are de-centred and “not caused 
by one single event or driver” (Verbong & Geels, 2007, p. 1031), a tenet that calls for a 
multi-dimensional, multi-causal analysis. Instead, transition processes are character-
ized by uncertainty, complexity and non-linearity in their outcome (Grin, 2008). 
Whereas classical governance models appeared to look at the state as the key driver in 
such developments, MLP assumes that – although the power balance between differ-
ent layers and actors might be asymmetrical – no single actor possesses the power to 
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lastingly alter the entire system. Only an alignment of major system actors can, in a 
“stepwise and co-evolutionary” approach (Verbong & Geels, 2007, p. 1031), instigate 
regime transformation. Usually, a major regime change only occurs when this situation 
is accompanied by changes at the regime and landscape levels (Kemp et al., 2001, 
p. 277). 
MLP theorists identify three layers of socio-technical change: niches (micro-), regimes 
(meso-) and landscapes (macro-level). These layers cannot be seen as hierarchical, but 
as an integrated entity facilitating or preventing systems to follow a certain develop-
ment path. On each level, various decision-making bodies and persons interact, form 
coalitions or conflict with each other in order to achieve the common goal of their re-
spective agency structure. 
In greater detail, the landscape-level is the macro-level of analysis and refers to any 
wider, circumstantial factors that nonetheless can have major impacts on socio-
technical developments in a given system. Changes in the landscape level occur only in 
the medium or long term. Geels uses the metaphor “landscape” in order to express the 
characteristic “hardness” of that layer (Geels, 2004, p. 913), which is beyond the reach 
of even powerful regime-level actor groups and that cannot be changed at will. With 
electricity systems of the hydrocarbons-rich Arab states taken as regime-level refer-
ence points, relevant examples for landscapes are a set of factors such as oil prices and 
macroeconomic goals of the national economies, wars and political history, overall 
power structures in the state in its political organisation, the dominant mode of elec-
tricity production and grid infrastructure, climate change, or commonly held social 
values. In addition, the wider regional policy arena can have a major implication of 
domestic electricity systems, as Verbong & Geels show in the case of the EU’s influ-
ence on the Netherlands’ energy policy (2007). This is also the case for Algeria, where 
currently European transcontinental renewable energy projects such as Desertec, the 
Mediterranean Solar Plan (MSP) or MedGrid have a major influence on the national 
renewable energy policy discourse. Taking a critical view at the mentioned examples of 
potential landscape-level factors it is striking that – as a collective – they form a very 
heterogeneous group with strongly diverse causal patterns and effects on the regime 
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and niche levels. In order to present a more differentiated analysis within the land-
scape level, attempts have been made to classify the inter-level impact patterns. Van 
Driel and Schot (2005) present three patterns within the landscape level category de-
rived from their case study on technology innovation in the port of Rotterdam (gradu-
ally changing factors such as the climate; long-term changes such as industrialisation 
throughout the century and rapid external shocks on the landscape level, such as oil 
prices or wars). In their work, Geels and Schot propose an even more differentiated 
model of five impact types (regular – hyperturbulence – specific shock – disruption – 
avalanche impact, Geels & Schot, 2007; p. 404f). 
While MLP-inspired researchers tend to emphasize the importance of landscape-level 
developments for regime- or niche-level developments, ST landscapes often remain 
out of the focus of many publications. Arguably, this is due to the fact that beyond very 
general statements of influence (e.g. “climate change can drive renewable energy poli-
cy”) it is difficult to establish concisely – let alone to quantify – a causal link between 
landscape and regime developments. This is in line with the notion, as Geels and Schot 
maintain, that landscape level developments do not “mechanically impact niches and 
regimes” (Geels & Schot, 2007, p. 404) but their perceived or real impact on ST transi-
tions are translated by regime- or niche-level actors into actions on the ground. More 
generally, the two authors state the MLP produces “narrative explanations” (Geels & 
Schot, 2007, p. 414) , which rather than identifying precise variables or empirical data, 
provide a broader picture of specific patterns that are produced by typical forms of 
processes within and between the socio-technical levels. While this can undoubtedly 
produce relevant analyses, this fact presents a serious limitation of the MLP’s analyti-
cal capability beyond a certain general level. Acknowledging this fact, however, these 
macro-drivers still need to be taken into account, which this thesis does on a qualita-
tive level through interview data. 
The key level of analysis of the MLP is the level of socio-technical (ST) regimes. ST re-
gimes are the dominant macrostructures in which the incumbent systemic actors de-
fine rules and practices for a given system. They contain the “grammar embedded in a 
complex of engineering practices, production process technologies, product character-
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istics, skills and procedures…ways of defining problems; all of them embedded in insti-
tutions and infrastructures” (Rip & Kemp, 1998, p. 340). Socio-technical regimes thus 
occupy a central position in modern societies. 
Following Schot and Geels (2008), the concept of a socio-technical regime has its origin 
in the technical regime literature of the 1980s which focused more strongly on the 
conditions for the development of technology trajectories within expert groups (Nel-
son & Winter, 1982). In the 1990s, sociologists developed this theory further by stress-
ing the role of other societal stakeholders, such as politicians, business or civil society 
interests groups in the technology policy process (Bijker, 1997). 
The adaptability of ST regimes to innovation varies strongly according to the openness 
of the incumbent regime actors. While some allow for incremental change which might 
eventually guarantee regime survival in the long term, others block the (mostly niche-
based) radically innovative practises which might lead to their own demise in the me-
dium term (Geels, 2004). 
It is important to note that a socio-technical regime interacts with a number of differ-
ent ST regimes through the mutual interconnectedness of social systems. In Figure 6, 
Geels lists the five major subsystems of ST regimes.  
Figure 6: Actor systems in socio-technical regimes 
 
Source: Geels (2004), p. 905. 
The following elements of the regimes can be identified when applying this categorisa-
tion to renewable energy policies in resource-rich Arab states: 
- Technological regime 
o Transmission and power generation infrastructure 
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- User and market regime 
o Regulations and policies 
o Distribution of power between relevant regime actors 
o Demand rise issues 
- Socio-cultural regime 
o Consumption patterns 
o Environmental awareness 
o Potential role of religion or environmental ethics 
- Policy regime 
o Regime-level and transregional governance structures 
o Existence and role of civil-society organisations (CSOs) 
- Science regime 
o R & D infrastructure 
o Technology ownership 
o Technological developments 
These elements will guide the regime-level analysis of Subchapter  3.3 as well as the 
corresponding sections of the case studies. 
Moreover – a result of Luhmann’s theory of social systems (Luhmann, 1987) – each 
sub-regime usually has its own inner-systemic logic (Luhmann: “code”), drivers, power 
structures according to which it operates, as well as other sub-system “memberships” 
at the same time. The scientific regime, for instance, works according to the code 
“truth”, while a policy regime might operate to the code “power” and a market regime 
to “profit”. This determines the sub-system’s specific agenda within the wider ST re-
gime. A simple example: while it might be in the financial interest of the incumbent 
system operator to keep its monopolistic position for as long as it can in order to gen-
erate more profit, a government might have an interest to decrease its overall power 
subsidies and thus hope that by introducing market competition, price competition 
increases and thus prices drop. At the same time, the scientific regime is interlinked 
with the renewable energy regime, but also with regimes of universities and religious 
54 
 
education. The market regime defining electricity prices is, in turn, also interlinked 
with larger macro-economic drivers of the economy, and so on.20 
Lastly, socio-technical niches are regarded as crucial by MLP researchers. As the per-
formance and regime-level acceptance of novelties is initially low, they emerge in pro-
tected spaces to shield them from market forces, usually by means of regulatory sup-
port or financial (public or private) subsidies. This way, niches can serve as “incubation 
rooms” for social and/or technical innovations and can thus be the spaces in which a 
radical, regime-changing innovation by means of a deviation from the regime-level 
rules can usually be tested and honed until it is ready for mainstream deployment.  
A niche can have two different functions. First, it can be system-endorsing (which most 
niche-level efforts are), whereby niche-level innovators attempt to resolve existing 
regime-level problems by technological improvements or other regime-stabilizing initi-
atives. Such processes are usually fully steered by the regime level and can, for in-
stance, be technological optimization processes in the car or IT industry that, in re-
search terms, do not leave a certain locked-in development pathway. While even those 
processes are not regularly accepted by the incumbent systems (cf. Roger’s prominent 
example of the QWERTY-keyboard; Rogers, 2003), radical changes developed in niches 
are even less welcome. MLP research regards those “radical niches” as the places 
where entire systems can be changed fundamentally. It is for this reason some MLP 
authors have a certain predilection for niches as starting points of policy designs.21 
The strength of the MLP is in its explanatory power which captures the systemic 
change on these three analytical scales as well as the interplay between them. Geels 
suggests the concept of “nested hierarchy” to describe this interaction (see Figure 4). 
This nested character expresses the view that niches are embedded within ST regimes, 
which are in turn parts of macro-landscapes. As mentioned, this theoretical framework 
usually states that innovation is produced in the niches and, while initially developed 
                                                      
20
 This discussion follows Meadowcroft (2007, p. 7), who also notes the proximity of the MLP with parts 
of Luhmann’s sociological analysis. 
21
 See for instance the works of Kemp et al. or Hoogeven et al. (Kemp et al., 1998; Hoogeveen et al., 
2002). 
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for an old ST regime, can instigate change at the regime and even the landscape level. 
Niche-based innovation, however, cannot be expected to single-handedly alter the 
higher socio-technical scales. Instead, “the further success of a new technology is not 
only governed by processes within the niche, but also by developments at the level of 
the existing regime and the socio-technical landscape” (Geels, 2002, p. 1261). As dis-
cussed in Subchapter  2.2, many renewable energy studies primarily focus on regime 
level developments, such as renewable energy promotion policies or market barriers. 
However, as Verbong argues, such analyses often remain limited because they do not 
operate within a multi-level perspective meaning that they often do not take “deep 
structural trends into account” (Verbong & Geels, 2007, p. 1035). Meanwhile, the MLP 
offers a balanced assessment through its broad, three-level analysis of regime devel-
opments, while simultaneously stressing the strategic character of a niche. Thus, in 
spite of the focus on ST niches, one of the MLP’s key tenets is that beyond the niche 
level, the alignment of developments across the scales will reinforce or block regime 
shifts. 
A representation of multilevel interaction is given in Figure 722. 
                                                      
22
 As Geels and Schot (2007) argue, this diagram has become somewhat of a “standardised picture” 
depicting the key elements of the MLP transition dynamic. As a result of the criticism highlighted below, 
the authors have added “downward arrows” on the left-hand side of the figure thus indicating the pre-
viously overlooked inter-relatedness of the three layers, particularly focusing on the impact of landscape 
level developments on the niche and regime levels. 
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Figure 7: A multi-level perspective on transitions 
 
Source: Geels/Schot, 2007, p. 401. 
According to the MLP analysis, socio-technical change occurs when niche-based inno-
vation potential is met by landscape level pressures on the incumbent regimes trigger-
ing reform of the ruling regime (=niche incorporation if regime actors are sufficiently 
ready to adapt) or its demise. This notion has led to various systematic attempts to 
distinguish types of niches and regime reaction to niche-based innovation (Berkhout, 
Smith, & Stirling, 2004; Geels & Schot, 2007). In their paper Smith, Stirling and Berk-
hout (2005) develop a classification of transition contexts, which are mapped on a two-
dimensional matrix (see Figure 8). This is instrumental for this work as it sets the stage 
for the policy design model employed, Transition Management (see the following Sub-
chapter  2.4). While the first dimension measures the degree to which an ST innovation 
process is desired and actively coordinated by regime actors, the second dimension 
maps how far selection pressures rely on resources and are endogenous or exogenous 
to the regime under study. Accordingly, the authors propose four ideal types of trans-
formation processes: 
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- reorientation of trajectories 
- endogenous renewal 
- emergent transformation 
- purposive transition 
Figure 8: Transition contexts as a function of the degree of coordination to selection pressures and the 
locus of adaptive resources 
 
Source: Smith et al. (2005), p. 1499. 
The authors maintain that TM is close to the “purposive transition” model (Smith et al., 
2005, p. 1502) as it presupposes a willingness to govern – or at least influence change 
– on the actor level.  
 
While this model, as presented, is a valuable analytical tool for the purpose of this the-
sis, researchers’ criticism regarding the validity of this model as a whole needs to be 
taken into account. In their 2007 article, Geels and Schot identify three main points of 
criticism that have been highlighted in previous years. 
The first point is the question of scale in its empirical application, which is located on 
several different levels. While in the case of electricity systems, a regime level can be 
defined as a national power pool; a different MLP analysis might consider other sys-
tems where national levels appear as landscapes or, vice versa, even overlook them 
when being applied to very large global systems. Geels and Schot rightfully admit that 
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this could become an issue. They therefore claim that the analyst first needs to demar-
cate the borders of the empirical level of the object of analysis and then proceed to 
operationalize the MLP. This cannot be limited to merely one industry or technology, 
but should rather address – the regime level – the level of “organisational fields” to 
reflect its broad analytical approach. Applied to this thesis, the level of analysis is suffi-
ciently broad and varied in order to justify such an approach, as national energy sys-
tems are neither limited in the scope of their technologies of choice nor limited to cer-
tain industries, users or models of regulation. 
Another issue is the already addressed focus of the MLP on socio-technological niches 
as principal locations of change. As discussed in the corresponding section on the land-
scape level above, the authors have differentiated their previous analysis and intro-
duced at least five attributes of change. Here, they also underline their view that (as 
pointed out by the alteration of their key graphic representation of Figure 7 compared 
to previous versions) the three MLP levels mutually interact with each other. In con-
trast to models such as strategic niche management that assign utmost importance to 
ST niches23, they only have a relative value with Geels and Schot as they are by no 
means the only variables that matter in a MLP framework. To further counterbalance 
the notion of an overly strong focus on bottom-up developments the two authors de-
velop a whole range of models for different transition pathways based on the timing 
and nature of interaction. While further differentiating cases, (e.g. between the con-
figurations and respective “readiness for change” among the three levels that may 
cause slightly different outcomes in transition pathways) their overall argument, that 
socio-technological change is a de-centred, multi-actor process that is enabled by cer-
tain inter-scalar constellations between the MLP layers, remains the same.  
Arguably, the major point of criticism, as the authors point out, is its “relative neglect 
of agency” (Geels & Schot, 2007, 400) leading to the argument that MLP was, in es-
                                                      
23
 See the instrumental publication of Smith & Raven (2012) for a recent discussion on individual aspects 
of ST niches that are – contrary to their frequently stated importance in transitions literature – by and 
large under-researched.  
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sence, a functionalistic theory, which seriously damages its broad explanatory claim.24 
As the authors point out, the underlying concept of agency within MLP is a multi-
dimensional one, through which agency is, in fact, “always present” (Ibid., p. 413) in 
the actual processes while it arguably remains under-represented on the level of fig-
ures and graphs. They claim that, according to the different transition processes, the 
main protagonists are regime actors, outside groups and incumbents, yet, new com-
panies or new niche actors are by no means absent. The reason for this apparent un-
derrepresentation of agency is that MLP models usually tend to be reproduced as high-
ly aggregated models showing large groups of actors within superstructures evolving 
over long periods of time, often several decades. Zooming into these structures, there 
cannot be any doubt that the issue of agency is appropriately addressed within the 
MLP system. The complexity in such overarching, multi-level and multi-actor research, 
however, lies in the fact that we can expect multiple types or agency with combined 
with alternating causal processes (p. 415). Seeking to take this assessment into ac-
count, this thesis attempts to paint a multi-layered picture of renewable energy relat-
ed phenomena in both case studies. Analysing the broader energy systems on country 
levels with their multitude of (at times conflicting) drivers and actors involved, this 
study attempts to trace causal links between agents and legal, social and economic 
structures on all three levels of MLP thereby preparing the ground for an integrated 
policy design model to develop renewable energy policies for the analysed cases. For 
singular cases within the larger MLP framework, other theories of agency and political 
power, such as advocacy coalition research25 might be employed. Yet again, the advo-
cacy coalition framework could not have been able to outdo the complex and compre-
hensive analysis that is made possible by the application of MLP. In addition to this, it 
should be asserted that the analytical approach selected for this thesis is essentially 
one that puts its primary focus on structures, rather than on actors. This does not 
mean that agency should not be highlighted wherever possible – indeed, the focus on 
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 Researchers’ concern that transition management is essentially apolitical and lacks the dimension of 
power follows a similar line, cf. Section  2.4.1. 
25
 See the most influential works by Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith (1993) and Sabatier (1999), as well as the 
research article by Schlager (1995). 
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individual actors and their powers will, at times, be essential in order to understand 
political decision-making structures. Yet, the study focuses on the systemic framework 
conditions, institutional arrangements and potential drivers for ST change in the field 
of renewable electricity rather than exclusively focusing on the individuals driving 
these trends.26 
 
In conclusion, the multi-level perspective is a strong tool for analysing the conditions of 
socio-technological change. While laying a stronger focus on structures and on actor 
groups it is not – nor does it claim to be – an ontological description of transformation 
processes. Instead, it underlines its character as a hermeneutic tool to make sense of 
the multifacetedness and complexity of socio-technical change (Geels, 2002, p. 1259) 
and is thus, in its refined version, an appropriate tool to analyse renewable energy 
policies in resource-rich Arab states. 
 
2.3.2. Analytical dimensions of renewable energy policy for hydrocarbons-
rich Arab states 
As a variety of socio-technical regimes are interlinked, the attempt to develop wide-
ranging analyses for socio-technical change on multiple levels can run the danger of 
becoming a mere collection of individual factors without a logical interrelation or con-
sistent argument. Consequently, a selection process has to be conducted in order to 
gain overall explanatory value, as it is often not self-evident where the systemic bor-
ders for MLP analysis ought to be drawn. In this thesis, the main drivers to be covered 
for an analysis of renewable energy policy in resource-wealthy Arab countries can be 
summarized as follows in Table 3:27  
                                                      
26
 This dichotomy between analyses focusing on individuals and those stressing the importance of struc-
tures is not new and cannot be easily resolved in one direction or the other. Arguably, a theory integrat-
ing elements of both descriptions can produce the best outcomes in analyses such as this one, where 
the analytical scope comprises millions of individuals and hundreds of potential actors and impact fac-
tors. 
27
 All analytical dimensions presented here will be developed fully in Chapter  3. 
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Table 3: Analytical dimensions of renewable energy policy in hydrocarbons-rich Arab states structured 
by the multi-level perspective 
Scale Definition Analytical focus on 
Landscape 
Level 
Long-term macro-drivers that 
cannot effortlessly be altered 
by regime-level stakeholders 
 
- Political system 
- Key regional and transregional energy govern-
ance bodies 
- Climate change 
- Long-term national economic diversification 
- Country branding  
Regime 
Level 
Entrenched actors and domi-
nant regulatory, financial and 
political systems 
 
- Technological regime: transmission and power 
generation infrastructure  
- User and market regime: structure of national 
energy markets, pricing and demand issues; legal 
and institutional frameworks 
- Socio-cultural regime: consumption patterns, 
environmental awareness and potential role of 
religion or environmental ethics 
- Policy regime: regime-level and transregional 
governance structures, CSOs 
Niche 
Level 
Protected spaces with a po-
tential for radical change in 
the established regimes 
- Science regime: industry structures, R&D strate-
gies
28
 
- Technological developments  
Source: own compilation.  
This list represents the criteria for a modified MLP model applied to the analysis of 
renewable energy policy in hydrocarbons-rich Arab countries. This essentially new 
model offers an overarching framework for the policy analysis in the described cases. 
Its explanatory value and comprehensiveness will be tested through its application to 
both cases in Part B and shall later be evaluated in Part C. 
 
2.4. Policy design: the Transition Management approach 
Although the main focus of this work is analytical, the final segment of the thesis, Part 
C, will discuss which renewable energy policies can be recommended for the specific 
energy policy situation in the case study countries analysed by the multi-level perspec-
tive approach. While the previous subchapter introduced the MLP as an analytical tool 
and defined the categories that are relevant for a MLP analysis of renewable energy 
                                                      
28
 Contrary to Geels’ classification in Figure 6, this thesis treats science regime questions as niche-level 
phenomena. While ST niches can indeed be regulated, the niche-focused perspective of the policy de-
sign theories applied make this a more fitting classification. 
62 
 
policies of resource-rich Arab states, this subchapter shall discuss models of policy de-
sign interlinked with the MLP. 
Section  2.4.1 will introduce TM as a comprehensive model of ST system steering that 
will inform later policy design sections of this thesis. It will also discuss the most preva-
lent critical arguments regarding this approach. The final Section  2.4.2 will then discuss 
under which preconditions policy design in resource-rich Arab states can be carried out 
using this approach. 
 
2.4.1. Policy design with the transition management approach 
Transition management is a governance model developed to formulate policies, which 
trigger innovation for complex socio-technical constellations in need of change. Dis-
cussed for public policy applications since the early 2000s29, it is the objective of this 
approach to trigger a transition process facilitating the creation of alternative socio-
technological regimes, which perform better from a general welfare point of view 
(Kemp et al., 2007). 
Examples for situations are, for instance, global anthropogenic climate change or un-
sustainable transport policies. Moreover, the transition to post-fossil systems of power 
generation in a given country or world region can, as shown in this thesis, also be re-
garded as such a case.  
Renewable energy policy in any society is multi-scalar and touches upon a variety of 
key societal sub-systems hosting actors with strong vested interests in the continua-
tion of these sub-systems. Thus, transition processes cannot be expected to happen 
without major external pressure or an active policy process attempting to steer the 
power sector of a country into a more sustainable direction.  
The TM toolbox has largely been developed by Dutch researchers (Kemp, Rotmans, 
Loorbach, Verbong, and Schot) and the SPRU research unit at the University of Sussex 
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 See Rotmans et. al (2001) for one of the first explicitly TM-related discussions in the field. 
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(Smith, Stirling, and Berkhout)30 in close cooperation with policy makers. Its first policy 
application was performed in choosing the TM method to steer transitions in the 
Dutch power sector.31  
Taking the view that socio-technical steering processes are multi-scalar, complex and 
partially open in their outcomes, TM puts forward the concept of goal-oriented modu-
lation combined with the idea of quasi-evolutionary selection processes of technology 
innovations. Its main interest is not the achievement of particular outcomes, but ra-
ther the creation of a “variation-selection-retention process” by triggering a whole 
bandwidth of potential technology pathways and their integration into adaptive socio-
technical regimes (Kemp & Loorbach, 2006). This open-ended system is expected to 
yield better results than classical, hierarchically controlled and state-centred national 
planning policies. In misguided attempts to take the role of an omniscient deus ex 
machina (Grin, 2008), those have often produced large undesirable effects or misallo-
cations while at the same time not integrating major stakeholders into the system. 
Thus, TM is a strategy in which government stakeholders are regarded as managers of 
socio-technical transition processes, not as most powerful, let alone exclusive actors. 
Instead, TM relies strongly on market forces and the signal function of market prices to 
reach its transition goals. TM is thus a process-orientated governance model. As for 
epistemological reasons the goal cannot be known during the start of a transition, TM 
focuses on different potential trajectories of socio-technical change using sustainability 
visions and long-term goals in an adaptive manner. Government, as a transition man-
ager, needs to maintain a great deal of flexibility and adaptive capacity in order to 
monitor and protect, but not to suffocate the transition process. 
                                                      
30
 The Dutch transition research of Geels, Schot et al. focuses more strongly on technology transitions in 
history and the present and therefore represents a key research strand in that field. While Rotmans, 
Loorbach and the SPRU team share with their colleagues the MLP approach, they focus more closely on 
societal transitions than their counterparts.  
Many relevant publications have already been named in the course of this chapter. For further refer-
ences see Loorbach (2007), van Bergh & Bruinsma (2008), Rotmans et al. (2000; 2001), Kemp et al. 
(2007a&b) and Kemp & Rotmans (2004; 2005) for the Dutch school and Smith & Stirling (2007), Smith et 
al. (Smith et al., 2005), Stirling & Scoones (2007), Smith & Stirling (2008) for the UK school. 
31
 See Smith & Kern (2009), as well as Dietz el al. (2008) and Loorbach & Kemp (2008) for related re-
search. 
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While a conflict with mainstream government policy could arise, Loorbach maintains 
that the two processes can coexist in the manner in which government policy frames 
and triggers a transition process, thereby identifying a limited transition arena to ex-
plore alternative futures to a given regime. Interacting with existing policy pro-
grammes, such transition processes could influence mainstream policy over time 
through a process of scaling up its transformative vision (Loorbach, 2007, pp. 272; 291-
292). Grin also stresses that it is not the role of transition policy to “go against the tide” 
but rather to amplify on-going transition processes with a choice of transition instru-
ments that enable change (Grin, 2008).32 
These transformative visions are explored and developed in transition arenas, integrat-
ing the positions of stakeholders from government, the power sector, research and 
civil society organisations. It is the government’s role to shield the niches developed in 
the process through protective policies, and to periodically re-assess and, if necessary, 
re-adapt the goals of the transition arenas when niche underperformance or other 
regime change occurs. 
As a whole, TM is a cyclical process. After the phases of problem identification and the 
development of a vision in transition arenas, the next step is to test and further devel-
op the established goals in transition experiments. When the results have been moni-
tored and assessed, a new cycle of (adapted) policy development begins. The reitera-
tive nature of the TM cycle is represented in Figure 9:  
                                                      
32
 The significant role of ST landscapes is also highlighted by Geels. While conceding that broad cultural 
changes in values, ideologies or political power setups can exert pressure on regimes, he singles out 
climate change as a significant factor causing the internal restructuring of the energy sector, “triggering 
changes in technical search heuristics and public policies” (Geels, 2004, p. 914). 
65 
 
Figure 9: The Transition Management cycle 
 
Source: Loorbach (2007), p. 124. 
In the case of renewable energy innovation in Arab states, a TM process would entail 
the following elements: 
1) Problem structuring in the transition arena and formulating a vision: coordinat-
ed by government, setting up a multi-stakeholder energy council with the aim 
to develop a renewable energy vision as part of a wider national energy policy 
blueprint 
2) Devising a concrete transition pathway and agenda: identifying key goals and 
realistic targets for mid- and long-term developments; choosing policy instru-
ments (e.g. feed-in-tariffs, tax benefit system, legal changes in energy law or 
market restructuring) 
3) Experimental phase: putting the designed policies into action for a limited 
amount of time 
4) Monitor and evaluate the results: assessing the results, clearly identifying fail-
ures in the system, unexpected flaws and underperformances 
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5) Adaptation: attempting to find solutions to the negative outcomes/reinforcing 
the successful elements of the programme 
6) Start again from step 1 (problem structuring) on a more advanced level 
 
Having said that, it needs to be underlined that the TM approach in and of itself is by 
no means uncontroversial. This does not only relate to the transferability issue dis-
cussed in the thesis and to be introduced in the following Section  2.4.2, but also in-
volves criticism from different theoretical angles.  
In their book chapter, Rotmans and Loorbach (2008), two noted TM researchers, pre-
sent key points which will be discussed here.  
First, the TM model has drawn criticism from theorists considering it both as too top-
down and technocratic as well as unrealistically bottom-up. Both, however, do not ring 
fully true as one of the specificities of the TM model is precisely to integrate both ap-
proaches in a new, “third way” (Kemp et al., 2007a, p. 85). The conceptual strength, 
the authors maintain, lies particularly in the synthesis of both models. 
Second, Berkout and others have argued (2003) that the very idea of developing a 
guiding vision upon which a certain government policy was to be oriented is flawed in 
itself. Instead, as the example of many failed socialist economic plans shows, innova-
tion was rarely inspired or even guided by a “central plan”. In many ways, one could 
argue that the above-made characterisation of innovation as chaotic, complex and 
generally not steerable would give ample reason not to attempt such a measure by 
introducing a planned development. Yet, Rotmans and Loorbach (2008) counter this 
argument by giving a more nuanced view of the TM-inspired vision and transition pro-
cess. Most importantly, they maintain that a TM vision does not constitute a single-
minded, technocratic plan that, like an instruction manual, guides the “users” through 
steps after which they will have reached the necessary outcome. A “vision” in the TM 
sense is much broader as it inspires the more technical plans that are to be found in 
individual technical, legal or economic reports and strategies and paints an overall pic-
ture of the ST transition at hand. Additionally, they stress that this vision need not be 
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shared by all those participating in the TM process; a heterogeneity in ideas and (at 
least partially) in desired outcomes is very well possible, probably even necessary to 
maintain the creative, evolutionary and re-iterative process that characterizes TM de-
sign. 
On a more general level, the entire assessment of ST literature shows a classical di-
lemma of government. Even taking into account that transition processes are in es-
sence chaotic and extremely difficult to steer into a desired trajectory, governments all 
over the world have a responsibility to at least attempt that. The alternative decision 
not to interfere – equally a form of government action – would mean to leave the en-
tire realm of ST development to market forces alone. Whether this would necessitate 
more desirable outcomes for the national (or global) public benefit is, at least, doubt-
ful. This counterweighs the argument put forth by Hajer and Poorter (2005) that is es-
sentially based on that paradox. In awareness of this dilemma, TM aims for flexible 
target-oriented outcomes and has explicitly abandoned a determinist set of rules. 
Another problem raised by Meadowcroft (2005) is the one that has already been dis-
cussed in the previous subchapter: the one of suitable system boundaries for both 
analysis and the policy process. In a globalised world, it needs to be questioned almost 
by default whether or not the national level is a suitable system boundary for analysis. 
Technological advancement is today not – and probably never has been – limited by 
the borders of a nation state. That rings also true for social innovation. Why then, does 
this study, focus on national energy systems as reference points? There are two fun-
damental reasons that need to be highlighted. First, while technological or even social 
innovations are global, energy systems – on the whole – are not: legislation, energy 
markets, as well as most vital actors in this field remain organised on a national level. 
Subsidies are granted on this level, electricity demand and (renewable) energy markets 
are defined by these borders as well as many other vital aspects to be discussed in 
Chapter 3. Undoubtedly, national energy systems are connected with global energy 
developments. However, in order to develop a methodologically meaningful unit of 
analysis for this thesis (or any other research work, for that matter) a choice has to be 
made. For instance, a technology-oriented, trans-boundary analysis can be conducted 
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with the caveat of cutting through many vital discourses on the national levels. Alter-
natively, some global interconnections have to be severed in order to present a com-
prehensive picture on a national level. Since the focus of this study is rather in the (en-
ergy) political, economic and governance domain than a technological study, the na-
tional level appears to be the more appropriate unit of analysis for this purpose. Sec-
ondly, the analytical MLP model, to a certain extent, allows for integrating trans-
boundary phenomena into the scope of analysis, mainly on the landscape level. Thus, 
the focus on national level case studies appears to be a warranted – and indeed the 
only feasible – model for that matter. 
This, in turn, makes the analyst focus on a dimension that is strongly related to the 
level of nation states: politics and power relations. In his doctoral thesis, Kern (2009) 
laments that in a classical TM approach the political dimension often remains neglect-
ed. Rotmans and Loorbach (2008), using Avelino’s argument, acknowledge this previ-
ous deficit of TM and call for more empirical work in that field. Further, they distin-
guish between structural and innovative power.33 While the former is mostly in the 
hands of the incumbent system actors on regime level and can be used to either foster 
or withhold innovation, the latter is more commonly found in ST innovators. Redefin-
ing ST development trajectories, they argue, often entails a power shift from an old to 
a new regime. Yet another noteworthy consideration is that these shifts in power do 
not necessarily mean that individual incumbent actors, e.g. national power utilities, 
lose them in a ST innovation. However, as will be visible in this thesis’ case studies, this 
often appears to be one of their main concerns. Following Kern’s assessment, (power) 
politics play a crucial role in understanding socio-technological change and of its block-
ade. This thesis shows that without taking into account the actual power relations, 
certain developmental failures of attempted renewable energy innovations in Algeria 
and the UAE are not to be understood from a purely managerial, technical point of 
view. Understanding, let alone steering system innovations without this remains es-
sentially impossible.  
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 See also the instructive paper by Avelino & Rotmans (2009) for an in-depth analysis of ST transfor-
mation and different possible forms of power relations. 
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2.4.2. Transition Management and its application to hydrocarbons-rich 
Arab countries 
Before delving into the details of how to apply TM as a form of policy design to renew-
able energy policies in oil- and gas-rich Arab states, one fundamental criticism needs to 
be addressed: critics of TM have argued that this model is unfit for transregional appli-
cation since it closely reflects a Dutch model of policy making that can be best de-
scribed as “liberal consensus model” (Rotmans et al., 2008, p. 39f). Yet this appears to 
be too generic a criticism for a theory that, in principle, regards itself as having a global 
scope and transferability. In order to present a more nuanced argument in this thesis, 
the following section develops a first set of criteria upon which the discussion regard-
ing the applicability of this policy design theory to Middle Eastern policy contexts will 
be based. 
Discussing TM and its tenets, it is apparent that this model has been developed with a 
non-traditional understanding of the role of government in mind, as well as tacitly 
seeming to presuppose an affluent, western-style democracy as the overall political 
framework. While the oil-wealthy Arab states in principle do not lack disposable in-
comes – although not all states of that category are high-income states (see for in-
stance Table 2) – all states in this group are governed by non- or at most semi-
democratic regimes. It is thus questionable how far open-ended steering processes, in 
which government regards itself as a mere manager of open-ended transition process-
es, are conceivable in this region. Governance structures in the target countries appear 
to favour strongly a centralized, top-down policy model that is suspicious towards lib-
eral, open-ended transition processes. Also, while it is already an open question how 
far autocratic governments are at all willing to codify national energy visions or similar 
policy documents, it is even more questionable, what actual political value such docu-
ments possess and how far governments hold themselves accountable to these docu-
ments in a way that gives businesses sufficient securities to invest into new technolo-
gies. In other words: who can hold an autocratic ruler accountable for a sudden policy 
change? 
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Similarly, the relevant actor groups to be integrated into the process, such as scientific 
organisations or NGOs specializing on energy and environmental issues, usually do not 
exist as independent bodies in these countries. In contrast to that, national oil compa-
nies or energy governance bodies, such as national petroleum councils or OPEC, have a 
disproportionate influence on government policies due to the vital role of hydrocar-
bons in this group of countries. 
On top of that, the vital function of transparent assessment of the policy experiments 
is extremely difficult: in a society where processes are organized in a top-down manner 
and where success – at least on paper – is a mandatory requirement set by quasi-
absolute rulers, it is not in the interest of officials or employees in the middle or lower 
tiers of the hierarchy to report failure to the top level. As research interviews by the 
author have shown, fear of relegation is great. While this is not a new phenomenon in 
itself, this means that an open assessment of experimental failures and adaptive learn-
ing processes – key modules for TM – can hardly be successfully launched. 
In conclusion, the following barriers to the success of TM for renewable energy policy 
in hydrocarbons-rich Arab states can be identified:34 
Table 4: Critical points regarding the application of TM as policy design model in Arab oil and gas 
wealthy countries 
Challenge  Description 
1 
The role of government and its self-conception as a policy actor (“managers vs. 
rulers”) 
2 
Role, policies (and existence of) relevant non-governmental stakeholders, such 
as businesses, civil society, research organisations, national oil companies, oth-
er traditional energy governance bodies and international organisations (OPEC, 
etc.) 
3 
Willingness of government to codify its own policy in the form of a long-term 
vision and more tangible policy goals and instruments 
4 
Accountability and consistency issues: willingness of government to adhere to 
the course set by a national policy document or similar announcements; ability 
of stakeholders to sue government/hold it accountable for sudden policy shifts 
5 Transparency issues in the assessment of renewable energy introduction 
                                                      
34
 In addition to this, there are standard challenges of technology promotion policies that exist in most 
societies that opt for a TM-inspired model. Renewable energy-related examples are for instance: the 
reaction of consumers (acceptance or rejection of ST innovations); grid integration; living up to the 
promised long-term cost reductions. 
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schemes both in terms of technologies and market introduction 
6 Inner-systemic adaptive capacities for ST regime change 
 
After an extensive MLP analysis that provides the relevant data, this policy design 
model will be used in both case studies to develop TM pathways for the Algerian and 
the UAE energy system. The aspects most relevant to the overall theoretical research 
aim of the thesis, however, is not so much the aspect of material energy policy de-
sign,35 but rather the theoretical implications concerning the transferability of govern-
ance concepts to different regions of the world. The latter will be discussed from a 
comparative perspective in Subchapter  7.1 of Part C. 
 
2.5. Conclusion and outlook 
After the general introduction in Chapter  1, Chapter  2 first discussed the available re-
search literature for renewable energy policy research in Arab resource-rich states in 
three sections focusing on Middle Eastern studies (Section  2.2.1), energy studies (Sec-
tion  2.2.2) and governance theories and concepts of socio-technical change (Sec-
tion  2.2.3). Having established that none of the research strands discussed can serve as 
an exclusive reference for the research aims of this thesis, a multi-level governance 
approach has been identified as the most adequate approach for this purpose, as it is 
able to integrate different explanatory models in the various dimensions of energy 
transitions analysed. Section  2.3.1 accordingly discussed the multi-level approach as an 
analytical tool in greater depth, which in turn was applied to the material dimensions 
of renewable energy policy in Arab hydrocarbons-wealthy states in the following Sec-
tion  2.3.2. This latter section remained focused on the formal introduction of MLP 
analysis as the following Chapter  3 is fully devoted to the material dimensions of re-
newable energy policy analysis in resource-rich Arab states.  
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 These aspects will briefly be discussed in the two case studies on an individual case study level and in 
Subchapter  7.1 under a comparative perspective. 
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While the MLP is a key analytical tool for energy transition, its contribution to policy 
formulation remains limited. Thus, the final Subchapter  2.4 discussed TM as a model of 
policy design that is closely interlinked with MLP. However, as was argued in Sec-
tion  2.4.2, TM has significant limitations in its application to countries outside of West-
ern-style liberal democracies. A list of the most critical issues has been collected in 
Table 4 and will inform the model application in Part B and C of the thesis. 
In conclusion, Chapter  2 has defined the theoretical framework for the thesis both for 
its analytical and its policy application side. While the MLP will structure the following 
chapter as well as the major parts of the case study analysis in Part B, its purpose is of 
an overall analytical, not a heuristic nature. Thus, informed and structured by MLP, the 
TM, a model conceived with the specific purpose of policy design, will generate ele-
ments of material renewable energy policies, and, more importantly for the theoretical 
contributions of this thesis, be tested in its role as an adequate policy design model in 
Parts B and C. 
In the following chapter (Chapter  3), the general policy setting of renewable energy 
policies in resource-rich Arab states will be discussed. Informed by MLP and the analyt-
ical dimensions of MENA renewable energy policy outlined in Section  2.3.2, it will dis-
cuss general trends for the region. After Chapter  4 presents the research methodology 
of this thesis, Part B will then proceed with the analysis of the case studies against the 
background of what has been established in Part A. 
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3. The policy context for renewable energy policy in resource-
rich Arab countries under the multi-level perspective 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter introduces analytical dimensions of renewable energy policy in resource-
rich Arab countries as identified by the multi-level perspective and summarised in Ta-
ble 5, including where these sections are discussed in this chapter. Structured by the 
multi-level perspective, the chapter presents the key elements of renewable energy 
policy in the three dimensions suggested (landscape, regime and niche-level). It thus 
introduces the key elements that will guide the analysis in the two case studies of Part 
B. This chapter only discusses transnational trends and challenges that are of relevance 
for the case study analysis. As the structure of Chapter 3 and its subchapters will be 
replicated in both case studies, a more in-depth discussion of the more country-
specific issues can be found in the case study chapters respectively. 
All major sections of this chapter end with research questions that formulate condi-
tions of a success for renewable energy policy in resource-wealthy Arab states and that 
will be taken up in the related chapters of Part B. 
Table 5: Chapter orientation: analysis of renewable energy policy in hydrocarbons-rich Arab states 
structured by the multi-level perspective 
Scale Definition Analytical focus  
Covered in Sub-
chapter 
Landscape 
Level 
Long-term macro-
drivers that cannot 
effortlessly be altered 
by regime-level stake-
holders 
 
- Political system 
- Key regional and transregional 
energy governance bodies 
- Climate change 
- Long-term national economic di-
versification  
- Country branding 
-  3.2.1  
-  3.2.2 
-  3.2.3 
-  3.2.4 
 
-  3.2.5 
Regime 
Level 
Entrenched actors and 
dominant regulatory, 
financial and political 
systems 
 
- Technological regime: Transmis-
sion and power generation infra-
structure  
- User and market regime: Struc-
ture of national energy markets, 
pricing and demand issues; legal 
and institutional frameworks  
- Socio-cultural regime: Consump-
tion patterns, environmental 
awareness and potential role of 
religion or environmental ethics 
-  3.3.1 
 
 
-  3.3.2 
 
 
 
 
-  3.3.3 
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- Policy regime: Regime-level and 
transregional governance struc-
tures, role of CSOs  
 
-  3.3.4 
Niche 
Level 
Protected spaces with 
a potential for radical 
change in the estab-
lished regimes 
- Science regime: Industry struc-
tures, R&D strategies
36
 
- Technological developments  
-  3.4.1 
 
-  3.4.2 
 
3.2. Landscape-level factors 
3.2.1. Political system 
Renewable energy policy always takes place in the context of national political systems 
as they relate to wider landscape-level phenomena, which cannot easily be altered by 
system actors. Two theoretical approaches guide the analysis of political systems in 
hydrocarbons-wealthy Arab countries: Henry/Springborg’s “bunker state” theory (Sub-
section  3.2.1.1) and Luciani/Beblawi’s “rentier state” theory (Subsection  3.2.1.2). 
While Subsection  3.2.1.3 focuses on personal patronage networks, the final subsection 
discusses to what extent the spread of renewable energies could be a goal adopted by 
conservative elites to boost regime survival and whether a democratizing effect of re-
newable energies could be expected (Subsection  3.2.1.4). 
 
3.2.1.1. Algeria: “Bunker state” theory 
Henry and Springborg (2010) conceptualize the difference between Arab states by dis-
tinguishing between four categories of Middle Eastern political systems: bully praeto-
rian republics (Egypt, Tunisia), bunker states (Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Syria, and 
Yemen), globalizing monarchies (UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Oman, 
and Bahrain) and fragmented democracies (Israel, Iran, Lebanon, and Turkey) (Henry & 
Springborg, 2010, pp. 26–27).37 For resource-wealthy Arab countries, the categories of 
                                                      
36
 Contrary to Geels’ classification in Figure 6 this thesis treats science regime questions as niche-level 
phenomena. While ST niches might be regulated, the niche-focused perspective of the policy design 
theories applied appears a more fitting classification. 
37
 In light of the recent events in the Arab world, the analytical categories arguably will have to be al-
tered, especially in terms of the “bully praetorian republic” category. It is, however, beyond the scope of 
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bunker states and globalizing monarchies are particularly apposite. According to this 
model, with its largely paralyzed state structures, a strong security apparatus, a weak, 
post-socialist private sector Algeria is regarded as a “bunker state”, while the UAE falls 
into the category of a globalizing Gulf monarchy that has managed to follow a dynamic 
and flexible development pathway that will be further described in the next subsec-
tion. The authors derive the name “bunker state” from the observation that this group 
of states is being “ruled physically or metaphorically from bunkers” (Henry 
& Springborg, 2001, p. 99) by an elite that historically gained its public legitimacy in the 
wake of anti-nationalist colonialist revolutions. Bunker states, the authors maintain, 
are potentially always in a state of war with the societies they rule with the help of 
strong, if not violent armies and other forms of security services. 
In the case of Algeria, for instance, Bouteflika’s last election in 2009 was only made 
possible after a constitutional change that allowed his third tenure.38 By and large, 
Algerian political leaders place themselves in the tradition of the democratic, anti-
colonialist struggle of the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962). Apart from that, 
however, this state is characterized by the absence of a significant, independent and 
vocal intelligentsia or strong entrepreneurs who amass political power or capital. In 
Algeria, these groups have mostly been “deactivated, silenced, forced into exile, or 
eradicated” (Henry & Springborg, 2001, p. 100) during the civil war in the 1990s.39 
Consequently, these countries’ administrations perform poorly and have little power 
to inform or influence the policy process. 
In relation to the thesis and the Algerian case study, the militarization of society and 
the opaqueness of its decision-making structures in a country where the presidential 
elite feels besieged by the military security service DRS needs to be taken into account 
as landscape-level influences on renewable energy policy. Renewable energy policy 
                                                                                                                                                            
this thesis to tackle that problem, particularly considering the fact that the “Arab Spring” is an on-going 
phenomenon. 
38
 See Werenfels (2009) for an assessment of the 2009 presidential elections. 
39
 In a different publication, Henry argues that such a group has never actually existed in Algeria and 
that, while it is publicly believed that the country’s “original sin” was oil and gas; it was in fact the long 
and brutal phase of French colonialism. 
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designs targeting successful niche-based innovation systems have to integrate the 
strong position of the national oil company SONATRACH and the Algerian Ministry of 
Energy and Mines (MEM) as well as take into consideration the governance environ-
ment, which is characterized by physical force and top-down approaches. 
Thus, the corresponding research question for the Algerian case study is as follows: 
- How far do the Algerian political system and the non-existence of independent 
CSOs allow for system innovations in the energy sector, particularly bottom-up 
innovations? 
 
3.2.1.2. UAE: rentier states and globalizing monarchies 
The resource allocative character of the smaller, wealthy hydrocarbons-based socie-
ties, such as the UAE, has to be underlined.40 Conceptually, this is best described by 
the rentier state model (Beblawi & Luciani, 1987) according to which the social con-
tract is based on the state allocating its wealth to its citizens while, simultaneously, its 
quasi-absolute rulers remain politically dominant, largely unchallenged by weak civil 
society groups.41 Although these monarchies have substantial financial resources, they 
are politically more vulnerable as they have not undergone the same period of violent, 
anti-colonial transition some of the bunker states (e.g. Algeria) have. Another subsidi-
ary aspect is that in spite of the comparatively strong public acceptance of the heredi-
tary, quasi-monarchical governance structures, political power is protected by strongly 
repressive measures and the quasi-absence of the rule of law on the top level. Thus, by 
and large politically docile or intimidated citizens enjoy the extensive benefit sys-
                                                      
40
 In his publication, Luciani criticizes the term “hydrocarbon society” and argues in favour of the term 
“allocation state” (1987, pp. 65–67). He emphasises that oil in the region has incentivized formerly com-
peting Emirs to arrange federal structures (UAE), partially quelled the secessionist tendencies in the 
Hijaz region, and has helped in “gluing together” the three Libyan regions of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and 
the Fezzan. Again, in light of recent events in Libya, this thesis is likely to undergo substantial criticism 
soon. 
41
 Cf. Salem’s study on Kuwait (2007). Also Nonneman analyses the Gulf States as systems that are es-
sentially held together by legitimization through payments to the subjects, patronage and charismatic 
leadership (Aarts & Nonneman, 2005). 
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tems,42 the favourable taxation regime and largely withdraw from the public sphere 
into private fulfilment thus honouring the “ruling bargain” described, among others, by 
Davidson and Krane (Davidson, 2005; Krane, 2010b).  
This “shrinking of democratic space” (Abubakar, 2008, p. 220) combined with the rent-
seeking behaviour of citizens affects all spheres of life including the realm of (renewa-
ble) energy. As with Algeria, a key question that emerges is how authoritarian, top-
down governance structures allow for niche-based system innovation in the context of 
the state-induced (and subsidized) renewable energy policy initiatives that are charac-
teristic to the UAE. In a state where there is no vocal civil society in the environmental 
sector and where the state directly funds renewable energy research and businesses, it 
is pertinent to ask how far an innovation system which might run contrary to the vest-
ed interests of the governing elite can preserve its momentum. 
In parallel to the Algerian case, the corresponding research question for the political 
system of the UAE is therefore: 
- How far does the UAE’s political system and the non-existence of independent 
CSOs allow for system innovations in the energy sector, particularly bottom-up 
innovations? 
 
3.2.1.3. Personal patronage networks 
For this thesis, one of the most important elements of political system analysis is the 
strong role of personal patronage networks to members of the ruling elites. These in-
formal power structures weaken a stronger institutionalisation and render formal deci-
sions subordinate. Due to largely opaque top-level decision-making structures, person-
al allegiances can be secured by granting commercial privileges43 or government ca-
reers. As Henry/Springborg put it “In the monarchies the local business elites act as 
                                                      
42
 A study from the UAE has recently claimed that an average male UAE citizen collects approximately 
US$ 55,000 per year as benefits from his government (Brown, 2007). 
43
 Due the fact that most resource-rich Arab states have mandatory 51% ownership rules for foreign 
investment, there is a wealth of lucrative partnerships that can be given to favourites of the ruling 
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part of a big extended family” (Henry & Springborg, 2001, p. 168). For foreign compa-
nies as well as domestic outsiders, the workings of those patronage networks are often 
difficult to comprehend as they form an informal power structure that exists parallel to 
the formal structures of the state. Their importance for eventual top-level political 
decision making should not be underestimated. As one interviewee in Abu Dhabi said: 
“Well, here in Abu Dhabi, of course, there are these rather opaque circles of power 
around the ruling family. But this doesn’t mean that someone from these people can 
just command the state structures to do a big project, and then it will be done without 
questions asked. Institutions here are at least that strong that they force decision-
makers to seek a formal approval and have experts heard before they make an official 
decision” (Interview no. 74 – national and international power sector, Gulf States)44 
However, other expatriates take a very different view stating that: 
“Well, decision-making structures remain unclear to me. I think, whatever the ruler “in 
his infinite wisdom” decrees will be done, everything else is just a façade...” (Interview 
with undisclosed Public stakeholder, Gulf States) 
While Henry/Springborg have highlighted this phenomenon with regards to the “glob-
alizing monarchies”, it needs to be stressed that these networks are at least as relevant 
in the case of Algeria, where the infamous Tlemçen-clan around president Bouteflika, 
and the military service DRS have long battled for supremacy (Lacher, 2010). Due to 
the republican face of the Algerian body politique no Algerian politician could capitalize 
on a royal background. Instead, functional equivalents are a military, energy 
(Sonatrach) or political one. This, however, does not mean that personal patronage 
networks were less obscure or self-serving than in the Gulf States, as the bunker 
states’ rankings on transparency and corruption indices demonstrate. In the Transpar-
ency International’s 2010 global corruption perception index, for instance, the Gulf 
States receive much higher ranks than the resource-rich North African states.45 Thus, 
                                                      
44
 The research interviews conducted by the author have been coded according to the four interviewee 
categories (Public stakeholders – Private and public investors – National and international power sector 
– R & D) and the interviewee’s regional background (Algeria – Europe – Gulf States), e.g. “Public stake-
holder – Algeria”. If the interviewee has consented to publish his or her name this is preceded by the 
interview number referring to the list of interviewees provided in Annex II. See Chapter 4 for an in-depth 
discussion of research methodology, the development of the questionnaire and the interviewee catego-
ries. 
45
 Qatar has scored the highest with a global 19
th
 place out of 175; UAE: 28
th
, Oman 41
th
, Kuwait 45
th
, 
Bahrain 48
th
, Saudi Arabia 50
th 
Egypt 98
th
, Algeria 105
th
, Libya 146
th
 (Transparency International, 2010). 
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the issue of political patronage networks is of key relevance for the analysis of political 
processes in these countries. 
A research question with regards to personal patronage networks for both case studies 
is: 
- To what extent are the official decision-making processes the actual decision-
making structures? 
 
3.2.1.4. Regime stability vs. democratisation: governance effects of renewa-
ble energy systems 
Providing cheap and reliable electricity constitutes an important element of regime 
stability in all allocative Arab states. This poses the following question: in which way 
could the interest in regime stability by conservative elites, who have a stake in the 
continuation of the political and economic status quo, drive the spread of renewable 
energies in the region? While, paradoxically, the possession of nuclear energy capaci-
ties might produce more external guarantees for regime survival (Marktanner & Naj-
meddine, 2011), political leaders could be motivated to invest in renewable energies 
for domestic reasons, such as freeing more domestic resources for the sale on global 
energy markets, bolstering their domestic and international positions and creating 
employment opportunities for their citizens. 
Apart from that, creating outside dependencies by large-scale renewable power inter-
connections, as has been advertised in the Euro-Mediterranean sphere, could have a 
positive impact on regime stability – arguably not as much as the positive side effects 
for domestic industries for these projects,46 but rather in the same way as oil and gas 
deposits today raise the Western stakes in regime survival of these states. Conse-
quently, what might be the result is the continuation of Western oil policies (energy for 
silence in terms of human rights violations, see, for instance, Saudi Arabia) trans-
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 Scholvin (2009) and others are very sceptical about that. See also Kumetat/Hamiane (2011) for a dis-
cussion on the potential role of the Maghreb renewable energy sector in these projects. 
80 
 
formed to a different energy carrier47 bolstered through this potential new form of 
energy interdependence.48 
Therefore, currently, regime stability might have a mildly positive effect on the spread 
of renewables in the region because this may consolidate local energy security, long-
term price stability in addition to other effects discussed below. More impact may only 
come about should external major powers obtain stakes in the renewables sector in 
the Arab countries, as might possibly be the case with Algeria and the Desertec Initia-
tive. 
In contrast, Western voices representing CSOs, donors or renewable energy lobby or-
ganisations, attach very different aspirations to the spread of renewables in the MENA 
region. Franz Alt, for instance, views the spread of renewables as pivotal for interna-
tional peace: 
“Coal, gas and oil, but also uranium…are finite. The sun, wind, water, biomass...are 
infinite. Many wars have been waged for the sake of oil…[but] the sun shines for us 
all...Thus, the most important question for the 21st century is: war for oil or peace 
through the sun? Either we abolish our current energy policy or it abolishes us...It 
would serve peace better to install solar power plants across Iraq’s deserts than to 
bomb the country.” (Alt, 2002) 
Whether an assumed causal nexus from decentralized energy production to a demo-
cratic political system can actually be established at all, must remain doubtful.49 In-
stead of a research-based, scientifically cogent argumentation this appears to be a 
rather one-dimensional projection of Western concepts and political ideals into the 
Middle East as a region and into renewable energy as a form of energy production. 
However, various studies, such as Adelphi Consult & Wuppertal Institute (Tänzler, 
2007), stress that an ecological transformation of energy systems can in fact yield a 
peace and a human security dividend through the diversification and decentralisation 
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 A recent article already problematized the fact that Morocco, a key partner in Desertec, plans to build 
two of the five RE demonstration plants in the annexed West Saharan territories (Schattenblick, 2010); a 
concern that the Desertec Industry Initiative’s (Dii) PR section was quick to deny (Maung, 2010). Moroc-
can and the consortium’s final site assessments, however, are yet to be announced. 
48
 Schot et al. show that the move to create dependencies (with potential peace dividends) through the 
interconnection of energy infrastructure has been under discussion since at least the early 20
th
 century 
(Schot & Lagendijk, 2008; Schot, 2010). 
49
 See Subsection  3.4.2.1 for a more detailed discussion of both the governance and the technical as-
pects of this point. 
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of energy supply as well as through lifting least developed countries out of their status 
of absolute energy poverty. 
To this author it appears highly unlikely that the spread of renewable energies would 
trigger a democratization process in hydrocarbons-wealthy Arab states. The causal link 
between distributed renewable energy production and more transparent or participa-
tory political systems is, at best, weak, and overstretched. In fact, if such a link could 
be established by Arab energy stakeholders, this could potentially develop into a key 
barrier against the spread of renewable energies in their countries. 
Furthermore, Western idealists pin their hopes on small, decentralized renewable 
power systems, which aim to strengthen the (then-) independent consumers in their 
new role as power producers. This is an unlikely scenario for the hydrocarbons-rich 
Arab states, because, as will be argued in Parts B and C of this thesis, de-centralized 
systems are unlikely to play a major role in this region; if so, an industry-scale, state-
induced and -controlled spread of renewables will transpire. Thus, the most likely sce-
nario for these states is a Middle Eastern form of environmental authoritarianism50 
and a continuation of a state-controlled, centralized form of power generation. In 
terms of installed capacity, this might be an environment conducive to renewable en-
ergies; in terms of participatory governance structures, however, this is unlikely to be 
the case. 
A corresponding research question from this section follows: 
- What do interviewees regard as the key governance effects of renewable ener-
gy production? 
 
 
                                                      
50
 See Beeson (2010) for a discussion of this concept with respect to Asia. He highlights that although 
authoritarian regimes may well be “unattractive” as countries, they might develop better response ca-
pacities to environmental pressures than other, more democratic forms of government. Spiess (2008), 
however, criticises the notion that the Gulf States would have actually developed such capacities. 
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3.2.2. Key transregional energy governance bodies 
On the landscape-level, policy is also co-designed by governance bodies whose role 
transcends national policy-making. In contrast to the governance bodies presented in 
Subsection  3.3.4.2, which do not exceed the mandate of the member states and do not 
have own policy agendas, the three governance bodies IRENA, OPEC, and OAPEC, yield 
substantial influence.  
 
IRENA 
The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) has just become a full-fledged 
international organisation. Until April 2011, it operated from its headquarters in down-
town Abu Dhabi as a “preparatory commission”. As part of Abu Dhabi’s original bid for 
IRENA at the founding conference in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, in June 2009, IRENA’s 
headquarters will eventually move to Masdar city. However, due to the various re-
assessments of Masdar city, IRENA is still in its temporary offices in downtown Abu 
Dhabi. This situation is unlikely to change until at least 2013 (Interview no. 54 – public 
stakeholder, Gulf States) (Arabianbusiness.com, 2011). As a sufficient number of mem-
ber states have ratified the IRENA treaty, the delegates’ meeting on 4-5 April 2011 
constituted IRENA’s first conference of the parties (COP) during which Adnan Amin was 
elected IRENA’s first General Secretary. In June 2012, the IRENA statute had 158 signa-
tories, including all Arab states. However, merely 98 states, including only seven Arab 
states (Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, Tunis, Algeria, the UAE and Yemen) and the EU have also 
ratified the treaty. With the exception of Saudi Arabia, which retains only an appli-
cant’s status, all other signatory Arab states are yet to ratify the statue. 
 
OPEC 
The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is arguably the most well-
known energy cartel worldwide. Founded in Baghdad, OPEC holds about 80 per cent of 
global oil reserves (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 2010a, 
p. 24). This share is not reflected in current and historic production shares: OPEC con-
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tributes currently between 40 and 50 per cent of the total oil production (see Figure 
10).  
Figure 10: OPEC share in relation to world crude oil production 1960-2009 in mb/day 
 
Source: Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (2010a), p. 35. 
With slight changes in membership over the years, it currently comprises the Arab oil 
exporters of Algeria, Iraq, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE, as well as the non-
Arab states of Angola, Nigeria, Iran, Ecuador and Venezuela.  
According to the organization’s long-term strategy, OPEC’s goal is it to ensure “fair and 
stable prices” (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 2010b, p. 5). 
However, it is remarkable that this recently written policy document does not take into 
account a potential shift of long-term oil demand. Furthermore, while the report men-
tions the potential “downward pressure on all forms of fossil fuel demand” through 
climate change mitigation (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 
2010b, p. 8), there is no mention of renewable energy in the strategy whatsoever. As 
will be underscored upon discussing Abu Dhabi’s key conventional oil and gas govern-
ance bodies in the case study, the fact that the Supreme Petroleum Council does not 
take into account renewables seems to be a common phenomenon among oil and gas 
governing bodies. Traditional oil and gas bodies, it appears, do not entirely change 
their focus to renewable electricity production, as this would exceed their mandate 
and may potentially be at odds with member states’ policies, which have strong vested 
interests in the continuation of the oil and gas energy regime. 
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OAPEC 
The same characteristic can be observed in the case of the Organization of Arab Petro-
leum Exporting Countries (OAPEC).  
“OAPEC is primarily a technical organisation. Unlike OPEC (with which we of course 
cooperate closely), OAPEC works much less on political issues such as international oil 
policies, production quotas and the like. OAPEC focuses more on the promotion of inter-
Arab oil and gas cooperation, research and business operations.” (Interview no. 57 – 
public stakeholder, Gulf States) 
The rather apolitical character of this organisation is also the reason for the difference 
in member states. OAPEC comprises most Arab states that have (at least at one point 
in time) a significant oil and/or gas production.51 Its members are: Kuwait, Libya, Saudi 
Arabia (founders, Beirut, 1968), Algeria, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and 
Tunisia (Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), 2008). 
In its entirety, OAPEC states control approximately 56% of global oil and 28% of global 
gas reserves (Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), 2010), 
making it the by far most significant regional organisation of oil exporting states. De-
spite its close contact with Vienna, OAPEC is not a subsidiary organisation to OPEC, nor 
are there other sub-groupings within OPEC with other regional foci (e.g. African or 
South American OPEC members). Furthermore, another noteworthy difference be-
tween OPEC and OAPEC is that not all OAPEC states are also Arab members of OPEC: 
Bahrain, Syria, Egypt, and Tunisia are members of OAPEC exclusively.52 Conversely, 
however, the picture is less blurred: all Arab OPEC members are also members of 
OAPEC. However, the OAPEC does not regard itself as a sub-organization of the League 
of Arab States (LAS). A proposal to this effect in the period preceding OAPEC’s founda-
                                                      
51
 According to its statutes, OAPEC membership is open to Arab countries in which “petrole-
um…constitute(s) a significant source of its national income” (El-Gebali, 1981, p. 37). 
52
 This is also the reason why this thesis always uses the slightly lengthy term “resource-wealthy Arab 
states”. The term Arab OPEC or OAPEC states means political groupings within the Arab world, which is 
not the focus of this work. 
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tion was rejected by its three founding members53 thereby rendering it an independ-
ent Arab energy association in its own right. 
The predominantly technical character of today’s OAPEC, however, is a relatively re-
cent phenomenon in the organisation’s history. OAPEC has trailed pan-Arab politics. 
Indeed, its very foundation was political, brought about by the partially-implemented 
Arab oil embargo following the 1967 war. It was therefore designed as a pan-Arab oil 
pressure group only to admit Arab states, which pursued strong anti-Zionist politics. In 
addition to that, all three founding members had to approve the admission of new 
member states, such as Egypt, Iraq, Algeria and Syria (El-Gebali, 1981, pp. 29–32). 
While the organisation played a major role in organizing the 1973 oil boycott together 
with OPEC, no further political initiative of that sort was carried out successfully. The 
organisation showed signs of political weakness when Egypt was excluded from the 
organisation after the signing of its peace treaty with Israel in 1979.54 Also, Tunisia’s 
membership has been suspended upon its own request since 1986. However, the lat-
ter is still counted as a member state, and, according to the OAPEC secretariat, would 
be able re-activate its membership at any time. Today, OAPEC is mainly limited to 
commercial oil cooperation in the Arab upstream and downstream sectors.55 As was 
confirmed by stakeholder interviews, renewables are only of marginal interest to this 
organization, and its stakeholders do not regard it necessary to change this. 
                                                      
53
 In theory, the League of Arab States is the umbrella organisation for all political and economic affairs 
regarding Arab states. Thus, OAPEC could have become a sub-regional forum of the LAS, which the pro-
gressive regimes of the late 1960s like Iraq and Egypt supported. The conservative regimes and later 
OAPEC founders (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the then-Kingdom of Libya), however, rejected this proposal 
citing the LAS’ poor performance. In the founding period, however, the Libyan revolution under Gaddafi 
changed the character of the OAPEC founders; and Libya now promoted the extension of OAPEC to the 
revolutionary Arab states of Algeria, Syria, Egypt and Iraq, which were eventually admitted to OAPEC 
alongside all other current members in March 1970 (El-Gebali, 1981, pp. 30–31). 
54
 El-Gebali discusses the exclusion of Egypt and the legal problems attached to it at length (1981, 
pp. 52–67). 
55
 OAPEC coordinates various inter-Arab joint ventures in the petroleum sector and related industries, 
such as maritime petroleum transport (Arab Maritime Petroleum Transport Company AMPTC), ship-
building (Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard Company ASRY), petroleum investments (Arab Petroleum 
Investment Corporation APICORP), exploration (Arab Drilling and Workover Company ADWOC), among 
other key joint ventures. In addition to that, OAPEC also runs the Arab Petroleum Training Institute 
(APTI), which was established in 1978 in Baghdad, which issues a monthly bulletin and the journal “an-
naft wa at-ta’awun al-‘arabi” (Oil and Arab Cooperation) (Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OAPEC), 2008). 
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Thus, the following research question can be identified:  
- Which role do transregional energy governance bodies such as OPEC, OAPEC or 
IRENA play in the promotion or stalling of national renewable energy policy in 
the respective target country? 
 
3.2.3. Climate change vulnerability and low environment-related profile of 
oil-producing states 
Another important contextual factor relating to the national political economies of the 
resource-rich Arab states is the region’s strong exposure to the negative effects of an-
thropogenic climate change. While the projected effects of climate change to the two 
case study countries will be discussed in the case study chapters respectively, some 
transregional aspects will be highlighted here. 
First, currently, more than half of the water used in the MENA region originates from 
desalination. In light of the sharp rise in demand for fresh water and the quickly drop-
ping renewable water tables, this quota is likely to increase. Besides the production 
costs, a pertinent issue to this research is the close nexus between desalinated water 
and energy. On average, desalination plants require 1.5-15 kWh to produce one cubic 
meter of water (German Aerospace Center (DLR), 2006a, p. 22). Thus, the rising water 
production by desalination further increases the already high annual growth rates of 
national electricity demand. The case study chapters shall discuss whether the large-
scale application of renewable energy for seawater desalination could be an entry 
point for renewable energies in Arab countries.56 
                                                      
56
 See for instance (Bouchekima, 2002; Enzili, 2007, German Aerospace Center (DLR), 2006a; Mahmoudi 
et al., 2009). One of the most recent and comprehensive research projects on that subject was the EU-
funded Promotion of Renewable Energy for Water production through Desalination (PRODES) project, 
cf. Papatreou et al. (2010) for the final report and http://prodes-project.org/index.php?id=45 for the 
project homepage (last accessed 25 February 2011). 
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Further regional issues include the carbon footprints, which are far higher than the 
average of OECD states (see Reiche, 2010b as well as Figure 11),57 Arab leaders’ scepti-
cism towards climate change and their poor performance in the recent post-Kyoto ne-
gotiations. While all resource-rich Arab states are signatories of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Kyoto protocol, they have 
merely joined as non-Annex-I-states, meaning that these states do not have any bind-
ing obligations to cutting greenhouse gas emissions under the Kyoto protocol (Reiche, 
2010a).58 
Figure 11: GCC CO2 emissions relative to GDP in 2004 
 
Source: Hertog & Luciani (2009), p. 3. 
This is particularly noteworthy because the Arab region is heavily water-stressed and 
strongly vulnerable to a climate change induced rise in average temperatures. Thus, it 
could have been expected that there is an interest among decision-makers to cooper-
ate constructively in the post-Kyoto negotiation process in order to eliminate or at 
least minimize this potential stress multiplier.59 However, this was not to be in recent 
                                                      
57
 As discussed in Subsection  3.3.1.1, another reason for the high carbon emissions in the region’s desal-
ination plants is the boom in the construction sector and energy intensive industries. 
58
 As information on the multitude of aspects touched upon in this chapter is widely spread, this text 
cites numbers from a broad variety of sources as there is no standard volume where all the necessary 
information was published. Unless otherwise highlighted, the author cites important numbers only from 
peer-reviewed journals, major government reports or credible international organisations. 
59
 In recent years, climate change debates have moved successively towards the securitization of this 
issue (Brzoska, 2008). Thus, there are a growing number of publications on this topic from traditional 
security circles (see for instance the US Center for Naval Analyses CNA Corporation, 2007). For CSO-
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COPs (Conference of the Parties) to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto protocol. As Depledge 
shows, the well-staffed and well-funded Saudi Arabian delegation in particular played 
a key role in undermining many UNFCCC initiatives (Depledge, 2008), which Luomi con-
firms (Luomi, 2009; 2010).60 Furthermore, the UNFCCC’s Clean Development Mecha-
nism (CDM), a means to promote low-carbon growth and North-South technology 
transfer, has hardly been used by the Arab hydrocarbon rich states (see Table 6). 
CDM credits, which could be sold to industrialized countries registered in Annex I of 
the Kyoto protocol, could help gather the necessary investment money for renewable 
energy projects. Until 2009, Qatar’s (large-scale) Al-Shaheen CDM project was the only 
one of its kind in the GCC. However, the number of projects is gradually growing in 
resource-rich Arab states. In October 2011, out of 3542 registered projects, the entire 
Arab region merely registered 23 projects (less than 1% of the total number regis-
tered).  
Table 6: Overview of CDM projects registered under the Kyoto protocol in the Arab region 
 
Source: UNFCCC (2011).  
In conclusion, the climate change mitigation agenda, the UNFCCC regime and carbon 
credits could develop a significant momentum in the spread of renewable energies as 
it does in other world regions (e.g. the EU). A corresponding subsidiary research ques-
tions in this respect is: 
- Is the climate change agenda actively considered in the political decision-
making on renewable energy developments? 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
funded or academic research see for instance the two publications by Brown et al. (Brown, 2008; Brown 
& Crawford, 2009), Kumetat (2011) or Carius et al. (2007) for a more in-depth discussion of climate 
change and security-related issues in the MENA region. 
60
 Although Luomi holds a slightly differentiated view highlighting the potentially significant role of the 
smaller Gulf States in weakening the oil-rich states’ coalition from within, Luomi is only cautiously opti-
mistic with regards to the outcome of future COPs. 
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3.2.4. Long-term national economic diversification 
In hydrocarbons-rich Arab states, the importance of hydrocarbon revenues for the 
national economies is striking. Aware of this revenue’s eventual finiteness, the key 
economic goal in these countries is to diversify their national economies. Apart from 
the fact that national economic diversification is an important strategic form of hedg-
ing against future income deficits through depleting hydrocarbons reserves or dimin-
ishing demand on the world markets, it is also a precautionary measure against strong 
fluctuations in world oil prices. Such fluctuations and their high GDP dependency on oil 
exports (see Figure 12) have left the resource rich Arab states vulnerable to significant 
drops of national income in some years while having to deal with inflationary prob-
lems61 in years of high cash inflows into their national economies due to oil price 
peaks. 
Figure 12: Oil export revenues as share of GDP in select Arab countries 
 
Source: Bhattacharyya, 2010, p. 1101.  
                                                      
61
 In their paper, Woertz et al. (2008, p. 4) give inflation rates for the Gulf States between 2002 and 
2007. In 2007, inflation rates in all GCC states were between 5.3 (Oman) and 12.8 (Qatar) per cent. The 
authors state that approximately two thirds of this can be attributed to the abundant liquidity and a 
domestic investment boom, about one third of this has been imported through price peaks in global 
food and commodity prices. The recent stark increases in government-paid salaries for GCC nationals in 
the wake of the Arab spring have only exacerbated these tendencies. 
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The recent oil price peaks have generated additional revenues for these countries 
amounting to trillions of dollars. The large amounts of cash have been handled very 
differently with some of it trickling down towards the domestic population and some 
re-invested into long-term sustainable assets. By and large, the Gulf States have tack-
led both challenges well by dispensing generous benefits to the national population 
and carefully managing sovereign wealth funds (see Table 7). Although states like Lib-
ya, Algeria and Iraq established similar institutions, as well, the trickle-down effect to 
the general public was much less. With their institutions, infrastructure and human 
resources crippled by the wars in the 1990s and 2000s, Iraq and Algeria are yet to fully 
develop dynamic and transparent mechanisms governing their hydrocarbon incomes. 
The outcome of the 2011 Libyan uprising and what this will yield for the country’s 
economy in the long term still remains unclear.  
Table 7: Select Arab Sovereign Wealth Funds in 2008 
Source: Behrend, 2008, p. 5 and www.swfinstitute.org, 2010.
62
 
                                                      
62
 Algerian officials have hinted that the FFR was at a size of around US$ 75bn at the end of 2011 (APS - 
Algérie Presse Service, 2011f). 
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Most states of the region have developed economic strategies63, which are supposed 
to link decision-makers in their daily work with the national long-term objectives of 
economic diversification and the creation of employment for the steadily increasing 
national populations (see Table 8). 64 Considering the fact that members of the large, 
poor and unemployed youth population were among the most destabilizing factors for 
the former regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, Arab rulers in resource-wealthy states are 
taking this aspect increasingly into account. 
Table 8: Growth of population in selected MENA countries according to UN medium growth scenario 
 
Source: German Aerospace Center (DLR), 2009, p. 139. 
With regard to the thesis, renewable energies are increasingly identified as target are-
as for strategic national investments as this area promises a direct use for the usually 
strained capacities of the national power sectors as well as resource economic benefit 
by being able to sell more hydrocarbons on the world markets instead of using them 
for domestic (and subsidized) power production. Lastly, domestic development of re-
newable energy technologies offers the ownership in one of the most relevant future 
technologies, which could turn into a source of export income and soft power in the 
medium to long term. 
A relevant subsidiary research question is: 
                                                      
63
 See Hvidt (2010; 2011) for an analysis of development schemes of the GCC countries. 
64
 For an in-depth study on Arab demographics see Winckler (1998). 
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- Are the renewable energy-related efforts connected to the national economic 
visions or national SWF activities in the respective country? 
 
3.2.5. Country branding 
For oil and gas exporting countries, a related asset of a strong domestic renewable 
energy policy lies in the realm of public diplomacy. In addition to the fact that most 
hydrocarbons-wealthy Arab states have hardly democratic political systems – a fact 
that is not highly regarded by the global public – these states have a particularly bad 
image with regards to environmental issues. This is due to their poor performance on 
indicators such as carbon footprints, energy efficiency ratings, waste management or, 
as described above, their positions vis-à-vis a post-Kyoto regime. Renewable energies 
can therefore significantly raise national profiles, without considerable changes in the 
lifestyle of both the domestic population or of the political system.65  
More recent attempts of country branding often include the hosting of major sports66, 
cultural or business events, the marketing of its products as premium goods67 or the 
targeting of special-interest groups for tourism, travel and trade. Country branding 
usually aims to increase tourism, investment and trade balances in addition to the 
hardly quantifiable outcomes of a global positive image, such an increased political 
clout, cultural leadership or an influx of global skilled labour into that nation. A country 
image can be defined as: 
                                                      
65
 As the case of Masdar featured in Chapter 6 shall exhibit, such a PR campaign would not necessarily 
mean that a full-fledged energy transition will take place (one interviewee dubbed this project a “tri-
umph of marketing over substance” [Interview no. 85 – R&D, Gulf States]). However, one can argue that 
even a prolonged promotion of renewable energy efforts (without much substance) might serve as an 
entry point to the otherwise rather closed and opaque Middle Eastern energy markets. 
66
 See Berkowitz et al. (2007) for an analysis of China’s efforts to use the 2008 Olympics as a reputational 
asset. Similarly, Qatar is likely to attempt to make use of the 2022 FIFA World Cup it will be hosting. See 
also Gripsrud et al. (2010) for research on the effects of sporting events on a country brand. 
67
 In the last decade, Dubai has attempted to imitate the country-of-origin policy of Switzerland and 
combine this with attributes, such as speed and efficiency to become a global brand name (Interview no. 
92 – R&D, Gulf States). It remains to be seen to what extent this will be transferable into a longstanding 
public perception. Cf. Bagageen (2007) for an urban planner’s view on Dubai’s branding efforts in: 
“Brand Dubai: The Instant City; or the Instantly Recognizable City”. 
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“[…] the sum of beliefs and impressions people hold about places. Images represent a 
simplification of a large number of associations and pieces of information connected 
with a place. They are a product of the mind trying to process and pick out essential 
information from huge amounts of data about a place.” (Kotler & Gertner, 2002, 
pp. 250–251) 
Thus, those country images (and the related attempts to create brands out of them) 
are usually composed of consumers’ beliefs based on personal experience (if existent) 
and the already described imagery shaped by media, social, political and economic 
conditions in a given cultural setting (O'Shaughnessy & O'Shaughnessy, 2000, pp. 57–
58). Bearing in mind that most members of the public are unlikely to have any directly 
conceived, strong stances towards distant countries, there is large potential for active 
country marketing of resource-rich states. 
It is therefore not surprising that particularly the states on the Arabian Peninsula, are 
in a race both to bolster the positive public imagery and to generate associations con-
nected with their names68. 
Arguably, the most successful Gulf State in that regard is Qatar, a country that has 
emerged as a well-known and -respected member of the international community 
through its proactive policy initiatives. Peterson maintains that, like other small or mi-
cro states aiming to be recognized on a global scale, Qatar attempts to occupy a 
“unique niche whereby the small state provides a service or commodity that benefits 
neighbours, the region, or the broader world” (Peterson, 2006, p. 724).69 
As shown in the case of Abu Dhabi’s Masdar Initiative, a comprehensive and well-
advertised renewable energy initiative can have the character of such a niche. Again, 
the actual outcome of this is difficult to quantify. However, the perceived greening of 
one of the largest oil and gas exporters worldwide and the hosting of the Arab world’s 
only international organisation speaks for itself, as it is unlikely that Abu Dhabi would 
                                                      
68
 The North African oil states are much less active on that front. This, however, does not mean that 
public diplomacy or an improvement of their image would remain out of their interest or reach.  
69
 Examples of this niche strategy: “Kuwait (formerly important player in gold imports/re-exports, dhow 
building and trade); Bahrain (regional commercial headquarters, financial services, regional service in-
dustries, and a weekend resort for neighbouring states); Dubai (gold imports/re-exports, emergence as 
a regional entrepot, free trade zone, consumer bargains, and tourism)” (Peterson, 2006, p. 742). 
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have been successful in its bid to house the new International Renewable Energy 
Agency (IRENA) had it not launched the multi-billion dollar Masdar Initiative. There is 
scope for this to be copied by other oil-wealthy Arab states through similar initiatives. 
Indeed, sustainability-related initiatives could be an important driver for the spread of 
renewable energies in hydrocarbons-rich Arab states that are struggling with their pub-
lic image both in terms of environmental issues as well as with regards to the nature of 
their political systems.  
In the long run, marketing tools will not be able to gloss over the hard facts that are 
revealed by investment, R&D, legal and electricity output indicators. If carefully man-
aged, the benefit of branding, however, might outlast the actual achievements. 
In conclusion, the relevant research question regarding that area is: 
- Is country branding a catalyst in the spread of renewable energies? 
 
3.3. Regime-level factors 
As discussed upon introducing the MLP perspective in Subchapter  2.3, the regime level 
is arguably the key layer of socio-technical systems. Here, the dominant market players 
negotiate structures, interact with other major societal regimes and decide which 
types of innovations will be given the room to develop from niches into regime-wide 
standards. This subchapter identifies the key hypothesized regime factors that are 
thought to be relevant to renewable energy policy in resource-wealthy Arab states. As 
was the case in the previous subchapter, each discussion of general regime-level driv-
ers in Arab energy markets will conclude with one or two subsidiary research questions 
that will inform the questionnaire for the empirical research and further discussion of 
the subject matter in Parts B and C. 
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3.3.1. Technological regime 
3.3.1.1. Challenges for the power sector 
Although rapidly growing the energy systems of most Arab resource-rich states remain 
relatively small (see Table 9). 
Table 9: Electricity systems in resource-rich Arab countries 
 
Source: EIA, 2010.
70
  
However, as users enjoy a double subsidy in electricity prices (see Subsection  3.3.2.2), 
the demand for power is rising sharply. Instead of showing a flattening curve like in 
most mid-to high income countries, electricity demand is constantly on the rise (see 
Figure 13). While European OECD countries have electricity demand growth rates from 
1-2 per cent per annum,71 primary electricity demand in the hydrocarbons-wealthy 
Arab states rose on average 5.3 per cent between 1999 and 2009 in MENA (Al Masah 
Capital Ltd., 2011, p. 7). In the UAE and Saudi Arabia figures were substantially higher, 
with a 6.1 and 9.6 per cent growth rate per annum between 2000 and 2007 respective-
ly, and an average growth rate of 2.5 per cent per year can be expected until 2035 (US 
                                                      
70
 This table is based on the statistical database of the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). The 
data was provided on the EIA website http://www.eia.gov/countries, access date: 28 February 2011. 
71
 Due to the global economic downturn, global electricity demand sank for the first time in more than 
30 years in 2010. In general, however, electricity generation in OECD Europe can be expected to in-
crease by 1.1 per cent per annum on average. Most long-term EU member states have mature electricity 
markets and stable, if not decreasing population numbers. Thus, most of the demand growth can be 
expected from new EU member states with stronger population and industrial growth patterns (US 
Energy Information Administration, 2010, p. 84). 
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Energy Information Administration, 2010, p. 89). This poses a major challenge to the 
national power sectors.  
Figure 13: Electricity demand perspectives of some MENA countries 
 
Source: Kharbat, 2010.  
Along with the strongly rising domestic consumption which, at peak hours, constitutes 
up to 60% of the national electricity demand,72 energy intensive industries represent 
the second demand driver. The asset of cheap oil and gas, as well as subsidized elec-
tricity, has made the region attractive for these industries, which has resulted in the 
fact that five of the six of the most energy intensive industries (steel, styrene, propyl-
ene, polyethylene, ethylene and aluminium) have 25% of their global production ca-
pacities in the GCC alone (see Figure 14) (Al Masah Capital Ltd., 2011, p. 7). In addition 
to that, in the entire MENA region, steel production is expected to rise by an average 
of 25% per annum to reach 54.9 million tons of steel per annum by 2012 (69th OECD 
Steel Committee Meeting, 2010). 
                                                      
72
 Confirmed by various interviewees (Interview no.50, public stakeholder; Interview no. 87, R&D; Inter-
view no. 65, private and public investors, all Gulf States). The main domestic demand driver in summer is 
power for cooling. 
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Figure 14: Announced capacity expansion in energy intensive industries in % as of 2006 
 
Source: Al Masah Capital Ltd., 2011, p. 7.  
National utilities face problems providing for the annually rising power demand. This, 
in turn, poses a threat to the economic development of regions that are remote from 
the main grids and the centres of power production. Electricity and gas shortages oc-
cur, for instance, in the smaller emirates of Ajman, Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairah on an 
annual basis. As a result, local economic development is hampered by these shortages 
or the inability of utilities to connect business or industry customers with consumers in 
a reasonable time frame.73 As will be discussed in Chapter  5, these emirates are part of 
the UAE’s national grid and are powered by the Abu Dhabi-funded Federal Electricity 
and Water Authority (FEWA). This issue sparked a controversial debate in the UAE’s 
Federal National Council (FNC)74 causing representatives of the Northern emirates to 
                                                      
73
 One interviewee stated: “In Ajman, 15-20% of the industrial projects p.a. cannot be realized because 
they could not be connected to the grid – there is simply no power for them! The same is true for RAK 
and Um al Quwain and Fujairah. These are low-income emirates, like developing countries. But because 
Abu Dhabi and Dubai are so wealthy, we don’t get any development funds because on average, our 
country is high income!” (Interview no. 56 – Public stakeholder, Gulf States) 
74
 The UAE’s Federal National Council is the advisory body of the UAE government. Of its 40 members, 
20 are directly appointed by the rulers of the 7 emirates of the UAE while 20 members are elected by an 
electoral college consisting of approximately 12 000 UAE citizens. While this is by no means a fully dem-
ocratic form of political representation, the FNC remains nonetheless the only element of proto-
democracy in the UAE federal structure as many of its citizens confidently demand universal suffrage. 
According to article 68 of the UAE constitution, seats in the FNC are distributed as follows:  
Abu Dhabi 8 seats; Dubai 8 seats; Sharjah 6 seats; Ras AI-Khaimah 6 seats; Ajman 4 seats; Um aI -Quwain 
4 seats; Fujairah 4 seats. 
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accuse FEWA of poor planning and to question the responsible federal minister of en-
ergy, Mohammad Al Hamli, in the FNC (gulfnews.com, 2010b).75  
As Figure 15 shows, the unrestricted demand rise forms a major problem for Abu Dha-
bi’s power sector. Gas demand, the primary energy carrier for the UAE, is just about to 
exceed the local production causing gas shortages and necessitating imports from 
neighbouring gas exporters, such as Qatar, via the Dolphin pipeline (Krane, 2010b, 
p. 15). 
Figure 15: UAE oil and gas production and consumption 
 
Source: Krane, 2010b, p. 15. 
In conclusion, the following research question frames the renewable energies-related 
challenges or potentials for the domestic power sectors:  
- To what extent are renewable energies employed to reduce pressure on the 
domestic conventional power plant park? 
 
 
                                                      
75
 See Krane (2010b) for an in-depth discussion of these issues. 
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3.3.1.2. Renewable energy and the nuclear alternative 
In light of the strong demand rise, stakeholders explore different ways for further ca-
pacity enhancement by means of nuclear energy. Most Arab countries have run civil 
(or military) nuclear programmes at one point in time (International Institute for Stra-
tegic Studies, 2008). Besides domestic policy elements, nuclear energy appears to be 
an excellent choice for energy decision-makers in resource-rich Arab states. Nuclear 
power plants are able to supply large parts of their national base load capacities and 
are a strongly capital intensive undertaking – typical megaprojects that fit well into the 
country-specific development pattern outlined above. In addition to that, the authori-
tarian regime structures and the virtual inexistence of independent civil society organi-
sations ensure that obstacles facing the deployment of nuclear energy in the west, 
such as local or civil society pressure or lengthy planning procedures, are not an issue 
in the target region. 
On various occasions, it has been claimed that the load combination of nuclear for 
base load, gas-fired power plants for middle load and solar technologies for peak load 
were the optimal power mix for our category of states (Interview no. 58, public stake-
holder and Interview no. 84, R&D, both Gulf States). This, however, is a disputed con-
tention. While it is beyond the scope of this work to systematically analyse all technol-
ogy and policy implications of nuclear energy vs. renewable energy in this region,76 in 
general this work follows Verbruggen’s argument that renewable and nuclear power 
options are by no means an ideal combination for low-carbon energy systems, but that 
in many ways, the installation of nuclear electricity prevents the wide-spread deploy-
ment of renewable energy in the respective energy systems (Verbruggen, 2008). 
In contrast to that, the MENA region is located in a high-resource potential region: part 
of the global “sun belt”, it receives an average solar radiation intensity of 2000-2800 
kWh/m2 per year (see Table 10). While not all areas in the region are ideally suited for 
concentrating solar power (CSP) technology, other areas could make use of the more 
                                                      
76
 See Marktanner/Najmeddine (2011), Supersberger/Führer (2011) and particularly the two papers by 
Jewell (2011a & b) for a further discussion of this topic. 
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diffuse light by the spread of PV panels. In addition to that, there exists also a signifi-
cant potential for wind energy in those parts of the region that have shores on the 
coasts of the Atlantic (Morocco, West Sahara), the Indian Ocean (parts of the UAE, 
Oman, Yemen) and the Red Sea (Egypt). 
Table 10: Wind and solar data for MENA countries 
 
Source: United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) & Federal Ministry for the Environment, Na-
ture Conservation and Nuclear Safety, 2007, pp. 13; 16. 
Furthermore, local demand patterns promote the domestic spread of renewable tech-
nologies (especially solar), as standard demand curves in the region follow the sun 
both on a daily as well as on an annual basis, in the sense that the demand peaks are 
at least partially parallel to sunlight maximums (daily: noon-afternoon; annually: sum-
mer months).77 
In conclusion, the subsidiary research question in this field is: 
- Is the nuclear option seen as a competitor in resources or as a mutually exclu-
sive form of power production? 
                                                      
77
 See the corresponding case study chapters for demand curves (Figure 35 and Figure 45 below). While 
the afternoon peak is indeed by and large parallel to the sunlight, the evening peak forms a challenge if 
it was to be largely supplied by renewable electricity. In the Arab world this is due to the relative lack of 
constant industry demand with the domestic demand patterns tending to dominate national demand 
curves (Interview no. 45 – R&D, EU). 
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3.3.2. User and market regime 
3.3.2.1. Market conditions 
While innovation processes in the renewable energies sector can be described by mul-
tiple models, the key material steps in this process are presented in Figure 16. Follow-
ing this approach, fundamental support areas for the uptake of any new technology 
are basic R&D, early test applications, first real-condition demonstrations, as well as 
protected niche markets, is likely to be successful. This “technology push” phase, how-
ever, can only be successful with private and public sector funding, as these nascent 
technology innovations cannot single-handedly compete with strong system actors. 
Thus, until a commercial viability can be reached and market forces drive the future 
development of such innovations (“market pull”) a set of promotion instruments is 
necessary, as has also been the result of the policy design discussions in Subchap-
ter  2.4. 
Figure 16: The innovation process 
 
Source: Metz, 2007. 
For renewable electricity, this means that, first and foremost, the price differential 
between renewable and conventional power has to be bridged (see Figure 17). If a 
national economy runs in line with market rules, this is the key instrument available, as 
companies will only make investment decisions if they have direct or strategic business 
incentives. Further dimensions discussed by this thesis, such as climate change or na-
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tion branding, will only be relevant to such a decision if there is a quantifiable link to 
the company’s performance. This, however, is unlikely to be the case.  
Figure 17: Cost of electricity generation in the MENA region 
 
Source: Krane, 2010b, p. 24. 
The manner in which the price gap between conventional power and renewable elec-
tricity is closed is irrelevant from a company’s point of view. A wide range of tools, 
from technology subsidies, tax reductions, favourable business conditions, raise of 
power prices, as well as green certificates is possible.78 
More than 40 governments worldwide (Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature 
Conservation and Nuclear Safety, 2010) have so far opted for feed-in-tariff (FIT) mod-
els in accordance with the successful German renewable energies act (EEG). With its 
EEG, Germany has long been the frontrunner in renewable energies since 2001, when 
Germany guaranteed producers the right to feed into the national grid with fixed FITs. 
The price gap between conventional electricity prices and the guaranteed FIT is paid by 
all electricity consumers amounting to an annual premium of 5.3€bn in 2009 (Federal 
Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, 2010). A differ-
                                                      
78
 Publications discussing and comparing different renewable energy promotion tools are abundant. See, 
for instance, EIB on financing renewable energies (European Investment Bank, 2010); Madlener/Stagl 
(2005) and Folkmanis (2011) for trading schemes and Philibert (2011) for a discussion on renewable 
energy vs. climate policies. A most comprehensive list of concrete government measures is presented by 
EU DG TREN (European Commission DG TREN, 2011b, pp. 4–5). 
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ent model is the renewable portfolio standard, a system that is, for instance, used in 
the UK under the name of “Renewables Obligation Certificates” (ROCs). This regulation 
obliges electricity suppliers to reach a target renewable electricity rate within their 
overall production portfolio. Entirely designed as a market-based tool, ROCs are dis-
tributed to renewable electricity producers by the national regulator, Ofgem (Office of 
Gas and Electricity Markets). While the number of ROCs provided is MWh-based, dif-
ferent types of renewable electricity production obtain different ROC payments. Sup-
pliers are obliged to purchase ROCs for a given percentage of their overall energy pro-
duction. When the pre-determined target is not met, a penalty payment has to be paid 
by the company. While in the FIT model renewable energy premiums can only be al-
tered through a legislative change, the ROC model follows a market mechanism: a 
shortage of ROCs increases the prices for ROCs, which encourages the market entry of 
more RE producers. This, in turn, decreases the ROC’s values again until an equilibrium 
price is established. 
Research has long argued whether market-based mechanisms such as the ROC are 
superior to FIT models in terms of installed capacity, electricity price, or market open-
ness (Butler & Neuhoff, 2004; Fouquet, Grotz, Sawin, & Vassilakos, 2005). While each 
system has its advantages in theory, actual developments of the last years have shown 
a higher performance of FIT systems. According to the UK Renewable Energy Strategy, 
for instance, the UK only produced 5.5% of renewable electricity in 2008. FIT-countries 
like Spain, Denmark, or Germany have far exceeded that quota. This does not mean 
that the FIT-model would be the only reasonable option for the hydrocarbons-rich Ar-
ab states. As will be demonstrated, their energy systems show strong dissimilarities 
compared to the ones where FITs have so far been most successful. In addition to that, 
the interviews have shown that many energy experts in the region would call for gov-
ernment-controlled IPP-models that might in fact lean more towards ROCs.  
So far, hydrocarbons-rich Arab states have been cautious about introducing any com-
monly accessible promotion instruments for renewable energy. If so, like in the Algeri-
an case, they have opted for a (flawed) FIT model prioritizing the incumbent system 
actors, which have formerly been the state utilities, which monopolise the power sup-
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ply. Usually, small, independent power producers cannot benefit from the FIT systems 
as renewables are produced by large utilities which do not disclose information per-
taining to their contracts with government. In addition, the transmission system opera-
tors are not obliged to purchase the electricity produced by independent power pro-
ducers, and customers do not have the liberty to choose their power providers; two 
essential elements for the spread of renewables in Europe. In light of the previous dis-
cussions in Chapter 2, a question that needs to be asked is to what extent can Europe-
an policy design models be transferred and if these would form a necessary condition 
for the spread of renewable energies in hydrocarbons-wealthy Arab states or whether 
other policy models that more closely match the local governance structures would 
not yield better results. This issue will be discussed in the policy design sections of both 
case studies. 
Another regulatory issue, which puts a structural burden on the spread of renewable 
energies, is the legal obligation of power providers to exclusively purchase the cheap-
est power available from power producers. While, on first glance, this appears to be a 
commercially reasonable regulatory measure this can develop into a major structural 
barrier for renewable electricity. As one senior interviewee in Abu Dhabi said: 
One of the key issues that make it hard for us to integrate renewables on a regulatory 
level is that our electricity law [DK: Abu Dhabi’s] demands from us that only the most 
economic form of electricity production enters our grid. (Interview no. 51 – public 
stakeholder, Gulf States) 
In conclusion, the guiding empirical questions for this section are the following: 
- Is there any system of renewable energy promotion in place?  
- Do stakeholders believe that the transfer of European renewable energy policy 
design models is a viable method for the spread of renewable electricity capaci-
ties in the region or would indigenous policy models work better?  
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3.3.2.2. The system of double subsidies 
Electricity markets in resource-rich Arab countries are dominated by fossil fuel based 
energy production and a system of double price subsidies.  
Abu Dhabi, for example, supplied its power plants with gas at US$ 1-2 per million Brit-
ish thermal units (BTU); which equals to selling oil at a price of US$ 6-12 per barrel 
(Krane, 2010b); a clear underpricing given current world oil market price levels. This 
means that the suppliers of these plants, the national oil companies (NOCs) forego 
substantial annual income, as they incur high opportunity costs for not being able to 
sell their products at world market prices. Consequently, it would be in their commer-
cial interest to burn less fossil fuels domestically and to increase the share of any sub-
stitute fuel in the national electricity systems.79 
Figure 18: Cost and income structure of a typical GCC utility 
 
Source: Krane, 2010b, p. 23. 
                                                      
79
 The extreme case for this is Saudi Arabia, where a sizeable share of the country’s energy supply is still 
produced by the burning of heavy oils. In contrast to the environmental issue, this is a commercially 
plausible solution. One interviewee stated:  
“The reason for that is that in Saudi Arabia, their oil & gas production has only very little unassociated 
gas. That’s why they cannot increase the gas production without increasing the oil production. This extra 
oil, on the other hand, cannot be sold on the world market due to OPEC quotas – so economically, it 
makes for them much more sense to go for burning oil.” (Interview no. 68 – national and international 
power sector, Gulf States) 
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In addition to the power generation side, electricity for consumers on the demand side 
is equally subsidized. Continuing the example of Abu Dhabi, the above-described sys-
tem of power generation subsidy allows utilities to produce and distribute electricity 
for 5-6 US$ cents per kWh. Residential customers pay 2 US$ cents or less per kWh, one 
fifth of the asking price in the United States. This implies a total subsidy of 8 US$ cents 
per kWh (Krane, 2010b, p. 11) compared to US prices. These price differentials can only 
be achieved through active government subsidy (see Figure 18), which incur a heavy 
burden on the state budgets. 
This system of double subsidies structurally favours the already existing modes of 
power production. In fact, in some countries, such as Kuwait, where the utilities and 
the NOCs are owned by the state, there is not even a proper separation of balances 
between the sales of the national oil company Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) 
and the national utility (Interview no. 84 – R&D, Gulf States). These interlinkages build 
on informal networks and create path dependencies that make it difficult for new 
forms of power production to enter the market, particularly for those that need an 
additional premium to close the price gap in LEC of oil/gas powered power plants and 
other technologies, such as various forms of renewable electricity production. Thus, 
electricity pricing remains a key issue for the uptake of renewables in resource-rich 
Arab countries. 
The relevant subsidiary research question is: 
- Are strategies developed to create a level playing field for all types of energy 
carriers by either removing subsidies for conventional power or by integrating 
renewable electricity into the existing subsidy schemes? 
 
3.3.3. Socio-cultural regime 
3.3.3.1. Social acceptance of RETs, potential role of religion or environmental 
ethics 
While prima facie, the social acceptance of renewable energies may not matter much, 
indirectly, it is a key determinant of success. First, only if renewable energies are re-
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garded as a more desirable form of power production than conventional or nuclear 
power there will be a general willingness to pay a premium price for this or, in heavily 
subsidized power systems, like the target countries, there will be a willingness to sub-
sidize these forms of energy production. In addition to that, should small-scale renew-
able energy programmes be the model of choice for decision-makers, the population 
would actually need to implement them first by installing solar panels on their roof-
tops or carrying out similar measures. 
Secondly, although the hydrocarbons-wealthy Arab states are far from being democra-
cies, decision-making elites may opt for a substantial renewable electricity programme 
if they feel renewables are somewhat supported by the domestic population (or at 
least not openly opposed). 
However, as Assefa and Frostell show for the case of Sweden, the level of general 
awareness towards technology choices for power production is usually low (Assefa & 
Frostell, 2007) and in-depth discussion rarely leaves expert circles.  
An important role in awareness-building – and action expressing a heightened sensi-
tiveness for sustainability issues on a local level – could also be fostered through a 
pronounced focus on environmental ethics, promoted by schools, universities or reli-
gious institutions. While authors such as Zsolnai (2011), Callicot (2011) and Schmidtz & 
Willott (2002) have discussed the more general features of environmental ethics and 
environmental education, other researchers such as Shrader-Frechette (2011) have 
argued for the global use of renewables rather than nuclear power on philosophical 
grounds. Furthermore, the question of how to develop global valid environmental eth-
ics in the face of de facto moral and religious pluralism has also been discussed (Mari-
etta, 1993). Marietta makes it a point to abandon monistic ethical approaches in the 
face of the globalized world where the “other voices” must seriously be considered. 
Yet, he does not delve into local ethical traditions to further elaborate his point. Unlike 
Marietta, regional philosophers such as Jain (2006) or Nuyen (2011), study and review 
East Asian traditional religious and philosophical approaches and explore their interre-
lationship with environmental ethics. The nexus between traditional communities, 
regional ethical traditions and global environmental ethics has yet to be fully explored 
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in research literature pertaining to the the Arab world, which usually focuses on Islam 
and neglects to explore secular approaches. This is an important research desideratum 
that needs to be addressed. 
A related research question is: 
- How widespread is the knowledge of renewable energies in the target coun-
tries? Does religion play a role in legitimizing this energy technology?80 
 
3.3.3.2. Labour markets 
Technology innovation as a means of national competence building and the diversifica-
tion of national income emerges as an important policy driver. As shown by the exam-
ple of Germany’s creation of 278,000 renewable energy-related jobs in the last 15 
years (Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, 
2009, p. 31), the production of renewable energy technology for the domestic, region-
al and the world market can become important factors in upgrading a nation’s position 
in a major growth market in the decades to come. 
In addition to the purely economic aspects, this job creation can play a role in absorb-
ing the large youth bulge of most Arab countries. According to A.T. Kearney (AMEInfo, 
2009c), the Middle East has the opportunity to become a boom region for solar energy 
technology in the next 10 years with additional 9,000 MW of concentrated solar power 
capacities until 2020 and more than 40,000 MW until 2030. A further 100,000 jobs 
could be created in the region in the next decade. Developing private sector jobs can 
play a vital role in the restructuring of the Arab domestic labour markets, which, par-
ticularly in the oil states, have massive but ill-performing public sector workforces. 
Particularly in the Gulf States, integrating nationals into the public sector enables the 
rentier states to distribute their generous welfare package through these positions 
                                                      
80
 The wording of the second part of the research question focuses on the role of religion in order to test 
whether religion could indeed be identified as key mover in that regard or whether – as discussed in the 
text – an approach based on environmental ethics and secular philosophy would not be more appropri-
ate. 
109 
 
(Interview no. 53 – public stakeholder, Gulf States). In combination with the substantial 
salaries of even low and mid-level jobs in the public sector, a main reason behind the 
Gulf nationals’ low interest in private sector jobs, Gulf governments pay their nationals 
premiums to work in the private sector (Interview no. 83 – R&D, Gulf States). In con-
trast, the labour markets in Algeria or Libya resemble labour markets of “communist 
states prior to the collapse of the USSR” (Henry & Springborg, 2001, p. 6): inefficient 
and poorly paid public sector and underpaid private sector jobs are the norm.  
In the context of rising power demands and rising numbers of citizens expecting em-
ployment, the comparative labour-intensity of renewable energies is a potential policy 
driver for the region. Compared with nuclear energy or gas-fired power plants, it is 
claimed that renewable energies create more jobs per kWh, and can thus contribute 
their share to depressurize Middle Eastern labour markets.81 
A key research questions in terms of labour markets is thus: 
- Is the job creation potential actually employed by promoters of renewable 
electricity in the country? 
 
3.3.4. Policy regime: Regime-level and transregional governance struc-
tures 
3.3.4.1. Renewable energy targets and actual performance 
The integration of substantial renewable electricity capacities into national power 
pools poses a major planning challenge to grid operators. In addition to that, states 
with a mid-term plan to increase their renewables quota will usually develop a national 
energy strategy – or a slightly less high-level planning document as a functional equiva-
                                                      
81
 The claim that subsidized renewable energies in fact produce sustainable jobs has been hotly debated. 
While Spanish researchers maintain that on the whole, renewable energies harm the economic system 
(Calzada Álvarez et al., 2009), Hentrich et al (2004) support this argumentation in their analysis of labour 
market effects in Germany. 
While both sides mainly acknowledge the creation of new employment opportunities in the renewable 
energy sector itself, calculations differ regarding the effects on other sectors of the economy, as well as 
further macroeconomic and environmental costs/benefits. 
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lent – that outlines a country’s mid- to long-term electricity strategy. Until recently, 
countries in the MENA region hardly had these documents published; and usually, the 
renewable energy quotas remained low.  
This situation has changed most recently: in Arab states, national renewable energy 
strategies have been launched or at least public interest expressed. Starting from the 
East, Oman has expressed its interest in developing a renewable energy strategy and 
launched an exploratory study in 2008 (Authority for Electricity Regulation, Oman, 
2008), while the UAE’s efforts to become a landmark in this area culminate in the 
Masdar Initiative, which will be analysed below in greater detail (see Chapter  5). In 
June 2009, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia announced joint-projects between the nation-
al oil company Saudi Aramco and Japan's Showa exploring the possibility of a solar 
power in the Kingdom in addition to other initiatives in the pipeline. 82 In North Africa, 
Algeria has set itself an ambitious 5% renewable energies target for 2015 with a de-
signed feed-in tariff, while both Morocco and Tunisia have embarked on ambitious 
renewable energy plans (Ministre de l'industrie, de l'énergie et des petites et moy-
ennes entreprises, 2009; Kumetat & Hamiane, 2011). Meanwhile Egypt, the Arab 
world’s pioneer in renewable energies, continues with both its ambitious solar and 
wind energy programmes. Table 11 presents an overview of currently published re-
newable energy targets or schemes in the Arab world: 
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 Cf. AMEInfo (2009a). See also Dargin (2009) and Apricum Advisers (2010) for recent activities, which 
include the foundation of the King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST) in 2009 and 
the King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (KACARE) in 2010. During the inauguration of 
KAUST, Saudi Arabia’s oil minister al-Naimi stated “in the same way we are an oil exporter, we can also 
be an exporter of power” (Lewis, 2011). However, it must be stressed that Saudi Arabia has so far not 
given itself a binding renewable energy target, nor does it not allow the on-grid production of renewable 
energies for independent power producers. Also, the legal systems do not provide further financial in-
centives. 
For a more research-based assessment of the Saudi Arabian renewable energy efforts see the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency’s (JICA) study (2009), the scenario research of al-Saleh et al. (2008) 
and al-Saleh’s doctoral dissertation (2010). 
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Table 11: Overview of renewable energy plans in MENA with solar and wind share 
 
Source: own compilation.
83
 
It is striking that the renewables-related efforts of those Arab states without hydrocar-
bons are much more dynamic than those in resource rich Arab states. Reasons for this 
are arguably the more immediate need to supply the national energy demands, as well 
as the more forceful agenda setting by funding agencies as is the case in the hydrocar-
bons rich states. While there is much media attention on renewables in hydrocarbons-
wealthy states, targets in this group of states evidently remain poor or not yet formal-
ized.  
In addition to that, even the announced renewable energy targets are far from being 
realized (see Figure 19). This incongruity between North African targets and reality is 
also powerfully demonstrated in a recent study by the European Investment Bank (Eu-
ropean Investment Bank, 2010). With regards to GCC energy statistics, demand scenar-
ios and targets, one interviewee stated: “It is well known and most people from the 
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 For Kuwait and Abu Dhabi cf. The National (2009), New Energy Finance (2009). 
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power sector will confirm this: most numbers that are published either serve a certain 
political purpose (for instance to demonstrate the need to install nuclear power in the 
UAE given the “scientifically proven strong demand rise”) or their numbers are entirely 
made up” (Interview R&D – EU). 
Figure 19: RE Targets and current realization in North African countries 
 
Source: Vigotti & Kappauf, 2010.  
In conclusion, research questions for this section are:  
- Is there a (binding) strategic document, such as an energy roadmap/blueprint or at 
least a non-binding planning scheme? If so, how does this integrate renewable 
electricity? 
 
3.3.4.2. Regional infrastructure and electricity governance bodies 
This subsection shall introduce the governance bodies regulating the traditional power 
sector in the oil-wealthy Arab states. 
Regional electricity regulation in the Arab states is often established in parallel to the 
political unions. Those sub-regional organizations also reflect historically developed 
113 
 
intra-regional, economic and language ties.84 However, the two regional organisations 
in existence do not have a strong say on energy matters. In the Maghreb, the Arab 
Maghreb Union (AMU) forms the relevant sub-regional organisation. Apart from Egypt 
it consists of all the North African Arab states (Morocco, Algeria, Mauretania, Libya, 
and Tunisia). Given the fact that regional integration between the Maghreb states is 
poor85 and any political rapprochement stalled through the on-going conflict between 
Algeria and Morocco on West Sahara (Martinez, 2006), the AMU’s weak performance 
is therefore expected. Also in terms of energy, the AMU – headed by the Tunisian 
Habib Ben Yahia – is yet to find a way to develop into a significant regional intergov-
ernmental forum.  
In terms of electricity markets, the key governing body for AMU members is the Ma-
ghreb Electricity Committee (Comité Maghrébin de l'Electricité, COMELEC). COMELEC 
was founded under the umbrella of the AMU in 1989 with the goal of strengthening 
regional cooperation of the domestic electricity grids, and to harmonize power mar-
kets ("Le « COMELEC » en bref", no date). Moreover, it is the regional contact point for 
EU-funded initiatives like the Euro-Mediterranean Energy Market Integration (MED-
EMIP) and grid integration (Medring) projects. However, COMELEC has not played a 
key role in many respects because not all AMU states have power interlinkages today. 
The states that operate synchronized grids are Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco (see Fig-
ure 20).  
 
                                                      
84
 This is the case for the Maghreb and the Gulf states. The states of the Mashreq (occ. Palestinian Terri-
tories, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and to some extent Iraq) have not established a functional equivalent to 
the other two sub-regional organisations presented here. 
85
 In “2003 intra-regional trade between the Maghreb countries (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) only 
reached 3% [of total commercial exchange]” Martinez (2006, p. 6). The cost of the poor regional coop-
eration in the Maghreb (French cout du non-Maghreb) has sparked a series of publications; see for in-
stance Ghilès (2010), Hufbauer/Brunel (2008) or the publication by the Moroccan ministry of economy 
(Direction des Etudes et des Prévisions Financières, 2008). 
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Figure 20: Power systems around the Mediterranean basin and open cut-sets 
 
Source: Euro-Mediterranean Energy Market Integration Project (MED-EMIP), 2010c, p. 27. 
In addition to enhanced intra-regional electricity trade a second key asset of the three 
mentioned states is their grid’s synchronisation with the European Network of Trans-
mission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E). The three states joined in 1997 
(Dahome, 2010) forming the South-Eastern Mediterranean Block (see Figure 21) of the 
then-Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity (UCTE),86 whose 
240,000 kilometres of high-voltage transmission lines connect 26 European countries 
(Fairley, 2008).87 
                                                     
86
 On July 1 2009 UCTE’s operations were taken over by ENTSO-E. 
87
 While Turkey’s grid has been synchronized in September 2010 (European Network of Transmission 
Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E), 2010), all other Arab Mediterranean states still lack a synchronisa-
tion. Thus, the Mediterranean power ring remains open. The synchronisation attempt between Tunisia 
and Libya failed on 21 November 2005. See MED-EMIP Study II (Euro-Mediterranean Energy Market 
Integration Project (MED-EMIP), 2010a, pp. 17–25) for an in-depth analysis of the synchronisation fail-
ure. A new synchronisation attempt is scheduled for the following years. 
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Figure 21: The Euro-Mediterranean power systems 
 
Source: Resources and Logistics, 2010, p. 26. 
In principle this fact makes it possible for North African electricity to be tradable on the 
Spanish electricity exchange88, an important precondition for a meaningful electricity 
interrelationship with a large renewables component. Although various other connec-
tions have been planned (see Figure 20), the only physical power interconnection be-
tween the Maghreb and the European grid system exits on the Straits of Gibraltar be-
tween Spain and Morocco. This connection has developed into an important source of 
power for the Moroccan electricity system89 that is struggling to keep up with rising 
demand, a reason why the original 700MW capacity of the interconnection has been 
doubled to 1.4 GW in 2006 (Benabid, 2009). However, the North African-European 
electricity interrelationship is currently largely an import of power to North Africa (see 
                                                      
88
 Since 2001, the public electric utilities ONE (Morocco) and Sonelgaz (Algeria) have acted as licensed 
traders on the Spanish electricity exchange platform Operador del Mercado Ibérico de Energía (OMEL) 
(Brand & Zingerle, 2011). 
89
 In 2008, for example, the national Moroccan utility Office National d’Electricité (ONE) purchased 15.4 
per cent of its total annual supply on the European power market and imported it to Morocco through 
the trans-continental interconnector (Fairley, 2008). 
116 
 
also Figure 22). For a large-scale export of (renewable) electricity to Europe however, 
new capacity would need to be established.90 
Figure 22: Spanish-Moroccan electricity trade 1997-2008 in GWh 
 
Source: Garcia, 2010. 
The AMU’s functional equivalent in the Gulf region is the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC). Its member states are Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, and the 
UAE.91 Based in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, the GCC is headed by Abdullatif bin Rashid al 
Zayani and has been successful in many, although by far not all, aspects of economic 
integration in the Gulf region.92 Energy matters, however, remain largely out of the 
scope of this organisation. 
In terms of regional cooperation in the power sector, the GCC grid has attained major 
significance in recent years. The GCC interconnection plan, begun in 2008, covers three 
phases of interconnection (see Figure 23). In July 2009, the grids of Saudi Arabia, Qa-
tar, Bahrain and Kuwait were linked in a first phase. Yusuf Janahi, chairman of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council Interconnection Authority (GCCIA) announced: 
                                                     
90
 For a further discussion of Euro-Mediterranean energy issues (with a focus on Algeria) see Subchapter 
6.5. 
91
 See Alasfoor (2007) for a historical review of the GCC.  
92
 In May 2009, for instance, the UAE pulled out of the plan for a common GCC currency after not being 
awarded the seat on the would-be GCC central bank, for which it had launched bids from 2004 onwards. 
More recently, however, UAE ministers underlined that their interest in a common currency remained 
strong (Thaindian News, 2010). 
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“With the successful linking of the electricity grids (...), the member countries are close 
to achieving their goal of having a joint power grid for all six member states. The grid 
aims at guaranteeing an adequate supply of power even in emergencies and also re-
ducing the cost of power generation in member countries. There will of course be other 
economic gains.” (BusinessIntelligence Middle East, 2009b). 
Thus, two GCC grids will operate for a period of time and only in a third phase; these 
will be integrated into one GCC Interconnection Grid.93 In the same month, all GCC 
member states except Oman signed a power sharing agreement in order to regulate 
the flow of electricity between their countries.  
Figure 23: Stages and interconnections of the GCC grid 
 
Source: Miller, 2005.  
The underlying reason for the GCC grid is the continuously growing power demand and 
the at times poor capacity of Gulf national utilities to cope with situation. In addition to 
                                                      
93
 Phase one includes a double-circuit 400kV, 50Hz line from Al-Zour in Kuwait to Ghunan in Saudi Arabia 
with an intermediate connection at Fadhili in the Kingdom and associated substations and a back-to-
back HVDC interconnection to the 380kV, 60Hz system at Fadhili, a double circuit 400kV comprises 
overhead lines and a submarine link from Ghunan to Al-Jasra in Bahrain and associated substations 
(BusinessIntelligence Middle East, 2009b). 
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that, the GCC utilities can optimize their power production, as well as reserve capaci-
ties, if they are able to rely on other regional electricity systems.  
Interviewees were divided on the question of whether the GCC states would actually 
allow for a full-fledged common electricity market as this would necessitate a trans-
parent and common electricity pricing mechanism.94 As highlighted in Section  3.3.2, 
electricity pricing issues are sensitive in all resource-rich Arab states. It might thus be 
the case that electricity exchanges would be performed on a case-by-case basis, for 
which no prices would be disclosed. In the first stages of the GCC interconnection grid 
(phase I – see Figure 23), negotiations between summer power exports from Qatar to 
Kuwait failed (The Peninsula, 2009). There are a wide range of regulatory and commer-
cial issues that need to be clarified before any form of intra-GCC electricity trade can 
take off. 
Research questions for this section are: 
- Do the regional electricity governance bodies promote political or infrastruc-
ture projects that enhance the role of renewable electricity in the target coun-
try? Is external demand a pull factor in that respect? 
 
3.4. Niche-level developments 
As was established in Chapter 2, the niche level can be regarded as the central socio-
technical layer with regards to system innovations. As a consequence, a particular fo-
cus has been put on questions of R&D, technology transfer and the development of 
the technological regime for RETs as a whole. The last issue, however, only comprises 
key elements of technology developments; more in-depth discussions can be found in 
engineering and science-oriented energy literature outlined above. 
 
                                                      
94
 Interviewee no. 52 (public stakeholder, Gulf States): “Due to price distortions and intransparent subsi-
dies in all states, there is no prospect of a common GCC electricity market in the medium term. The grid 
will only be there to share reserve capacity for blackouts and to build redundancy for summer peaks.” 
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3.4.1. Science regime: R&D and industry structures, technology transfer 
strategies 
For niche-based innovation to develop, research and development policies are of stra-
tegic importance. In the field of technology innovation such as renewable electricity 
generation, this is strongly interlinked with the area of industry structures as most 
technological innovations are supported by or take place in the framework of industry 
research. Thus, the two elements of R&D strategies and national industry structures 
will be covered together.  
As early as 1982, a major OAPEC report identified the lack of R&D capacities as a major 
barrier to the domestic spread of renewable energy. It particularly criticized two is-
sues: 
The “pathetically lacking” flow of information and the general lack of cooperation be-
tween Arab countries was the first barrier cited. Second, the following list of further 
impediments hampering the two major types of institutions conducting renewable 
energy research (research centres and universities), was compiled: 
- Lack of allocation of resources and manpower 
- Weak relevance of tasks and projects 
- Lack of education of local industries and end-users 
- No financial stability 
- Lack of management policies 
- Lack of confidence in Arab talent and the dominance of foreign advisors and 
educators (Kettani & Malik, 1982, p. 118). 
Arguably, many of these issues apply to the Arab R&D landscape today. However, the 
idea of the technology cluster in form of economic cities, free zones, or other 
megastructures had not yet been fully developed. Besides the most straightforward 
function of income generation through national economic diversification, the goal of 
these initiatives in very different industry sectors is to upgrade the skill level of the 
national labour force and to enhance the ownership in key future technologies. Often, 
these industry clusters are interlinked with university research programmes. For in-
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stance, the UAE’s Masdar Initiative or the Algerian Institute for Renewable Energy and 
Energy Efficiency (IAEREE) that will be established in the gas district of Hassi R’Mel 
works in close cooperation with the national renewable energy operator New Energy 
Algeria (NEAL). 
These initiatives are designed to improve the performance in higher education ratings 
(Giles, 2006) and patent developments in strategic research areas. This appears partic-
ularly urgent in the renewables sector, where, according to a recent study, patented 
renewable energy technology innovations with a relevance to world markets are negli-
gible (Lee et al., 2009). Not only is there no MENA country among the top 10 patent 
holders at the moment (Figure 24) but the company- or the more detailed (sub-
)technology-specific ratings this research reports also do not show any Arab state 
listed in any rating. 
Figure 24: Share of renewable energy related patents by geographical origin – top 10 countries 
 
Source: Lee et al., 2009, p. 15. 
This notion is also confirmed by an interviewee representing a global industry associa-
tion: 
 “The entire Middle East region is a black box for us. We do not have any formal con-
tacts there, not to experts, not to industry associations. Basically, we don’t really know 
what is going on there.” (Interview no. 38 – national and international power sector, 
Europe) 
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This underperformance is characteristic for the innovation system in Arab countries. As 
Nour notes: 
“Neither the Gulf nor the Mediterranean countries possessed sufficient financial and 
human resources necessary to promote S&T95 for development. Hence, they have mani-
festly lagged behind the rapidly advancing Asian countries in terms of S&T input and 
output indicators; the poor S&T input indicators lead to poor S&T output indicators. In 
both regions most R&D and S&T activities are allocated within the public and university 
sectors, with very small contribution from the private sector” (Nour, 2005, p. 249). 
This awareness of the domestic underperformance in most S&T areas forms the back-
ground for the widely reiterated call for technology transfer by the Arab political lead-
ership. Technology transfer as a mode of triggering domestic innovation is not a new 
research area. While classic authors of innovation theory such as Rogers (2003) pre-
dominantly focus on the conditions for the spread of technology innovations from a 
domestic point of view, the technology transfer in the renewable energies sector has 
recently been covered by Wilkins and Sawin (Wilkins, 2002; Sawin, 2004). These au-
thors, as well as Usha Rao and Kishore, underline that technology diffusion on an in-
ternational level is a complex issue, particularly in the case of renewable energies, 
where currently, all markets are government-created, yet the patents are privately 
owned and usually the results of costly, long-term R&D processes (Usha Rao & Kishore, 
2010).96 
Also, researchers such as Tomlinson and Kristinssion/Rao contend that traditional 
forms of technology transfer have not had an overwhelmingly positive record and are 
only reaching their goals in an insufficient manner. In their comparative paper on wind 
power generation technology policy in India and Denmark, Kristinsson and Rao, for 
instance, argue that a classical technology transfer approach has not brought about 
                                                      
95
 S&T: Science and Technology (the author). 
96
 The researchers underline this aspect in their study on low-carbon and climate mitigation technolo-
gies. Arguably, renewable energy technology transfer is structured very similarly: “Technology specific 
intellectual property rights related factors (such as the ratio of R&D to total costs, ease of copying and 
IPR enforcement; and patent application standards and processes)… affect the rate of innovation and 
diffusion. The vast majority of patents are held by private firms…There is a clear – and already apparent 
– tension between the desire to secure these economic benefits and the need to maximise technology 
diffusion to protect the global climate; as shown by the discussions over whether to include projects in 
developing countries inside the proposed EU CCS demonstration financing instrument” (Tomlinson et 
al., 2007, p. 13). 
122 
 
the expansion of the Indian wind power industry and installed capacity. This develop-
ment was much rather triggered by India’s policy of “interactive learning” (Kristinsson 
& Rao, p. 300), focussing on a bi-directional exchange of technology and expertise. This 
argument is also made in the comprehensive report by Tomlinson et al. calling for the 
establishment of effective innovation systems, rather than merely a narrow technology 
transfer (Tomlinson, Zorlu, & Langley, 2007, p. 10). 
This need to successively gain ownership in key technologies is very evident to deci-
sion-makers in the target countries, particularly those with a long working history in 
the oil and gas sector, where Arab national oil companies had long been dependent on 
the technological know-how of the oil majors. As one Algerian interviewee put it: 
“In a post-oil world, we are not interested in further royalties, that’s not what brings 
our country ahead. We have had this subordinate relationship to internationals in the 
oil and gas sector for too long and this is nothing we aspire to repeat for renewable 
energies.” (National and international power sector, Algeria) 
Considering the difficulties on the domestic front, the Gulf States, in particular, have 
resorted to a new form of technology transfer. Part of the SWFs’ mandate is the pur-
chase of strategic assets in international growth technologies, as is the case with Abu 
Dhabi’s Cleantech Fund as part of its comprehensive Masdar Initiative (Interview no. 51 
– public stakeholder, Gulf States). Whether combining domestic technology clusters 
might prove a promising method in the medium term, however, remains to be seen. 
The following subsidiary research question therefore attempts to gauge the empirical 
conditions for technology transfer-supported renewable energy innovation: 
- Is there an attempt to create a domestic knowledge hub for RETs and is there 
an industry structure that supports the spread of technologies into mainstream 
society? 
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3.4.2. Technological developments 
It has been the stated goal of this thesis to contribute to the social science dimension 
of renewable energy policies in hydrocarbons-wealthy Arab states. However, issues 
pertaining to technological development cannot be fully left aside, as these develop-
ments can become absolute barriers (or major enablers) to the overall growth path of 
renewable electricity production through all levels of MLP. Since most innovations in 
that respect can be expected from the ST niches, this discussion has been placed in the 
niche-level chapter. The first of the following two subsections ( 3.4.2.1) will focus on 
key forms of power supply, while Subsection  3.4.2.2 will present a summative assess-
ment of the three major RETs discussed in the thesis, wind power, concentrating solar 
power (CSP) and photovoltaics (PV). 
 
3.4.2.1. Decentralized vs. centralized power supply 
By and large, the application of energies can be distinguished into centralized and de-
centralized technologies. Centralized forms of power production, in the form of nucle-
ar-, coal- or gas-fired power plants, are usually the most common form of conventional 
power production. In the early years of their market introduction, renewable energies 
have traditionally been considered as small-scale, decentralised systems (e.g. single 
wind turbines or small wind farms with several MW capacity, small CSP or PV installa-
tions). In recent years, however, all three technologies analysed here (wind, CSP, less 
so PV) have been scaled up successfully, which is why the most current industry-scale 
projects need to be regarded as centralized energy projects. 
As indicated in Table 12, both forms of power production have specific assets. Typical-
ly, large-scale plants have higher commercial efficiency rates and better return of in-
vestment ratios than small-scale ones. This is due to the more favourable economies of 
scale, better bank credits, combined grid access and production costs. Evidently, the 
absolute capital costs of centralized installations can be several orders of magnitude 
higher than for small domestic installations.  
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Small-scale decentralized forms of power production, however, have their own distinc-
tive advantages, which are mainly in the areas of energy system planning and energy 
security. First, apart from the aspect of intermittence of renewable power,97 the dis-
persed nature of small-scale renewable systems delivers a higher security of supply 
than a few large, centralized systems of the same total capacity. If there is any supply 
cut due to sabotage98 or technological failures, reserve capacities for large-scale power 
would need to be significantly higher than for dispersed small-scale applications. Due 
to net redundancy, backup-power capacities would not have to be built in to an extent 
as large as in the case of centralized power production. 
Table 12: Strengths and weaknesses of centralized and decentralized systems 
 
Source: Supersberger et al., 2009, p. 27.  
Another non-technical aspect is the participation potential of the technology option. 
Large-scale power plants incur substantial investment costs that cannot be financed by 
individuals or small/local companies or municipal utilities. Compared to small-scale 
installations, this technology choice will reduce their role in the decision-making struc-
                                                      
97
 Czisch’s research (2005) has shown that intermittence in RE systems can be balanced out to a large 
extent by smart-grid technologies and load management using not only wind and solar technologies, but 
also geothermal energy, biomass and pumped storage power stations as backup reservoirs. 
98
 See Tänzler et al. (2007) for a general introduction into the impacts of RE on security policy and Lach-
er/Kumetat (2011) for a hard security threat analysis of renewable and conventional centralized power 
plants in North Africa. 
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tures on the nature of the power system to the role of minority shareholders or mere 
end consumer. Decision-making structures thus remain highly centralized and non-
participatory for large groups of the population. 
This is also the reason why the division between centralized and decentralized modes 
of power production has left the purely technical discourse and has entered the pub-
lish sphere, where this question is controversially debated in Western energy circles. 
Classic supporters of centralized structures are usually representatives of the major 
national utilities, contractors, commercial banks and large solar power industries, 
while group members of the decentralized faction usually come from small-scale utili-
ties or manufacturers of small-scale renewable energy technologies, farmers, as well 
as many citizens with a stake in this technology.99 Along with the technical advantages 
of small-scale installations, proponents of the decentralizing group particularly high-
light the participatory potentials of decentralized renewables,100 while their opponents 
highlight the greater cost-competitiveness of large-scale RETs as well as the fact that 
larger-scale applications are able to supply larger amounts of renewable electricity to 
the existing electricity system at a quicker pace. 
In resource-wealthy Arab states, this entire debate is not as prevalent as in Europe. 
The main reasons for this are the virtual absence of renewable energy and other envi-
ronmental pressure groups combined with a political culture that limits controversial 
public debate. Moreover, in most Arab states, there is the widespread notion that en-
ergy policy planning is a governmental task and does not contain in itself a participa-
tory element. In a nutshell, the enabling environment for renewable electricity produc-
tion capacity extensions differs strongly from the European context. Nonetheless, the 
two aspects of renewable energies remain relevant as well. By and large, however (as 
will be discussed in the case studies), OAPEC decision makers seem to favour large, 
                                                      
99
 An excellent example for the divisions centralized – decentralized within the renewable energy scene 
is the very large scale Desertec project. See Subchapter  6.7 for further details. 
100
 See also the above discussion on regime stability vs. democratisation/governance effects of RETs in 
OAPEC states in Subsection  3.2.1.4. 
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central structures most and only apply others if necessary, e.g. for remote desert 
communities. 
 
3.4.2.2. Assessment of renewable energy technologies (RETs) 
As a summative assessment of research literature, Table 13 presents assets and liabili-
ties that can be expected with the three named forms of renewable electricity genera-
tion (wind, CSP, PV). It becomes apparent that, while all three forms of renewable 
electricity generation presented here score far better in terms of environmental com-
ponents but worse in terms of (current) LECs, a technology mix might be the ideal 
combination for energy systems with a strong renewable electricity share. 
Table 13: Summative assessment of technology options 
 
Source: own compilation.  
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For the target region of this work, however, a focus on solar energy technologies seem 
warranted due to the comparatively poor resource potential of wind energy in that 
region.  
Turning to the empirical research of this thesis, the primary scope of the thesis is nei-
ther to make qualitative research about experts’ opinions on the development paths of 
individual technologies nor is it to discuss engineering innovations. What is relevant for 
this thesis, however, is the interviewees’ opinion on technologies, since the interview-
ees surveyed are, in fact, taking investment decisions in one direction or the other, 
making this an important issue. Furthermore, the question of whether the industry use 
of certain RETs might not serve as an entry point to a highly subsidized and closed con-
sumers’ market in the medium term will also be addressed through the following re-
search question: 
- What is the interviewees’ opinion on technology choices and on the chance of 
industry-use of RETs as entry points for further RETs in resource-rich Arab 
states?  
 
3.5. Conclusion: the policy context for renewable energy policy in hy-
drocarbons rich Arab states and development of the research ques-
tionnaire 
In conclusion, the key aspects of renewable energy policy that have been discussed 
thus far are striking due to the variety of macro-drivers (and barriers) for renewable 
energies, originating in key challenges of socio-economic development in resource-rich 
Arab states. It has become evident that a pure focus on resource economy and de-
mand growth would be too narrow to draw up a comprehensive energy system analy-
sis. (Renewable) energy policy is necessarily also industry and R&D policy. Simultane-
ously, it is also income generation through increased domestic hydrocarbon resources, 
country marketing, a climate change mitigation measure and, as a whole, a potential 
means of regime survival, imperfectly governed by a range of regional institutions. 
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In most discussions of renewable energy policies, many of these elements appear only 
fragmentarily; publications focus on one or another sub-aspect of this topic. In line 
with the broader theory argument of this thesis, the analysis of the two case studies 
shall be guided by the aspects discussed so far. Key elements of the analysis are re-
flected by the collection of the respective research questions of each section. A full 
compilation of the individual research questions is presented here:  
 
Landscape-level 
Political system 
Research questions for the political system 
1. How far do the political system and the non-existence of independent CSOs al-
low for system innovations in the energy sector, particularly bottom-up innova-
tions? 
Research questions with regards to personal patronage networks: 
2. To what extent are the official decision-making processes the actual decision-
making structures? 
Research questions regarding long-term effects of renewables on the political system 
3. What do interviewees regard as the key governance effects of renewable ener-
gy production? 
Key transregional energy governance bodies 
4. Which role do transregional energy governance bodies such as OPEC, OAPEC or 
IRENA play in the promotion or stalling of national renewable energy policy in 
the respective target country? 
Climate Change 
5. Is the climate change agenda actively considered in the political decision-
making on renewable energy developments? 
Long-term national economic diversification 
6. Are the renewable energy-related efforts connected to the national economic 
visions or national SWF activities in the respective country? 
Country branding 
7. Is country branding a catalyst in the spread of renewable energies? 
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Regime-level 
Technological regime  
Questions regarding the national power sectors 
8. To what extent are renewable energies employed to reduce pressure on the 
domestic conventional power plant park? 
Nuclear option 
9. Is the nuclear option seen as a competitor in resources or as a mutually exclu-
sive form of power production?  
User and market regime 
Market conditions 
10. Is there any system of renewable energy promotion in place?  
11. Do stakeholders believe that the transfer of European renewable energy policy 
design models is a viable method for the spread of renewable electricity capaci-
ties in the region or would indigenous policy models work better?  
System of double subsidies 
12. Are strategies developed to create a level playing field for all types of energy 
carriers by either removing subsidies for conventional power or by integrating 
renewable electricity into the existing subsidy schemes? 
Socio-cultural regime 
Social awareness and the role of religion or environmental ethics 
13. How widespread is the knowledge of renewable energies in the target coun-
tries? Does religion play a role in legitimizing this energy technology? 
Research questions in terms of labour markets: 
14. Is the job creation potential actually employed by promoters of renewable 
electricity in the country? 
Policy regime 
Questions on renewable energy targets and actual performance: 
15. Is there a (binding) strategic document, such as an energy roadmap/blueprint 
or at least a non-binding planning scheme? If so, how does this integrate re-
newable electricity? 
Questions regarding regional infrastructure and governance bodies: 
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16. Do the regional electricity governance bodies promote political or infrastruc-
ture projects that enhance the role of renewable electricity in the target coun-
try? Is external demand a pull factor in that respect? 
 
Niche-level 
Science regime and technology transfer 
17. Is there an attempt to create a domestic knowledge hub for RETs and is there 
an industry structure that supports the spread of technologies into mainstream 
society? 
Technological developments 
18. What is the interviewees’ opinion on technology choices and on the chance of 
industry-use of RETs as entry points for further RETs in resource-rich Arab 
states? 
 
The case study chapters of Part B are structured in parallel to the analysis of Chapter  3. 
Discussions there will be guided by the research questions developed here and will be 
followed by comprehensive overviews of the respective national renewable energy 
policies thus helping to identify reasons for the underperformance of the spread of 
renewable energies in resource-wealthy Arab countries. Having identified the major 
shortcomings, the ensuing policy design chapters can interact with this information. 
Second, in the comparative Part C of the thesis, the results will be used to identify 
common barriers to the spread of renewable energies in hydrocarbons-wealthy coun-
tries as well as regional particularities. 
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4. Methodological design of the study 
As highlighted in the Introduction (Chapter  1), it is the main goal of this thesis to ana-
lyse renewable energy systems of hydrocarbons-rich Arab countries by means of the 
MLP and to test the application of the TM policy design models in this region. While 
the theoretical frameworks to analyse renewable energy transitions and to draft re-
newable energy policy models have been discussed in Chapter  2, Chapter  3 provided 
an overview of the policy context in resource-rich Arab states, outlined key elements 
of analysis and developed a research questionnaire. This chapter discusses the re-
search methodology in greater detail. First, it will present the case study approach 
chosen for this thesis and discuss issues related to elite interviewing – the main meth-
od of data collection chosen for this study (Subchapter  4.1). In the same section it will 
present the rationale for choosing the UAE and Algeria as case studies. In the last sub-
chapter ( 4.2) the different groups of interviewees will be presented. 
 
4.1. Case study research and elite interviewing: opportunities and limita-
tions 
As Stake remarks, case studies have become popular means of inquiry in recent years 
(Stake, 2003). However, this does not imply that the selection of the case study meth-
od comes as a “natural” choice. Case studies can help to identify trends and patterns 
within certain developments or phenomena. By distinguishing the particular from the 
general, case study research can go beyond a merely descriptive level101 and add to 
theory formulation. Case study research can have different epistemological goals. Yin 
discusses potential rationales for case study design (Yin, 2003, pp. 39–42). The four 
most relevant are the following:102 
                                                      
101
 Yin (2003, p. 9): a case study method is warranted if “a ‘how’ or ‘why’ question is being asked about a 
contemporary set of events over which the investigator has little or no control. 
102
 In his paper, Cousin (2005) suggests a slightly different order system that, however, does not differ 
from Yin’s in substance. 
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First, case studies can be used to test the hypotheses of certain established theories in 
practise which are believed to be true by a certain scientific community.  
Second, they can also serve as in-depth studies of the particular in a unique or rare 
case. In such a case, a “thick description” (Geerz, 1983) of a case may be warranted to 
further knowledge, for instance, about a very rare disease.  
Third, a case could go into details about a representative or typical case, e.g. an aver-
age neighbourhood or work in a standard factory or clerical position. In that case, the 
goal is not to describe the particular, but rather a mainstream phenomenon that 
shapes societies or social contexts. 
Fourth, case studies can be used as revelatory cases, in which a paradigmatic phenom-
enon can be analysed that had before been unavailable for scientific scrutiny and can 
therefore further research in a broader sense. 
Evidently, the four models identified by Yin are ideal types that in practice often over-
lap. Case studies could thus be revelatory and by their very nature challenge prevalent 
knowledge about a certain phenomenon. Also, models two and three could interact 
with theory if their results would have such implications. Consequently, the case study 
models for this thesis overlap as well. With the description of Algeria and the UAE it 
analyses in detail two energy systems of more populous, hydrocarbons-rich Arab states 
and thus provides new information in an explorative manner (model four). In addition 
to that, it contributes to theory building through the testing of TM as a model for poli-
cy design under the governance situation of this group of states (model 1). 
A special aspect of this thesis is that it works with a case-study-within-a-case-study 
approach. In addition to the MLP-structured analysis of the state of domestic renewa-
ble energy policy as described in the two previous chapters both countries exhibit one 
initiative that transcends these layers and is a significant driver of the domestic agen-
da. In the case of Algeria, it is the trans-Mediterranean dimension (De-
sertec/Mediterranean Solar Plan), and in the UAE it is Abu Dhabi’s Masdar Initiative, a 
lighthouse project that claims importance far beyond this emirate and now houses 
IRENA. Figure 25 shows the different layers of this study’s approach. 
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Figure 25: Case study approach of this study 
 
While the research aims for individual case studies may differ substantially, all face 
similar questions of validity. Although Yin concedes that a multiple case study ar-
rangement often cannot be performed due to time or financial restraints of the re-
searchers (Yin, 2003, p. 9), the validity of single case study results can be substantially 
upgraded if another, comparable case can be added to the study as a whole.103 As 
Stake puts it, illustrating “how a phenomenon occurs in the circumstances of several 
exemplars can provide valuable and trustworthy knowledge” (Stake, 2003, p. 444). By 
choosing two states of the same population that represent different types in this group 
(common denominator: high oil and gas rents and rentier state characteristics; differ-
ences: size of national territory, number of national residents, Maghreb – Gulf region) 
this thesis aims to perform this task. 
Qualitative methods are most commonly used in combination with case study design. 
Nonetheless, this does not always have to be the case. Denzin and Lincoln, for in-
stance, remark that case studies and qualitative research should not be confounded 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2003). Instead, a quantitative research design or survey method can 
be very fruitful in case of clinical studies or as a multiple-method case study (Yin, 
                                                     
103
 Contrary to main stream, single authors also challenge this notion; see for instance Flyvbjerg (2006). 
While the author of this thesis differs with Flyvbjerg in that regard, Flyvbjerg’s view is very much in line 
with the argument of this thesis when he stresses the notion that case studies can be used for the test-
ing and building of theory. 
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2003). While the stated research goals of this thesis do not necessarily imply a qualita-
tive approach, it is the nature of the primary data used in this study that warrants a 
qualitative approach. This study does not consider itself a technical study on grids, en-
ergy pricing or engineering-related aspects of renewable electricity generation. In-
stead, it is particularly the actors’ perceptions and judgements about governance con-
cepts that are of empirical interest. These, however, cannot be identified by quantita-
tive methods. In addition, energy policy in the Arab world is considered sensitive by 
many regime stakeholders and, particularly in the case of Algeria, where in-depth re-
ports on the functioning of renewable energy policy in this country are rarely pub-
lished. Thus, a method that elicits information from stakeholders in a private research 
interview situation has more chances of success than gleaning information from writ-
ten texts or through less personal method of telephone interviews. Although personal 
interviews have been the method of choice for this thesis, a few telephonic interviews 
were used in order to add further information to the data set in cases where inter-
viewees were unavailable for personal interviews during the field trips. 
Moreover, the interviews were coded the due to the actual or perceived sensitivity of 
the data. As discussed by Lee (1993, pp. 179–182), protecting the confidentiality of 
qualitative data is vital when stakeholders perceive the data they are providing as sen-
sitive. While energy policy in many European countries might be regarded as a subject 
comparatively open to public scrutiny, many stakeholders in Arab resource-rich states 
regard the entire sector as politically sensitive as it touches on the economic core of 
this group of states. Thus, stakeholders are less willing to talk openly to researchers as 
they fear retribution for what may be deemed as leaking policy information or docu-
ments. It is unlikely that this thesis would reveal direct government secrets; however, 
it may reveal information about stakeholders that interviewees would not like to be 
publicly associated with. The interviewees have been categorized by their home coun-
try and the interviewee category that will be developed in Subchapter  4.2. This infor-
mation protects the identity of the interviewee while at the same time providing in-
formation about the person’s profession and nationality. 
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Furthermore, additional limitations of a qualitative case study approach must be taken 
into consideration. A key one that has been described by Crang (2003) is the question 
of how far the researcher as an informed outsider co-constructs his field by his re-
search design, the choice of interviewees, and so on. While this issue cannot fully be 
solved for this thesis, arguably the problems arises more if more intensive or intrusive 
research methods (e.g. ethnographical research with participant observation) had 
been chosen. In our case, this would have been required if the goal of the study would 
have been to reflect on the everyday use of off-grid renewables in rural areas or other 
questions revolving around the popular acceptance and use of certain energy carriers 
or issues of environmental awareness. Thus, the challenges of cross-cultural research 
discussed by Liamputtong et al. (2008) are only of limited relevance to this thesis.  
With a system of data collection relying on elite, stakeholder interviews, however, 
other methodological issues remain a challenge, such as the manner in which inter-
viewees are selected. The starting point for the interviewer is mostly that of an in-
formed outsider who selects interviewees who are available and willing to be inter-
viewed without any previous personal introduction. After a first initialization phase, a 
few of these well-connected interviewees might serve as “gate-keepers” by actively 
supporting the researcher in securing further interview contacts and information (Val-
entine, 1997). Particularly if the interviewer recruits further interviewees through 
snowballing, “gate-keepers” can facilitate additional contacts thanks to their expert 
knowledge and positions. Here, the researcher can make the most of the trust that is 
bestowed upon him through the gate-keeper’s respected position in a given communi-
ty. Although indispensable in many cases, the researcher should be aware that these 
gate-keepers can – be it willingly or unwillingly – can effectively distort the results of 
the entire research project through the interviewer’s exclusive exposure to certain 
groups of stakeholders or points of views.  
More systematically, Lee (1993, p. 131) distinguishes between three groups of gate-
keepers or sponsors: 
- The “bridge”: a person who provides the link into a social world that has been 
previously unknown to the researcher; 
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- The “guide”: a person who maps a route through unfamiliar terrain and gives 
orientational knowledge by providing explanations of certain phenomena or 
political events or warning against certain persons; 
- The “patron”: a sponsor who associates himself/herself with the researcher 
and helps him/her secure trust among the group of interviewees 
As will be discussed in the case study reports in Part B the author of the thesis has 
made use of “patrons” and “guides” in both cases respectively (Subchapters  5.2 
and  6.2) as they provided invaluable help in terms of access to information and inter-
viewees as described above. However, as too close a relationship with a key stake-
holder or expert can quickly lead to an unwelcome degree of complicity, these stake-
holders had to be kept at a certain distance from the interviewer.  
Second, with regards to the interviewees, the question of gender bias needs to be 
briefly discussed (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, pp. 111–113): the power sector as a whole is 
strongly dominated by men in both the Arab world as well as in Europe. Consequently, 
only a few women, constituting 20% of interviewees at most, were interviewed. Given 
the poor total representation of women in the power sector, however, this is an over- 
rather than an under-representation in terms of figures. 
The list of interviewees as well as the questionnaire developed for this series of semi-
structured expert/stakeholder interviews can be found in the appendices. The ques-
tionnaire used adheres to the standardized, semi-structured, in-depth elite interview-
ing model. Elites can be defined as those elements of society “considered to be the 
influential, the prominent, and the well-informed members of an organization or 
community and are selected on the basis of their expertise in areas relevant to the 
research” (Marshall & Rossman, 1997, p. 83).  
Targeting this group can be beneficial as they can provide invaluable information and 
in-depth analyses. They are more likely to be familiar with a broader background of 
legal and/or administrative structures of an organization and have – or are at least 
expected to have – an overview of the less obvious strategic long-term policies of their 
organizations, their histories and structural difficulties. On the other hand, these 
groups are more likely to change the structure of an interview fundamentally by being 
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unwilling or legally unable to speak about certain topics. Since they often strongly 
identify themselves with the organization they represent, it can be difficult to glean 
information about organizational flaws and structural or communicative shortcomings, 
because they either do not acknowledge them or simply do not see these problems, as 
they might be one of their originators. Also, there is a difference in power and social 
status between the interviewer and interviewee. In contrast to much social research 
conducted, where the interviewer as an academic might have a higher social status 
than the interviewee, this situation is reverse in the case of elite interviews (Lee, 1993, 
pp. 107–111).  
Interviewing a CEO or a high-ranking government official can be difficult. At worst, the 
researchers may not be taken seriously because of younger age or the senior position 
occupied by of the interviewee. At best, however, the interviewee may regard the re-
searcher as “harmless” and grant a “one-off-interview” particularly when the inter-
viewer is not media-related. In these rare situations interviewees can benefit from the 
deep insight of a leading figure in an organisation. This, however, is unlikely to happen. 
The unwelcome alternative would be a streamlined PR interview repeating formalistic 
statements (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p. 221) that do not add much to the researcher’s 
knowledge about the case. 
The general technique of in-depth interviews can be applied to various a-priori re-
search models. It is often difficult to rigidly structure interviews into predetermined 
response categories when using this model since the interviewer is interested in re-
ceiving creative responses to certain questions and does not want to limit the expert’s 
knowledge. Thus, open-ended or semi open-ended questions should normally charac-
terize this type of research. The overall mood of such a meeting works best in a less 
formal situation in which the interviewee is at ease and in a structured conversation 
rather than undergoing an inflexible interrogation (Esterberg, 2002, pp. 102–104). 
With the aim of maintaining this mood, the interviewer ought to allow the flow of the 
conversation to dictate the questions asked, those omitted and the order in which they 
are posed, i.e. the “participant’s perspective on the phenomenon of interest should 
unfold as the participant views it, not as the researcher” does (Marshall & Rossman, 
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1997, p. 80). Yet, it is important to maintain a certain degree of comparability with the 
other interviewees; a semi-structured system with standardized questions has been 
used to create this specific mixture of qualitative data: a holistic, in-depth understand-
ing of the interviewees’ points of view towards a select set of questions. 
While the positive aspects of in-depth, semi-structured interviews are evident, argua-
bly, one of the greatest problems is the issue of availability of interviewees, particularly 
elite stakeholders. It has been the experience of the researcher that high-ranking offi-
cials rarely commit to interviews longer than 15-25 minutes, which is hardly enough 
for an in-depth interview. While there still remains the potential for a high-quality in-
terview with these stakeholders, in many cases, there is the opposite effect in place: 
the lower the rank (and often also the expertise in the subject matter) of a potential 
interviewee, the more quickly he or she agrees to meet for an interview. While again, 
it is beneficial to broaden the population of interviewees as widely as possible this 
paradox has been observed during the research for this thesis as well. Having chosen 
interviewees from different levels of institutional hierarchy, this study attempts to 
counterbalance these effects. 
In conclusion, conducting multiple case study research with a qualitative interview 
methodology is, as are other possible ways of data collection, an approach fraught 
with practical limitations and theoretical inconsistencies. Still, this approach has been 
identified as the most fruitful and most viable one for the purpose of this study.  
 
4.2. Groups of interviewees 
In order to enhance the structure of the interviews and the results, the population of 
interviewees has been divided into four stakeholder categories. As shown in Table 14, 
94 interviews104 were conducted for this thesis. By the maximisation of perspectives on 
the subject matter the study aimed at the saturation of the data, the instant when new 
                                                      
104
 On several occasions, interview events consisted of more than one interviewee. These cases have 
been counted as one interview only. See Annex II for a list of all interviews conducted. 
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data collected by interviewing no longer changes the results or gives essential addi-
tional input (Bauer & Gaskell, 2000).105 Analysing the regional distribution of inter-
viewees presented in Table 14 it is striking that a comparatively high number of inter-
views were conducted in Europe or with European stakeholders. The rationale for this 
is that particularly in the case of North Africa, the EU and its renewable energy policy 
in the Mediterranean, as well as industry associations on the private level, form a key 
landscape level driver for Algerian renewable energy policies. At the same time, the 
large distance and only loose interregional connection of the EU to the Gulf States led 
to the fact that the overwhelming majority of interviews conducted in Europe effec-
tively covered Algerian or Euro-Mediterranean affairs exclusively.106 Thus, the Europe-
an interviewees can effectively be counted towards the North African regional dimen-
sion of this thesis. 
Parallel to that, the interviews that were led in other Gulf States (most notably in Ku-
wait) strongly focused on the conditions for the success of renewable energy policies 
in the Gulf. Specific North African or Euro-Mediterranean issues have by and large not 
been touched upon during these occasions. 
Taking these two factors into account, the study shows an equal regional distribution 
of interviewees (see Table 15). 
                                                      
105
 (Theoretical) saturation this is a term coined by grounded theory research. This approach is certainly 
part of the methodological background of the study, but empirically grounded theory development 
forms only a part of this study as a whole. Thus, this research method has not become the dominant 
approach chosen. For the discussion of grounded theory cf. Glaser (1978), Strauss & Glaser (2009), 
Strauss & Corbin (1990) and Kelle (2005). 
106
 A notable exception is formed by the interview conducted at the Masdar PV factory in Germany 
which, for obvious reasons, focused on Masdar policies and the success of this plant in Germany. In 
addition to that, some of the interviews with European government officials touched on IRENA. UAE 
domestic energy policy, however, has hardly been touched in these interviews. 
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Table 14: Distribution of interviewees by region and stakeholder group 
 
 
Table 15: Aggregated distribution of interviews by region 
 
The four following stakeholder categories have been identified by the author: 
1. Public stakeholders 
a. politicians, members of administrations/regulatory agencies  
b. lobby groups, CSOs 
2. Private and public investors (non-operative business) 
a. representatives of multilateral banks, SWFs 
b. private investors 
3. National and international power sector (operative business) 
a. grid operators, power companies (fossil and RE) 
b. manufacturing and construction industry 
4. Research and development 
a. academics 
b. business-related in-house researchers and consultants 
In the thesis, the interviews are coded by their regional background and their inter-
viewee category. Examples for this would be “R&D sector, Algeria” or “National power 
sector, Europe”. 
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Analysing the stakeholder distribution of the two cases in greater detail (see Figure 26 
and Figure 27) it is apparent that in both cases, groups 1 and 2 are slightly over-
represented. 
Figure 26: Distribution of interviewed stakeholders in the UAE/Gulf region 
 
 
Figure 27: Distribution of interviewed stakeholders in Algeria + EU 
 
This is largely due to the fact that business interviewees were the least willing to talk 
to the interviewer. Secondly, while the two business-related interviewee categories 2 
and 3 provided valuable insight into the national power sectors respectively, stake-
holder categories 1 and 4 could often provide the interviewer with a higher level of 
analytical knowledge about steering theories and the overall context of renewable 
energy policies in the case studies. In addition to that, the overall number of interviews 
can be regarded as sufficient to grant extensive insight into all four key areas covered. 
25%
15%
28%
32%
UAE/Gulf region
1 Public stakeholders
2 Non-operative
business
3 Operative business
4 R & D
38%
15%
13%
34%
Algeria + EU
1 Public stakeholders
2 Non-operative
business
3 Operative business
4 R & D
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In the subsequent sections, the four categories and their role for the analysis of the 
projects will be presented. It has to be stressed that these categories are hybrid be-
cause there is significant overlap in content. Actors and institutions have been as-
signed to the category into which they fit most; individual classifications remain, how-
ever, debatable. In each section, several interviewees have been named in order to 
exemplify what has been said. However, for reasons of legibility, not all interviewed 
companies or institutions have been named in the respective sections. See Annex II for 
a full list of interviewees.  
 
4.2.1.  Public Stakeholders 
“Public stakeholder” is a collective category for all those who have an official public 
mandate or who regard their work as being part of or informing policy processes, 
which is to be understood in the wider sense of the word. In an immediate sense 
(group 1a), this encompasses politicians, members of regulatory agencies, as well as 
national and international administrations. Secondly, the wide field of lobby groups 
and non-governmental organisations regularly describe themselves as public stake-
holders (group 1b). This thesis does not attempt to assess the validity of these claims – 
which sometimes appear doubtful – but instead takes them at face value.  
In this study, group 1a contains representatives of national ministries of environment, 
Abu Dhabi’s Ministry of Electricity and Water, the UAE Ministry of State for Federal 
National Council Affairs, as well as the Algerian Ministry of Energy and Mines. Unfortu-
nately, access to civil servants in both countries has been difficult, sometimes even 
impossible due to restrictions through the information and interview policy of the min-
istries themselves. 
Further, the same category has been assigned to the energy sections of the embassies 
of foreign powers, such as the United Kingdom in the UAE, or France in the Maghreb as 
former colonial power and presently staunch supporter of nuclear energy. The German 
global promotion of renewable energy and energy efficiency has been taken into ac-
count by an interview with the German Renewable Energy Export Initiative of the Fed-
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eral Ministry of Economics and Technology, Berlin. Also, the respective chambers of 
commerce and industry have been contacted to receive a comprehensive picture of 
the actors at hand, as well as their policies and opinions. In order to receive the larger 
view of international organizations and actors, renewable energy experts from the 
International Energy Agency (IAE), the EU’s Directorate-General for Energy and 
Transport (DG TREN) and the French Ministry of Environment and Innovation, which is 
leading on the Mediterranean Solar Plan, and the German Ministry of Economic Affairs 
were interviewed and a talk with a representative of the Regional Centre for Renewa-
ble Energy and Energy Efficiency (RECREE), Cairo has been held. 
Category 1b, the area of lobby- groups and non-governmental organisations, com-
prised of a wide array of organizations including a Greenpeace’s Energy (R)Evolution 
department representative; Eurelectric, the Union of the Electricity Industry, and the 
Desertec Foundation, the lobby group successfully promoting the idea of an intercon-
tinental renewable energy production and grid system. 
It is intended that these interviews give pertinent insight about the policy dimension of 
renewable energy in resource-rich Arab states and identify structural political barriers 
that slow down and driving forces attempting to speed up process of spreading of re-
newable energies based power production in the two countries at hand. Because these 
interviewees know the policy processes in the UAE and Algeria best, policy design 
models can also be discussed with members of this group. 
 
4.2.2. Private and public investors (non-operative business) 
The common denominator of stakeholder group 2 is the fact that all members are in-
volved in the renewable energy from a non-operative point of view; not all, however, 
are representatives of the profit-oriented private sector. Secondly, as inves-
tors/donors, all of this group have their primary focus on the financial and economic 
soundness of the projects; they are not crucially involved in the operative business as 
far as immediate power production or the manufacturing of spare parts is concerned. 
The general problem of business elite interviewing, as this thesis encountered, is their 
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availability and willingness to spend time on an interview that is not directly beneficial 
to the success of their business.107 What is, however, of greater concern here is the 
question of validity: one cannot expect business representatives to give sensitive in-
formation that might prove harmful to their personal achievement or to the overall 
business success of their company. Also, recorded interviews can serve as legal docu-
ments that, once they have been given to the researcher, can hardly be controlled or 
confiscated.108 Again, the establishment of trust through gatekeepers, the interview-
er’s demeanour or his institution cannot be overstated. 
Subcategory 2a encompasses representatives of Abu Dhabi’s sovereign wealth fund 
Mubadala, as well as the MENA energy section of Deutsche Bank. 
Apart from that, the industry side is represented through interviews with a Dii repre-
sentative as well as with the Dii’s only North African founding member, the Algerian 
Cevital group. 
Interviewees of category 2 have been instrumental in shedding light on the business- 
and investment-related barriers that renewable energy production (and the produc-
tion of parts, such as solar wafers, etc.) is facing and have produced feedback on how 
the investment climate in this field can be improved, what investors are currently con-
cerned about, and how their future analyses are. 
 
4.2.3. National and international power sector (operative business) 
Stakeholder category 3 encompasses the operative business in the power sector, the 
construction of power plants as well as related manufacturing industry. As currently 
attempted with Masdar, the latter can play a vital role in building up a national profile 
for renewables and constitutes a necessary part in any large-scale renewable energy 
production scheme lest such a country wants to perpetuate a dependency on foreign 
                                                      
107
 Cf. the section “Identifying Respondents and Obtaining Interviews” in Healey & Rawlinson (1993). 
108
 This is also an issue with public stakeholders and academics in countries where risks to the personal 
wellbeing or politically motivated sanctions of other kinds for unwelcome published quotations cannot 
be excluded. Cf. earlier remarks on interviews pertaining to sensitive issues in Subchapter  4.1. 
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expertise and technology. Since no large energy corporation solely focuses on renewa-
ble energies, most interviewees have risen into their positions in the conventional 
power sector, with renewables being just one branch of their company. A confinement 
to “renewables only” companies would have neither been feasible nor particularly 
sensible. The expected difficulties in obtaining interviews and information are by and 
large parallel to what has been said for stakeholder category 2 as it is the managerial 
elites of the respective company who are the targeted interviewees. 
Subcategory 3a comprises grid operators, and national power companies, such as the 
Algerian New Energy Algeria (NEAL) that has been founded with the explicit goal of 
promoting renewable energy power production in the country. Also, the Spanish com-
pany Abengoa-Abener that is currently finalizing the construction of Algeria’s first 
large-scale combined-cycle gas-solar power plant (Solar Power Plant 1) has been inter-
viewed as part of this category. 
In category 3b, manufacturing and construction industry, such as representatives of 
Masdar’s joint ventures with Masdar PV, Erfurt (Germany), have been interviewed. 
As expected, many of the interviewees currently working towards the spread of re-
newables are doing so not as a career choice but due to their individual management 
biography within a major power company. This, contrary to the view of many renewa-
ble energy activists, is not intrinsically problematic as a slight detachment might lead 
result in a more balanced view on the subject matter than a renewable energy enthu-
siast’s. 
It should be noted that particularly in this category, the two subcategories cannot be 
accurately separated. There is a large overlap between the two due to the highly cen-
tralised nature of the international power sector and the varying degrees of coopera-
tion, parenting and mutual ownership of companies. Nevertheless, since the subdivi-
sion is of a more hermeneutical nature than a rigorous separation, this problem does 
not have a major repercussion on the analysis. Interviews with representatives of this 
category are expected to elucidate information about the current state of the building 
projects and day-to-day problems the operative power sector faces, as well the ques-
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tion about security issues on site (for Algeria). Also, a managerial practitioner’s view on 
possible ways forward will be expected. 
 
4.2.4. Research and development 
The final stakeholder category has been designed for those involved working in re-
search and development branches of renewable energy technology companies, en-
gaged in related academic research, or those who apply related expertise in manage-
ment or non-partisan policy consulting. By and large, members of this group have en-
joyed a solid postgraduate education before assuming their current posts. Many of 
them have freely opted to work in renewable-energy related field, thus, they are usu-
ally sustainability/renewable energy enthusiasts, willing to talk to fellow researchers 
and happy to provide (optimistic) information to the interviewer.109 A potential caveat 
of these positive features is that the researcher cannot always be sure to record well-
balanced account of “the facts”; instead, the own enthusiasm (or their own business) 
might at times lead involved researchers to overly optimistic statements. 
As mentioned above, subcategory 4a exclusively contains academics in the non-profit 
and predominantly public sector. Academic interviewees in Algeria are based at the 
Centre for Renewable Energy Development and Research (CDER), the Université des 
Sciences et de la Technologie in Oran, the Centre de Recherche en Economie Appliquée 
pour le Développement (CREAD) in Algiers, and the General Direction for Scientific Re-
search and Technological Development. Among institutions in Europe are the Wupper-
tal Institute for Climate, the Environment and Energy and the German Institute for In-
ternational and Security Affairs (SWP). Institutions in the Gulf are, among others, Du-
bai’s Gulf Research Center110 and Abu Dhabi’s Masdar Institute of Science and Tech-
nology. 
                                                      
109
 Their eagerness to give interviews is also the reason why this group is slightly over-represented in the 
sample of this study. 
110
 The Gulf Research Center had to discontinue its work in Dubai in 2011 after its licence was not re-
newed by the UAE authorities. 
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In contrast, subcategory 4b comprises energy researchers and consultants working for 
profit-oriented private businesses. Again, these two subcategories overlap substantial-
ly; however, the primary institutional affiliation of an interviewee can usually serve as 
a good approximation. Researchers and officials of Algeria’s R&D Centre for Power and 
Gas (CREDEG, a daughter company of Sonelgaz) have been interviewed, as well as the 
UAE’s and Algeria’s country officers of the risk consultancy Control Risks. Furthermore, 
interviewees with staff from Deloitte Abu Dhabi and the UK-based specialised renewa-
ble energy consulting firm Nur Energie (Arabic “light”) have been held. 
Ideally, the author expected these interviews to produce data from informed, but 
nonpartisan analysts of the subject matter, and, more specifically, their view on the 
respective R&D landscape, the institutional setting of renewable energy agencies in 
the two countries’ decision-making structures and their interrelation with policy and 
business. Moreover, given the interviewees’ erudition and (assumed) affinity to ab-
stract thought and sound theory development, discussions about socio-technological 
steering models and the greater question of adaptability of governance concepts were 
most fruitful with this category 4. 
 
4.3. Conclusion  
In conclusion, this chapter introduced the methodological framework chosen for data 
collection. It was argued that the case study approach can elicit relevant and up-to-
date information for the focal area of renewable energy policies in resource-rich Arab 
states. Subchapter  4.1 has elucidated that in addition to desk research, a qualitative, 
interview-based method of data collection best suits the set-up and the research in-
terest of this study. 
Moreover, four stakeholder categories have been presented in Subchapter  4.2, in line 
with the questionnaire, which was in turn informed by the research questions of Chap-
ter 3. The interviewee population, as has been shown, can inform the two case studies 
in a way that would lead to innovative, relevant and saturated data. Further details on 
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the research interviews and the respective data collection phases will be presented in 
Subchapters  5.2 and  6.2. 
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Part B: Case Studies 
As outlined in the previous chapter, Algeria and the United Arab Emirates have been 
identified as appropriate case studies for this research.111 They are comparable in their 
basic economic structures as hydrocarbon exporters and have both made efforts to 
foster renewable energy production on their territories. While Algeria has opted for a 
more structural, laws-based and so far inefficient approach for its domestic power 
production, the Mediterranean Solar Plan and the Desertec Industry Initiative might 
one day serve as powerful landscape-level incentives for a strong support of renewa-
bles in the country. The UAE, by contrast, have hardly developed a structural model of 
renewable energy integration into their power systems. Instead, the largest and most 
influential emirate of Abu Dhabi has committed itself to renewables through the 
Masdar Initiative’s substantial investments, although the amount of innovation trig-
gered through this project is yet to be established. Thus, while in Algeria, the land-
scape-level appears to have the highest potential for the spread of renewable energies 
in this country, it is precisely the niche-level of Masdar that drives renewable energy 
policy innovation in the UAE. This significant distinction will be discussed in greater 
detail later in the thesis. 
First, the case studies will analyse the current energy production regime guided by the 
research questions and the MLP system of analysis developed in Part A. In order to 
have a more straightforward analytical structure, each case study will first analyse the 
respective country by means of the research agenda outlined in Chapter 3. In conduct-
ing this analysis, the structure of analytical units will exactly mirror the system devel-
oped in Chapter 3. All sections will close with “section conclusions” highlighting the 
main empirical results. Subsequently, these section conclusions will be merged in a 
final overview of the energy system in the respective country. Second, each case study 
                                                      
111
 Data collection for this study was completed in February 2011. All policy initiatives that were 
launched after that date are only taken into account rudimentarily. As the UAE and Algeria, the two case 
studies for this work, have not (yet) been significantly affected by recent political events in the Arab 
world, the findings remain valid to a large extent. This is also the case because the challenges Arab 
countries face in terms of energy policy are unlikely to change with the advent of a new political system. 
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will display a “case study within a case study” featuring a particularly promising or in-
fluential renewable energy project in the country before presenting the conclusion of 
the case studies, which will again highlight key findings and provide links to the policy 
design and governance theory sections of Part C. 
Following the two case studies, Part C will then conduct a comparative analysis of the 
two cases with the help of the results identified in Part B. Moreover, it will discuss pol-
icy design questions both for the single cases country and from a comparative perspec-
tive before putting forth more deliberations on energy governance theories. 
  
151 
 
5. The United Arab Emirates 
Figure 28: Map of the United Arab Emirates 
 
Graphs © 2013 TerraMetrics, Map Data ©2013 Google 
 
5.1. Introduction 
Due to their substantial crude oil reserves, the United Arab Emirates is a key oil- and 
gas-exporting Arab state. Since the country’s formation in 1971, the UAE has been or-
ganised as a federation of the following emirates: Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, 
Ras al-Khaimah, Umm al-Quwain and Fujairah. Abu Dhabi, by far the largest and 
wealthiest emirate112, plays an eminent role on most political decisions within the 
                                                      
112
 Abu Dhabi owns the majority of the UAE’s hydrocarbon resources (95% of the oil and 6% of the natu-
ral gas) giving it possession of 9% of the world’s proven oil and ca. 5% of the world’s natural gas re-
serves. This hydrocarbon wealth forms the basis for one of the highest per capita incomes in the world. 
In 2006, Abu Dhabi held a global third position with a nominal GDP per capita of US$ 63,000 (AMEInfo, 
2007). Abu Dhabi has a territory of 67,430 square kilometres, which is equivalent to 80% of the UAE’s 
total land area, cf. 
http://www.visitabudhabi.ae/en/uae.facts.and.figures/country.size.aspx, accessed 21 November 2011. 
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UAE.113 The key aspects of state power such as defence and foreign policy, however, 
remain in the hand of the individual emirates (Davidson, 2009).  
This divide between relatively weak federal ministries and strong emirate-based minis-
tries is also reflected in the field of energy policy: the Federal Ministry of Energy head-
ed by Mohamed bin Dha'en Al Hamili covers national aspects, while key decisions with 
regards to hydrocarbons exports/imports, electricity policy etc. are taken at the Emir-
ate level.114 
In greater detail, the structure of UAE energy policy is as follows: under article 23 of 
the UAE constitution, the competence for energy remains with the individual emirates, 
which has led to the important side-effect that the system of electricity supply is emir-
ate-based as well. As a consequence, for this comparatively small country with a total 
energy system of around 20 GW (see Table 16) there are four water and electricity 
suppliers: 
- ADWEA (Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Authority) 
- DEWA (Dubai Electricity and Water Authority 
- SEWA (Sharjah Electricity and Water Authority)  
- FEWA (Federal Electricity and Water Authority) 
 
Table 16: Installed capacity in the UAE by type of generation (MW) in 2008 
 
Source: Kharbat, 2010. 
While the first three institutions operate under the directive of supplying their respec-
tive emirate with water and electricity, FEWA is also based in Abu Dhabi and is respon-
sible for the electricity and water supply of the smaller emirates. This distribution of 
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 As Abu Dhabi is also the by far most important centre of renewable energy policy and technology 
innovation in the UAE, the following sections will focus strongly on that emirate, although developments 
in other emirates will also be taken into account. 
114
 Particularly in the field of energy policy, this is expected: as oil rents were the prime source of income 
for the emirates when the UAE constitution was negotiated, it was not in the interest of any ruler to 
transfer control over this key economic instrument to the federal level. 
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responsibilities is a historical result, as the smaller emirates traditionally displayed low 
electricity growth rates. Thus, it is not surprising that they were only connected to the 
Emirates National Grid in 2008 (see Figure 29). However, the strong demand rise in 
recent years has put the current system under stress, which regularly leads to black-
outs in the smaller emirates during the summer months.115 In addition to the personal 
inconvenience caused, this also affects local economic development in the smaller 
emirates and has sparked debates in the FNC, where members have called upon Abu 
Dhabi as the wealthiest emirate and in the spirit of inner-UAE solidarity, to supply the 
others with as much electricity as is needed by their citizens (gulfnews.com, 2010b). 
Figure 29: The Emirates National Grid 
 
Source: Carter, 2010, p. 6.  
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 A multitude of cases could be cited here, see, for instance, Al Serkal on the Sharjah blackouts in 2010 
(Al Serkal. gulfnews.com, 2010) and Kakande (2011) on the concerns of the Northern Emirates for the 
summer of 2011. 
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While the power sector with the three smaller suppliers remains fully government 
owned, in Abu Dhabi, ADWEA privatised five of its seven power plants with a majority 
share of 60% still held by ADWEA, and a 40% share held by international investors 
(German Embassy in the United Arab Emirates, 2010). These “Independent Water and 
Power Plants” (IWPP) are run on the basis of the “build, own, operate” (BOO) principle 
and sell their output to the country’s single buyer, the Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity 
Company (ADWEC). It should be emphasised that in Abu Dhabi, as in the rest of the 
country, power prices are not the results of price formation in a liberal power market, 
but arranged by power and water purchase agreements (PWPAs) (Abu Dhabi Water 
and Electricity Agency (ADWEA), 2010, p. 13). 
Traditionally, energy supply policy in the form of promoting certain forms of energy 
production was not a key concern in the Emirates. However, energy-related issues 
have recently received growing attention in the UAE. At least on the level of public 
statements Emirati stakeholders are looking for sustainable sources of cheap electricity 
supply to support the efforts of energy-intensive industry diversification and the climb-
ing of the production chain in oil-related products. Further, facing a rapidly rising do-
mestic power demand (see Figure 30), the UAE power production capacities need to 
be substantially extended in the near future to meet these projections.116 
                                                      
116
 The only UAE data on energy system planning available up to 2020 is the development of UAE’s elec-
tricity generation capacity increasing by 9 per cent per year (Government of the United Arab Emirates, 
2006). This pathway (Figure 30) assumes a more or less constant high growth of electricity generation 
capacity at around 9 per cent per year. 
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Figure 30: Projected future UAE power demand 
 
Source: Government of the United Arab Emirates (2006).  
While the UAE power market is currently 100% supplied by natural gas, ADWEA is aim-
ing to diversify its fuel basis by looking for alternative forms of energy for power gen-
eration. This is a necessary endeavour and in principle, all options (coal, nuclear and 
renewables) are being considered (Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Agency (ADWEA), 
2010, pp. 42–43). In short, these are decisive times for UAE energy policy. Championed 
by Abu Dhabi, the renewable energy initiatives could pave the way to a substantive 
renewable energy deployment if the political and commercial circumstances provide 
favourable framework conditions. In addition, it remains to be seen whether Abu Dha-
bi’s comprehensive Masdar Initiative will have a tangible outcome in terms of struc-
ture of the (renewable) energy policies in Abu Dhabi/the UAE or if its impacts for the 
emirate(s) will predominantly be in the field of science, industry policy and country 
branding. 
After a summative account of the data collection (Subchapter  5.2), this chapter will 
employ the MLP framework to address the 18 research questions developed in Part A 
(landscape level in Subchapter  5.3; regime-level in Subchapter  5.4; niche-level in Sub-
chapter  5.5). Wherever relevant, the results of the research interviews will also be in-
156 
 
tegrated into the text. Each subsection will end with section conclusions summarizing 
its main findings. The main outcomes of this analysis will be presented in Subchap-
ter  5.6 drawing heavily on the individual section conclusions. 
Due to the pivotal role of the Masdar Initiative, as will be shown in the MLP analysis, 
Subchapter  5.7 will then feature a “case study within a case study” and focus exclusive-
ly on this most prominent and comprehensive renewable energy initiative in the UAE. 
The ensemble of the results presented in Subchapter  5.6 will serve as background 
analysis indicating under which conditions energy policy, and particularly the Masdar 
Initiative, has to operate in the UAE. 
The data results produced in this chapter will also inform Subchapter  7.1 of Part C, in 
which the TM policy design model will be applied by drafting renewable energy policy 
models for the UAE. Simultaneously, this exercise will have the function of testing how 
far such policy design models can be applied to the particular governance situation in 
an oil- and gas-wealthy Arab state. 
 
5.2. Account of the data collection phase of the UAE case study 
Most interviews for the UAE case study have been conducted in the country itself. The 
author carried out three field trips to the UAE between 2009 and 2011, residing there 
for a total of seven weeks. In 2009 and 2011, the author was also able to visit the 
World Future Energy Summit, a global clean energy industry meeting that is held in 
Abu Dhabi each January as part of the Masdar Initiative. This presence at the summits 
facilitated the author’s contacts with the relevant business community, whose mem-
bers are otherwise usually difficult to interview due to time constraints. While research 
interviews in the UAE were conducted in the Emirates of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Ras al-
Khaimah and Sharjah, the host institutions during these trips were the Gulf Research 
Center Dubai (GRC) and the Dubai School of Government (DSG), two well-known re-
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search centres.117 The author’s affiliation to both institutions served as a door-opener 
to many policy and research contacts in the country. In addition, a snowballing tech-
nique was used to tap into the large German and British business communities in the 
Gulf. This was facilitated by the author’s (German) nationality on the one hand, and 
the contacts established in London and through the London School of Economics on 
the other hand. Analysing the list of interviewees in Annex II, it is striking that only a 
limited number of UAE nationals have been interviewed for the data collection phase. 
To a certain extent, this represents a typical bias by a foreign researcher who will inad-
vertently find that professional expatriate networks with a similar background and 
language skills are more open to interview requests and probably more willing to give 
personal assessments of the situation in a given country. On the other hand, this rep-
resents the typical structure of Gulf labour markets: by and large, most mid-level and 
senior management positions are filled by expatriate workers, mostly of a European-
American or non-Gulf Arab, and to a smaller extent Asian background. Only a tiny po-
litical elite or a top-level manager of a company is Emirati, and is usually unwilling to 
give interviews to comparatively minor research projects such as PhD theses. During 
the course of his work the author has attempted to interview a variety of Emirati 
stakeholders, such as members of the Federal National Council (with an energy pro-
file), clean energy CEOs and ministry officials. In spite of positive introductions by third 
parties, however, most of these interview requests remained unanswered or were 
forwarded to less senior European management staff. 
This lack of access to high-level representatives in the Emirati elite forms a challenge, 
particularly when it comes to tracking decision-making structures. Due to the very per-
sonalized nature of power in the country, this meant that in most cases, mid-level 
management available for research interview could not or would not answer to ques-
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 The author chose not to affiliate himself with Abu Dhabi’s Masdar Institute of Science and Technolo-
gy (MIST). During the first visits, the MIST was only in a start-up phase. In a later stage, it would have 
arguably been problematic to collaborate with MIST too closely for a research project that also has the 
task of critically assessing that very institute/the Masdar Initiative as a whole. In the last phase of the 
research, the author’s relationship to MIST has been a cordial, yet distant one; and the information 
gathered by visits to MIST and interviews on campus represent valuable sources for the overall assess-
ment of the situation. 
158 
 
tions around the rulers’ predilection for one policy option or another. Thus, the  ques-
tion as to why certain policy initiatives in the country remain stalled and how the be-
low-mentioned formidable challenges in the publicly announced spread of renewables 
in this country can be overcome often remained open. This problem represents a seri-
ous limitation for data quality and could in parts be triangulated by other interview 
data. In addition to that, this problem is faced by all other social science oriented re-
searchers in the UAE and thus only reflects the implicit restrictions in academic free-
doms and self-censorship interviewees often apply when talking to foreign research-
ers.  
While this is undoubtedly regrettable, it does not mean that mostly interviewing ex-
patriates had produced insufficient data. Particularly in terms of technical and struc-
tural matters it can be argued that expatriates’ analyses would not markedly differ 
from that of an Emirati. At the same time, the author often had the impression that 
expatriate interviewees would speak more openly about political, economic, or leader-
ship shortcomings in the UAE body politique than their Emirati counterparts. This was 
true for English-language conversations, to some extent with Arabic-language inter-
views with non-Gulf Arab citizens, and most strongly in the case of interviews conduct-
ed in German. The situation of an expatriate researcher interviewing an expatriate 
manager often created a bonding “we” and “they” situation; in which the “we” was 
often defined by common national/regional background and language. Thus the usual-
ly strict borders between the interviewee (and his company) and the interviewer (and 
the rest of the outside world) were blurred. Naturally, the information received in 
these I’ll-tell-you-how-it-really-works-here-moments has to be treated with caution. 
However, their value for a comprehensive and open assessment of national energy 
policies, particularly in a closed society like the UAE, is high. 
In addition to the majority of UAE-related interviews having taken place in that coun-
try, the author conducted several further interviews in the United Kingdom, Germany 
and Kuwait. In the UK, Gulf and energy experts working on similar research projects 
provided valuable data “at home”, while in Germany, the author was able to interview 
the COO of Masdar PV, a company fully owned by the Masdar Initiative to receive his 
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point of view. Lastly, the interviews in Kuwait were conducted to gather further infor-
mation about renewable energy policies and research in oil- and gas wealthy countries, 
as Kuwait has a longstanding tradition in that regard. Additionally, a former acting sec-
retary general of OPEC and a technical director of the OAPEC secretariat were inter-
viewed there in order to shed light on the renewable energy policies and the im-
portance of these organisations in the Arab world. 
The overwhelming number of interviews was conducted in a friendly and constructive 
manner. As highlighted in the methodological discussions of Chapter 4, not all ques-
tions have been discussed with all interviewees, as particularly business and high-
ranking public officials lacked the time (and in parts: the willingness) to do so. Instead, 
interviewees usually focused on two sections: those where interviewees had particular 
professional experience followed by various issues of energy policy governance the 
interviewees felt passionately about. While the talk on the former issues usually led to 
rich information on the respective aspects, the latter aspects were not necessarily 
identical with their area of expertise. In those cases, the information usually was not of 
such high quality. However, the fact that certain points, such as a common GCC energy 
market, local electricity supply in the smaller emirates, or a nation-wide renewable 
energy blueprint, stirred strong emotions among energy experts, provided valuable 
information which can also identify local political fault lines. 
In conclusion, field work in the UAE formed a highly instructive part of the research 
work for this thesis. Particularly compared to the field trips in the Maghreb, interview-
ees in the Gulf were much more open, available and willing to provide information on 
different aspects of renewable energy policies in the UAE. As will be shown in this 
chapter, however, this does not necessarily mean that the UAE’s policies are much 
more advanced or effective than in Algeria. Yet, the positive, albeit at times very PR-
oriented approach of UAE energy stakeholders made the various research trips intel-
lectually productive. 
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5.3. Landscape-level developments 
5.3.1. The UAE’s political system 
How far does the UAE’s political system and the non-existence of independent CSOs 
allow for system innovations in the energy sector, particularly bottom-up innova-
tions? 
Due to the federal structure of the UAE, political decision-making takes place on sever-
al levels. First, at the individual emirate-level, decisions are by and large taken among 
the top-level leadership of the Emirs and the inner circle of the ruling families; a pro-
cess that is rarely criticized by the UAE citizens. The same group of leaders also man-
ages federal affairs in the Supreme Council, the UAE’s highest authority solely consti-
tuted by the rulers of the seven emirates. Parallel to this, the already mentioned Fed-
eral National Council (FNC) has the function of an advisory panel or proto-parliament. 
While FNC members increasingly express their desire for more powers and a more 
open electoral system,118 to the present day, the true centre of power remains the 
Supreme Council. This continuity of a hierarchical, hereditary leadership structure 
makes the UAE’s system of government both highly personalized and top-down. How-
ever, one should not make the mistake to assume that decision-making is necessarily 
unreasonable or less founded on international planning principles than in other simi-
larly developed countries, not least because the UAE, as a high-income country, can 
afford to purchase excellent quality both in terms of personnel and technology. One 
interviewee confirms this notion saying 
“Yes, the decision-making structures here are very hierarchical and top-down. But do 
not make the mistake to think that this is a banana republic here! Instead, particularly 
the Abu Dhabi government has shown a very high degree of professionalism. While 
initiatives usually come from the very top or can be stopped there at any time, if their 
initiatives are to succeed, at some point, the rulers cannot avoid the assessment by 
ministries and other institutions anymore.” (Interview no. 74 – National & International 
Power sector, UAE) 
The absence of civil-society organisations with sufficient expertise to champion a re-
newable energy campaign, which may also be in opposition to government policies, 
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 Interview with an undisclosed political stakeholder, UAE; see also recent newspaper articles (The 
Peninsula, 2011). 
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has to be accepted as a fact. One of the few organisations in that field is the Environ-
ment Agency Abu Dhabi which, however, is a government organisation and focuses on 
less controversial topics such as the protection of endangered species, environmental 
awareness campaigns in schools, and similar activities.119  
This notion is also confirmed by one of the representatives of the UAE’s ruling elite 
who is active in environmental affairs. He confirmed that there are no major environ-
mental pressure groups in the UAE today: 
“I was the chairman of an environmental NGO in the 1990s…There were lots of other 
groups as well back then, but after 9/11 they were all closed due to ‘security con-
cerns’…In general, every criticism in that field is banned; there is a huge brain drain 
here because people cannot speak out and leave; this is true both for Emiratis and for-
eigners; there is no freedom of speech here; all speeches, conferences etc. are con-
trolled – this is not good as only a free discourse will bring this society forward.” (Inter-
view no. 56 – public stakeholder, Gulf States) 
A notable exception, however, might be a new group of industry associations, such as 
the Clean Energy Business Council (CEBC) or the Emirates Solar Industry Association 
(ESIA) established in 2010. According to one of the key stakeholders, the ESIA has the 
following agenda (Interview no. 64 – Private and public investor, UAE): 
- To build up a solar community in the UAE 
- To organize networking events  
- To produce research reports on solar energy 
- To be a contact point for international companies willing to enter the UAE solar 
market 
CEBC is structured in a very similar way where a greater focus is placed on the provi-
sion of information for outside investors, but also to strengthen the renewables lobby 
within the UAE (Interview no. 80 – R&D, UAE and Young, 2010) 
Whether these organisations, in addition to Masdar, with whom a good relationship 
exists, will develop into influential lobby groups for renewable energies in the UAE 
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 The titles of annual reports suggest that one of the goal of this agency is rather country marketing 
than the formation of a non-government position. Cf. “Annual report 2007 – another year of achieve-
ments” (Environment Agency Abu Dhabi, 2007). 
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with political clout, remains to be seen. In the renewable energy field, however, these 
organisations are currently the only meaningful, not fully government-controlled bod-
ies in that field that could promote innovation in that sector. Whether this would nec-
essarily be a bottom-up innovation process can only be speculated. As both ESIA’s and 
CEBC’s interests largely lie with the big power industry, this would find a significant 
role in most scenarios published by this group. 
As stipulated in the UAE constitution, energy issues constitute a reserved right for the 
individual emirates.120 The rationale for this is much less the electricity sector than the 
oil and gas revenues, which rulers wanted to keep in the hands of their individual 
emirate since the foundation of the UAE in 1971. The most relevant traditional gov-
ernance body for the oil and gas markets in the UAE is arguably Abu Dhabi’s Supreme 
Petroleum Council (SPC). As only Abu Dhabi has major hydrocarbons resources left the 
SPC retained a say in energy politics. However, the SPC has not yet made the decision 
to take environmental issues, climate change or renewable energies formally and fully 
into account and thus mostly overlooks these issues. 
The same also rings true for the national and international oil companies. As one oil 
expert confirmed: 
“They don’t have a big political influence here. They are rather implementing agencies, 
and also don’t have seats on the national councils like the petroleum council. They im-
plement political decisions from the oil or energy ministries, but they can’t/won’t be 
pro-active on the renewables front themselves and push for a national/company agen-
da if the political leadership doesn’t give them the mandate to do so. Also, this is not 
their core business. In addition to this, there is a general lack of awareness among pe-
troleum executives of renewables; this is out of their view usually.” (Interview no. 93 – 
R&D, UAE) 
Only in 2009, Dubai’s ruler Sheikh Mohamed bin Rashid Al Maktoum has created a 
Supreme Council of Energy (The Media Office for H.H. Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid 
Al Maktoum, 2009) that is also mandated to work more closely on the electricity sector 
(AMEInfo, 2010). So far, however, this council is yet to launch a significant energy initi-
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 Article 23 of the UAE constitution stipulates: “The natural resources and wealth in each Emirate shall 
be considered to be the public property of that Emirate. Society shall be responsible for the protection 
and proper exploitation of such natural resources and wealth for the benefit of the national economy”. 
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ative. Instead, it has been active in PR and environmental awareness campaigns, such 
as urging Dubai to become the highest energy-saving city in the world (Al Mashni, 
2011) – a somewhat futile attempt given the strong rise of the already high per-capita 
electricity consumption. 
At least in Abu Dhabi, the institutional struggles between different government bodies 
can also be regarded as a greater struggle for political hegemony within the ruling 
elite. Several interviewees characterized the situation of Abu Dhabi’s elite (and to a 
lesser extent those of most emirates) as currently being in a political tug-of-war be-
tween two types of leaders that represent two “speeds of governance”. 
One the one hand, there is the conservative, long-serving political and economic lead-
ership that is best represented through the UAE’s president, the ruler of Abu Dhabi, 
Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan (*1948) and previously his father Zayed bin Sultan 
Al Nahyan (1918-2004), founder-president of the UAE and long-serving Emir of Abu 
Dhabi (1966-2004). This type of ruler has governed the country through the Cold War 
and the first periods of globalisation. In terms of national economic development, 
these individuals were usually cautious not to digress from the successful oil- and gas-
focused path of the last decades and often have little interest in developing new fields 
of income or diversifying their national economies. Typical institutions for this socio-
economic model are, for instance ADWEA, ADNOC (Abu Dhabi National Oil Company), 
or the SPC. 
This is contrasted by a type of policy maker with a different vision of their countries, 
such as Dubai’s Sheikh Muhammad bin Rashid Al Maktoum or Sheikh Mohammed bin 
Zayed Al Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi. Their vision is much more in tune with 
the development plans of the last decade or so, including a liberalization of financial 
and investment regulations, a broad, long-term diversification of the national econo-
mies, as well as globally recognized phenomena such as Abu Dhabi’s Formula One race 
course, the Masdar Initiative, the investment vehicle Mubadala, Dubai’s extravagant 
development plans; in short, as one interviewee put it, “all what is sexy in the Emir-
ates” (Interview no. 85 – R&D UAE). 
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Section conclusion 
In the UAE, a bottom-up system innovation can hardly be expected from non-
government UAE entities as personalized, centralized and top-level decision-making 
structures persist. This has direct impacts on policy making, as the will of these per-
sonal and, effectively, absolute rulers in the policy process cannot be ignored, and a 
mid-level management’s attempts to circumvent them would almost certainly be pun-
ished as it represents a direct threat to the influence of the rulers. This type of rul-
ership is characterized by a pyramidal decision-making structure. Thus, the leverage of 
even senior aides to take decisions without the approval of the respective top-level 
figure remains low. Third, and as a consequence of that, the realisation of the much-
advertised mega-projects are at the mercy of good will on the top level. Projects (like 
the case of Masdar), legal initiatives (like the elusive renewable energy blueprint) and 
further significant strategic decisions on Emirate level are essentially dependent on the 
rulers’ consent. If, when and under which conditions this is granted remains out of the 
realm of this thesis and is, like the attempt to predict other absolute rulers’ policies – a 
methodologically difficult and often flawed form of Kremlinology. 
A bottom-up innovation approach is thus unlikely to develop any time soon unless up-
on initiative of the federal government or of well-connected individuals belonging to a 
faction that can provide political support. Evidently, however, if such an innovation 
process was to be launched and managed by central government it would lose its main 
characteristic. Significant innovations in the UAE energy system are most likely to stem 
from strongly system-entrenched actors such as Masdar and, to a lesser extent, busi-
ness organisations such as the CEBC or the ESIA. 
Second, the fundamental divide in policies is a key analytical tool to understand the 
different policy systems of UAE policy and will be discussed further below. It is not al-
ways evident which of these models of policy making within the ruling elite has the 
upper hand. However, it seems that although the old oil and gas elites continue to be 
powerful, they are mostly interested in the perpetuation of the business as usual sce-
nario that has been immensely lucrative in recent decades. As long as their policy 
model is left untouched, the “newcomers” will not be prevented from launching inno-
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vative renewable energy initiatives such as Masdar. Even comprehensive renewable 
energy initiatives are not a major issue, as they do not diminish the returns on hydro-
carbons exports, but rather turn capacities that have previously been bound for do-
mestic consumption into new export capacities. In short, the traditional oil and gas 
elites might have the power to both launch such initiatives themselves and prevent 
them from being successful. However, as long as their old business models remains 
undisturbed, they do not have the economic and political interest to act in either way. 
 
5.3.1.1. Personal patronage networks 
To what extent are the official decision-making processes the actual decision-making 
structures? 
While there remains a fuzzy overlap between official and non-official decision-making 
structures, the official decision-making bodies in the UAE are arguably also those 
where, to a large extent, policies are made. For the UAE, two aspects need to be high-
lighted. First, although the official decision-making structures are to a large extent par-
allel to the actual processes, this does not mean that reasons for certain decisions are 
publicly given or the decision-making process publicly explained. Second, in the top-
level positions of the state, decisions are highly personalized, and, as has been argued 
in the previous subsection, individuals represent certain approaches of general poli-
cies. Perhaps the most striking case of personal patronage in the UAE’s renewable en-
ergy landscape is the case of Masdar’s CEO Dr. Sultan al-Jaber. As a young Emirati, al-
Jaber became the figurehead of the Masdar Initiative. Although not from the inner 
circles of the ruling family, Jaber’s profile has grown in parallel to the Masdar Initia-
tive121, under the protection of Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince. As an example for the work-
ing of the personalized management structure:  
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 In mid-2011, for instance, al-Jaber is not only the CEO of Masdar, but also the UAE’s Assistant Minis-
ter of Foreign Affairs, the UN’s contact point for climate change, chairman of the Abu Dhabi Ports Com-
pany (ADPC), chairman of Abu Dhabi Media Investment Corp., Chairman of Sky News Arabia, Vice 
Chairman of the UAE Federal Health Authority and serves on the boards of the Advanced Technology 
Investment Company (ATIC), ALDAR Properties and ZonesCorp. In addition to this, he holds several other 
offices. Cf. http://gggi.org/board/member/sultan-ahmed-al-jaber, accessed on 26 June 2011. Undoubt-
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“Due to the leadership structure, things are all resting in a few hands, and Masdar still 
…is a prestige object not only for Jaber, but also important for the Crown Prince. Jaber 
again has hired a few people (3-5) who are in charge of key projects like the World Fu-
ture Energy Summit etc. and they operate them on a sink or swim basis.” (Interview no. 
27 – Public Stakeholder, EU) 
This is an example of blurred decision-making structures in the UAE. Prima facie it ap-
pears that Sultan al-Jaber is the key decision-maker of Masdar, yet, this does not rep-
resent the full truth. However much Sultan al-Jaber develops an independent political 
clout, his decisions inevitably remain subject to higher-level blessings or swings in the 
fortunes of the Crown Prince himself. 
Other official decision-making structures are even less transparent. During the entire 
research period for this thesis various interviewees have stressed that the release of 
an Abu Dhabi strategic energy blueprint, as well as a national FIT system was imminent 
and merely needed a last signature to be enforced.122 However, after three years of 
research, nothing substantial has been released. From an outsider’s perspective it can-
not be deemed with certainty whether this delay is caused by institutional inertia or 
active lobbying on behalf of anti-renewable energy stakeholders. The latter, however 
appears to be unlikely as no publicly visible anti-renewable energy lobby exists in the 
UAE. 
 
With regards to formal or informal policy networks supporting or blocking the spread 
of renewables in the UAE, the most pertinent divide has already been discussed in the 
previous subsection. As confirmed by various interviewees, energy policy in the UAE 
takes place along these lines. In the greater struggle for directional hegemony over the 
future development path, (renewable) energy policy merely represents one battle in 
                                                                                                                                                            
edly, this stellar rise from an “assistant manager” in 2004 (Interview no. 66 – Private and public inves-
tors, UAE) would not have occurred without strong backing of the ruling elite. 
122
 Quotes were, for instance, as follows: “There is no common energy policy document out yet, but it is 
bound to happen within the next few weeks” (Interview no. 51 – Public stakeholder, UAE); “the policy 
document is 100% ready, it just needs to be signed on the very top level, without this consent, it cannot 
move” (Interview no. 63 – private and public investor, UAE) vs. the much less enthusiastic statement “A 
comprehensive energy policy is supposed to have been released since more than 2 years now (=2008, the 
author) – but it is still ‘under discussion’” (Interview no. 87 – R&D, UAE). 
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the conflict. Classical constellations of Western states, such as party-political disputes, 
CSO campaigns against government policy, or inter-ministerial tensions between the 
ministries of economy, environment and energy are less relevant or non-existent due 
to the hierarchical, top-down political system that allows for open political discourse 
only in very limited contexts.  
A noteworthy ancillary-aspect is the fact that in the UAE, there often seems to be a 
substantial overlap between the political support networks for renewable and the nu-
clear energy under the terminological umbrella of terms such as “clean” or “future”. 
One striking example for this is the annual World Future Energy Summit, which tradi-
tionally displays not only renewable energy products, but also nuclear energy, “clean 
coal”, CCS and other technologies that renewable energy activists in the West would 
not like to see associated with RETs. What is incongruous in other countries seems to 
harmonize rather well in the UAE. The question, however, seems to be whether or not 
renewable energies will be marginalized under the capital-intensive competition of 
nuclear energy in the medium term. While the technical issues pertaining to this ques-
tion will be discussed in Subsection  5.4.1.2, for now, it suffices to deduce that this unu-
sual coalition might actually promote the spread of renewables in the UAE.  
In short, concisely tracing decision-making structures within UAE (renewable) energy 
policy is a daunting task. While, as described, the most powerful actors within this mul-
tiple speed structure can be identified, those key stakeholders, usually senior members 
of the ruling families or ministers, are usually unavailable for research interviews. This 
thesis is no exception in that regard. Other stakeholders, who are accessible for inter-
views, usually either do not have personal access to high-level members of the ruling 
class or, if they do, they will make sure not to divulge this.  
This lack of access might constitute a certain deficiency in terms of precise data collec-
tion on the case study level. In a more abstract sense, however, this dearth of data on 
these points reflects the opacity and highly personalised decision-making structures 
within the UAE government that amass decision-making power within few high-level 
offices while leaving almost none to mid- or lower-level managerial staff. The fact that 
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other research publications stay equally – or more – quiet with regards to these mat-
ters highlights the sensitivity and opacity that clouds these issues.  
 
Section conclusion 
UAE renewable energy decision-making processes take place on a highly personalized 
basis and within a very small national elite. This is indicative of the Emirati political 
system, in which decisions are usually taken behind closed doors and remain opaque 
to the outsider. 
 While there is a large overlap between supporters of nuclear and those of renewable 
energy under the umbrella of the catchword “clean energy”, it needs to be emphasised 
that the division in this group cannot be regarded as running parallel those lines in 
western liberal democracies, but rather along the “old vs. new guard” system that, as 
described in the previous section, is dividing Gulf elites. 
 
5.3.1.2. Governance effects of renewable energy systems 
What do interviewees regard as the key governance effects of renewable energy 
production? 
As mentioned earlier, the provision of cheap and abundant electricity is regarded as 
part of the ruling bargain, thus, major rises in power prices are usually avoided by Gulf 
rulers. Second, the notion of a long-term democratisation of the UAE body politique 
through a spread of renewable energy capacities is amiss in both the ruling and the 
slightly government-critical circles. However, what was mentioned several times by 
interviewees was the principled opposition of the UAE government to both a free and 
open electricity market and also the full liberalization of the energy production sector. 
Interviewees felt the government feared losing control over this vital sector stating: 
“You don’t want to end up with too many decentralised projects; everyone is very pro 
centralized power production here!” (Interview no. 76 – National and international 
power sector, Gulf States) 
However, it appears doubtful whether this statement in fact implies a confirmation of 
this assumption. Instead, it appears more likely that this notion results from the typical 
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paranoia of autocratic rule, which attempts to retain control over every aspect of life, 
the power sector included. 
Further, it is striking how well-known the project of a common GCC grid is, bearing in 
mind that this is a “mere” technology project. In light of the on-going power shortages 
and the mid-term gas shortage of the UAE and many other GCC states, this project 
carries within itself one element of an enhanced regional, intra-GCC cooperation. 
However, as Miller argues (Miller, 2005), key commercial elements of the GCC grid are 
yet to be developed. Thus, while the grid will form a much-needed emergency back-
bone for the Gulf States, it is uncertain how much physical electricity exchange will in 
fact take place there. First, for the time being, no common electricity market is 
planned. This cannot be seen as surprising given that even the national electricity pric-
es in the GCC are not created by market forces but by government price-setting and 
subsidies. Second, as the load peaks of all GCC states occur by and large in the same 
time period (summer), it remains doubtful how much reserve capacity states will actu-
ally have in a phase during which all regional energy systems are under stress (Inter-
view no. 68 – National and international power sector, UAE). Third, although so far, the 
GCC grid connections have proceeded well, a full-fledged grid might face unexpected 
problems, as in the case of the failed MedRing grid project around the Mediterrane-
an.123 Also, the fact that Saudi Arabia operates on the US-standard of 60Hz, while the 
rest of the Gulf operates on a 50Hz standard means that the only way to integrate 
Saudi Arabia, the largest GCC power pool by far, to the rest of the GCC grid is via HVDC 
converters (Interview no. 65 - Private and public investors, UAE); a further obstacle to a 
major GCC electricity market. 
 
Section conclusion 
Answered ex negativo, by and large, rulers do not seem to connect the spread of re-
newable energy capacities with any political agenda. Yet, an agenda can be found in 
                                                      
123
 As discussed in Footnote 87, the closure of the Tunisian-Libyan interconnection failed due to unfore-
seen technical difficulties. Thus, the closure of the MedRing still remains an on-going project. 
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the provision of cheap and abundant electricity. This forms a crucial part of the nation-
al “ruling bargain”, which political elites refrain from challenging. 
Furthermore, it can be confirmed that the creation of a common GCC energy infra-
structure can certainly promote regional integration in a wider sense. Due to the fac-
tors mentioned above, however, it is unclear as to how well this common security 
backbone will actually work and whether a dysfunctional GCC grid might hamper re-
gional cooperation. 
 
5.3.2. Key transregional energy governance bodies 
Which role do transregional energy governance bodies such as OPEC, OAPEC or IRE-
NA play in the promotion or stalling of national renewable energy policy in the re-
spective target country? 
As noted above (Section  3.2.2), OPEC and OAPEC have a regional governance mandate 
that is restricted to technical cooperation in the oil and gas sector (OAPEC) or the oil 
price and oil policies (OPEC). Neither organisation has devoted many human or finan-
cial resources to renewable energies; on the whole, these organisations tend to stay 
out of national Arab renewable energy policies. Thus, their role on the level of domes-
tic renewable energy politics is, at the moment, negligible. This might also be due to 
the fact that no hydrocarbons-wealthy Arab state would attempt to implement a poli-
cy that could be interpreted as an all-out attack on the oil economies – a move that 
would not be in any oil-producing states’ interest. 
With regards to IRENA, its presence in Abu Dhabi has not had any major effect on 
countries with the same economic structure. While certainly, the combination of 
Masdar and IRENA in Abu Dhabi have helped promote public awareness of these insti-
tutions in the UAE (and particularly in Abu Dhabi), immediate policy implications have 
so far not been visible.  
On the one hand, IRENA officials are careful not to privilege the host state in any way. 
Although a MENA renewable energy expert is part of IRENA staff, not much conceptual 
or policy work in that respect has carried out thus far. This was anticipated since 2010 
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was IRENA’s first full year of operation, a year fraught with leadership difficulties and 
financial problems.124 Moreover, it is not the task of this organisation to put a particu-
lar focus on the host country or region. As one interviewee put it: 
“Just the fact that we are hosted by Abu Dhabi doesn’t justify a special focus on Abu 
Dhabi or the Middle East as a whole. The UAE is one of our 148 member countries and 
will not get a special treatment. Of course, we are cooperating closely with some peo-
ple from Abu Dhabi’s Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) as they are our 
host agency, but that’s all.” (Interview no. 54 – public stakeholder, Gulf States)  
Instead of the international organisation attempting to influence policies of its host 
state, it seems that there has rather been an inverted attempt by the host state to in-
fluence the topical focus of IRENA. An open controversy about whether IRENA should 
also cover or promote nuclear energy has emerged; a direction that would have been 
very beneficial to Abu Dhabi’s “clean tech” doctrine of confounding these two systems 
of energy production. The former general director of the preparatory commission for 
IRENA, Helène Pelosse, strongly rejected this demand (Khaleej Times, 2009) with refer-
ence to the article III of the IRENA Statue that defines renewable energy as 
“All forms of energy produced from renewable sources in a sustainable manner, which 
include, inter alia: 
1. bioenergy; 
2. geothermal energy; 
3. hydropower; 
4. ocean energy, including inter alia tidal, wave and ocean thermal energy; 
5. solar energy; and 
6. wind energy” (Preparatory Commission for IRENA, 2009) 
thus clearly excluding nuclear power from its agenda. Also, several interviewees con-
firm that there has been a power struggle behind the scenes between Masdar/Abu 
Dhabi (Jaber) and IRENA (Pelosse).125 
 
                                                      
124
 In October 2010, founding director Helène Pelosse left the organisation. “IRENA 2.0”, a new staff and 
financial policy was implemented (Interview no. 27 – public stakeholder, EU). 
125
 “Jaber thought, he was her boss, but he wasn’t, this was totally inappropriate” (Interview no. 53, 
public stakeholder, UAE); “Pelosse was always anti-nuclear; this caused the main friction! Somehow 
Jaber thought he was her boss…” (Interview no. 69 – National and international power sector, UAE) 
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Section conclusion 
Transregional energy governance organisations have not had a traceable impact on 
domestic renewable energy policies in the UAE. In turn, the UAE had a minor negative 
role in the start-up phase of IRENA. An impact on domestic UAE renewable energy pol-
icies by IRENA itself cannot be expected in the medium term aside from the fact that, 
by hosting IRENA, the UAE (and particularly Abu Dhabi) would suffer global reputation-
al damage in abandoning their domestic renewable energy plans, as well as the 
Masdar City project. 
 
5.3.3. Climate change vulnerability and low environment-related profile of oil-
producing states 
Is the climate change agenda actively considered in the political decision-making on 
renewable energy developments? 
The impacts of anthropogenic climate change in the Lower Gulf are already noticeable. 
As Riegl’s research on coral reefs in Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah demonstrates, local 
marine ecosystems in the Arabian Gulf are substantially affected by climate change 
and must be placed among the “most stressed reef environments on earth” (Riegl, 
2003, p. 434). In a local climate of increasingly frequent temperature anomalies,126 
unprecedented bleaching events and a heightened coral mortality rate have occurred. 
In line with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007a) and other 
meteorological models (Met Office, 2009; Zhang, Aguilar, Sensoy, Melkonyan, 
Tagiyeva, Ahmed et al., 2005) it is justified to predict that climate change will put addi-
tional stress on the regional political and economic systems.127 Initially, a decrease in 
precipitation in combination with a projected temperature rise of 1.8°C by 2040 and 
                                                      
126
 In 1998, average temperatures exceeded 37.3°C in central regions of the Gulf being more than 2°C 
above average. This was the largest temperature rise in the southern Gulf since 1870 and emphasizes 
the increase in sea surface temperature in the Gulf of at least 0.2 °C per decade for the last 50 years 
(Richer, 2008). 
127
 As Hemming et al. (2010) discuss, the exact prognosis of climate change related changes on the Ara-
bian Peninsula poses a major challenge to research. The general trend, however, can be regarded as 
certain. 
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3.6° by 2070 (see Figure 31) will render even wider areas of the Gulf States unfit for 
agriculture and uninhabitable for a non-nomad population. 
Figure 31: Changes in Regional Climate Model projections of seasonal average temperature (°C) across 
the Gulf region for the 2040s relative to the 1990s 
 
Source: MET Office, 2009.  
This “desertification in the desert” (Richer, 2008, p. 8) will raise the stakes for existing 
water supplies in the region, accelerating the depletion of non-renewable saline aqui-
fers. Most fossil water resources on the Arabian Peninsula are between 10,000 and 
30,000 years old. While the domestic water use in the Gulf is currently about six times 
the natural renewal rate, also in this case, the question is when rather than if aquifers 
deplete (Brook, Al Houqani, & Al Mugrin, 2006).128 Water tables have dropped sharply 
as demand from rapidly urbanizing and industrializing populations has outstripped 
supply from fossil water and local aquifers (Raouf, 2009). 
                                                     
128
 In 2000, only four countries (Iraq, Iran, Syria and Lebanon) of the entire MENA region had freshwater 
reserves beyond the water poverty level of 1000m
3
/cap/y (German Aerospace Center (DLR), 2006a, 
p. 4).  
It should be noted that the fossil water reservoirs in the Gulf are significantly smaller than in North Afri-
ca. Thus, mega-projects like Libya’s ‘Great Man-made River’ tapping the world’s largest fossil water 
reservoir in the Nubian sandstone aquifer system cannot be realized on the Peninsula. This does not 
suggest that the realization of such a project would be particularly desirable. However, in the Gulf, this is 
not even possible from a resource perspective. For more information on Libya’s project cf. at: 
http://www.water-technology.net/projects/gmr (last assessed 1 November 2011) and Simons (2000). 
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Currently, more than half of the water used originates from desalination or 
wastewater treatment. However, in the mid-term perspective, the growing freshwater 
demand of the region cannot be sustained by the reliance on fossil water reserves, 
which is why both the relative and absolute amounts of desalinated water are going to 
rise. The 15 desalination plants that are currently operating in the GCC on the Arabian 
Gulf alone already have adverse environmental effects such as releasing gases, hot 
brine, treatment chemicals and other trace elements. Besides the production costs129 
and their impact on marine life (Abderrahman & Husain T., 2006), the key issue for this 
research is the close nexus of desalinated water and energy. On average, desalination 
plants need 1.5-15 kWh to produce one cubic meter of water (German Aerospace 
Center (DLR), 2006a, p. 22). Thus, the rising water production by desalination further 
increases the already high annual growth rates of national electricity demand. 
Renewable energy policy could interact with climate protection measures in two ways: 
first, large-scale application of renewable energy for seawater desalination could be an 
entry point for renewable energies in the UAE.130 Second, the climate change argu-
ment could be used by politicians to justify an enhanced deployment of renewable 
energies in the UAE. 
With regards to the first issue, while CSP-based seawater desalination might be an im-
portant driver in the mid-term future, for the time being, this is not an actively consid-
ered technology option by UAE stakeholders due to the significantly lower costs of 
fossil-fuel-based desalination. 
The second aspect is the use of the clean development mechanism (CDM) as a poten-
tial financing tool for the spread of renewables. This yielded an equally weak outcome. 
As was shown in Section  3.2.3, the spread of the CDM in the MENA region is strongly 
                                                      
129
 Until 2020, Saudi Arabia alone will invest US$ 50bn in desalination projects, while an overall invest-
ment volume of US$ 200bn has been earmarked for water and energy infrastructure projects (The Saudi 
Gazette, 2010); and in the UAE, desalination costs are expected to rise by 300% over the next 6 years to 
an annual US$ 3.22bn.  
130
 See for instance Bouchekima (2002), Enzili (2007), German Aerospace Center (DLR) (2006a), 
Mahmoudi, Abdellah, & Ghaffour (2009), and Hashem (2011). One of the most recent and comprehen-
sive research projects on that subject was the EU-funded project Promotion of Renewable Energy for 
Water production through Desalination (PRODES) Papatreou, Wieghaus & Biercamp (2010). 
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underdeveloped compared to other world regions. No interviewee has mentioned this 
mechanism as a potential business stimulant for the UAE. One of the very few institu-
tions in the UAE that works actively with CDM is the carbon unit of Masdar (see Sub-
chapter  5.6 for further details). However, most of its projects are not based in the UAE 
itself, and an employee of this Masdar branch confirmed that, CDM money usually only 
helps to fund “the icing on the cake for renewable energy investments, maybe 1-2% of 
the overall investment costs”. This might serve as an explanation as to why the hydro-
carbons-rich states that had large budget surpluses in recent years, have not been in-
terested in using the “very complicated mechanisms of CDM” (both quotes: Interview 
no. 78 – national and international power sector, Gulf States) for comparatively little 
funds. 
 
Section conclusion 
The framing of renewable energy policy in the context of climate change plays only a 
minor role in the UAE. While statements, for instance by Masdar, refer to climate 
change, public discourse on this topic in this group of states remains very critical to-
wards it. In conclusion, it can be argued that both aspects of climate change only play a 
minor role in the spread of renewable energy in the UAE. 
With regards to finance, the CDM is widely regarded as a mechanism that is both com-
plex and financially not particularly rewarding. Stakeholders have little hopes in its 
effects. Thus, it is not likely that the CDM – in its current form – is a valuable tool for 
the spread of renewable energy capacities in the UAE. 
 
5.3.4. Long-term national economic diversification 
Are the renewable energy-related efforts connected to the national economic visions 
or national SWF activities in the respective country? 
As discussed in Section  3.2.4, it has become a trend in the Gulf to develop national 
policy blueprints that are designed to guide the country’s development in the decades 
to come. In this trend, the UAE forms no exception. Due to the particular federal struc-
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ture in the UAE, the federal blueprint remains rather weak, while most emirates have 
developed their own set of policy papers.131 Renewable energy policies in the central 
policy documents will be analysed next. 
Apart from short-term government policy white papers such as the UAE government 
strategy 2011-2013 (Government of the United Arab Emirates, 2011a), the document 
on the federal level “UAE Vision 2021: United in ambition and determination” is in its 
character merely a loose policy document enlisting common aspects of UAE policy. 
Renewable energy policy does not appear as such. However, the previously discussed 
blending of renewable and nuclear power is included. The only text passage where 
energy policy is mentioned reads as follows: 
“Balanced growth must be fuelled by a sustainable range of energy sources, within 
which the UAE will ensure an important role for alternative and renewable options such 
as nuclear power.” (Text highlighted by the author) (Government of the United Arab 
Emirates, 2011b, p. 17) 
It seems evident that not only are the two forms of energy carriers confounded here, 
but nuclear energy also is being championed as an energy carrier more than renewa-
bles are. 
On the emirate level, the documents of Dubai and Abu Dhabi, the most populous and 
economically powerful emirates, set the tone. At the height of its economic boom 
(2007), the government of Dubai released a new Dubai Strategic Plan for 2015 after its 
previous Dubai 2010 plan had been very successful. The 2007 plan was titled “Du-
bai…where the future begins” and outlined a very ambitious urban development strat-
egy for the emirate. Renewable energies played virtually no role in its strategic eco-
                                                      
131
 UAE: UAE Vision 2021; UAE Education Strategy 2010-2020. 
Abu Dhabi: Abu Dhabi Economic Vision 2030 / Abu Dhabi 2030; Abu Dhabi Vision 2020; ADEC 10 Year 
Strategic Plan. 
Dubai: Dubai Strategic Plan 2015 (DSP 2015); Dubai Strategic Plan 2010; Dubai Courts Strategic Plan 
2009-2011; Dubai Municipality Strategic Plan 2010-2014; Dubai Municipality Strategic Plan 2007-2011; 
DTCM Strategic Plan; RTA Strategic Plan. 
Ras al-Khaimah: 20 Year RAK Development Plan for Southern Region; 2005 Master Plan 
(RAK internet webservice, 2009)  
Source: http://www.dubaifaqs.com/strategic-plan-vision-uae.php, last accessed 20 June 2011. 
Consultants’ plans to sell to the ruler of Sharjah a similar “Sharjah Vision 2020” in 2003 for US$ 1.9m 
have apparently been unsuccessful (Amirahmadi, 2003). 
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nomic assessment (see Figure 32). The only energy-related statements were the two 
goals in the environment sections of this strategy: 
“Provide efficient energy, electricity and water supplies to meet Dubai’s growing 
needs” and “Maintain Dubai as a safe, clean, attractive and sustainable environment” 
(Government of Dubai, 2007, p. 32) 
Thus, a link to renewable energy as long-term national economic diversification, indus-
try or labour market policy cannot be identified – a situation that is unlikely to change 
in the impending re-launch of this strategy.132 
Figure 32: Dubai's sectoral strengths in light of future global growth 
 
Source: Government of Dubai, 2007, p. 20.  
Lastly, the Emirate of Abu Dhabi has arguably presented the most sophisticated and 
influential set of “visions” that have set the tone for the entire country, the “Abu Dhabi 
Economic Vision 2030” and the “Plan Abu Dhabi 2030”, which, to a certain extent, re-
fer to renewable energies as well. The “Economic Vision” has been issued by the Gov-
ernment of Abu Dhabi and outlines key economic development goals for the next dec-
ades. It stresses the strategic importance of diversified economies and a decreased 
                                                     
132
 The global economic downturn made the 2007 planning goals unattainable, hence this re-launch. Cf. 
http://www.dubai.ae/en.portal?topic,hm_dxbstgplan,0,&_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=misc. Last accessed 
02 July 2011. 
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dependence from hydrocarbons revenues for a sustainable wealth in the 21st century 
and beyond (Government of Abu Dhabi, 2008, p. 7). Moreover, it identifies the follow-
ing determinants of Abu Dhabi’s long-term economic success (see Figure 33): 
Figure 33: Pillars of the Abu Dhabi policy agenda vision 
 
Source: Government of Abu Dhabi, 2008, p. 6.  
Further, it defines the following economic areas as key for Abu Dhabi’s diversified eco-
nomic growth: 
1. Energy – Oil and Gas 
2. Petrochemicals 
3. Metals 
4. Aviation, Aerospace and Defense 
5. Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology, & Life Sciences 
6. Tourism 
7. Healthcare Equipment and Services 
8. Transportation, Trade and Logistics 
9. Education 
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10. Media 
11. Financial Services 
12. Telecommunication Services (Government of Abu Dhabi, 2008, pp. 11–12) 
From that list it is evident that although renewable energy could be subsumed under 
point 1., it does not have a prominent role in this plan. 
Further, the document makes another reference to non-fossil energy sources;133 in the 
wake of that statement, however, nuclear energies are championed again while re-
newables play largely no role – “solar” or “wind energy” are not mentioned at all. This 
assessment can also be supported by the fact that the much-promoted Masdar Initia-
tive, supposedly the flagship project of renewable energies in Abu Dhabi, is not given 
major attention in the document and is not at all mentioned in its renewable energy 
component. The only instance Masdar is mentioned in this 145 page-report is in the 
context of ADNOC, as Masdar is also in charge of a Carbon Capture and Sequestration 
(CCS) project that might be beneficial for this NOC. This supports the notion that while 
this report appears to be innovative and catering to the new group of rulers in Abu 
Dhabi, it remains very conservative in energy sector terms and even fails to show Abu 
Dhabi’s greatest international renewable energy achievement, Masdar. 
The second policy document, the “Plan Abu Dhabi 2030” has been released by the Abu 
Dhabi Urban Planning Council and is thus of a lower political status as the publication 
above. Much like its counterpart, Abu Dhabi’s second city Al Ain (Abu Dhabi Urban 
Planning Council, 2009) mostly focuses on planning concern for the built environment 
of that city and is to a lesser extent a general policy document.  
Nonetheless, it sets a positive tone for renewable energies: 
“Oil has brought considerable wealth to the city, but it is a finite resource. Abu Dhabi’s 
future lies in the ability to cautiously use existing wealth, to actively explore renewable 
energy production, to reduce the consumption of non-renewable resources and to edu-
cate future generations. Resource efficiency is vital.” (Abu Dhabi Urban Planning Coun-
cil, 2007, p. 6) 
                                                      
133
 “Diversifying energy sources is a key strategy to ensure future energy security“ (Government of Abu 
Dhabi, 2008, p. 80). 
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In line with its mandate the report does not continue with a detailed energy policy 
blueprint, nor does it give recommendations in terms of material energy policy, such 
as feed-in-tariffs, or similar RE promotion instruments. It discusses, however, the 
Masdar Initiative as key experiment for a zero or low-carbon built environment in the 
UAE and beyond. 
 
With regards to the role of SWFs and their investments in renewable energies, again, 
Abu Dhabi leads the way in the UAE. While the size and, in parts, the lack of transpar-
ency of the UAE’s sovereign wealth funds makes it impossible to identify every renew-
able energy investment, one, however, needs to be highlighted. As part of its Masdar 
Initiative, Abu Dhabi successfully launched the Masdar Cleantech Funds. Mubadala134, 
one of Abu Dhabi’s smaller, transparent135 sovereign wealth funds, is widely regarded 
as the investment vehicle of Abu Dhabi’s crown prince and the generation of young 
innovators among the ruling elite. It has partnered with major international banks 
(Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank) for its launch.136 With a total investment volume of US$ 
250m and US$ 290m respectively, Abu Dhabi’s first two137 clean tech funds invested in 
key technologies overseas and created several important joint-ventures for the Masdar 
Initiative. In the East German state of Thuringia, a PV plant has been built for US$ 
230m, Masdar has also announced a joint-venture with the small, Finnish wind-turbine 
manufacturer WinWinD to set up its business in Abu Dhabi through a 120€m invest-
ment. This, and further recent investments do not only have a short-term financial 
interest. As one interviewee stated: 
“Of course we know that we could get a better return on investments with other prod-
ucts in the short term. But these are strategic investments for Abu Dhabi. We want to 
get ownership in key future technologies – and on way for us to do it is to buy shares in 
                                                      
134
 Founded in 2002, Mubadala is one of the key investment vehicles of the Abu Dhabi government. 
135
 Together with Bahrain’s Mumtalakat, it regularly receives the highest transparency ratings of any 
Gulf SWF (BusinessIntelligence Middle East, 2009a). 
136
 Masdar as a whole is fully owned and funded by Mubalada. 
137
 A third cleantech fund is due to be launched soon. However, release dates and fund sizes have not 
yet been revealed (Emirates 24/7, 2011).  
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successful companies worldwide or to build them from scratch.” (Interview no. 76 – 
National and international power sector, UAE) 
While it is true that Abu Dhabi’s much larger SWF IPIC (International Petroleum In-
vestment Company) also makes strategic investments in the energy sector in line with 
the emirate’s economic diversification plans, IPIC’s investments remain focused on all 
areas of hydrocarbons (up- and downstream); renewables are usually not part of IPIC’s 
portfolio. In that sense, the Masdar Initiative and its subsidiaries remain a unique in-
vestment strategy in the UAE. 
 
Section conclusion 
UAE policy documents remain cautious about the role of renewable energies in the 
future economic development of this country. While the need for economic diversifi-
cation appears to be widely accepted (most pronounced in Abu Dhabi), the potential 
of renewables is only highlighted in the case of Abu Dhabi. However, even here, a con-
cise role of renewable energy as part of a widened spectrum of industry products, and 
also all references to domestic energy policy are avoided. Although references to nu-
clear energy are also rare, they are often more concrete than references to renewable 
energy industry or electricity in the UAE. 
Furthermore, compared to the vast financial potential the UAE’s SWFs have, their stra-
tegic acquisition policy in the global renewables industry has been remarkably low. 
Only Abu Dhabi has already acted successfully in this regard. However, compared with 
global renewable energy investments138 – this sum still remains low. A key determi-
nant of success of this technology transfer/strategic acquisition strategy is the absorp-
tion potential of the domestic market and the level of R&D. Subsequent sections will 
assess in how far all those necessary conditions of success are met or where deficits 
remain. 
 
                                                      
138
 In 2009, global renewable energy investment reached US$ 162bn; see Chapter 1. 
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5.3.5. Country branding  
Is country branding a catalyst in the spread of renewable energies? 
While the UAE was recently ranked 25th in a significant country brand index (Future-
Brand, 2011, p. 79), the promotion of renewable energies does not play an eminent 
role in the official policies of the UAE as a whole, nor of any UAE emirate apart from 
Abu Dhabi, which by far has the most elaborate branding campaign of the UAE. Since 
November 2007, the emirate has an official “Office of the Brand of Abu Dhabi”139; no 
other UAE emirate has a similarly professional country marketing office.140 Again, any 
reference to Masdar or other clean tech products (even nuclear energy for that mat-
ter) are absent in the listing of Abu Dhabi’s “brand promise” that, however, registers 
“hydrocarbons” as a “product feature” (see Figure 34). 
 
 
 
                                                      
139
 In Arabic, this office is called maktab abu dhabi lil-hawiya al-alamiya (Office of the media identity of 
Abu Dhabi), which further elucidates its. 
140
 While Dubai’s ruler has attempted to launch a similar institution in 2009 with less success, this does 
not mean that Dubai is internationally less well-known. This, however, is much less linked to official 
branding efforts than to its role as globally recognized boom town in the previous decade. 
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Figure 34: “Brand features” of Abu Dhabi 
 
Source: http://brand.abudhabi.ae/en/the-abu-dhabi-brand/our-brand-promise; last accessed on 01 
November 2011. 
It remains slightly surprising that Abu Dhabi does not feature the entire energy reputa-
tion it has tried to establish during the last years in this context.141 From the perspec-
tive of this thesis, a reference to any form of renewable energy technology, Masdar, or 
indeed the fact that IRENA is seated in Abu Dhabi was expected. Moreover, and in light 
of Abu Dhabi’s confounding of nuclear and renewable energy technologies, a reference 
to its nuclear ambitions, the World Future Energy Summit or CCS research, would have 
been noteworthy additions for the establishment of an international energy reputation 
beyond hydrocarbons. 
Several expert statements from the research interviews contrast with this analysis. The 
interviewees’ point of view is most aptly captured here: 
                                                      
141
 Arguably, most of these initiatives, such as Masdar, the WFES or IRENA were only in the start-up 
phase when the initial “brand portfolio” had been developed in 2006/07. However, given the efforts 
Abu Dhabi has taken to obtain a globally recognized position in that field, an updated strategy would be 
a warranted measure. 
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“Certainly, those real estate mega-projects give you more return on investment; 
Masdar doesn’t give you much; but there is a big plus in terms of country reputation!” 
(Interview no. 82 – R&D, UAE) 
While this position was repeated by several insider stakeholders, it still needs to be 
conceded that this interpretation of branding policies it not reflected in Abu Dhabi’s 
own branding office. 
 
Section conclusion 
After the analysis of policy documents in the previous subsection, it was expected that 
the UAE or its individual emirates would perform below their potential when it comes 
to possible country branding through renewable energies. This is particularly the case 
for Abu Dhabi, which has by far the largest, earliest and – in spite of all caveats – most 
successful renewable energy initiative in the region. Given that the advertising cam-
paign for Masdar and its various sub-organisations permanently makes use of classical 
branding language (“unique”; “the world’s first”; “innovative and ground-breaking” 
etc.) it should be noted that the existing branding potential of Abu Dhabi’s renewable 
energy initiatives has thus far underperformed. It appears that these initiatives have 
not yet reached the responsible branding offices and therefore is absent from the offi-
cial “Brand of Abu Dhabi”. 
 
5.4. Regime-level factors 
5.4.1. Technological regime 
5.4.1.1. Challenges for the power sector 
To what extent are renewable energies employed to reduce pressure on the domes-
tic conventional power plant park? 
As discussed in the corresponding section of Part A, the spread of industries and other 
local economic development in all emirates is seriously hampered due to the bottle-
necks in capacity extensions. While this is a particularly pertinent issue for the smaller 
and substantially less wealthy Northern Emirates, this is also partly the case for Dubai, 
185 
 
Abu Dhabi and Sharjah. One interviewee describes how even high-profile projects such 
as Masdar were severely obstructed due to this more general economic situation: 
“Originally, Masdar PV was designed to build three production lines: one in Germany 
(which was built) and another two as ‘smart copies’ of the first one in Abu Dhabi. We 
actually purchased the land and the two production lines for Abu Dhabi – but nothing 
was ever built, as only later, the management realized that there were severe problems 
with the power supply of those properties –we couldn’t get power to these sites for at 
least two years. Now, these production lines are stored and pretty much useless.” (In-
terview no. 75 – National and international power sector, Gulf States)142 
However, as many interviewees confirmed, the use of renewable energies to promote 
local economic development in the Emirates receives only marginal attention. It is 
largely not actively considered by stakeholders, and if so, it is not regarded as suffi-
ciently reliable. 
This is surprising, as the national demand curve (Figure 35) reveals that renewables 
could play a role in mitigating the daily (and annual) peak demands through peak-load 
capping since the electricity peaks correspond to the production peaks of renewable 
energy installations. 
Figure 35: Weekly electricity peak 1990-2005 in Abu Dhabi 
 
Source: Miller, 2005, p. 11. 
                                                      
142
 See also AMEInfo (2011a) for the decision to suspend the Masdar PV plant in Abu Dhabi – the reason 
given in the article is not the lack of power supply, but the lack of local demand.  
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A notable exception can be observed in Ras al-Khaimah’s efforts to further develop the 
solar pond technology, which aims to: 
“experiment with low-cost-technologies to reduce the operating costs and particularly 
to make the system workable in normal economic situations outside oil-rich countries.” 
(Interview no. 88, R&D, Gulf States) 
 
Turning to a second aspect in relation to this subsection, the renewable electricity 
share in the UAE energy system is currently virtually zero, aside from the 10 MW PV 
test field within Masdar City, which is partially used to supply its own power demand. 
The Emirates have been cautious to give renewable energies too large a share in its 
official energy policy planning. Two of the smaller emirates, Ajman and Fujairah, have 
in the last years considered a stronger integration of renewable energy capacities on 
their territory. Ajman has considered a renewable energy strategy since 2010 (Khaleej 
Times, 2010) with a particular focus on waste to energy technology (Kakande, 2010). 
Apart from a top-level interest in clean electricity production for domestic and industry 
use, the renewable energies-related activities in Ajman might also have been triggered 
by the lobbying of Sheikh Abdul Aziz Bin Ali Al Nuaimi, the “Green Sheikh”, a member 
of Ajman’s ruling family, who is a pronounced supporter of renewable energies,143 as 
was established by a research interview conducted for this thesis. 
However, it remains to be seen how much of these proclamations will actually develop 
into tangible policies for that emirate. Similarly, Fujairah witnessed some development 
on the wind energy front in the early 2000s. 
In 2002, it was announced that the Spanish company Energia Hidroelectrica de Navarra 
was selected from 45 other international companies to manage the establishment of a 
renewable energy project in Fujairah, including four wind farms (gulfnews.com, 2002) 
of 150-200 MW capacity each, which would have been a significant upgrade of Fu-
jairah’s energy system. This plan that was confirmed in a press statement in 2004, that 
also mentioned a “Fujairah Renewable Energy Centre (FREC)” (UAE Interact, 2004) 
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 See for instance gulfnews.com (n.y.) or The Green Prophet (2010). 
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which was to help assess the wind data gathered to identify a suitable site for the wind 
farms and to launch other renewable energy projects in the emirate. Its director Dr 
Fathy Hussain confidently announced:  
“With full support from the Fujairah government, we established the Fujairah Renewa-
ble Energy Centre and started gearing up for the huge project” (United Arab Emirates 
news agency (WAM), 2004). 
However, at the time of writing this thesis, not a single project has materialized in Fu-
jairah, and none of the interviewees during the course of the study had ever heard of 
or cooperated with FREC. 
Meanwhile, the larger emirates of Dubai and Sharjah have shown little tangible 
measures in renewable electricity production. As highlighted before, Abu Dhabi has 
taken a lead role in that field. Its government has committed itself to the target of 7% 
renewable generation capacity by 2020 (The National, 2009) which requires a renewa-
ble energy production capacity of approximately 1.5 GW. Currently, one 100 MW CSP 
power plant is under construction in Madinat Zayed, about 120km south of Abu Dhabi 
city (Shams 1; Arabic: “sun”) which is scheduled to be finished by the end of 2012 
(Masdar, Abu Dhabi Future Energy Company, 2010). In addition to that, a 100 MW PV 
project (Nour 1; Arabic “light”) is under way, while other projects, such as a 100 MW 
wind farm and further PV and CSP power plants are being considered by the Abu Dhabi 
government (AMEInfo, 2011b). Furthermore, this emirate is also working on a smart 
grid concept, as well as on a solar rooftop programme that will be discussed in Sec-
tion  5.4.4. 
 
Section conclusion 
The large potentials of renewable energy for local economic development are current-
ly not realized, neither with regards to actual capacity extensions nor to public rela-
tions. 
While all UAE emirates face substantial demand rise pressures, a predicament, which 
can be resolved by the extension of renewable energy capacities without further in-
creasing the domestic demand for natural gas, only Abu Dhabi has resorted to using 
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this tool. Whereas some of the smaller emirates had unsuccessfully attempted to de-
velop renewable energy capacities, Ajman and Ras al-Khaimah might be more success-
ful in that regard. 
 
5.4.1.2. Renewable energy and the nuclear alternative  
Is the nuclear option seen as a competitor in resources or as a mutually exclusive 
form of power production?  
Recent nuclear energy developments have taken place in two forums: at the state and 
at GCC level. In 2007, IAEA conducted a feasibility study for the GCC already factoring 
in the benefits of a common electricity market via the GCC grid. The grid would permit 
the GCC to centralize nuclear power production by building several plants in one loca-
tion. This would produce substantial economies of scale benefits as far as construction 
and maintenance are concerned, and also from a proliferation angle, this option might 
find a speedier acceptance in the international community. Inner-GCC rivalries about 
the leadership and the actual location of such a site, however, rendered the actual 
launch of the joint nuclear programme unlikely. Among this group of states, the UAE is 
likely to be the first nuclear power producer. The current UAE nuclear white paper has 
projected the year 2017 to be the first possible date for on-grid nuclear power in the 
country (Government of the United Arab Emirates, 2006). In accordance with a rec-
ommendation of the IAEA, the Emirates founded a Nuclear Energy Program Implemen-
tation Organization (NEPIO) and the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) with 
seed money of US$ 100m to get the nuclear industry off the ground.144 In spite of 
American reservations about such a programme145, the country went ahead and is now 
building four 1400 MWe nuclear reactors with the Korean nuclear energy operator 
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 While the country was keen to abide by IAEA regulations in some regards, the international nuclear 
energy governance body recently criticized the UAE for not yet having released a sound nuclear waste 
strategy (Reuters, 2011b). 
145
 “Given the U.A.E.’s past history as the major transshipment point for goods destined for Iran’s nucle-
ar and missile programs, serious concerns remain about its eligibility for a nuclear cooperation agree-
ment with the U.S. We still have questions about the effectiveness of its export control system, ele-
ments of which have yet to be fully implemented,” said Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, the Rank-
ing Republican member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.” Congressman Brad Sherman (2009) 
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KEPCO. The first US$ 3.9bn contract was signed in June 2010 (World Nuclear News, 
2010), after which site clearing started immediately at the site of Braka, 300km away 
from Abu Dhabi, and about 75km from the Saudi border (gulfnews.com, 2010a); con-
struction will officially start in late 2012.  
As has already been established in Sections  5.3.1 and  5.3.4, the nuclear and renewable 
energy policy discourse in the UAE remarkably resemble each other and are often led 
under the common label “clean technology”. Most stakeholders have not voiced any 
concerns about this nor about the problem of a potential structural privilege of nuclear 
energy. Only one stakeholder expressed a different view: 
“Nuclear energy has come to the UAE top-down from the political elite; there has been 
no local involvement in that at all! Why do we need nuclear energy here? I am not to-
tally against that, all I say is that I don’t like nuclear for the following reasons: The ura-
nium resources are scarce – how is this supposed to be a sustainable form of energy if 
the fuel is so finite? Then, we have a security issue – this is like having live bombs in the 
country waiting for someone to blow up – and who can exclude the likelihood of a nu-
clear disaster? Thirdly, there is the waste issue. This waste remains highly toxic for 
thousands of years - what kind of place are we leaving to our children?” (Interview no. 
56 – public stakeholder, Gulf States) 
This statement, however, remained the exception. Most other interviewees did not 
speak at length about this subject, making it difficult to discern citizens’ views on the 
topic. Thus, it is difficult to tell how many UAE citizens would agree with or indeed op-
pose this pointed opinion. According to a public opinion poll conducted by the UAE’s 
own nuclear energy corporation ENEC, 60% of the polled population of 750 interview-
ees based in the UAE were in favour of its construction; and 23% indifferent (Khaleej 
Times, 2011).146  
Also the Fukushima nuclear accident in March 2011 has not altered the UAE govern-
ment’s course on its way to nuclear electricity production. At the World Economic Fo-
rum, the UAE’s energy minister Mohammed Bin Dhaen Al Hamli underlined his coun-
try’s determination to pursue the path it had taken, albeit with an even stronger em-
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 What the report does not explicitly say is that consequently, up to 17% of the interviewees were 
against that project. More generally, given that this poll was launched and financed by a pro-nuclear 
energy agency and given limitations of freedom of expression in the UAE, particularly with regards to 
political sensitive issues like this, the poll results should be taken with a grain of salt. 
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phasis on safety issues. He said “Our strategy for nuclear power will not change be-
cause of the Fukushima incident…We have a lot of oil and gas, but we must renew and 
diversify, including into nuclear energy” (Aburawa, 2011). This position has been un-
derlined by the formal power plant registration application submitted at the 55th Gen-
eral Assembly of the IAEA in Vienna. The UAE’s permanent representative to the IAEA, 
Ambassador Alkaabi, reiterated Al Hamli’s position by stating that “in light of this un-
fortunate event, the UAE places utmost emphasis on nuclear safety and security as we 
take stern and progressive steps towards realizing a peaceful nuclear energy pro-
gramme” (White, 2011). 
This follows from what has been discussed so far that the renewable and the nuclear 
energy coalition are less clearly separated from each other in the UAE than in other 
countries. Thus, high-level decision-makers of both groups must be regarded as in fact 
part of one larger group; Abu Dhabi’s high-speed, new level of innovative leaders that 
attempts to develop the emirate at a quicker pace and at times into a different direc-
tion than the desires of the older generation (see Section  5.3.1 for the differentiation 
between these two groups within the UAE leadership). It can be expected that in the 
long run, the new leadership generation will fully assume control over the country. 
Within this elite, however, the mix-up of these two forms of energy carriers might lead 
to the undermining of the renewables proper agenda by an increasingly powerful nu-
clear energy interest group. 
 
Section conclusion 
It can be stated that the decision to introduce nuclear energy has not been subject to 
any free public debate, which is not surprising given the centralized, authoritarian and 
at times opaque decision-making structures of the UAE. Public opinion towards this 
initiative is thus difficult to gauge within a reasonable margin of error. This also applies 
to nuclear energy as a competitor for resources for renewable energy or whether re-
sistance against these plans originated from the renewable energies scene. In general, 
however, system competition between these two options appears to be less of an is-
sue than in many renewable energy research and business centres in Europe or the US. 
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However, it is difficult to discern, if this is due to the UAE interviewees’ more flexible 
and less ideological views or due to concerns about publicly criticizing high-level gov-
ernment policy. 
Additionally, as a political interest group solely and aggressively lobbying for renewa-
ble energies hardly exists in the UAE, it is questionable whether such a binary charac-
terisation can be instructive. The danger in the mid-term future, however, is that the 
renewables component in the clean tech lobby of the upcoming ruling elite cannot 
sustain itself compared to the financial and (eventual) political influence of nuclear 
energy interest groups in the UAE. 
 
5.4.2. User and market regime 
5.4.2.1. Market conditions 
Is there any system of renewable energy promotion in place?  
Do stakeholders believe that the transfer of European renewable energy policy de-
sign models is a viable method for the spread of renewable electricity capacities in 
the region or would indigenous policy models work better? 
Currently, there is no system of renewable energy promotion in place in any UAE Emir-
ate apart from the limited efforts in Abu Dhabi. Indeed, stakeholders have frequently 
confirmed that the introduction of a general FIT system was imminent in the frame-
work of a larger energy policy blueprint for the emirate. So far, however, this has not 
materialized.147 
This has led several business interviewees at the World Future Energy summit to claim 
that: 
“Currently, there is no renewables market in the UAE. We see market opportunities in 
the region mainly outside the UAE, but we have still opted to establish our regional 
offices here hoping that in a few years from now, the market will come here. Clearly, 
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 No public statements explaining this severe delay has been issued. Interviewees either had no infor-
mation on the reasons or were unwilling to disclose them, thereby spurring speculation. In light of the 
absence of attestable facts, however, it does not appear productive nor scientifically sound to continue 
this discussion. 
192 
 
the regulation is missing, that could create a platform and a security for business. 
When the regulation would be in place, the market would follow automatically. Now, 
we can’t even calculate returns on investment for business!” (Interview no. 69 – Na-
tional and international power sector, UAE) 
Still, Masdar’s planned power plants of Shams 1; Nour 1 and future plants will receive 
a premium from ADWEC, which, in spite of the liberalized market of power production, 
remains the single buyer for electricity in the country (see Figure 36 for details on the 
structure of Abu Dhabi’s water and electricity sector). 
Figure 36: Abu Dhabi’s electricity and water sector structure 
 
Source: www.rsb.gov.ae 
However, these premiums are usually not disclosed and are, as the above figure 
shows, also not directly linked to (subsidized) customer prices for electricity, which are 
set by the Regulation and Supervision Bureau (RSB), Abu Dhabi’s regulator. 
A second initiative that might be regarded as a proto-system for a general FIT is Abu 
Dhabi’s solar roof programme. This programme is currently in the start-up phase and is 
expected to reach up to 500 MW of installed PV capacity in Abu Dhabi within the next 
years. While the feed-in premium will have to be published as soon as the programme 
is officially launched, its height currently remains undisclosed. 
Apart from the programmes mentioned, however, there is no openly accessible pre-
mium or other promotion instrument available in the UAE, be it on federal or on emir-
ate-level. In principle, large-scale renewable electricity subsidies are available for all 
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independent power producers (IPPs) in Abu Dhabi that have successfully won a bid for 
a renewable electricity project – a system, which would work in principle also for the 
SEWA, DEWA and FEWA should the government wish to install such a plant. However, 
since the power production markets in these emirates are not liberalized, this theoret-
ical option does not exist. Currently, only Abu Dhabi’s solar rooftop PV programme 
might actually open the renewables markets to a larger share of the general public. 
 
Meanwhile, the barriers hindering the spread of renewable electricity in the UAE con-
tinue to be a major development barrier. Article 34 of the law 1998 law no. 2 concern-
ing the regulation of the water and electricity sector148 (Government of Abu Dhabi - 
Privatisation Committee Water and Electricity Sector, 1998) defines the “economic 
purchase rule” as follows: 
“Art. 34 - General procurement duties - Economic purchase:  
(1) In contracting for the purchase of - capacity for water desalination or capacity for 
electricity generation; new or additional production capacity; and fuel, the Abu Dhabi 
Water and Electricity Company shall purchase or otherwise acquire such capacity (or as 
the case may be, fuel) by adopting the economic purchase method and after considera-
tion of its obligations in this Law.” 
Consequently, articles 91, 93 and 94 again confirm this rule for the areas of power pro-
curement, transmission/dispatch and distribution/supply licences.  
 
The extent to which Western regulatory concepts can be successfully transported to 
other world regions remains arguably the most complex issue in this subsection. While 
stakeholders’ answers differed regarding details, a general line of argumentation 
emerged: the exact transfer of Western governance models cannot be an acceptable 
or successful way of enhancing renewable capacities in the UAE or other Gulf States. 
Particularly the instrument of the FIT (feed-in-tariff) was criticized and singled out as 
unsuitable for the region. As one interviewee put it: 
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 This law is a key legal document for Abu Dhabi’s water and electricity sector as it founded ADWEA as 
a private company, replacing the former Water and Electricity Department (Abu Dhabi Water and Elec-
tricity Agency (ADWEA), 2010). 
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“It’s a truism that not all concepts can work in all places and that you need to adapt 
that, everybody is aware of that. For instance, I have expressed myself rather critically 
towards feed-in-tariffs (FITs) for different world regions and got strongly criticized for 
that – but I think it is very obvious that FITs are not the optimal solution for every coun-
try; FITs won’t save the world! Particularly here, in vertically integrated, wealthy Gulf 
countries: why do you want to complicate the situation with a FIT?” (Interview no. 54 – 
public stakeholder, Gulf States) 
Moreover, as previously discussed, interviewees regarded the political concerns con-
nected to a “loss of control” over the energy sector as further major impediments to 
any similarly structured system. Another interviewee highlighted a rather technical, 
albeit potentially key aspect in favour of the IPP model:  
“I think the independent power producer (IPP) model is the one to follow rather than an 
FIT principle: the authorities can just replicate the template and bidding process for 
conventional power plants for those renewables plants. This is already happening in 
Oman, where the first solar-IPP (CSP plus PV) has been tendered.” (Interview no. 68 – 
national and international power sector, Gulf States) 
It needs to be stressed, however, that such a proposal would also essentially be a 
transfer of foreign governance concepts to a UAE context. While potentially very suc-
cessful, a local governance component would still be elusive. 
 
Section conclusion 
On the federal level and on the level of most emirates, no renewable energy legislation 
(or initiative below the rank of a state law) has been launched. As highlighted before, 
the only tangible regulatory actions have been taken in Abu Dhabi. While many pro-
jects have been initiated with undisclosed renewables premiums in that emirate, the 
much-advertised solar rooftop PV programme could mark the beginning of an openly 
accessible FIT for renewable energies. 
According to regulators and interviewed stakeholders within the UAE energy system, 
the economic purchase rule poses a strong challenge to justifying an extension of re-
newable energy capacities. If the levelized electricity costs are to be exclusively taken 
as cost reference figures without factoring in the larger environmental costs or further 
externalities of electricity production, then renewable electricity would currently re-
main substantially more expensive. This issue can only be resolved through a legal re-
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form that makes clear exceptions for renewable electricity. In the meantime, the con-
flict between the least-cost-rule and the political will to enhance renewable energy 
capacities persists. 
While the potential transfer of Western governance models to this world region will be 
discussed in much greater detail in Part C, the interviewees seemed sceptical about the 
effectiveness of the highly popular tool of FIT. Instead, interviewees maintained that a 
spread of renewable electricity production capacities in states like the UAE would only 
be successful with the current IPP model as it would best fit the current Gulf energy 
governance model: large-scale, top-down, capital-intensive, close to big industry, cen-
tralized, and with little or no need for public consultation. This, however, is in principle 
also not a locally developed model but a global form of energy market organisation. 
The combination of IPP and renewables promotion on a large scale that has been sug-
gested by interviewees could indeed be a promising venture and could be operated 
close to a quota model on the utility side. Yet again, this would mean the application of 
Western governance models in the UAE and not a development of local policies.  
 
5.4.2.2. The system of double subsidies 
Are strategies developed to create a level playing field for all types of energy carriers 
by either removing subsidies for conventional power or by integrating renewable 
electricity into the existing subsidy schemes? 
In the UAE, all forms of fossil fuel consumption are strongly subsidized. According to 
IEA data, 4.9% of the UAE’s total GDP in 2009 went to fossil fuel and electricity subsi-
dies. Taking a closer look at Table 17, it is most striking that by far the largest share of 
subsidies are used for the electricity and the gas sector (US$ 5.51 and 9.99bn respec-
tively), a substantial 6% of GDP or roughly US$ 2,500 per capita. 
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Table 17: UAE’s fossil fuel consumption subsidy rate as a proportion of the full cost of supply in 2008-
2010 
 
Source: International Energy Agency (IEA) web service (http://www.iea.org/subsidy/index.html; last 
accessed 10 July 2011). 
Both figures are related to the system of double subsidies in the power sector. As one 
interviewee put it: 
“These markets have two forms of subsidies. For one, the oil and gas that is supplied to 
the power plants from the national oil (and gas) companies is sold below world market 
prices, which is why the rise of domestic power demand is commercially unattractive 
for the local producers...The second subsidy is, of course, on the customers’ side. Citi-
zens hardly pay for their electricity use, expats a little bit more, but this is also insignifi-
cant.” (Interview no. 68 – national and international power sector, Gulf States) 
Power prices in the UAE are regulated on emirate level and thus differently set by all 
four of the UAE’s power providers. 149 As a general rule, however, neither the height of 
the power subsidies nor the price per kWh the single buyers pay to the power plants 
are publicly disclosed. However, an interviewee of Abu Dhabi’s RSB described the pro-
cess of price building as follows:  
“In general, the consumer prices are fixed by the government. The RSB’s role is to rec-
ommend a certain market price to the IWPPs [Independent Water and Power Plants, 
the author] and the government tops up the missing amount of money and we are 
there to guarantee transparency in this process” 
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 The level of power prices in the UAE is bound to the economic performance of the individual emirate. 
While ADWEA provides the cheapest electricity, DEWA is more expensive, and electricity prices in Shar-
jah (SEWA) “almost reach common market prices” (Interview no. 90 – R&D, Gulf States). 
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Insiders confirmed that the usual production price for conventional power plants in the 
UAE amounts to 10-11 fils (approx. 0.02€) – only possible through the subsidized gas 
prices in the UAE. 
Strategies aimed at creating a level playing field by either integrating renewables into 
the common subsidies scheme, abandoning the power subsidies entirely, or introduc-
ing a new electricity pricing regime are only discussed to a very limited extent and have 
an almost scholarly character, as an instant change in Gulf energy pricing regimes is 
regarded as highly unlikely and highly undesirable by regime stakeholders. The reason 
for this is that supplying cheap power is part of the “ruling bargain” in resource-rich 
Arab states, as one interviewee confirmed: 
“The rulers here must maintain their legitimacy in front of the people; supplying the 
people with cheap electricity is obviously a key element of that.” (Interview no. 68 – 
national and international power sector, Gulf States) 
While it is understood that the political elites do not wish to raise electricity prices, 
two options remain if a government wished to integrate renewable energy production 
into its system of subsidies.  
In the first and most likely solution, it could simply integrate a certain percentage of 
renewable electricity into its national power system without raising consumer prices – 
a model that is similar to the UK quota model discussed in Subsection  3.3.2.1. As cur-
rently carried out by Abu Dhabi, governments can tender a renewable energy plant as 
an IWPP project. Following Krane’s calculation (see Figure 37), an average CSP plant in 
the UAE would need to be supported with 29.2 cent per kWh.  
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Figure 37: Estimated cost and subsidy structure of future CSP plants in Abu Dhabi 
 
Source: Krane, 2010b, p. 24. 
If governments wish to integrate a higher renewables quota but are unwilling or una-
ble to touch the subsidy regime, this will remain the only viable way for the foreseea-
ble future. Effectively, however, it will put severe barriers on the spread of renewables, 
as governments will be careful to construct too many expensive renewables projects. 
Second, a more hypothetical option has been put forward for the Kuwaiti context by a 
former acting general secretary of OPEC, Dr Adnan Shihab Eldin. This model could also 
work in the UAE. Instead of offering citizens subsidized electricity rates which do not 
allow for a liberalization of the electricity market nor offer incentives for end-
consumers to save electricity, Dr Shihab Eldin suggested charging citizens full market 
prices while giving them the equivalent of the former subsidies granted to the power 
sector to the end consumers. This way, citizens would have ample incentives to econ-
omize their power consumption, as it would directly benefit their own financial situa-
tion. Moreover, this would create a level playing field, as the government could charge 
market prices for electricity, and it could offer different, probably slightly more expen-
sive “green” tariffs (Interviews no. 58 - Public stakeholder, Gulf States, and no. 84 – 
R&D, Gulf States). 
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Section conclusion 
While not all stakeholders were aware of the system of double subsidies as such, the 
fact that UAE electricity prices are strongly subsidized is common knowledge in the 
energy community of the UAE. Efforts by UAE energy stakeholders to create a level 
playing field for all kinds of energy carriers are currently not visible on a regulatory 
front. This will hamper a swift spread of renewables even if there are significant LEC 
price drops that match global market prices for conventional power. If regulatory 
transparency of power prices is not produced, the decision to spread renewables will 
remain in the hands of the ruling elite, as only they can issue tenders for renewable 
electricity projects. Other pricing models as suggested by Shihab Eldin are innovative 
and theoretically promising, but appear unlikely to be realized in the medium term. 
 
5.4.3. Socio-cultural regime 
5.4.3.1. Social acceptance of RETs, potential role of religion or environmental 
ethics 
How widespread is the knowledge of renewable energies in the target countries? 
Does religion play a role in legitimizing this energy technology? 
In stakeholders’ views, general knowledge about renewable energies is relatively wide-
spread in the UAE, not least because of the various awareness campaigns in educa-
tional settings.150 To many, however, renewables do not seem to be sufficiently effi-
cient to serve as the major source of electricity for their own country. 
Secondly, although many citizens would not mind using solar water heaters or domes-
tic PV installations, actual know-how about these installations and positive experiences 
cannot be found, as these technologies are largely not in use in the Gulf region. This is 
a direct consequence of the lack of government support schemes and the prohibition 
of independent power production in the UAE. Currently in the UAE, there are only two 
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 Although the late Sheikh Zayed, “the man who turned the desert green” (Daily Times, 2004), promot-
ed environmental awareness in the Emirates, no direct link between his legacy and the modern renewa-
ble energy projects has been found. 
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opportunities allowing the general public to experience the reliability and potential of 
this technology; the much-advertised and relatively popular Masdar Initiative and its 
annual events such as the WFES and the luxury desert resorts or natural reserves. As 
one business interviewee confirmed, in the absence of a standard, on-grid domestic 
users’ market, the only market for solar installations in the country is its high-end use 
in the desert: 
“Our currently finished projects are mostly off-grid solar PV combined with water desal-
ination and filtration. We built an artificial lake (1000 m3 – the largest artificial lake in 
MENA) and many other projects for wildlife conservation far out in the desert. These 
projects are all relatively new, but around them, new biospheres are already develop-
ing and might even eventually lift the ground water level so much that a natural oasis 
develops in the very long term.” (Interview no. 67 - National and international power 
sector, Gulf States) 
Similarly, another interviewee argued: 
“Absurdly, solar water heaters are luxury items in the UAE! They are not installed on 
poor men’s houses but instead on luxury hotels and palaces.” (Interview no. 70 - Na-
tional and international power sector, Gulf States) 
 
The second issue that should be raised here is the potential juncture between religion, 
environmental ethics and local advocacy for renewable energies in the UAE. Public 
references by political leaders to religious beliefs rarely occur in the UAE when it 
comes to sustainability issues. This is the case for both the Arabic and English version 
of policy documents that usually do not display strong religious argumentations. The 
various announcements on and with regards to the Masdar Initiative, or ADWEA’s 
comprehensive 2009 sustainability report (Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Agency 
(ADWEA), 2010) are cases in point. Instead, secular references to the concept of sus-
tainability, climate change and a “common future in a clean environment” were fre-
quently made. This supports the argument that the UAE government and its citizens 
prefer to stress research-based, secular arguments when it comes to supporting the 
broader issue of sustainability leaving religious references aside. The minor role of reli-
gion in this regard is also supported by the statement of one interviewee: 
 “Well this is not so easy here as Imams don’t have their own sermons and everything 
they say is controlled by government…I mean, sure, this is important, but at the end of 
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the day, the imam talks in the mosque; what children need more urgently are role 
models in the household.” (Interview no. 56 – public stakeholder, Gulf States) 
Apart from confirming the UAE government’s tight grip on local Imams this statement 
shows that UAE nationals also focus on educational role models and ethics-based envi-
ronmental education in homes and schools when it comes to moral references to sus-
tainability. This assessment needs to be taken into account in future research and poli-
cy design. 
 
Section conclusion 
Public knowledge about a certain potential of renewable energies undoubtedly exists 
in the UAE. However, due to the absence of a standard domestic market, the only sys-
tems that are actually deployed are luxury items that operate outside the realm of 
commercial logic. Consequently, positive anecdotal knowledge about this technology 
cannot be accumulated; hands-on learning effects on the ground thereby remain 
small. 
Further, it can be stated that religion has no part in legitimizing national renewable 
energy policy in the UAE. Instead, actors promote the role of ethics-based approaches 
to sustainability and renewable energy policy as points of reference. This allows an 
environmental education that transcends religious boundaries and cross-references 
into the global narrative of environmental protection and the individual responsibility 
for the realisation of environmental policies on a local level.  
 
5.4.3.2. Labour markets 
Is the job creation potential actually employed by promoters of renewable electricity 
in the country? 
As discussed in the corresponding section of Part A, the theoretical job potential for 
renewable energy technologies in the UAE is large, particularly in the long term per-
spective. For the present time, in the absence of a full-fledged domestic market, busi-
ness operations and job opportunities in the UAE are reduced to a few dozen jobs in 
three types of operations: 
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First, there is the staff of the several branches of the Masdar Initiative in Abu Dhabi, 
which is mainly limited to managerial as well as R&D positions in the Masdar Institute 
of Science and Technology. Despite the limited amount of positions, Masdar remains 
the UAE’s biggest employer in the renewables sector. 
Second, there is a very limited market for those solar developers in the UAE developing 
the high-end desert products, off-grid PV guard house projects or other small off-grid 
projects that are implemented in the UAE, such as EnviTech, EnviroMena etc. With the 
exception of Mulk Holdings’ PV mirror plant for the Indian market (Hashem, 2010), and 
the Fujairah-based company Microsol no other company produces RET equipment in 
the UAE.151 
In addition to that, there are very few companies engaged in genuine R&D on the 
ground, such as the Ras al-Khaimah-based CSEM-UAE (Centre Suisse d'Electronique et 
de Microtechnique – UAE branch). This group of developers, however, only employs a 
few dozen employees with a renewable energy focus at best. As in the case of Masdar, 
the number of Emirati staff is low. As one developer stated: 
Unfortunately, we have not yet hired any Emirati engineers; we have Indian, Iraqi and 
German ones. I think one reason for this is that the local higher education sector in this 
regard is still young, so potentially qualified employees might still be studying” (Inter-
view no. 67 – National and international power sector, Gulf States) 
Thus, job opportunities in the renewables sector, particularly for UAE citizens, remain 
rare and certainly below any measurable effect on the national labour market. 
A third type of companies in the renewables sector do not have active operations in 
the UAE, but retain an office with representatives or even a sub-division of larger com-
panies in one of the emirates in order to keep abreast of developments and to be able 
to quickly upgrade their presence in case the domestic governments would in fact ini-
tiate a renewable energy market. In both cases, staffing is very low and, again, rarely 
includes Emiratis. 
                                                      
151
 While journalistic sources estimate Microsol’s total staff currently on 325, it has recently acquired the 
bankrupt German-American company Solon. Another production capacity extension in the UAE is 
scheduled for late 2012 (Montgomery, 2012). 
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At the present time, this under-representation of Emirati citizens in the (few) renewa-
ble energy-related jobs in the country will continue due to the few opportunities in the 
region where UAE citizens can in fact gain expertise in that field. However, this need 
not remain the case. If Masdar and other research centres are successfully established, 
a larger number of qualified UAE personnel will be on the labour market in the medi-
um term. 
This job creation potential, particularly for Emirati citizens, has so far not been includ-
ed in the announcements of new renewable energy projects. Indeed, employee num-
bers are usually not even mentioned. As most construction workers in the Gulf are not 
Emirati nationals, the construction and maintenance of announced projects, such as 
Shams 1 or Nour 1, will have little short-term impact on the labour market for UAE 
citizens. 
 
Section conclusion 
Although there is a high theoretical job creation potential for renewable energies in 
the UAE, actual positions are scarce and no measurable labour-market effects for the 
entire country currently results from them. Additionally, the majority of the few posi-
tions that are available are, in line with common UAE HR policy, filled with non-Emirati 
citizens. 
As a consequence of the current underperformance of the UAE renewable energy sys-
tem, it might not be seen as surprising that the job creation of renewables is rarely 
highlighted by promoters of renewable electricity. One exception might be seen in the 
UAE’s and individual emirates’ commitments to build a sustainable, diversified econo-
my, as discussed in Section  5.3.4. These terms, however, are broad, catch-all terms 
that could encompass national economic development in many possible directions. If 
these terms were to be regarded as tangible commitments to extending the renewable 
energy sector, this would mean incorrectly narrowing them down to one particular 
meaning. 
 
204 
 
5.4.4. Policy regime 
5.4.4.1. Renewable energy targets and actual performance 
Is there a (binding) strategic document, such as an energy roadmap/blueprint or at 
least a non-binding planning scheme? If so, how does this integrate renewable elec-
tricity? 
Energy policy in the UAE is largely based on emirate-level decisions. As the UAE’s pub-
lic administrations tend to remain secretive about their plans, very few meaningful 
energy policy planning documents are made available on either the federal or the indi-
vidual emirate level152. However, in Abu Dhabi, more technology-oriented power plant 
park extension plans have been released, the most important one being ADWEA’s 5-
year Strategic Plan of May 2008 (Abu Dhabi Transmission and Despatch Company 
(TRANSCO), 2007). In addition to the demand forecast in the UAE electricity sector by 
ADWEA (Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Agency (ADWEA), 2008), these documents 
model the expected development in Abu Dhabi’s and in the Northern emirates on a 
purely technical level. Questions of energy policy are not discussed in these docu-
ments. Also the UAE’s nuclear energy policy white paper (Government of the United 
Arab Emirates, 2006) is no substitute for a nation-wide energy strategy. What is, how-
ever, relevant to renewable energy is that this white paper mentions that 6-7% of re-
newables could (at most) be in the UAE power mix by 2020. This appears to be based 
on the same calculations as Abu Dhabi’s goals, only projected on to the entire UAE. 
Nonetheless, this is not referenced in any other document. 
In the absence of a comprehensive planning document, Abu Dhabi has made several 
announcements that can be interpreted as parts of a new strategy that includes the 
promotion of renewable energies, such as the 7% renewable energy goal (The Nation-
al, 2009), the announcement to launch a solar rooftop programme, and the introduc-
                                                      
152
 In early 2012, Dubai announced the launch of an “Integrated Energy Strategy 2030”, coupled with 
plans for a large-scale renewable energy power plant park (1 GW by 2020). Dubai also announced that 
only 1% of its energy should be based on renewables by 2020, and a 5% goal should be reached by 2030 
(Bitar, 2012b, gulfnews.com, 2012a; AMEInfo, 2012). While the goals do not appear to be extremely 
ambitious judged by international standards, Dubai’s plan has not been made publicly available. The 
announcement’s credibility is therefore in question (Interview no. 40 – R&D, Europe). 
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tion of a smart metering system (Stanton, 2010b, 2010a) as a first step into an innova-
tive demand side management system in 2011. 
Thus, while elements of a comprehensive strategy have been released, the document 
as a whole is still missing in spite of its public announcement in early 2009.153 This is 
also the case for details about funding schemes, tax deductions, and the height of 
premiums for renewable electricity or other tangible data that are vital for any sub-
stantial business plan. 
Also, as Abu Dhabi’s 7% target is the only publicly announced renewables target, only 
this one can be scrutinized. In the press (The National, 2011) and in research inter-
views, stakeholders from various sectors confirm that the 7% was not a political num-
ber, but instead part of a thoroughly thought-through energy strategy that is yet to be 
revealed and certainly within Abu Dhabi’s reach. One high-level stakeholder stated: 
“This 7% by 2020 goal is certainly not a random number, but a developed target as a 
result from checking what is realistic in terms of power generation and grid system in 
Abu Dhabi. We don’t know yet if we can exceed the target, but I think it is likely we will 
stay under 10% of generation capacity for renewables by then.” (Interview no. 51 – 
public stakeholder, Gulf States) 
Another stakeholder explained with which components this goal is to be reached: 
“7% will approximately mean 1.5GW of renewable power. The rooftop programme 
alone will supply one third of it; the rest will go forward either through IPPs or through 
an extension of the rooftop programme, which generally should have the 500MW in-
stalled by 2020 max.” (Interview no. 65 – Private and public investor, Gulf States) 
Asked, how realistic these numbers are, a third interviewee expressed confidently: 
“If Germany can install 1.5GW of PV in one summer month alone I am pretty sure the 
UAE can do this in 10 years!” (Interview no. 64 – Private and public investor, UAE) 
However, while the majority of stakeholder subscribed to a by and large positive anal-
ysis that Abu Dhabi can achieve its 7% goal, there are also some critical voices, such as 
this energy executive featured in a professional journal: 
                                                      
153
 Parallel to the announcement of the 7% goal, the following information was published in January 
2009: “The UAE’s goal of boosting its renewable energy capacity is an important part of the Govern-
ment’s comprehensive energy policy, which is expected to be published within the next few months.” 
(The National, 2009). 
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“The UAE has been largely successful in cultivating a reputation as one of Asia’s hot-
beds of solar-energy activity, thanks principally to the Masdar City project under con-
struction outside the capital city of Abu Dhabi. But behind the scenes the UAE is strug-
gling to reconcile its outsized solar ambitions with the relatively poor local conditions 
for both photovoltaics (PV) and concentrating solar power (CSP), claims Khurram Na-
wab, managing director of Mulk Renewable Energy. “I think there are some big dis-
crepancies between what people were thinking a few years ago and what we see hap-
pening today, because the solar radiation is so poor in the area…If you build a solar 
plant near Abu Dhabi or Dubai or Sharjah, it needs to be twice the size of [similar ca-
pacity] plants elsewhere in the Middle East or India.” (Stromsta, 2010) 
Moreover, it is debatable how binding this target actually is: certainly, the 7% target 
has been announced in the most vocal fashion during the 2009 WFES and was ap-
proved by Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed and Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed, the ruler and the 
crown prince of Abu Dhabi respectively (The National, 2009). Technically, however, 
this target remains a political aspiration and is not formally part of any energy law or 
other legally binding commitment. Given Abu Dhabi’s commitments with Masdar, as 
well as the UAE’s commitment to IRENA as a host nation, and the public character of 
this statement, it is not likely that the target will be abandoned as this would be a 
great loss of credibility for the ruling family and the country, one which Abu Dhabi’s 
government will aim to avoid.  
Another option to dilute the previously proclaimed target later in time would be a tacit 
readjustment of these goals, or an extension of the deadline. While there have been 
significant and poorly communicated readjustments of the Masdar City project (see 
Subchapter  5.7 for further details), nothing similar has been communicated about Abu 
Dhabi’s renewable energy target. Arguably, the closing date for this target is still far 
ahead and several CSP and PV plant projects are works in progress, so there is current-
ly no need to readjust anything. Again, as the accompanying comprehensive policy is 
still missing, details on funding or other financial support schemes for that industry, 
where cuts could be expected, cannot be assessed. 
 
Section conclusion 
While the publication of an Abu Dhabi energy policy has been “imminent” for several 
years now, nothing has been published yet, which exceeds energy systems planning, or 
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top-level announcements such as the 7% goal or the similarly “imminent” launch of an 
emirate-wide solar rooftop programme. Most stakeholders interviewed were of the 
opinion that the 7% goal was both realistic and attainable. While opinions about the 
binding character of these announcements differ, their public character and the fur-
ther commitments of Abu Dhabi to renewable energies, such as the hosting of IRENA 
make the abandonment of this target an unlikely scenario. 
 
5.4.4.2. Regional infrastructure and electricity governance bodies 
Do the regional electricity governance bodies promote political or infrastructure pro-
jects that enhance the role of renewable electricity in the target country? Is external 
demand a pull factor in that respect? 
In the GCC, the most relevant common electricity infrastructure project is the GCC grid. 
As already described in Subsection  5.3.1.2, this grid is regarded by stakeholders as a 
supply backbone. A common electricity market is not envisaged in the mid-term fu-
ture. As Miller claims, on top of technical questions, mostly issues around spare capaci-
ty and power price subsidies prevent a closer cooperation.154 The GCC grid has never 
been designed as an initiative to promote renewable power in the Gulf, in thus far, the 
success or failure of this initiative might be seen as irrelevant to the spread of renewa-
bles in the UAE. However, in a more refined strategy, a working GCC connection could 
be key to the spread of renewable energies in the UAE, as the intermittent form of 
renewables-based power generation necessitates a much larger power pool and re-
serve capacity as a purely conventional power plant park.  
Above that, a foreign demand for renewable electricity does not exist from a UAE per-
spective as there is no country in the vicinity of the UAE that would be interested to 
purchase renewable electricity for two reasons. First, unlike the case of Europe and 
North Africa, the UAE does not neighbour any country with a large domestic renewa-
                                                      
154
 Since there exists no market-based power price in the GCC, any power sharing agreement would be a 
political decision at the current moment, as it is unclear which power price could or should be taken if 
electricity was to be sold to a third country. It is not in the economic interest of the GCC countries to sell 
power to other states at preferential rates, thus cross-subsidizing the power sector of a third country by 
its domestic power charges or by lower domestic unit fuel costs (Miller, 2005). 
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bles market that has a lesser resource potential than itself and that is willing to pay for 
large-scale imports of renewable electricity from third countries. Second, the grid in-
frastructure in the greater Gulf region is not well developed. Thus, even if there was to 
be an interest outside the GCC, for instance by Iran, Iraq, Pakistan or India, this de-
mand could not be met in the medium term. 
 
Section conclusion 
While the flagship project of regional energy governance bodies in the Gulf, the GCC 
grid, does not promote the spread of renewables per se, its larger power pool and sub-
stantially enhanced reserve capacities could have a positive impact on the UAE’s do-
mestic renewable electricity landscape. This, however, could only work if the GCC grid 
would develop into a truly common inner-GCC power market, which seems unlikely for 
the mid-term future. 
As neither foreign demand nor the necessary electricity export infrastructure to hypo-
thetical non-GCC buyers of UAE green electricity exists, the question whether external 
demand interacts with domestic renewable energy policy is irrelevant in the current 
situation in the UAE. 
 
5.5. Niche-level developments 
5.5.1. Science regime: R&D and industry structures, technology transfer strat-
egies 
Is there an attempt to create a domestic knowledge hub for RETs and is there an in-
dustry structure that supports the spread of technologies into mainstream society? 
Only one project in the UAE has the potential of developing into a local technology hub 
for renewable energy technologies – the Masdar complex.155 Stakeholders with key 
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 This project will be discussed in detail in Subchapter  5.6. 
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roles in this initiatives confirmed that one of its key goals has always been the estab-
lishment of a technology cluster in the UAE. A senior Mubadala official stated: 
“It was planned by the Abu Dhabi government to create a technology cluster with 
Masdar.” (Interview no. 62 – Private and public investors, Gulf States). 
This notion is confirmed by a key property developer who was instrumental in conceiv-
ing the Masdar project in the early 2000s: 
“I was responsible in the start-up phase. We wanted to develop a meta-strategy for 
renewables in the region, not just an individual property project. There were elements 
of low-carbon policies in the air at that time, for instance the Dubai LEED initiative, but 
there was nothing comprehensive here. Our real goal was to build up a whole technol-
ogy cluster with long-term technology transfer strategies.  
When we got the ok by Mubadala, we went on a world-wide fact-finding mission to 
Japan, to the EIA, to companies and to universities to learn about the different ele-
ments to build up such a technology cluster. We were very much inspired by Dongtan 
City in China – unfortunately, this city didn’t get off the ground eventually.” (Interview 
no. 66 – private and public investor, Gulf States)156 
Apart from Masdar, smaller knowledge hubs for renewables-related R&D are the Na-
tional Energy and Water Research Centre (Abu Dhabi), as well as individual researchers 
at existing universities, such as the Petroleum Institute of Abu Dhabi. 
Housed by ADWEA, the former institution has a strongly technical focus. While the 
research centre itself is several decades old, its renewable energy department has just 
been opened two years ago, according to its research team leader (Interview no. 89 – 
R&D, Gulf States). The institute is limited to in-house R&D on PV, and does not take in 
students. Thus, its external outreach is very limited; major technology innovations by 
this institute alone cannot be expected. The Petroleum Institute of Abu Dhabi has its 
focus on the oil and gas industry. However, several individual researchers also offer 
the students courses in renewable energy technologies. According to the professors, 
these are in high demand (Interview no. 91 – R&D, Gulf States). Both institutes, how-
                                                      
156
 Dongtan, Masdar’s conceptual guideline, was commissioned by the Chinese government in 2005. It 
was designed to be a carbon-free eco city approximately 9 miles from downtown Shanghai housing 
25000 residents by the time of the 2010 Shanghai World Expo (sustainable cities, 2009; City Innovations 
Review, 2008). In 2010, however, the project was put on hold and has not been taken up since (Tree-
hugger, 2010). 
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ever, are by no means comparable to the size and comprehensiveness of the Masdar 
Initiative with regards to renewable energies. 
One key determinant of success for this effort is the existence of a local industry struc-
ture to which a technology hub such as Masdar can relate to, from which it can draw a 
trained work force and with which it can share market expertise. Currently, this is a 
major issue for Abu Dhabi and the UAE RET developments. As analysed in Subsec-
tion  5.4.3.2, in the absence of a domestic market there is only a tiny workforce that is 
trained in the renewables sector. Also there are hardly any companies employing a 
sizeable amount of people in the UAE. Therefore, as long as the basic market struc-
tures in the UAE and in the GCC region itself are absent, any technology hub will face 
great difficulties in translating the expertise and know-how developed by it into any 
domestic economic advantage.157 
In the absence of a strong domestic industry, a further area of cooperation emerges – 
research cooperation between Masdar and the various established renewable energy 
researchers in the country. Such an institutionalized cooperation would be an obvious 
way to create common domestic research clusters, facilitate research exchange and 
harmonize research agendas to create a maximum of domestic output. Interviews, 
however, have elicited that domestic research cooperation remains poor. Researchers 
in the Petroleum Institute have voiced strong criticism on the three aspects of Gulf 
research networks (1), their view on Masdar’s domestic policies (2), and Masdar’s 
technology transfer strategy (3): 
“There are no semi- or fully formalized research networks in that area. We shouldn’t 
forget that there are only very poor research networks among Gulf researchers in gen-
eral, this isn’t connected solely to RET. This unhealthy, negative competition is a re-
gional characteristic of research!  
Regarding Masdar: yes, of course, everyone knows Masdar, but people actually only 
have very little knowledge of what else is going on in the country. Masdar is attempting 
to monopolize all R&D and international renewable energy cooperation… 
And regarding the MIST: well, how can you establish a serious knowledge transfer for 
the region if you only hire international faculty who will leave again after a short while. 
                                                      
157
 See also Section  5.7.4. 
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We also don’t regard them very highly in any technical dimension. You need to produce 
a stable and steady research environment, where people want to stay!” (R&D, Gulf 
States) 
As discussed in the corresponding section in Part A, the policy of strategic acquisitions 
in the renewables industry have the potential to develop into a success model for the 
UAE (see also Section  5.3.4). Besides the active mergers and acquisitions of UAE-based 
private companies it is particularly the financial backing of the country’s SWFs that 
secures a long-term growth strategy in that field. Yet, as presented, while technology 
ownership in the form of patents and company shares abroad is an important asset for 
a country that has traditionally scored poorly in S&T indicators the question remains in 
how far the country will be able to translate this potential into a domestic renewable 
energy industry that, as has been established, hardly exits. 
In recent years, the Masdar Initiative has been able to launch partnerships with many 
major companies in the global power industry. However, the purchase of a company 
does not replace an innovation management strategy that transports the knowledge 
acquired abroad back to the UAE and that could be an innovation incubator for the 
domestic renewables industry. While Masdar claims to work as a technology cluster, 
such an innovation management strategy is yet to be developed. A current example is 
the world’s first molten salt CSP plant that is currently being built by a joint venture 
between Masdar and the Spanish company SENER (The National, 2011). While this can 
be regarded as a future technology in the renewables industry; it remains unclear how 
the knowledge produced there could be transferred to the UAE. 
As several interviewees confirmed, in the long run, the research produced by the 
Masdar Institute of Science and Technology (MIST) will be used for other branches of 
Masdar, such as Masdar Power, as well as to potentially employ MIST graduates at 
Masdar. So far, however, these concepts are mostly limited to future plans.158 
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 This concept is also championed by Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah University of Science and Technolo-
gy (KAUST), which is, among other goals, mandated to produce skilled staff for the Saudi Aramco Group 
(Interview no. 40 – R&D, Europe). 
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In addition to that, external interviewees also criticized Masdar’s technology transfer 
strategy: 
“How could they talk about technology transfer and then open a PV plant in Germany 
and axe the one they wanted to build here? –This is exactly the opposite of what should 
be done. We in the UAE have a lot of excellent graduates; but again, it’s a mentality 
thing. People believe products are better and more valuable if they have been fabricat-
ed in the West. From the technical point of view, we don’t have any doubt that you 
could establish a RE industry in the UAE – but not or at least not only through Masdar!” 
(Interview no. 91 – R&D, Gulf States) 
Another interviewee painted a broader, but equally critical picture of the domestic 
technology transfer policies: 
“In the Gulf, they don’t start small-scale, but huge – with megaprojects! This is a big 
mistake; because: where is the added value for the country; the UAE in our case? Al-
most non-existent!” (Interview no. 55 – public stakeholder, Gulf States) 
 
A third issue is the potential conflict of interest, which has drawn much of the criticism 
levelled at Masdar. As will be shown in Subchapter  5.7, Masdar’s nature is hybrid. 
While assuming the role of national agencies without own commercial interests it is at 
the same time a profit-oriented company with its own business interests. Thus, if 
Masdar was to purchase or develop a technology innovation that it could translate into 
a domestic market advantage, its agenda as a profit-maximizing entity would be to use 
this to its own advantage, and not to develop a diversified industry structure in the 
UAE or Abu Dhabi. However, at the present time, there have been no known attempts 
to resolve this dilemma. 
 
Section conclusion 
The example of Masdar proves that Abu Dhabi is attempting to create a RET hub in the 
UAE. Other existing research centres are either small in size or have a different scope 
thereby not qualifying as a mainly RET-focused effort. Subchapter  5.7 will present a 
more in-depth analysis of the Masdar project which will also attempt a judgement on 
the question as to whether the Masdar project can so far be assessed as successful. 
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While Abu Dhabi’s Masdar initiative is globally known, the absence of local industry 
structures that could feedback and entrench the innovations of this initiative on the 
ground means success is not a given outcome. In addition, the alternative level of R&D 
cooperation, which should suggest itself, is riddled with inter-institutional competition 
and Masdar’s tendency to monopolize matters. 
In conclusion, the UAE is not yet at a point where a robust domestic innovation system 
has been successfully established. Its creation is one of the goals of the Masdar Initia-
tive, which, in combination with its strategic acquisition policy, could yield success in 
the mid-term future. However, as the vocal criticism of Masdar’s actual policy decision 
shows, it is not at all certain whether Masdar can in fact assume such a role, not least 
because it would necessarily be a partial actor due to its own commercial interests, 
and not a neutral UAE business agency. 
 
5.5.2. Technological developments 
What is the interviewees’ opinion on technology choices and on the chance of indus-
try-use of RETs as entry points for further RETs in resource-rich Arab states? 
The large majority of interviewees were of the opinion that the key technology options 
for the UAE are the different forms of solar energy production, particularly the CSP 
technologies. While this was the prevalent notion among Masdar employees, other 
energy stakeholders had a more differentiated view and rather favoured PV. In line 
with the Indian company Mulk, they highlighted that due to the diffuse solar radiation 
in the UAE, CSP plants need a much larger catchment area (mirror fields) than else-
where to produce the same amount of power and would thus be less preferable in this 
context (Recharge - The global source for renewable energy news, 2010). This question, 
however, will be answered by resource availability maps of the country. 
With regards to industry use of RETs as an entry point for renewables in resource-rich 
states a key point of discussion was enhanced oil recovery (EOR). Many national oil 
companies use their own natural gas for EOR; a technology that exacerbates the gas 
shortages experienced by states like Abu Dhabi (Interview no. 85 – R&D, Gulf States). 
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Thus, a CSP-steam replacement is of commercial interest to the oil majors and a test 
project is under way in Oman (Interview no. 91 – R&D, Gulf States); other countries 
with heavy oil fields (where steam-injected EOR might yield good results) are Kuwait 
and Saudi Arabia. In the UAE, however, the character of the main oil fields makes the 
use of this method impossible (Interview no. 90 – R&D, Gulf States). Instead of steam, 
the UAE oil fields might use carbon dioxide as a replacement for natural gas, one rea-
son why both the Masdar Institute and Masdar Carbon are working on carbon capture 
and storage (CCS) projects (Interview no. 78 – national and international power sector 
and Interview no. 87 – R&D, both Gulf States). 
 
Section conclusion 
Industry use of RETs will not develop into a large renewables market in the UAE any 
time soon, in spite of the existing potentials in other countries. Thus, only the standard 
electricity sector is expected to yield a strong growth in this area. 
 
 
5.6. Key findings in the analysis of the UAE energy system  
The last three sections have analysed various aspects of the UAE energy system and its 
renewable energy policy in line with the 18 subsidiary research questions developed in 
Chapter  3. While the section conclusions exhaustively addressed the respective re-
search questions, the outcomes of the analysis follow: 
It has been demonstrated that the UAE’s renewable energy efforts are largely limited 
to the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, and particularly to the Masdar Initiative. While the insti-
tutional and legislatory framework remains weak, the most significant policy driver 
behind the UAE’s renewable energy policy appears to be the general attempt at na-
tional economic diversification and the quest for new forms of power generation for 
the Emirates, including nuclear energy. While still incomplete in several major ways, 
the most striking expression of the UAE’s (particularly, Abu Dhabi’s) political will to 
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foster the growth of RETs are the already published elements of a comprehensive re-
newable energy strategy of Abu Dhabi, such as the 7% goal for 2020. 
It has become apparent that the main political sponsor of these developments is Abu 
Dhabi’s Crown Prince Mohamed bin Zayed, as well as his very senior aide Sultan al-
Jaber and his investment vehicles around Mubadala. While this empirically-grounded 
observation can be stated, giving a more concise analysis of intra-Emirati high-level 
decision-marking structures remains elusive as the accumulation of decision-making 
power in a few members of the ruling elite, their inaccessibility and the silence around 
them in media and research publications make a precise tracking of how decisions are 
taken, impossible. Instead, unspecific references by the interviewees to high-level de-
cision makers abound without them being able to give more than anecdotal data in the 
form of “the final decisions will be taken soon”; “someone very high up the hierarchy 
decides this” etc.  
The fact that the UAE remains an absolute monarchy; a “globalizing” one, to use Hen-
ry/Springborg’s terms, but nonetheless a monarchy needs to be kept in mind. Thus, 
the crystallization of decision-making power on the very top combined with a relative 
powerlessness on all lower levels needs to be taken into account. Additionally, this 
means that the idea of tracing decision-making structures and agency in a way that 
researchers can expect from open, transparent democracies is by and large mistaken. 
Apart from these problems that are results of the UAE political system, further key 
barriers to the spread of renewables are largely due to the structure of the power sec-
tor: the on-going system of power subsidies and the absence of a level playing field for 
new forms of power production make any progress in this field dependent on extra-
commercial logic of government subsidies and essentially keeps the development 
bound to top-level political decisions. The unwillingness of government to open up the 
power sector in that field is reflected in the lack of a binding, long-term renewable 
energy strategy that specifies renewables premiums and gives investors a clear guide-
line for investments and profits. The combination of a poor performance in terms of 
national innovation systems and the small  trained work force for that sector outside 
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of Masdar has meant that renewables – beside glitzy advertisements and summits, 
have so far little substance on the ground. 
While the most significant obstacles are arguably the lack of a legal framework and the 
strong power subsidies, the research has revealed several areas of untapped potential 
for mobilization or actual developments. These areas often entail ‘soft issues’, such as 
climate change, culture and religion, and country branding, but also the potential role 
of the GCC grid for the spread of renewables – a function of the unsolved subsidies 
issues, remains unexploited.  
 
On the analytical level, four subjects can be identified: 
First, with regards to the interaction of the three layers of the MLP, it has become evi-
dent that both the landscape and the niche levels play a subordinate role in the UAE. It 
appears that most power in the UAE energy system lies with the entrenched regime 
actors, particularly in the political and in the business sphere. The areas of culture, 
R&D, and civil society organisations only play a marginal role. As a consequence of this 
focus on state institutions with poor legitimacy and opaque, top-level decision-making 
structures, niche-level innovation faces major barriers. 
Second, in terms of the UAE political system, it has become apparent that the federal 
level is largely inactive in that regard, which is also true for most individual emirates 
apart from Abu Dhabi. While in principle, a lead role of this largest, most populous, 
wealthiest and most powerful emirate is expected, the almost total lack of similar initi-
atives in the other emirates is indeed perplexing.  
Third, within Abu Dhabi, the overwhelming majority of projects are channelled through 
the various branches of the Masdar Initiative. While the launch of this initiative has 
certainly played a large role in promoting renewables in the country and beyond, 
Masdar alone is unlikely to succeed. It cannot take over government agency functions 
in parallel to common business objectives and is likely to fail in the continuing absence 
of a grown renewable industry and expertise around it.  
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Fourth, in terms of governance concepts, a critical stance towards key tenets of west-
ern renewable energy governance theory, such as decentralization, a liberalized power 
market, and the instrument of feed-in-tariffs has been voiced by stakeholders in the 
country, which poses a challenge to policy design, as will be discussed further in Sub-
chapter  7.1.  
In conclusion, the MLP analysis of the UAE energy system has shown that in spite of 
various innovative elements to promote renewable energies in the Emirate of Abu 
Dhabi, this emirate, but more so the entire country does not yet have a comprehensive 
renewable energy strategy. While, as demonstrated, key aspects are still missing, it is 
likely that the country’s efforts around the Masdar Initiative will be complemented by 
more wide-ranging efforts on emirate- or on the federal level. This top-down approach 
will arguably also be the UAE’s only chance for a real renewable energy innovation as 
its policy structures pose strong barriers to all forms of bottom-up innovation. Concep-
tually, a mere application of western renewable energy (industry) promotion instru-
ments to the UAE appears premature and would yield only few chances of success. 
 
5.7. Case study in the case study: Abu Dhabi’s Masdar Initiative 
While the in-depth analysis structured by the MLP has shed light on many individual 
aspects of the UAE’s energy system and its renewable energy policies, one aspect de-
veloped into a leitmotif of the discussions: the potentially pivotal role of the Masdar 
Initiative for the UAE’s (or, more precisely, Abu Dhabi’s) renewable energy efforts. 
While many UAE outsiders and Masdar representatives have argued that in fact, 
Masdar embodies the renewable energy policy of Abu Dhabi, the last pages have 
shown that this claim must be qualified, as many other policy fields, determinants and 
individual actors are equally relevant. Nonetheless, the Masdar initiative is of key rele-
vance for the renewables agenda in this country, thereby warranting a full section in 
this case study. It is also highly instrumental to assess whether Masdar can be regard-
ed as a model for successful niche-based renewable energy innovation or whether the 
UAE energy policy system remains strongly dominated by top-down approaches with 
only little chances for alternative development models. 
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This section is structured in four parts. Section  5.7.1 will introduce the planning phase 
prior to the founding of the project. Section  5.7.2 will present the structure of the orig-
inal set-up, a phase that can arguably be called the “Masdar I phase”. While the third 
section ( 5.7.3) will discuss developments since the latest downsizing of the project in 
2010 (Masdar II), the final section ( 5.7.4) will discuss the conditions of success required 
by this project for a long-term success (Masdar III). 
 
5.7.1. Background and the pre-Masdar planning phase 
The conceptual guideline for the Masdar Initiative was developed by a Dubai property 
development company.159 As previously highlighted, their goal was to develop a com-
prehensive renewable energy strategy for Abu Dhabi. A key interviewee reported the 
following about the first phase of the project: 
“Masdar City began in our office in 2004/05. At this time, Sultan al-Jaber was an assis-
tant business manager here. When we conceived the project we called it ‘Abu Dhabi 
Energy Vision’. The name ‘Masdar’ came up later after the project was accepted in Abu 
Dhabi; it was chosen by Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed.” (Interview no. 66 – private and 
public investor, Gulf States) 
The proposal is said to have found favour with the Abu Dhabi government for three 
reasons. First, conscious of its high carbon emissions, the Abu Dhabi leadership felt a 
new project was necessary to contribute to the solution of this dilemma. Second, this 
project suited the overall strategy of national economic diversification developed at 
the time. Third, the UAE’s unprecedented economic boom, particularly in the real es-
tate sector also served as a factor. The interviewee continues: 
“Then, Mubadala agreed to give us the land of the US$ 22bn real estate plan (today 
worth maybe 15bn); a US$ 100m seed money for the first clean tech fund and the gov-
ernment paid 20% of the money for the properties the rest was supposed to come from 
private sources. We got the go-ahead in April 2006, when we also had a big launch of 
the project.” 
                                                      
159
 Much of the account of this subsection is based on the interview with the CEO of this company and 
former head of Masdar City. Unfortunately, other similarly knowledgeable and open sources hardly 
existed. Thus, a potential bias from this main source cannot be excluded, but due to the high informa-
tional value of the source it has been decided to take this information into account. 
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As has already been discussed in Section  5.5.1, the conceptual guideline for Masdar 
was closely modelled on the idea of a carbon-free eco-city, such as the Chinese Dong-
tan eco city (Pentland, 2011).160 However, apart from being a costly country branding 
object, the planners had intended a much more ambitious role for Masdar: 
“Our idea was to empower the people of Abu Dhabi in renewable energy technologies 
and to create future leaders in that area. The whole concept was always centred 
around R&D and human capital. Our plan was to start this innovation project with the 
university as a core, and to do the residential, commercial, the whole real estate sec-
tion later. Many people asked me why not start with the real estate plans – but this 
would have defeated the purpose of the entire project!” (Interview no. 66 – private and 
public investor, Gulf States) 
Innovative property developers were therefore able to sell their concept of an Abu 
Dhabi energy vision to the top-level leadership, at a moment when the new leadership 
was looking for projects that would be both noticed on the global scale as well as actu-
ally benefit the domestic industry. This combination of landscape- and regime-level 
formation formed the ideational core of Masdar City as a government-steered, niche-
based innovation project. Meanwhile, the size of the project was due to the simulta-
neous exceptional real estate boom and the mutual competition for superlatives be-
tween Dubai and Abu Dhabi. However, in spite of many other schemes launched in this 
period, Masdar actually possessed a meaningful core strategy. 
 
5.7.2. The set-up phase (Masdar I)161 
After its initial launch in 2006, tangible figures and data were formally disclosed at the 
World Future Energy Summit in Abu Dhabi in January 2008, and construction began in 
February of the same year at a site close to Abu Dhabi’s international airport. Under 
                                                      
160
 See also Footnote 156. 
161
 The following presentation of the main business areas of Masdar is based on Masdar PR sources and 
several stakeholder interviews with Masdar staff members. The subsection has been written with the 
purpose of outlining the original plans of this initiative as publicly presented. On the whole, rather than 
offer an uncritical presentation of the Initiative, this subchapter aims to provide a critical analysis of 
Masdar’s achievements, as well as outline the conditions for a long-term success of this project. 
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the roof of the Abu Dhabi Future Energy Company (ADFEC), the Masdar Initiative 
houses the following five elements (see also Figure 38)162: 
Figure 38: Set-up of the Masdar Initiative 
 
Source: Wouters, 2010, p. 2.  
- Masdar City 
The city is the core element of the Initiative. Stretching on a 6.5 square kilometre de-
velopment area, Masdar aims to construct a zero-carbon city thus extending the limits 
of carbon-neutral urban planning. This car-free city is intended to house up to 90.000 
inhabitants. In addition to domestic accommodation and office space for companies 
from the energy industry, IRENA and the MIST (see below) are to be based here. Origi-
nally, MIST had an in-built system of data collection in order to facilitate the construc-
tion of further buildings in Masdar City. It is uncertain whether this system is currently 
in operation.163 
 
                                                     
162
 In addition to the five strategic pillars the Initiative contains several further elements such as the 
World Future Energy Summit, and, in its context, the Zayed Future Energy Prize. 
163
 “Over 30.000 data points are already installed in the MIST; it has all sorts of usages, such as offices, 
domestic, grocery, gym, labs, etc. – in all rooms there is data collected on consumption patterns, use of 
light, AC, fridge, etc. – all this was supposed to feed special programs that would be analysed by a spe-
cial IT team. But now the entire IT crew has been changed, so I don’t know what is happening with all the 
data now – if this is being used at all at the moment.” (Interview no. 66 – private and public investor, 
Gulf States) 
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- Masdar Power 
Masdar Power is Masdar’s power branch with investments both in the UAE and over-
seas.164 It is also one of the main vehicles for technology transfer and one of the major 
employers in the renewables sector in the UAE.  
- Masdar Carbon 
Masdar Carbon is working on R&D in the hydrogen fuel sector, and is involved in car-
bon trading based on the CDM mechanism. In addition to that, it promotes CCS and 
industry use of CCS through enhanced oil recovery (EOR).  
- the Masdar Institute of Science and Technology (MIST) 165 
Partnering from the outset with Boston’s Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 
the MIST is the research core of the Initiative. The MIST commenced teaching in 2008 
on the premises of Abu Dhabi’s Petroleum Institute, and is housed in Masdar City since 
the beginning of the academic year 2010/11. On 5 June 2011, MIST graduated its first 
group of students in the presence of Sheikh Hazza bin Zayed Al Nahyan, National Secu-
rity Adviser and Vice-Chairman of Abu Dhabi Executive Council, and further members 
of the ruling elite. Their attendance is a sign of continuing considerable top-level inter-
est in the project (Masdar Institute of Science and Technology, 2011). 
- Masdar Venture Capital/the Masdar Cleantech Fund 
The Fund is 100% owned and directed by Mubadala. As discussed, it has now launched 
three clean tech funds to invest the global renewables industry and related sectors.  
 
                                                      
164
 As previously discussed, Masdar Power’s investments comprise Shams 1, Nour 1 and a PV test field in 
the UAE, as well as WinWinD, Masdar PV (Germany), and further engagements in Spain and the United 
Kingdom overseas. 
165
 In the Gulf, this has coincided with efforts to improve the level of higher education that has achieved 
substandard scores in various international ratings (Nour, 2005). One step towards this is the establish-
ment of branches of international universities in the Gulf, such as the Georgetown School of Foreign 
Service in Qatar (part of Doha’s “Education City”) and Dubai’s University of Atlanta (Davidson & Smith, 
2008). 
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In conclusion, the Masdar I phase started in early 2009 with high hopes, ambitions and 
short-term success plans. The UAE’s successful bid for IRENA in June 2009 confirmed 
that the project was on a sound development trajectory. However, as will be shown in 
the following subsection, on closer inspection, many issues in the UAE did not proceed 
as planned. 
 
5.7.3. The downsizing of Masdar in 2010 (Masdar II) 
In early 2010, citing the project’s innovative character and its complexity rather than 
the global financial downturn, it was announced that the original time plan needed to 
be pushed back to 2020-2025. In addition to this, Masdar’s initial rhetoric changed 
from a “zero-carbon city” to a “low-carbon city”, leaving all options open as to what 
this actually entails. Yet, the first phase stipulating the completion of the IRENA build-
ing is set to be finished on time by 2013, and, as highlighted above, MIST has already 
moved into its premises with the start of the academic year 2010/11 (Egbert, 2010; 
Pepper, 2010). 
Apart from the reasons mentioned, it is not straightforward to identify other causes 
for this sudden change of plan after such a promising start. In line with the general 
UAE phenomena of opacity, non-disclosure and blurred responsibilities established in 
the landscape-level analysis of this chapter, little information was revealed official 
sources. Interviews with industry stakeholders in the UAE immediately highlighted key 
shortcomings in the system of Masdar; particularly of Masdar City. According to one 
stakeholder of an Oil Major: 
“Masdar City was run like a normal real estate project. The international partners had 
to buy office space for very high prices and with zero value, as up to now, none of the 
office space is actually there! Also, I didn’t see any sustainability strategies anywhere 
when visiting the site. I cannot identify anything particular on that site, nothing ex-
tremely environment-friendly, no particular waste management system, etc. Ok, they 
buy some CDM credits for carbon-offsetting, but this really doesn’t make this place a 
special eco-city; anyone could do this.” (Interview no. 74 – national and international 
power sector, Gulf States) 
Another business interviewee confirmed this notion: 
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“We are not in the UAE because of Masdar, but to develop for the general market. We 
don’t have a registration within Masdar City, as they couldn’t offer us anything attrac-
tive. This also goes for the other free zones. One sales manager tried to sell me the 
membership in Masdar as a huge business opportunity, but when I analysed the num-
bers she gave me it showed that what we would potentially gain extra wouldn’t even 
pay the expensive rent for the offices there.” (Interview no. 69 – National and interna-
tional power sector, UAE) 
Additionally, Masdar had to lay off a large number of staff members and sacked the 
general management of Masdar City, Masdar PV and other senior management posi-
tions. Sultan al-Jaber, however, could maintain his position as a CEO of the entire pro-
ject, although, according to interviews, the restructuring of the project symbolized a 
strong challenge to his role (Interviewee no. 52 – public stakeholder, Gulf States). The 
current Masdar II phase is riddled with international criticism. Several analysts, who 
argued that Masdar166 – as most other eco-cities – is bound to end up in failure, feel 
their opinions have been confirmed. This, however, appears too pessimistic, as the 
project continues to evolve. 
Two other interviewees also offered a more balanced point of view: 
“Masdar is the first mover in that field in this entire region. Of course, first movers are 
always criticized and must change things, but still, it is a noteworthy initiative!” (Inter-
view no. 64 – Private and public investor, UAE) 
 “The whole project is like an amoeba! It grows very fast, constantly changing and shift-
ing due to constant learning effects. Take Masdar City for example: it started as a zero-
carbon city, and then suddenly developed into a property developer – management cut 
it short, re-orientating it again to its core-business. Masdar as a whole is a love or hate 
project. Many of my colleagues told me “you are selling out” when I went to Masdar, 
but I don’t think so. If only a small part of what is being developed here is reintegrated 
in global modes of living or transport then it was definitely worth it!” (Interview no. 78 
– national and international power sector, Gulf States) 
Thus, stakeholders come to very different conclusions when it comes to analysing the 
reasons for the downsizing of Masdar II. What needs to be kept in mind, however, is 
apart from the management issues it has mostly been Masdar City that has been 
downsized; the Masdar branches by and large remain intact. Furthermore, the early 
reshuffle of posts is not an unusual measure in a start-up project that does not show 
                                                      
166
 See, for instance, Pentland (2011) or Matthes (2011). 
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the desired outcomes or indeed exhibits mismanagement. Still, the downsizing of 
Masdar I itself after a rather positive 2009 beg the question whether decision-makers 
could not have anticipated that a more long-term time frame would have been neces-
sary for the success of the project and that the original 2016 deadline could not have 
been met in any case. A key stakeholder involved in the planning phase stated: 
“We had originally planned at least 14 years for the completion of Masdar’s develop-
ment, but our plan was cut down to 7 years by the political leadership. We had no 
choice but to say ‘Yes, sure, we’ll finish in this time’ – at least some part; knowing this 
would be a very unrealistic goal. This short time given to us was mainly a function of 
the speed things were being realized in Dubai (and Abu Dhabi) before the crisis; this 
atmosphere generated competition, which is why we were forced to do this.” (Inter-
view no. 66 – private and public investor, Gulf States) 
In conclusion, while the downsizing of Masdar City and the change in the senior man-
agement of several Masdar branches met with different reactions, the project as a 
whole should not prematurely be regarded as a failure. Instead, the global financial 
crisis has changed key landscape-level determinants of success. Additionally, the over-
ambitiousness of Abu Dhabi’s decision makers, combined with allegations of misman-
agement, might be regarded as the reason for the announced changes. Furthermore, 
extrapolating from the interviewees’ testimonies, renewable energy in the UAE is cur-
rently perceived as a new “buzzword”. Indeed, there seems to be little understanding 
of the complex conditions necessary to create an enabling environment for the spread 
of renewable energy innovation in the country. 
 
5.7.4. Masdar III, or: criteria of long-term success  
The previous subsections have demonstrated that the Masdar Initiative is still in flux 
and that while severe problems have emerged, it has largely retained its original, inno-
vative character. Still, it has become evident that a lot remains to be done for Masdar 
not to “end up like one of these other big real estate complexes here in the Gulf; noth-
ing special”, as some Masdar staff informally fear.167 This analysis is particularly rele-
                                                      
167
 Interview no. 69 – National and international power sector, UAE. 
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vant not only for the internal dynamics of Masdar, but also for Masdar’s pivotal role in 
the UAE energy system. As highlighted above in the MLP analysis, it also showed that 
this project still underperforms on various levels. Thus, a Masdar III phase might be 
required to guarantee the long-term success of the project under the aforementioned 
framework conditions of the UAE energy policy. 
Due to the different functions of the Initiative, criteria of its success have to be given 
accordingly. 
With regards to its internal success, the criteria are relatively straight-forward. Down-
sizing and expectations management are the first, important steps of a realistic as-
sessment of the project’s potential. Evidently, only sound business operations will yield 
success in the long term. 
However, the question as to whether Masdar can assume the role of all the aspects 
highlighted in the MLP analysis of this case study is much larger. What can enable 
Masdar to develop into a meaningful technology cluster, to be an actual asset in terms 
of national economic diversification, to be used in a country branding context and to 
assume the role of a national business incubator, national renewable energy agency, 
think tank and industry complex under the given circumstances?  
This touches upon the wider question of whether such cities function as national inno-
vation incubators, or whether innovation will remain locked-in, as is envisaged by the 
“island of efficiencies” argument (Hertog & Luciani, 2009). 
Currently, even Masdar-funded journalists wonder “whether the money being spent 
here will translate into practical learning with impact elsewhere” (Gunther, 2011).168 
However, an early Masdar planner underlines that Masdar I has been designed with a 
concept that strongly differed from the classical “islands of efficiency” in the Gulf, such 
as petrochemical complexes: 
“The Masdar concept was not modelled along the petrochemicals cities in Saudi Arabia. 
Instead, the plan was to develop a super-strategy for the RET area for Abu Dhabi. For 
                                                      
168
 The article of this renewable energy journalist carries an open disclaimer that his travel to Abu Dhabi 
was funded by Masdar (Gunther, 2011). 
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example, the whole carbon initiative, the RE fund, the WFES – all these elements are 
crucial parts of the concept and are not at all part of these cities in Saudi – they focus 
rather of oil peripherals with purely economic interest. Our plan was always to estab-
lish an innovation mechanism.” (Interview no. 66 – private and public investor, Gulf 
States) 
Currently, Masdar does not fulfil its external functions well, not least because of an 
absence of government policies and industry structures to which it could relate. More-
over, there is the structural issue whereby Masdar suffers from an overload of de-
mands: it will not be able to assume functions that are related to government (and 
thus neutral) and commerce (and thus economically partial) at the same time in addi-
tion to furthering the other agendas touched upon. One step in solving this predica-
ment is the further internal differentiation of Masdar in a Masdar III phase. While this 
might still result in a conflict of interest in some cases, the current 5-pillar structure 
could be extended by at least one pillar: a renewable energy agency that takes over 
government functions and thus provides a clear and impartial guidance for domestic 
and international investors. This agency could be further subdivided thereby covering 
functions such as establishing a national innovation system, the coordination of re-
search work in the UAE, the provision of impartial consulting services to the UAE gov-
ernment in energy matters, and other aspects highlighted as currently lacking in the 
MLP analysis. Naturally, such an agency could also be founded without any link to 
Masdar. Given the size, contacts and current weight of Masdar, however, it appears 
unwise not to integrate such an agency in an existing meta-project. 
Its conditions of success, however, will always remain tied to the overall energy gov-
ernance situation outlined above. Thus, although tangible improvements for internal 
conditions of a Masdar III phase can be made, the question of how system innovation 
can occur in the UAE energy system, remains. Comparing the ossified power structures 
in the energy governance as a whole, Masdar still appears fragile. In the UAE and Abu 
Dhabi, the traditional system of energy policy (under the framework conditions out-
lined above) is likely to dominate the development of the Masdar Initiative. As will be 
argued in greater details upon discussing the realpolitik caveats of energy policy design 
in the UAE (see Subchapter  7.1), it is improbable that Masdar can trigger a systemic 
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innovation process in and of itself. Instead, a top-down process of renewal remains the 
more likely innovation process in the UAE. 
 
5.7.5. Conclusion 
The Masdar Initiative has been through different phases in its still comparatively short 
existence. Conceived as an “Abu Dhabi energy vision” by real estate developers with a 
comprehensive, research-based approach, this project suited the desires of Abu Dha-
bi’s ruling elite during the mid-2000s, which is the reason why it was hastily adopted 
and given a considerable budget. Although the project launch was met with great in-
ternational enthusiasm and had made early accomplishments such as the hosting of 
IRENA, the Masdar I phase was also not entirely successful: mismanagement and poor 
performance for the business community, as well as an excessively ambitious (gov-
ernment-enforced) time schedule soon led to a scaling down of the project, only am-
plified in its effects due to the global financial crisis of 2008/09. Another reason for 
these problems was the politically imposed time table that made the initial goals unre-
alistic from the outset. This also reinforces the impression that Masdar has always pri-
marily been driven by strong political, much less so energy or commercial imperatives. 
The currently on-going Masdar II phase is more realistic in its outset and is well capable 
of yielding some success in the coming years. However, in order to fully live up to its 
self-proclaimed goals as a business incubator, technology cluster, as well as an asset 
for country branding, technology transfer and national economic diversification, a 
Masdar III phase has to be launched. A slightly transformed Masdar Initiative could 
also incorporate a possible sixth pillar. Such a pillar could take over the impartial, gov-
ernmental function as a renewable energy agency. This step could be vital to disentan-
gle private-sector interests and governmental functions within the Initiative. Only then 
can the concern raised by stakeholders and researchers that this project is turning into 
yet another “island of efficiency” characterized by innovation lock-in and a lack of eco-
nomic interaction with the rest of the country be avoided. 
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The Masdar Initiative is an excellent example of the potential of bottom-up-innovation 
processes. While it entails many promising elements, its conditions of success are de-
termined by the conditions of the UAE energy policy system as a whole, as presented 
in this case study. As argued above, only an adaptation of the project to the overall 
variables of renewable energy policy in the UAE in a Masdar III phase will help make 
this project successful. Analytically, this shows how little a well- funded and well-
connected niche-level initiative can move without more comprehensive changes to the 
regime- and landscape-level determinants of renewable energy policy in the UAE. 
 
5.8. Conclusions of the UAE case study 
This chapter presented the first of two case studies that represent the empirical core 
of this thesis. Analysing the UAE renewable energy system guided by the subsidiary 
research questions developed in Chapter  3, the case study showed that while renewa-
bles receive considerable attention in the UAE on all levels (landscape level: Subchap-
ter  5.3; regime-level: Subchapter  5.4, niche-level: Subchapter  5.5), particularly in Abu 
Dhabi, the structural elements of legislation and a binding long-term policy are absent. 
As also the summative overview of the results (Subchapter  5.6) showed, the overall 
system of energy policy in the UAE is currently characterized, among others, by  
- Strong individual initiatives coupled with a poor regulatory context and a low 
willingness to change this situation 
- Opacity and policy of non-disclosure 
- Entrenched but uninterested system actors in the fields of oil and gas industry 
- Authoritarian structures and, in parts, blurred responsibility 
- A certain predilection for megaprojects and prestige. 
As the closer analysis of Masdar (Subchapter  5.7) has demonstrated, the role of the 
Masdar Initiative is pivotal for renewable energy policies in the UAE. However, the 
aforementioned problems on the landscape and regime levels in combination with 
Masdar’s current functional overload have rendered the initiative, in its current form, 
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fragile. Without change in these framework parameters, a niche-level project such as 
Masdar will not succeed, but instead create the much-cited lock-in of innovation. 
Without change in these framework parameters, a niche-level project such as Masdar 
will not succeed, but instead create the much-cited lock-in of innovation. 
The framework conditions developed by means of the MLP analysis, summarized in the 
individual Subchapter conclusions, the summative overview of UAE energy policy and 
its application to Masdar will form the background upon which questions of policy de-
sign and the broader issues revolving around the travel of governance models will be 
discussed in Subchapter  7.1 of Part C. An ideal type application will demonstrate that 
Western governance models such as TM can only be applied to the UAE in a very lim-
ited sense as caveats prevent most key elements of this approach to be successful. This 
will be succeeded by a comparative analysis of both case studies’ results, which in turn 
will demonstrate whether this is a general trend or whether diverging results of the 
two case studies cannot confirm such an argument. 
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6. Algeria 
Figure 39: Map of Algeria 
 
Graphs © 2013 NASA, TerraMetrics, Map data ©2013 Google, Mapa GISrael, ORION-ME, Basarsoft, 
basado en BCN IGN España. 
 
6.1. Introduction 
The second case study will focus on Algeria, which represents the second country type 
of resource-wealthy Arab states identified in Chapter 1. After outlining the basic ener-
gy and policy context for Algeria and summarising the data collection, the case study 
will follow the same structure of the UAE case study by applying the MLP and TM 
frameworks. Characterized by large hydrocarbon reserves and a large territory and 
population, these states have developed different governance structures than small, 
hydrocarbons-rich states like the UAE. While the latter distribute their wealth among 
small national populations and possess leadership structures that allow for swift policy 
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changes and institutional reform, governments in states like Algeria, Libya or even 
Saudi Arabia, “bunker states” in Henry/Springborg’s terminology, often display slower, 
more sclerotic governance structures and generally find it harder to perform massive 
transfers of wealth to achieve a “ruling bargain” situation that the smaller Gulf states 
can reach effortlessly. Parallel to the UAE case study, this subchapter will first give a 
brief introduction into the fundamentals of Algerian (renewable) energy policy and 
then sketch the further outline of the Algerian case study. 
Present-day Algeria is shaped by its war of independence, the Arab socialist regime 
and the “lost decade” of the 1990s. The uneasy alliance of a strong security apparatus, 
technocrats, the dominant elites around President Bouteflika and incoming oil money 
has kept the country afloat. The ministry of energy and mines under Youcef Yousfi has 
a key position in the country’s institutional setup since it directs SONATRACH (Société 
Nationale pour la Recherche, la Production, le Transport, la Transformation, et la 
Commercialisation des Hydrocarbures), the national oil producer that, in 2009, ac-
counted for 98% of Algeria’s foreign currency revenues.169 This dominance of hydro-
carbons in a largely autocratic “bunker state” (Henry & Springborg, 2001) means that 
energy policy agenda is largely dominated by conventionalism and by a stress on ex-
port stability. In many circles, renewables have traditionally not enjoyed major atten-
tion or enthusiastic support. Unlike in the Gulf, Algeria’s national diversification agen-
da is not far advanced, nor have Algerian policy makers acted with the swiftness that 
has been visible in the UAE in recent years. 
While SONATRACH is an important player in the entire Algerian energy sector, the Al-
gerian state utility is SONELGAZ, the acronym for Société Nationale de l'Electricité et du 
Gaz (Algerian Electricity Utility), currently headed by Noureddine Boutarfa. Although 
the Algerian electricity sector has formally been liberalized in 2002 with the law n°02-
01 on energy, Sonelgaz remains the dominant player in the electricity sector. It contin-
ues to produce 87 per cent of the Algerian domestic electricity as an Independent 
                                                      
169
 Cf. Mebtoul (2010). For an in-depth, comparative discussion of Middle Eastern national oil companies 
cf. Marcel & Mitchell (2006). 
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Power Producer and co-produces the remaining 13% in international joint-ventures. 
Additionally, it still owns the national power grid, which has not been liberalised.170  
Following the main centres of demand and population, the Algerian grid system is well 
developed in the coastal regions (cf. Figure 40), however, it fails to provide a grid cov-
ering the expanse of the country. This is expected given the low population density, 
economic performance and the adverse conditions of the Sahara Desert. A result of 
that is that most of Algeria’s renewable energy efforts began with rural electrification 
programmes to impoverished communities in the Grand Sud of the country, mostly 
realized through off-grid PV or, less frequently, CSP. 
Figure 40: Map of the Algerian electricity grid 
Source: Supersberger et al., 2010, p. 27. 
This, however, does not mean that a national renewable energy policy is non-existent. 
On the contrary, Africa’s second largest state has desert territories for solar power 
plant deployment, a similar expertise in energy exports as the Gulf, large amounts of 
                                                      
170
 For more details on the structure and historical development of the Algerian electricity market cf. 
Supersberger et al. (2010, pp. 31-34). 
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capital available and a multitude of small, albeit rather uncoordinated renewable en-
ergy initiatives and centres. Moreover, according to journalistic sources (Bensebaini, 
2008) its ministry of environment plans a project similar to Masdar City, the Nouvelle 
Cité Boughezoul.171 
One key driver for an extension of the electricity production infrastructure, as in the 
Gulf States, is the steep rise of local power demand (cf. Figure 41 for an overview of 
the rise in power demand since 1990 and for projections until 2019). Additionally, the 
proximity to the European Union constitutes an important strongly different incentive 
from the classic goals of energy policy. Europe’s continuously growing power demand 
and its ambitious renewable energy targets offer a large potential for industry innova-
tion and rent generation through a large-scale construction of concentrated solar 
power plants and wind parks designed for power export to Europe. The growing inter-
est in this new export opportunity for Algeria is also reflected in Sonelgaz’ cooperation 
agreement with the Desertec Industry Initiative (Dii) (Sonelgaz, 2011) – a direct out-
flow of the minister’s ambitious export goals for 2030. Since this aspect is outside the 
classic pathways of national renewable energy policy, these developments and poten-
tial implications for Algeria will be discussed in a “case study within the case study” in 
Subchapter  6.7. 
                                                      
171
 As will be demonstrated in Subchapter  6.5, the Nouvelle Cité Boughezoul has yet to reach a serious 
project planning stage. While theoretically a megaproject and eco-city in its own right, currently, its 
realization in the mid-term future appears beyond reach. Moreover, compared to Masdar, its role is 
much less significant for Algeria, which is why the case study in the case study in this chapter has not 
been conducted in this project. Rather the Euro-Mediterranean renewable energy will be given particu-
lar attention as this is substantially more significant to the Algerian renewable energy policy. 
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Figure 41: Historic and projected energy demand in Algeria 1990-2019 
 
Source: Commission de Régulation de l’Electricité et du Gaz (CREG), 2010, p. 11. 
Algerian decision-makers have agreed on increasing the currently almost non-existent 
share of renewable energy in power generation. A key number is a 6%-target until 
2015 (Algerian Ministry of Energy and Mines, 2007), which was released in 2007 and 
has been re-adapted in 2011 to 7% by 2020. While this target already appeared to be 
ambitious given the very low current RE quota, the new energy minister has launched 
yet another, substantially more ambitious investment and renewable energy produc-
tion programme in 2011 that will also entail a technology transfer and domestic indus-
try component. The renewable electricity quota of this investment programme is to be 
raised to up to 40% of all energy produced by 2030 (12 GW) in addition to another 10 
GW destined for exports (Algerian Ministry of Energy and Mines, 2011). 
Thus, renewable energy policy in Algeria stands at a crossroads. It may well be that the 
ambitious plans by the Algerian MEM in the areas of energy and industry policy will 
lead the country into a prosperous renewable energy future that harvests a part of the 
country’s impressive resource potential. In this positive scenario, external, landscape-
level developments such as Desertec and the MSP could trigger synergy effects. How-
ever, the Algerian and external renewable energy promoters can only pave the way to 
a substantive renewable energy deployment if the political and commercial circum-
stances provide favourable framework conditions. The alternative to this would be a 
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continuation of declaratory policies and the decree of laws without any tangible ef-
fects on the ground. The question of which governance structures will persist in Algeria 
will also determine how far a multi-agent, open government approach such as TM can 
succeed in this environment and, if not, which alternative means might prove to be 
more successful. 
After a brief and more general account of the field work and the data collection (Sub-
chapter  6.2), this chapter will analyse the Algerian renewable energy system by means 
of the MLP framework and the 18 research questions developed in Part A (landscape 
level in Subchapter  6.3; regime-level in Subchapter  6.4; niche-level in Subchapter  6.5). 
As in the previous case study, results or quotes of the research interviews will be pro-
vided wherever suitable. Each subsection will end with section conclusions summariz-
ing its main findings. The results of the section conclusions will be presented in an 
overview in Subchapter  6.6. 
Since, as has been mentioned, the Euro-Mediterranean dimension of renewable ener-
gy cooperation constitutes a complex and relevant factor for the Algerian domestic 
renewable landscape, Subchapter  6.7 will conduct this chapter’s “case study within a 
case study” and discuss this issue and its interlinkages to Algiers more extensively. 
Finally, the combination of the results of the Algerian case study and the case study 
within the case study will provide the material for the final assessment on the condi-
tions of renewable energy policy in Algeria and the theoretical implications to be 
drawn from that in Subchapters  6.6 and  6.8. 
This will serve as the background for Subchapter  7.2 of Part C, in which TM will be ap-
plied by drafting renewable energy policy models for Algeria. At the same time, this 
will serve as a test for how far such policy design models can be applied to the particu-
lar governance situation in an oil- and gas-wealthy Arab state of large territory. 
As one stakeholder put it: 
Algerian foreign and energy policy is performed in several layers (“casquettes”): OPEC, 
the Arab world, Africa, as well as some close partners from the EU. In order to be suc-
cessful Algerian stakeholders have to navigate through all these settings, where each 
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one is a totally different context with complex interests involved. (Interview no. 3 – 
public stakeholder, Algeria) 
It is the goal of this chapter to show the interaction of the multiple casquettes of the 
Algerian system of energy policy. It will analyse the conditions under which renewable 
energy policy is performed in order to retrieve the more general patterns of energy, 
and particularly renewable energy policy in OAPEC states. 
 
6.2. Account of the data collection phase of the Algerian case study 
Research for the Algerian case study was carried out in parallel to the UAE case study. 
Four research trips were conducted in 2009 and 2010172. Due to the strongly central-
ized structure of Algeria, the prime destination for interviews was the greater Algiers 
area as most companies, politicians and other interviewees are located in the capital. 
In addition to that, Algeria’s second largest city of Oran was visited twice. An initial visit 
to interview renewable energy researchers led to the author’s participation in a con-
ference the following year, where more Algerian and North African renewable energy 
stakeholders were interviewed. Unlike in the UAE, the author did not seek an affilia-
tion to a research institute in Algeria.173  
In general, interviews were conducted in French with occasional talks in Arabic. While 
access to the mostly expatriate interviewees in the UAE was usually granted and 
scheduled in advance, this posed a major problem in Algeria: almost no interviews 
were scheduled from abroad; the most effective method was to call the respective 
persons on in their mobile phones and to make an appointment for the same day or 
shortly after. Indeed, this direct way of establishing a contact worked best, whereas 
introductions by third parties or official email requests usually remained unanswered. 
                                                      
172
 Parallel to the UAE case study, data collection was terminated in February 2011. All policy initiatives 
that were launched after that date are only rudimentarily taken into account. See also Footnote 111. 
173
 While the German-Algerian Chamber of Commerce and Industry was helpful in facilitating contacts to 
interviewees from the Algerian energy sector and at times offered its rooms for research interviews, this 
contact did not constitute a formal or informal research affiliation. 
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In addition to that, obtaining an interview appointment did not mean that a great 
amount of information was revealed to the interviewer. The remaining security issues 
in Algeria and the fact that in principle, all energy issues are regarded as highly politi-
cal, many interviewees did not want to go on record with their assessments of the sit-
uation in their home country, nor did they easily reveal insights on Algerian energy 
policy, particularly if connected to the main state institutions. While this can be read as 
a general remark on most Algeria-related research projects, the particular circum-
stances in the research period worsened the situation. In 2010, the long-serving minis-
ter of energy and mines, Chakib Khelil, stepped down over a large-scale corruption 
scandal in the national oil and gas company SONATRACH. Rather than an anti-
corruption-sanction, researchers have interpreted this affair as a political manoeuvre 
in the intra-elite power struggles between President Bouteflika’s clique and the mili-
tary security apparatus174, the DRS (Département du Renseignement et de la Sécu-
rité175). The Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM) – key for Algeria’s economy – is now 
headed by Youcef Yousfi. Due to this situation, the author was unable to obtain an 
official interview with a representative of the MEM. 
Apart from that, however, a limited number of interviewees assisted in establishing 
contact with further Algerian experts. Methodologically, these interviewees cannot be 
characterized as gatekeepers. Much rather, their provision of further contacts was a 
result of a successful snowballing technique. In Algeria itself, the large majority of in-
terviewees were Algerian citizens, as opposed to the UAE case study. The research was 
therefore conducted in a manner which was much closer to the actual Algerian popula-
tion. Yet, in terms of results, this does not mean this has always produced the most 
open and informative interviews. The problem of access produced an important chal-
lenge in Algeria. Unlike in the UAE, it was easy to interview local citizens, yet major 
state institutions such as ministries remained sealed off. Their representatives would 
not give interviews or agree to meet at all, not even on the condition of anonymity. 
Additionally, the reasons for the mismatch of much-advertised innovation and the con-
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 See Lacher and Ghettas for insightful analyses of this move (Lacher, 2010; Ghettas, 2010). 
175
 English translation: Department of Intelligence and Security 
238 
 
tinuation of legal and institutional roadblocks could by and large not be answered by 
the interviewees. Essentially, these were the author’s impressions, even energy ex-
perts were poorly connected to the inner circles of the political and security apparatus, 
where decisions about the future of the national energy system were taken. This has 
somewhat reinforced MLP’s tendency to neglect personal agency and to focus more on 
structural questions. With this in mind, however, the author was still able to present a 
comprehensive picture of the (renewable) energy situation in the country both 
through desk research176, as well as interviews with nationals and expatriates. As de-
scribed above, talking with the latter group of interviewees had certain benefits due to 
the establishment of a perceived or actual personal proximity between the researcher 
and the interviewee. 
In addition to the interviews conducted in Algeria, particularly the “case study in the 
case study” focussing on Desertec and further trans-continental renewable energy 
projects and their implications for Algerian energy policy necessitated obtaining data 
from further non-Algerian sources. For that purpose, several interviews were conduct-
ed with European stakeholders in various geographic locations, most notably Brussels, 
Paris, the UK and Germany. 
 
6.3. Landscape-level developments  
6.3.1. The Algerian political system 
How far do the Algerian political system and the non-existence of independent CSOs 
allow for system innovations in the energy sector, particularly bottom-up innova-
tions? 
The Algerian system of energy policy remains very much centralized in the capital Al-
giers. While it is largely dominated by the MEM and the major companies of Sonelgaz 
and Sonatrach, several other state institutions are relevant to renewable energy poli-
cies: 
                                                      
176
 Desk research also did not lead much further in terms of tracing personal agency as other research 
publications evidently faced the same issues. 
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- NEC - The National Energy Council (Conseil national de l’énergie). Established 
through the presidential decree n°95-102 (8 April 1995), the NEC is charged 
with supervising and controlling Algeria’s long-term national energy policy. The 
NEC represents the top-level energy body in the country and is presided over 
by the President of the Republic. Other members include leading Algerian en-
ergy officials such as the ministers of defence, energy, finance, the Algerian 
central bank governor, and the head of the national planning committee. In its 
scope and work, the NEC is comparable to the UAE’s Supreme Petroleum Coun-
cils.  
- CREG – The Regulatory Commission of Electricity and Gas (Commission de régu-
lation de l’électricité et du gaz). The national regulatory framework has been 
defined by law n°02-01 released on 5 February 2002. Articles 132 and 133 form 
the legal basis for the CREG. Apart from the standard tasks of a regulatory 
body, this commission observes and enforces the transparency of electricity 
markets and the well-functioning of a healthy competition. The CREG is the 
equivalent of a national regulator in the UAE. It releases national electricity tar-
gets and detailed plans of how renewable power is to be integrated into the 
national energy system 
- The Ministry of Land Use Planning, Environment and Tourism (Ministère de 
l'aménagement du territoire, de l'environnement et du tourisme). Through its 
Directorate for Energy and Development, this ministry oversees the technologi-
cal aspects of the power sector and is responsible for enacting laws for the 
promotion of sustainable development. Headed by Chérif Rahmani, this minis-
try has a distinctly different conception of renewable energy policy and sus-
tainability issues on the whole. This can be seen by the different projects put 
forward by its two ministers, the ville nouvelle Boughezoul (environment) and 
the Algerian national energy programme (MEM) (Interview no. 14 – R&D, Alge-
ria).  
- CDER – The Centre for the Development of Renewable Energies (Centre de déve-
loppement des énergies renouvelables). Founded in March 1988, the CDER is 
the best-known renewable energy research institution in Algeria. It focuses 
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mostly on R&D programmes focusing on solar, wind, geothermal and biomass 
energy as well as some teaching connected to the newly founded PhD pro-
gramme (Ecole Doctorale). The headquarters of the CDER is based in Bou-
zareah, in the outskirts of Algiers, but further research and development units 
are deployed in the oasis of Ghardaia, in the coastal city of Tipaza and in the 
desert town of Adrar (see Figure 42). While the CDER could potentially be a sig-
nificant institution in Algeria, it has very limited funding and political influence, 
mostly because it is not an organisational part of the MEM, but rather a pure 
research institute under the tutelage of the Ministry of Higher Education and 
Research.177 
Figure 42: Internal organisation of the CDER 
 
Source: CDER Website http://www.cder.dz/?rub=epst&srub=n&pag=admin, last accessed 05 January 
2011.  
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 This notion has also been confirmed by Interview no.20 – R&D, Algeria. 
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- New Energy Algeria (NEAL) was founded in 2002 as a subsidiary of the Algerian 
energy incumbents Sonatrach (45%) and Sonelgaz (45%) with 10% extra capital 
from the private investor SIM (UbiFrance, 2010b). The task of this start-up is to 
foster and develop any kind of renewable power production in the country. In 
an interview, the CEO of NEAL acknowledged the difficult task at hand. In addi-
tion to navigating between various ministries and the powerful national energy 
companies, he must also tread carefully in order not to threaten any informal 
source of income to members of the ruling civil or military elites, otherwise his 
scope of action will remain limited (Interview no. 9 – National & International 
power sector, Algeria). 
- In many ways, the IAEREE – The Algerian Institute for Renewable Energy and 
Energy Efficiency (Institut algérien des énergies renouvelables et de l’éfficacité 
énergétique) can be regarded as an institution competing with the CDER for po-
litical clout, research money and international recognition. Although only 
founded in 2009, the IAERE finds itself in a much better starting position as it 
belongs to the MEM. The institute will be established in the new village of Bellil 
in the district of Hassi R’Mel (Maghrebemergent.com, 2010). It is designed to 
interact closely with the national renewable energy company New Energy Alge-
ria (NEAL) and other energy companies. The potential role of the institute as a 
knowledge hub will be treated in the corresponding Section  6.5.1.  
- APRUE – The Algerian National Agency for the Promotion and Rationalisation of 
Energy Use (Agence nationale pour la promotion et la rationalisation de 
l’utilisation de l’énergie). Originally created in 1985, this institution has been re-
structured by law n°99-99 on energy efficiency on 28 July 1999. The APRUE is 
institutionally weak, but represents efforts to work on demand side manage-
ment in Algeria. 
The diversity of Algeria’s renewable energy institutions reveals the country’s 
longstanding commitment to the exploration of this form of energy production. How-
ever, all the institutions mentioned are directly or indirectly state-run. No independent 
energy NGO with a significant expertise in this field exists in Algeria. As a consequence 
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of the state-centeredness of these institutions, the overall energy policy inputs in Alge-
ria remain strongly oil- and gas-focused178, as the decisive ministries and boards are 
usually staffed with representatives of this key Algerian industry.  
In contrast to the UAE’s political system presented in Section  5.3.1, the Algerian body 
politique is strongly modelled on the French system. Its centralised mode of govern-
ance concentrates all significant powers in the greater Algiers region. Thus, energy 
policy is being performed in a top-down mode. Unlike the UAE, where the individual 
emirates have certain reserve rights when it comes to energy policy as a whole, the 
Algerian constitution does not grant such rights to the 48 provinces of Algeria (wila-
yas). Additionally, since their governors (walis) are directly appointed by the President 
of the Republic according to Art. 78 of the Algerian constitution179, they lack the inde-
pendence their counterparts in federal systems enjoy – rights that are even stronger in 
the UAE form of federalism which is formed by a federation of quasi-absolute rulers. 
One business interviewee confirmed this notion by stating:  
In the entire region, everything is unfortunately decided in a top-down approach. Pow-
er structures are very hierarchical with mid- or low-level management having almost 
no say. This is often very unproductive. (Interview no. 36 – private and public investors, 
Europe) 
 
Section conclusion 
The strongly centralised political system that is in itself largely dominated by oil and 
gas and the military elites is hardly open to bottom-up innovation in general, let alone 
in the renewable energy sector, which is only of marginal interest to many members of 
the ruling elite. Additionally, the non-existence of independent CSOs leaves a void in 
the Algerian body politique, as no external agenda setter can exert pressure on ruling 
                                                      
178
 As one stakeholder put it: “the focus of the Algerian energy system is on natural gas” (Interview no. 3 
– public stakeholder, Algeria). More generally, the term pays gazeux (“gaseous country”) is frequently 
used to denote the importance of hydrocarbons in Algeria by both experts and – to a lesser extent – the 
general public. 
179
 A most up to date version of the Algerian constitution can be accessed through the online service of 
the Official Journal of the Democratic Republic of Algeria: http://www.joradp.dz/hfr/Consti.htm, last 
accessed 28 December 2011. 
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politicians in that regard. In terms of policy-making, these two facts lead to the as-
sessment that only the incumbent, regime-entrenched actors are potent, not only 
when it comes to policy formulation, but particularly also with regards to the power to 
block on-going initiatives and reforms. In essence, this means that in the “bunker 
state”, the interests of the most important groups in the country (in Algeria: the oil 
bureaucracy, the security apparatus and the top-level political elite around them Tlem-
cen-clan) must never be crossed during policy formulation. If this is the case, these 
powers can be expected to render certain initiatives null and void.  
By and large in the current Algerian techno-political system, technology and regulatory 
innovations are either to be imported from abroad or developed domestically, i.e. 
within the Algerian bureaucracy, a rare occurrence. 
 
6.3.1.1. Personal patronage networks 
To what extent are the official decision-making processes the actual decision-making 
structures? 
Unlike the situation in the Gulf States, the republican governance model of Algeria im-
plies that there is no double structure consisting of elected bodies and administrations 
on the one hand and a hereditary family structure on the other hand.  
Yet, the official absence of double power structures does not automatically signify that 
there is no second (or third) layer of political-economic interest groups in the country. 
On the contrary, researchers have dubbed the recent reshuffling relating to the 
Sonatrach corruption scandal a classical power struggle behind closed doors; a military 
intelligence (DRS) attack against the President’s aides (“Tlemcen Clan”) in the cabinet 
(Ghettas, 2010). Endemic corruption, both petty and grand, corroborates this claim.180  
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 Algeria is ranked 112
th
 on the 2011 global corruption perception index (see 
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/, accessed 10 January 2012). In December 2011, the Algeri-
an president signed a presidential decree establishing a new anti-corruption office (El Moudjahid - Quo-
tidien National d'Information, 2011). While first doubts had already been raised regarding the efficiency 
of this office, a rigorous assessment of its effectiveness could be launched in 2-3 years at the earliest. 
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In short, it is safe to assume the existence of strong and powerful double structures in 
Algeria. This notion has also been confirmed by the following interviewee: 
If you want to realize a project you can either talk to the officials or try to take the in-
formal channels. It is rather uncertain which way actually works better. (Interview no. 
36 – private and public investors, Europe) 
Another hint of the influence of non-political interests groups in the Algerian renewa-
ble energy policy is the stalling of implementation measures for this policy area. In 
contrast to the Gulf States, Algeria has been among the first Arab states to have intro-
duced a renewable energies act. This 2004 law181 was largely modelled on the German 
feed-in tariff system and was designed to stimulate growth of the renewable energy 
share in Algeria’s electricity production. However, seven years after its entering into 
force, the law cannot be applied as the necessary administrative decrees for its imple-
mentation have not yet been released. According to interviewees, this is “not normal 
at all” considering that this “is not a luxury for Algeria, but a strategic investment” (In-
terview no. 14 – R&D, Algeria). While an official explanation for this severe delay that 
is essentially stalling Algerian renewable electricity deployment has never been issued, 
interviewees suspect a mixture of oil and gas interest groups and corruption as the 
true reasons behind this, as the topic is too important and public to merely be the vic-
tim of administrational inertia. Unsurprisingly, tangible information proving this suspi-
cion could not be found during the research conducted. Anecdotal and interviewees’ 
testimonies, however, render this speculation quite probable. 
Similar to the UAE case, a minute insight into the decision-making structures of Alge-
ria’s ruling energy elite remains elusive. Indeed, as also reflected by Hen-
ry/Springborg’s use of the term “bunker state”, in Algeria, state and army institutions 
remain in power. The combination of low transparency and accountability, as well as 
unwillingness to give access to foreign researchers made a concise tracking of decision-
making processes impossible as access was not granted to the author on most occa-
sions. As highlighted, the non-top-level interviewees were glad to speak to the author. 
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 Law n°04-09 of 14 August 2004, “Law on the promotion of renewable energies in the context of sus-
tainable development” (loi relative à la promotion des énergies renouvelables dans le cadre du dévelop-
pement durable). The specific regulations of the law will be discussed in Subsection  6.4.2.1. 
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Yet, cautiousness or ignorance about top-level decisions and particularly the issue of 
why exactly the FIT law has so far been stalled caused a level of uncertainty and 
vagueness in their replies that forbade all precise statements on agency. The named 
top-level energy, security and political institutions have, no doubt, unspecifiable pow-
ers to block the development of certain – in their view – undesirable development tra-
jectories. Which other means and which structures – apart from formal rejections of 
law proposals – are employed remains, however, uncertain. 
 
Section conclusion 
Algerian energy policy is still heavily dominated by the traditional oil and gas elites. 
While a formalized double power structure similar to that in the UAE does not exist, 
informally these structures exist constantly blurring the margin between official deci-
sions and opaque, closed-door decision making. However, unlike other countries, the 
formal decision-making structures around the Presidency, the military security services 
and the oil and gas industry still command a strong degree of authority. This state of 
affairs makes it particularly difficult to the outside researcher to precisely pinpoint the 
influence of interest groups on Algerian renewable energy policy. For by definition, 
outside researchers are very rarely admitted access to the inner decision-making struc-
tures. 
 
6.3.1.2. Governance effects of renewable energy systems 
What do interviewees regard as the key governance effects of renewable energy 
production? 
Although renewable energy policy is largely dependent on decisions made by the oil 
and gas dominated energy opaque power structures around the MEM, there is some 
interest in the topic by Algeria’s elected representatives, as the parliamentary day on 
renewable energies (journée parlementaire) held on December 11, 2011 demon-
strates. On this day, representatives of key Algerian renewable energy institutions such 
as NEAL and the CDER (see above) presented aspects of national renewable energy 
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policy and stressed their strategic importance (Portail Algérien des Énergies Re-
nouvelables, 2011d). However, no references were made towards potentially democ-
ratizing effects through a strong domestic spread of renewables or indeed increased 
political stability through transregional renewable energy cooperation.182 
While renewables are not regarded as a means to enhance democratisation processes 
in Algeria, the country is in need of political stability, particularly in light of the turbu-
lent ‘Arab spring’ events during the year 2011 in its immediate neighbourhood. In prin-
ciple, renewable energies can contribute to system stability by offering several positive 
outcomes, such as the diversification of national energy supply and national income; 
improving the labour market and branding effects for the country and a securing a 
reliable power supply in Algeria.183 However, this added stability is not explicitly men-
tioned by stakeholders as an effect induced by renewable energies. 
 
Section conclusion 
Neither did politicians, interviewees nor the available published research acknowledge 
any direct governance effects this mode of energy production can deliver. While the 
spread of renewable energy production and related industrial capacity buildings argu-
ably have indirect impacts on overall regime stability, the argument that renewable 
energies lean towards certain political, bottom-up, democratic structures cannot be 
confirmed in any way. 
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 Also the greater hopes that by increased regional energy cooperation, the path towards an Arab-
Israeli rapprochement could be paved, as Kraemer and other proponents of the Medgrid initiative argue 
(Kraemer, 2011), should be treated with caution. As will be shown in Section  6.7.2, currently, the stalled 
Arab-Israeli peace process disturbs transregional energy cooperation rather than vice versa. 
183
 See the respective subsections for details on the aspects mentioned. 
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6.3.2. Key transregional energy governance bodies 
Which role do transregional energy governance bodies such as OPEC, OAPEC or IRE-
NA play in the promotion or stalling of national renewable energy policy in the re-
spective target country? 
While Algeria has traditionally been among those states that have pushed for a greater 
Arab political coordination in the Arab League, OPEC, OAPEC and other regional fora, 
its willingness to accept these bodies as actors in local energy policy has remained low. 
The fact that Algeria has the OAPEC presidency in 2012 (Portail Algérien des Énergies 
Renouvelables, 2011e) is unlikely to have many domestic impacts on the oil and gas 
industry. The priority for the Algerian presidency was clearly set by the first official 
declarations relating to Iraq’s role, its membership and production quotas. 
While Algeria signed the original IRENA statute during the initial Bonn conference on 
26 January 2009 (IRENA, 2011), Algeria’s instrument of ratification was only deposited 
to IRENA’s headquarters on 09 May 2012 (IRENA, 2012). Hopes had been voiced that 
Algeria’s interaction with IRENA might have some effects. As one interviewee stated: 
IRENA could well be able to give a new impetus to Algerian energy policy. Also, it could 
trigger new cooperation with Europe, as well as with Africa. (Interview no. 15 – R&D, 
Algeria) 
However, IRENA’s role in North Africa has so far been very limited, and its influence on 
Algerian domestic politics is merely speculation. 
As shall demonstrated in Subchapter  6.7 with the European example, major renewable 
energy policy decisions in neighbouring world regions can serve as landscape level in-
novation incubators and as pull factors for the domestic renewable energy policy.184 
 
Section conclusion 
Similar to the case of the UAE, the will (and the potential) of transregional energy gov-
ernance institutions to shape the domestic energy policy of individual member states is 
                                                      
184
 This can also be seen in the recent signature memorandum of understanding between the Desertec 
Industry Initiative (DII) and the Algerian major utility Sonelgaz (Sonelgaz, 2011). 
248 
 
limited, as this would in many ways counteract the purpose of such intergovernmental 
bodies. Nonetheless, as the case of Europe indicates, renewable energy policies in 
neighbouring economic blocs can have landscape-level impacts on the domestic re-
newable energy scene. 
 
6.3.3. Climate change vulnerability and low environment-related profile of oil-
producing states 
Is the climate change agenda actively considered in the political decision-making to 
spread/block further renewable energy developments? 
Due to Algeria’s high population density in its coastal regions, its large desert areas and 
the comparatively small amount of available arable land the country is vulnerable to 
climate change. The most energy-related climate change-induced challenge will be 
water scarcity, as national energy demands will soar due to increased desalination ef-
forts. As research has shown (al-Weshah, 2002, p. 6), while Algeria’s water shortages 
are not as severe as in the Gulf States, they still present a formidable challenge.185 
Thus the country’s latest 5-year investment programmes (plan quinquénnal) of 2009-
2014 totalling approximately US$ 150bn (Le Figaro, 2009) have included the construc-
tion of 12 large-scale desalination plants. While the Algerian energy sector is already 
the largest GHG emitter in the country,186 the planned schemes are likely to further 
increase the emissions. 
                                                      
185
 Further numbers are given in Figure 43 and in Section  3.2.3. 
186
 See http://www.cantdrinkoil.org/en/post/Facts-Sheet-Maghreb.aspx, last accessed April 14, 2012. 
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Figure 43: Water budget of the Arab Region up to 2030 
 
Source: al-Weshah, 2002, p. 6.  
Thus, the spread (or at least the promotion of) renewable energies would be an excel-
lent way to serve the ever-increasing energy needs while cutting GHGs. Additionally, 
declaring these schemes as CDM projects could bring about further income. Yet, Alge-
ria currently remains below its potential. It has, for instance, not yet registered one 
CDM project.187 This is confirmed by an experienced interviewee’s view: 
“In principle, renewable energy projects would work great as CDM projects in Algeria, 
but currently, there doesn’t seem to be any interest on the Algerian side to implement 
them – certainly not with foreigners. I have had contacts to a European consultant, 
who offered his CDM-knowledge here, but he was rejected and his services not 
bought.” (Interview no. 4 – public stakeholder Algeria) 
Reasons for this include the weak institutional set-up in this regard. While Algeria has 
established a National Climate Change Agency (Agence Nationale des Changements 
Climatiques – ANCC) in 2009, this agency remains understaffed and institutionally 
weak, as its director confirmed in a research interview (interview no. 20 – R&D, Alge-
ria): 
“After Copenhagen things are different with regards to climate change policies as for 
the first time, the energy minister, the foreign minister and the minister of environment 
have been present at a COP – this has increased top-level awareness and I expect a 
stronger cooperation” (Interview no. 3 – public stakeholder, Algeria) 
This was stated by an interviewee in January 2010, right after the 15th Conference of 
the Parties of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) which took 
                                                      
187
 Cf. the official UNFCCC statistics 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Registration/NumOfRegisteredProjByHostPartiesPieChart.html, last 
accessed December 27, 2011. 
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place in Copenhagen between 7 and 18 December 2010. However, no change has oc-
curred since with regards to the institutional setup or climate change policies or CDM 
projects, and the 2011 renewable energy programme does not even make a reference 
to climate change as an important challenge. However, as there is no existing, strict 
climate change policy in force in Algeria, climate change cannot be identified as a poli-
cy driver for renewable energy policies in a narrow interpretation of the term. It might 
only be characterized as an ideational motive for some actors and a further declaratory 
add-on. 
 
Section conclusion 
Algeria’s main GHG emitter is its energy production; strongly growing due to increased 
desalination demands that in turn are necessary because of climate change-induced 
water shortages. While climate change is frequently cited in renewable energy-related 
speeches, interviews or publications, the lack of any enforceable climate change poli-
cies in Algerian national regulation cannot justify the statement that renewable energy 
policies in this country are indeed driven by climate change policies in the narrower 
meaning of the word. 
 
6.3.4. Long-term national economic diversification 
Are the renewable energy-related efforts connected to the national economic visions 
or national SWF activities in the respective country? 
As Table 18 demonstrates, the Algerian national economy is heavily dependent on hy-
drocarbons. This quasi-total dependence (a 97.7% share of its export values in 2007) 
makes the need to prepare for a post-hydrocarbons world and to strategically develop 
alternative sources of income an undertaking of the highest national priority. 
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Table 18: Algerian merchandise trade balance 2007 (Faid, 2008, p. 114) 
 
Source: Faid, 2008, p. 114. 
Due to its relation to the oil and gas sector, developing a strong renewable energy sec-
tor for industry innovation, domestic use and power export, lends itself as an idea. In 
absence of national long-term strategies or national economic visions similar to those 
published by the Gulf States, the basis for a sound strategic analysis remains weak. In 
addition to that, the Algerian national SWF (Revenue Regulation Fund/Fond de Regula-
tion des Recettes, FRR, see also Table 7) is not known for its transparency (see Figure 
44). Therefore, while it could be possible that Algeria has purchased some strategic 
renewable energy assets through its SWFs, it appears rather unlikely, as no such news 
has ever been published by either the FRR or any cooperation partner. 
Figure 44: Sovereign Wealth Funds: Strategy and Transparency 
 
Source: Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (online source) http://www.swfinstitute.org/2011/01, last 
accessed 04 January 2011. 
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Nonetheless, the subject of national economic diversification, of a post-hydrocarbons 
age, and its connections to renewable energies has often been highlighted by research 
interviewees. One interviewee stated for instance: 
As a company investing in Algeria we are interested in diversifying the economy before 
our gas and oil revenues run out! We must be active! Unfortunately, while the dis-
course is the same in Algeria as in the Gulf States, not much action is taken here. (In-
terview no.7 – Private and public investor, Algeria) 
Moreover, this line of argumentation is frequently reiterated in newspaper articles and 
interviews of decision-makers. In February 2011, for example, energy minister Yousfi 
introduced the launch of his new renewable energy investment programme by stating 
that that Algeria must prepare its transition towards renewable energies today to de-
velop all aspects of this strategic asset domestically (APS - Algérie Presse Service, 
2011c); a statement the minister reiterated during an interview on the occasion of the 
40th anniversary of the Algerian nationalization of the hydrocarbons industries (APS - 
Algérie Presse Service, 2011d).188 Also the fact that the substantial renewable energy 
export amount of 10 GW has been identified as a 2030 target in the government’s 
2011 renewable energy programme (Algerian Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM), 
2011, p. 4) indicates that rent income by renewable power is regarded by key Algerian 
energy stakeholders as a long-term substitute of hydrocarbon rents. 
While ample space is given to this particular asset that renewable energy can repre-
sent, it remains doubtful whether this priority is always fully implemented in Algerian 
energy policy. As the regime-level analyses will show, essential aspects of a functioning 
renewable energy promotion regime are not in place. This can be interpreted in two 
ways: either, stressing the potential of renewable power for Algeria is a mere lip ser-
vice to interested domestic and foreign audiences or the intent is real but insufficiently 
implemented. However, this debate is irrelevant to this subsection as either, way deci-
                                                      
188
 Another example is Mokrane who writes in an article “It is well-known that the fossil energy reserves 
are destined to disappear successively. Thus, the future lies within renewable energies, and particular-
ly…the electricity production through solar energy. Our country is banking on this energy carrier by mak-
ing tangible commitments in this new era” (Mokrane, 2011) – translation from the French by the author. 
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sion-makers and interviewees in Algeria utilize the economic diversification argument 
for the spread of renewable energies. 
 
Section conclusion 
In Algeria, renewable energies are given a great role in the diversification towards a 
post-hydrocarbons era. The wish to remain in the energy exporting business is fre-
quently voiced; Minister Yousfi’s new renewable energy programme that includes a 
strong export share can also be interpreted as a step in this direction. Yet, as will be 
highlighted in the regime-level analysis of this case study, further major domestic 
framework conditions, such as a functioning renewable energy law, are yet to be met. 
 
6.3.5. Country branding 
Is country branding a catalyst in the spread of renewable energies? 
The concept of country branding in Algeria is virtually absent. This is due to the fact 
that Algeria’s political-economic system is still strongly shaped by its socialist tradition 
with a certain suspicion towards the private sector. Meanwhile, the very idea of assign-
ing a “brand value” to an entire country is a capitalist, market-oriented idea of a west-
centred economic globalisation most likely imported to the UAE, among others, by 
foreign consultants. Needless to say, Algeria also does not have a “National Brand Of-
fice” or similar institutions. 
Algeria therefore ranks low on international indices, such as the Country Branding In-
dex: whereas it was ranked 100th out of 110 in 2010 (in between Sudan and Ukraine) 
(FutureBrand, 2010), the same index ranked Algeria in 85th place in 2011 (FutureBrand, 
2011, p. 79).189 
 
                                                      
189
 This brand index is only quoted as an example. By no means does it represent a truly global perspec-
tive nor can it claim to be neutral. Instead, it is the work of a brand consulting agency with its own 
commercial interests and a methodology that cannot fully be assessed through its own publications. 
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Section conclusion 
Given that the concept of nation branding is not part of the public (or experts’) dis-
course in Algeria in itself, an interrelation with renewable energies, which is construct-
ed in the UAE and some European countries, is absent. This is a clear underperfor-
mance, particularly if Algerian energy policy stakeholders are intent on carrying out 
their ambitious renewable energy production and industry programme. 
 
6.4. Regime-level factors 
6.4.1. Technological regime 
6.4.1.1. Challenges for the power sector  
To what extent are renewable energies employed to reduce pressure on the domes-
tic conventional power plant park? 
Currently, the Algerian electricity system is strongly based on gas power plants190. With 
an average annual growth of 5.6% in the last ten years (Commission de Régulation de 
l'Electricité et du Gaz (CREG), 2010, p. 9), the Algerian power sector is under pressure 
to extend the total power generation capacity, which has been at 9.1 GW in 2009 by 
50% until 2019. In parallel to that, over one third of the power plant park has to be 
replaced with new production facilities (Commission de Régulation de l'Electricité et du 
Gaz (CREG), 2010, p. 8). This puts the power companies, most particularly the 
hegemon in power generation and monopolist in transmission and distribution, Sonel-
gaz, under extreme pressure. In support, the state has launched the extension and 
renovation programme of the power plant park and its transmission network that will 
cost a total of US$ 49bn until 2020 (UbiFrance, 2010a). 
While the outlined planning procedures to modernize Algeria’s power plant park are 
advanced and published by the MEM and the regulator CREG’s annually updated “pro-
gramme indicatif”, the renewable energy section of these documents is less differenti-
                                                      
190
 In 2009, Algerian power was produced as follows: 46% gas-fired power plants; 28% steam-cycle; 24% 
combined cycle power plants; 1% diesel; 1% hydropower and others (Commission de Régulation de 
l'Electricité et du Gaz (CREG), 2010, p. 9). 
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ated. However, the programme calculates two scenarios of 6% and 8% renewable en-
ergy quota by 2020, which equals to 1180/1675 MW renewable energy capacity. Ac-
cording to CREG, this means a 235/335 MW capacity extension as of 2015 (Commission 
de Régulation de l'Electricité et du Gaz (CREG), 2010, p. 23).191 While the newly re-
leased renewable energy strategy presumes even higher renewable energy shares192, 
all such plans appear very ambitious given that in 2010, Algeria’s share of renewable 
electricity production remained negligible with a mere share of 0.02% of the installed 
capacity (UbiFrance, 2010b). However, this situation is bound to change in the 2011 
statistics. In June 2011, the country’s first hybrid gas/CSP power plant began producing 
electricity in Hassi R’Mel, Algeria’s gas field area in the Sahara with a 25 MW solar elec-
tricity share (Abengoa, 2011)193.  
Moreover, a wind park close to Adrar will become operational in 2012 with a capacity 
of merely 10 MW.194 Added together, however, the Algerian renewable electricity quo-
ta will remain below 1%.195  
Algeria’s aim to use solar-based renewable power generation technologies in an at-
tempt to ease power demand at the day-time peak hours (see Figure 45) would there-
fore be warranted. 
                                                      
191
 The same source predicts a majority CSP share, a much smaller PV share, and an only negligible share 
for other RE sources, mostly wind energy.  
192
 For details see Subsections 6.4.2.1. and 6.4.4.1.  
193
 The press statement by the power company as well as other reports failed to mention that the 
launch was delayed by almost two years, as a company’s country representative confirmed (Interview 
no. 11 – National and international power sector, Algeria). 
194
 While the national utility Sonelgaz will provide 30€m for the investment, the construction will be 
carried out by the French wind park developer Vergnet (Agence France Press, 2010). 
195
 Furthermore, the construction of a gas-solar hybrid plant (Le Midi Libre, 2012) and another 150-MW 
CSP plant (APS - Algérie Presse Service, 2012) were announced recently. As building has not started yet, 
their announced finalization dates of 2015 have to be treated with caution given the delay of the Hassi 
R’Mel plant.  
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Figure 45: Algerian demand curve for a summer day in 2011 
 
Source: www.ose.dz (Algerian systems operator), accessed 05 January 2012. 
 
Section conclusion 
While being less vocal than the UAE about its achievements, Algeria’s system operator 
has already integrated a certain share of renewable electricity in its long-term plan. 
Thus, the potential of renewables to ease national power demand pressures is partially 
employed, at least within the relevant planning documents. Meanwhile, the peak-load 
capping potential of solar power generation ought to be upgraded in the future. 
 
6.4.1.2. Renewable energy and the nuclear alternative  
Is the nuclear option seen as a competitor in resources or as a mutually exclusive 
form of power production? 
With its considerable nuclear research activity and its significant uranium deposits, 
Algeria currently owns one of the most advanced nuclear energy complexes in the 
MENA region. Indeed, nuclear energy policy on Algerian territory precedes the inde-
pendent Algerian state: on February 13, 1960, France began to conduct a series of nu-
clear weapons test in the desert hamlets of Reggane and In Ecker. The last French nu-
clear test on Algerian soil was conducted on February 16, 1966. Algeria’s nuclear ener-
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gy research is mainly conducted in two centres, the Centre des Sciences et de la Tech-
nologie Nucléaire (created in 1976) and four regional centres under the auspices of the 
Commissariat pour l’Energie Atomique (COMENA); an agency created in 1996 that di-
rectly reports to the Presidential Palace (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
2008). 
The Algerian government, a member of the IASA since 1963, has considered the possi-
bility of nuclear power generation since 1974. A full-fledged nuclear energy pro-
gramme that was mainly designed to save its own fossil fuel reserves for export into 
the world market was launched in 1981. Since the late 1980s, the Algerian programme 
has consisted of four facilities on two sites: the Nur (Arabic: “light”) research reactor 
and a fuel-fabrication plant at the Draria nuclear complex 20km east of Algiers. Nota-
bly, the former 1MWt light-water reactor that went critical in 1989 has not been a 
turnkey operation. The Algerian government made sure that numerous Algerian engi-
neers were involved in the project run by an Argentinean firm, thus guaranteeing a 
considerable knowledge and technology transfer towards the Algerian national nuclear 
programme itself. The second major nuclear site of the country is the Es Salam (Arabic: 
“Peace”) research reactor in Ain Oussera 140km south of Algiers. A 15MWt heavy-
water reactor was built by a Chinese contractor in line with an Algerian-Chinese nucle-
ar cooperation treaty signed in the 1980s. Owned by the Ministry of Science and High-
er Education, it went critical in 1992 (GlobalSecurity.org, 2012).  
In the recent past, Algeria has taken new steps towards nuclear electricity production. 
In his opening address to the 2007 African Union conference on nuclear energy, Presi-
dent Bouteflika strongly supported Iran’s nuclear plans accusing the global nuclear 
regime of unfairly denying emerging powers the support of the nuclear option (Inter-
national Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008, p. 111). More substantially, on the na-
tional level, COMENA announced increased efforts in nuclear energy while the coun-
try’s then-Minister of Energy and Mining, Chakib Khelil, confirmed the launch of a ma-
jor nuclear energy scheme in 2006 with the ambitious goal of running a nuclear power 
plant in Algeria by 2015 (algerie-dz.com, 2008), which was later pushed back to 2020 
(Jeune Afrique, 2009). 
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Regarding international technological cooperation, Algeria seems to opt for a multiplic-
ity of options. In addition to its December 2007 cooperative nuclear energy framework 
agreement with France (Le Quotidien d'Oran, 2008), Algeria enjoys nuclear research 
and business relations with South Korea (Rafa, 2011)196, Russia and the United States 
(New York Times, 2007). Additionally, Algeria has signed a uranium mining cooperation 
agreement with Jordan in 2010, which aims to enable exchange with the other major 
potential Arab uranium exporter (APS - Algérie Presse Service, 2010). However, at pre-
sent, these uranium deposits are not being exploited. The French company Areva 
withdrew its initial bid both due to uncertainty regarding the actual amount of the 
findings, as well as because decision-makers in France were concerned Algeria would 
betray the initial exploitation deal and nationalize this industry if sizeable uranium de-
posits were to be found (Interview no. 2 – public stakeholder, Algeria). 
At the present time, however, these plans appear to be somewhat far-fetched as nei-
ther has the uranium mining begun yet, nor has the current nuclear impasse with Iran, 
nor the Fukushima disaster helped furthering the cause for an Algerian nuclear pro-
gramme.197 Indeed, some Algerian energy experts doubt that any North African nucle-
ar programme (including Algeria’s) would be successful in the near future (Ihsane, 
2011).  
When asked about their view on nuclear energies, Algerian energy expert interviewees 
provided cautious answers, avoiding a candid analysis of the situation.198 It also re-
mained largely unclear whether they thought that an Algerian civil nuclear programme 
was imminent for the mid-term future, and whether a systemic competition with re-
                                                      
196
 The nuclear cooperation with South Korea is remarkable for two reasons. First, Algeria evidently 
attempts to cooperate with the same country as the only Arab country that is currently implementing a 
nuclear programme (the UAE, see Subsection  5.4.1.2). Second, this cooperation agreement is part of a 
much larger Algerian-South Korean framework of cooperation that has recently marked its 20
th
 anniver-
sary (Khris, 2011). Among other areas, it also covers the transfer of expertise in the construction of large 
eco-cities such as the Nouvelle Ville Boughezoul (see below). 
197
 See Le Quotidien d'Oran (2011b) for a critical newspaper article in the post-Fukushima period. 
198
 One Algerian interviewee stated that “people normally shy away from the nuclear issue because it is 
linked with nuclear proliferation and other security issues.” The same interviewee also did not see a 
competition between the two forms of energy production; rather a possible complementarity (Interview 
no. 14 – R&D, Algeria). 
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newables indeed existed. Most likely, this was due to the military component as in 
many countries, nuclear energy is a matter of national security that is not as quickly 
and openly discussed as renewable energies. International interviewees working in the 
country were much more open. One of them aptly expressed the core opinion of the 
majority by saying: 
I am absolutely certain that Algeria won’t see any nuclear power plant for at least an-
other 10 years, if not much more. To me, all those agreements Algeria signed look like 
mere rhetoric. (Interview no. 21 – R&D, Algeria) 
 
Section conclusion 
While Algeria had a noteworthy nuclear energy programme in the past, its present-day 
nuclear energy efforts have been weakened. This is due to current national and inter-
national landscape developments that make the construction of a nuclear power plant 
in Algeria unlikely. Consequently, it also has not published any schedule for a nuclear 
power plant. Thus, in the power sector, renewable energy and nuclear energy do not 
represent direct competitors. Unlike the UAE and their approach to renewables, Alge-
ria also does not have a pronounced nuclear energy lobby that supports these plans. In 
the fields of research, however, competition might arise. With both renewable and 
nuclear energy research being conducted in Algeria, a direct competition between the 
two research areas for funding or political influence has not been found during the 
data collection phase. 
 
6.4.2. User and market regime  
6.4.2.1. Market conditions 
Is there any system of renewable energy promotion in place?  
Do stakeholders believe that the transfer of European renewable energy policy de-
sign models is a viable method for the spread of renewable electricity capacities in 
the region or would indigenous policy models work better? 
In order to achieve Algeria’s ambitious renewable energy targets, a set of policy mech-
anisms and regulative frameworks has been established, which, in principle, operate 
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with the goal of stimulating renewable electricity growth along the lines of a market 
logic.199 Similar to the German Renewable Energies Act (EEG), Algeria’s 2002 Law on 
Electricity and Gas Distribution liberalizing the power market incentivizes the construc-
tion of renewable energy power production by paying premiums and tax reductions to 
the power producers. Two years later, a decree on the diversification of power gener-
ating costs further introduced feed-in tariffs for various sorts of “green” power. The 
current feed-in tariffs are the following (AHK - German-Algerian Chamber of Com-
merce and Industry, 2009): 
1. Solar power stemming from combined-cycle plants is paid a premium of 100% 
and up to 200% of the standard electricity rate, depending on the share of solar 
energy in the project, which needs to be at least 5% of the total production of 
the power plant (§ 12) 
2. Electricity from waste receives 200% of the standard rate (§ 13) 
3. Electricity generated by hydropower receives a 100% premium (§ 14) 
4. Wind power is remunerated with 300% of the KWh-rate (§ 15) 
5. A “pure" solar power plant receives 300% of the standard rate (§16)  
6. Cogeneration through steam or hot water receives 160% of the standard rate, 
as long as the overall capacity does not exceed 50MW (§ 17) 
The combined circle power plants even receive an extra premium since the Algerian 
Ministry of Energy has classified this technology as the most efficient means of renew-
able energy power production in the country. With the introduction of this renewable 
energy law Algeria currently possesses one the most advanced renewable energy pro-
motion tools at its hands in all of Africa and the Arab world. However, so far, the 2004 
law is yet to be applied in the country. As one interviewee put it: 
I have led a business delegation to the general director of CREG. He openly admitted 
that the law as such doesn’t function and does not attract any investors, as it is lacking 
the administrative decree to be applied and does not give investors reliable figures 
about their return on investment. Also, if the renewables premium really remains fixed 
                                                      
199
 This is by no means self-evident. As will be presented below, much of Algeria’s energy programme 
does not follow market logic. 
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to the gas price it will be much too low anyway. So, while the director told us about a 
future re-launch of the law as things are standing now, the law is totally dysfunctional. 
(Interview no. 4 – public stakeholder, Algeria) 
Thus, even eight years after its release Algeria’s renewable energy law is still not appli-
cable. While Algeria has a relatively advanced renewable energy policy, it is striking 
that its policy attempts have been limited to structural and regulatory amendments 
rather than innovative projects as presented in the UAE case study.  
In response to why the process has been stalled for so long, one interviewer stated: 
Even for Algeria it is most unusual that this takes so long. I think the MEM has long 
since stalled the law due to a general lack of awareness and also in order to counteract 
the Ministry of Environment. I am not sure, if people really wanted the renewable en-
ergies law in 2004, it was just a trend to make it. The Ministry of Environment pushed it 
a lot in the government, but they were basically the only ones. (Interview no. 147 – 
R&D, Algeria) 
Most likely, this stalling is owed to the interlinkage between factional interest and a 
weak state. In addition to this major limitation of the current system, an equally chal-
lenging obstacle is the fact that the Algerian energy market is yet to be fully liberalized 
and that it works – in parts – outside of a market capitalist logic. This means that re-
newable energy promotion schemes that are designed for European entrepreneurs (as 
the 2004 law) do not necessarily fit Algiers. The best example of this is the subsidized 
electricity price: in 2009, Algerian electricity rates for non-commercial power ranged 
between 2 and 3 Euro-Cent/KWh, about 50% of the EU market price (Interview no. 14 
– R&D, Algeria), rendering renewables hardly cost-competitive. Recent reports cite the 
government’s intention to gradually adjust national energy prices to the actual genera-
tion costs (Zidane, 2006). However, given the volatile situation in North Africa after the 
Arab Spring, in addition to the key role the provision of cheap electricity plays in mak-
ing the population honour its side of the “ruling bargain” it appears doubtful that the 
Algerian government would indeed consider such an unpopular move. Indeed, an Alge-
rian energy official corroborates this inference: 
In 2009/10 Sonelgaz wanted to raise the general price of electricity – but the govern-
ment intervened and made them retain this artificially low price. (Interview no. 9 – na-
tional and international power sector, Algeria) 
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In January 2010, in an attempt to stimulate growth in the renewables sector, a renew-
able energy fund was introduced in order to bridge the gap between energy price rev-
enues and investment costs.200 Yet, as its financial resources remained limited, its im-
pact remained small and it has been dismantled. As one interviewee put it, essentially, 
the assessment of the RE promotion system, be it quota- or FIT based, is always the 
following: 
I think that in principle, FITs should be working well, as long as the payments to pro-
ducers are really guaranteed. Yet, the question that EVERY system has to answer is the 
following and is very simple: who pays for the gap between the LCE prices of renewa-
bles and those for conventional power? Is it the state or the customer? Basically, these 
are the only real choices there are. (Interview no. 37 - Private and public investors, Eu-
rope) 
As demonstrated, the current renewable energy promotion regime is, at best, flawed. 
Thus, a certain caution has to be exercised upon approaching the newly launched re-
newable energy programme (Algerian Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM), 2011) with 
its above-mentioned capacity additions and an approximate investment volume of US$ 
60bn (Razzouk, 2011).201 
With regards to the second issue in this subsection, the transfer of European renewa-
ble energy governance models has already taken place in Algeria, at least insofar as the 
transfer of the concept of feed-in-tariffs is concerned. While, evident by the interview 
quotes below, also the quota model is a widely known form of renewable energy pro-
motion, Algerian decision-makers have opted for an FIT model. However, the failure of 
this promotions law in the last eight years has also shown that the immediate transfer-
ability of government models is bound to fail due to a variety of reasons, such as con-
flicting intra-governmental interest groups and the not fully liberalized energy market. 
This made it difficult, if not impossible for the market-based FIT incentive system to 
succeed, as one interviewee emphasised: 
                                                      
200
 See Subsection  6.4.4.1 for more information about the Algerian renewable energy fund. 
201
 The programme is to be launched with a start-up and test phase until 2013 and then transform into 
its deployment phase until 2015, with a final, large-scale roll-out plan between 2016 and 2020 (Portail 
Algérien des Énergies Renouvelables, 2011c). 
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Before (in 2010) the new RE investment fund was released, the renewable energy law 
performed very poorly. Not only did it take much too long to implement, it also didn’t 
promote private sector companies or initiatives at all. It was totally state-centred. I 
think this will also be the case with the new instruments and programmes released. 
(Interview no. 7 – public and private investors) 
Contrary to the UAE system, characterized by a bottom-up, project-based approach to 
promote innovation in the energy sector, Algerian decision-makers have opted for a 
different approach. They chose a top-down model of change management based on 
the power of legislative regulation. However, its poor performance casts doubts on the 
success of this approach. By and large, interviewees in Algeria were more critical than 
their Emirati counterparts about taking over regulatory or other governance models 
from Europe. However, when it came to regulatory innovation in the energy field, in-
terviewees in both cases inadvertently turned towards European concepts.202 Certain-
ly, foreign models need to be modified (or the systemic environment adapted accord-
ingly) if they are to come to fruition in Algeria. In the view of non-Algerian renewable 
energy experts, however, the long-term influence of European regulation on Algeria is 
expected to remain for the mid-term future. As one interviewee stated: 
Probably, the European initiatives such as the Mediterranean Solar Plan or the Dii will 
slowly pull the Mediterranean Arab states into the regulatory framework of the EU. 
(Interview no. 28 – public stakeholder, EU) 
However, other experts were cautious when it came to determining a specific regula-
tory system: 
Let’s not forget that actually, everything is only second best – if it is FIT or obligations 
or whatever – these are all subsidies to counterbalance the distorted energy markets in 
general. I think an obligation of the (former) energy monopolists could be easiest and 
most viable. However, FITs might bring in some more dynamics into the market; we 
have seen how much they were driven from small projects in the EU in the beginning – 
this could also be an entry option there. (Interview no. 33 – public stakeholder, EU) 
                                                      
202
 Part C will deal in greater detail with a comparison between the results of the two case studies both 
with regards to material policy options (in Subchapter  8.1; the Chinese energy governance models will 
be proposed as a potential substitute for an EU-inspired model) and the results in terms of renewable 
energy governance theory (Subchapter  8.2). As will be argued there, while a general criticism towards 
the uncritical takeover of non-native governance should be avoided, the Arab countries are yet to de-
velop fully home-grown renewable energy governance concepts. 
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There is therefore no doubt that the proximity to Europe, and the longstanding ex-
change of ideas and experts be it willingly or through French colonialism enabled the 
diffusion of regulatory concepts to a certain extent. However, the actual application to 
the Algerian context can only be successful with additional autochthonous elements of 
renewable energy governance or at least international models tailored to the Algerian 
context. 
By and large, stakeholders were sceptical towards extremely large structures. As one 
interviewee stated: 
In general, these mega-structures which politicians love are unlikely to succeed in real 
life, as they are prone to failure. Instead, we should follow a bottom-up approach. We 
should build small, easily reproducible structures that can be tested, improved and then 
scaled up at a later point in time instead of the opposite, which is starting as big as 
possible and then learning after big losses. This, I think, would also help local industries 
to develop. (Interview no. 14 – R&D, Algeria) 
This position was reiterated by a European stakeholder: 
Most basically, what is missing is the economic soundness of the renewable promotion 
system. I think, what could be of interest is a decentralised deployment of renewables, 
not these huge structures alone. One efficient way to start might be mini grids for the 
many off-grid areas in the country, of small villages that could then be scaled up in the 
medium term, but in any case a decentralized system. (Interview no. 25 – public stake-
holder, EU) 
As a result, while the need for Algerian renewable energy policy to develop its own 
models of renewable energy promotion, scale-up and deployment is frequently 
stressed, its results remain weak and cannot be called a full-fledged strategy. However, 
the governance elements that are in fact outlined by interviewees are diametrically 
opposed to the very large-scale approach the Algerian energy decision-makers prefer. 
Indeed, these elements of decentralized renewable power production and gradual 
scale-up are very close to the models used by successful European nations. While the 
German FIT model was mostly mentioned in interviews, arguably because this promo-
tion type has been chosen by the Algerian legislators, the quota model is also referred 
to as another possible renewable electricity promotion option. However, both models 
do not represent a conceptually new approach, but rather an already existing one that 
is diametrically opposed to the large-scale model favoured by influential decision-
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makers. Consequently, what the data shows is much less a quarrel between local and 
international governance concepts, but rather a struggle between two opposed inter-
national models, one promoting industry-size power plants, the other one a system of 
decentralized, small installations, which will be scaled up in the future. 
As these two models have – in principle – covered the range of what is possible as re-
newable energy promotion measure; there is a more fundamental issue to be raised 
here. Is Algeria in need of a genuinely native renewable energy governance model? Is 
this the “missing link” required for international governance concepts to work in Alge-
ria? It would appear that this notion cannot be verified by the data. This would mean 
that, the discourse on nationalizing theory would need to stop here. What would re-
main is theory-building that is abstracted from certain regions and the development of 
a range of models that aim (and claim) to work globally with slight regional adaptations 
respectively.203 
 
Section conclusion 
In contrast to most other Arab countries, particularly the hydrocarbons-rich states, 
Algeria has a long track-record of renewable energy research, promotion programmes 
and legislation. Yet, this does not mean that its installed capacity is of a sizeable 
amount. This is due to the phenomenon that once-released laws are blocked by the 
administration and that key market barriers such as energy pricing are still in place. 
This history of excellent promises and weak implementation also casts some doubt on 
the newly released major renewable energy programme. Essentially, Algerian stake-
holders will have to decide on whether they want renewable to spread, and, if so, 
whether they favour a purely market-based system or a government-induced and -
coordinated system. Currently, there is an unproductive mixing of both systems, which 
produces the most undesirable result of all: nothing. 
                                                      
203
 Again, cf. Part C for more in-depth discussion on that aspect. 
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As has been shown, the diffusion of regulatory concepts from neighbouring Europe can 
be expected and has partially occurred. Yet, as the example of the feed-in-tariff law 
shows, the uncritical transfer of Western governance usually remains unsuccessful. 
Still, various types of conflicting forms of renewable electricity promotion such as FITs 
or quotas developed in “the West” and mostly also by “Western” scholars appear to be 
the only models currently in use in Algeria. As the dispute between large-scale, central-
ized and small-scale decentralized concepts of renewable energy promotion demon-
strates, the fault lines do not appear between local and international/Western con-
cepts, but rather between different types of international models. 
This dispute notwithstanding, mainstream political decision-makers in Algeria appear 
to be set on a course favouring industry-sized megaprojects, probably also because 
these are easier to control and to integrate into the current energy system with its 
monopolistic structures. 
 
6.4.2.2. The system of double subsidies 
Are strategies developed to create a level playing field for all types of energy carriers 
by either removing subsidies for conventional power or by integrating renewable 
electricity into the existing subsidy schemes? 
As Table 19 shows, electricity rates for end consumers is heavily subsidised in Algeria. 
Including fuels, Algeria spent a massive 6.6% of its overall GDP on energy subsidies 
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Table 19: Algeria’s fossil fuel consumption subsidy rate as a proportion of the full cost of supply 2008-
2010 
 
Source: International Energy Agency (IEA) web service (http://www.iea.org/subsidy/index.html); last 
accessed 10 January 2012. 
As a result of these artificially low prices, which are below the gestation price, no al-
ternative form of energy production can compete on the regular electricity market. 
This is an additional liability for renewable electricity that is currently still more expen-
sive than conventional power even in fully liberalized power markets. While, as has 
been argued, it is currently unlikely for a full-fledged electricity price reform to occur, 
the only solution for upgrading the renewable electricity share in the Algerian power 
market is the integration of renewable electricity into the government-backed subsidy 
schemes. This would result in a higher renewables quota, but would simultaneously 
mean an additional cost for the subsidizing state agency compared to a scenario in 
which only conventional capacity would be added. Given the publication of its new 
renewable energy investment programme, a decision to integrate renewables into 
parts of the funding scheme has evidently been taken within the MEM.  
While this represents a major step forward for the spread of renewables in the coun-
try, this also means that no independent power producer can easily enter the Algerian 
market, as the market prices it can offer are kept artificially low, and FIT system will 
continue to be ineffective. Thus, only companies with a good rapport to the major 
stakeholders (and subsidy distributors) of the Algerian energy scene will effectively be 
able to profit from the large-scale renewable energy expansion scheme. This is not 
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only the case because of the funding schemes but also due to the on-dominance of 
pivotal systemic actors, particularly the CREG. As one interviewee stated: 
The permission for all kinds of renewable energy projects in Algeria is granted by CREG. 
An interested investor approaches them and declares his interest in a series of informal 
meetings. Then, if he succeeds, CREG issues a tender and most likely, the project devel-
oper will get the project. This means, that nothing goes without the CREG in this mar-
ket. This yes/no position of CREG effectively prohibits the development of a free market 
such as in Europe, where developers can just build their project without the approval of 
such an organisation. (Interview no. 9 – National & International power sector, Alge-
ria)204 
Thus, current market and power structures mean that the FIT system will play only a 
minor role in Algeria’s energy future. By means of the subsidy issue, renewables, as 
well as the entire Algerian electricity system, are effectively still run on a quota system, 
which allows for favouritism, market control and perpetuates the existence of pivotal, 
opaque systemic actors like CREG. 
 
Section conclusion 
Energy stakeholders in Algeria are acutely aware of the system of subsidies in the 
country and voiced quite pessimistic views regarding the possibility of change (i.e., the 
removal of electricity subsidies altogether) in the immediate or mid-term future. This 
means that while a spread of renewables is neither inconceivable nor unrealistic, MEM 
and CREG-affiliated energy elites will retain their control over the design of the power 
plant park as well as over who is awarded the capacity extensions construction con-
tracts. Independent power production – be it on a large scale or bottom-up – as in-
tended by the system of freely available FITs, will be effectively kept out of the market. 
The state, therefore, returns to an implicit quota system ruled by government (particu-
larly the MEM) and the hydrocarbons-dominated energy elites. 
 
                                                      
204
 In addition to what the interviewee stated, this also opens the door to grand corruption. 
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6.4.3. Socio-cultural regime 
6.4.3.1. Social acceptance of RETs, potential role of religion or environmental 
ethics 
How widespread is the knowledge of renewable energies in the target countries? 
Does religion play a role in legitimizing this energy technology? 
Generally speaking, there is considerable public knowledge about renewable energy in 
Algeria, not only due to Ministry of Environment-sponsored awareness campaigns but 
also due to the fact that in countries where wealth is based on hydrocarbons, energy 
topics are in general much more prevalent than in countries where this is not the case. 
However, as actual installations are not widespread, much like in the case of the UAE, 
there are only few occasions for the general public to interact with this technology. As 
one interviewee put it: 
Unfortunately, renewable energy and environmental awareness is currently not very 
high on the schools’ teaching agenda. But the Algerians for sure know of the potential 
of renewable electricity, both for the immediate energy needs as well as a potential 
income generator in a post-hydrocarbons era. However, the people are usually interest 
most when they can save money, which is usually still difficult with renewables. The 
government (APRUE agency) recently launched a very successful programme during 
which 100.000 low-energy light bulbs were distributed to people. This programme was 
funded by the Algerian Banque de Developpement Locale and went very well. (Inter-
view no. 15 – R&D, Algeria) 
Meanwhile, other researchers suggested that the lighting of the new East-West coastal 
highway could be powered by renewables (Interview no. 16 – R&D, Algeria). However, 
this is not seriously debated by decision-makers at the moment. 
Regarding the second aspect of this research question, the Algerian political-military 
elites, in light of the Algerian civil war, have an uneasy relationship to religious refer-
ences in any political context. Apart from the fact that some mosques’ roofs are used 
as carriers for solar water heating, public references in all major policy documents re-
main strictly secular. This is also the case for the government agencies and schools 
working on awareness-building campaigns. 
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Section conclusion 
Undoubtedly, Algeria’s general public, and even more so its stakeholders, are aware of 
the existence and potential of renewable electricity, not least due to successful aware-
ness campaigns by government agencies. However, the spread of solar or wind instal-
lations remains limited for the time being, which might change soon due to the large-
scale programme launched in 2011.  
This massive programme might also help to build awareness on a local level that so far 
remains an undertaking based on environmental ethics rather than religious reference 
systems.  
 
6.4.3.2. Labour markets 
Is the job creation potential actually employed by promoters of renewable electricity 
in the country? 
As discussed in the corresponding Part A, the theoretical job potential for renewable 
energy employment is large.205 While only a fraction of these jobs are actually on the 
market, the situation is, by and large, better than in the Gulf States, albeit with much 
lower salaries, as several interviewees confirmed. The renewable energies job market 
in Algeria is dominated by public sector jobs such as the specialist CDER with its 
branches all over the country, as well as several engineering university positions, for 
instance at the universities of Algiers and Oran. Apart from this, some jobs are availa-
ble in the private sector: the semi-public specialized company NEAL is most prominent, 
but also the largest Algerian conglomerate Cevital has a renewable energies branch.206  
Apart from that, both the recently launched silicon wafer factory Rouiba Eclairage and 
the 2011 large-scale renewable energy programme by the MEM will create further 
renewable energy employment in Algeria. Journalists already forecast the creation of 
one hundred (Portail Algérien des Énergies Renouvelables, 2011f) or even two hundred 
                                                      
205
 See also a recent study on potential labour market effects in Algeria through domestic renewable 
energy industries (Portail des Energies Renouvelables en Algérie, 2012a).  
206
 The role of Cevital in the renewable energies business is a remarkable one. See also Subchapter  6.7 
for more information on Cevital’s early role in Dii. 
271 
 
thousand jobs in the Algerian renewable energy by virtue of the 65 planned projects 
(Korso, 2011), with 50 per cent produced by the power exports and by national renew-
able energy demand respectively. Experts expressed more caution arguing that the 
successful establishment of an Algerian renewable energy technology industry is, at 
best, unlikely (Interview no. 45 – R&D, Europe). Without such domestic companies, the 
aforementioned labour market figures could never be achieved.207 
This notion is also confirmed by an independent assessment of the value chain effects 
of the only existing Algerian larger-scale renewable energy project in Hassi R’Mel with-
in the framework of a regional comparative study on value chain effects of renewables 
in North Africa:  
A very large share (up to 90 per cent) of all equipment and components is imported: 
there is no local share in the manufacturing of the solar field. Civil work at the Algerian 
site costs up to 30 per cent more than in Spain. Abener is expecting that future projects 
can use a locally produced steel mounting system. Although some know-how for pro-
ject development of conventional power plants exists in Algeria, the engineering, pro-
curement and construction (EPC) contractor is always an international company. A lo-
cal company, Sarpi, provides electronic equipment for the plant. An Algerian engineer-
ing company (Algesco) will provide turbine maintenance during operation…Although 
this analysis finds that the Algerian industry could play a role in local manufacturing, 
the share of local involvement in the current project is very low. Even components and 
services with a lower technology level have been provided by international companies 
(Ernst & Young & Fraunhofer Institute, 2011, p. 11) 
In short, labour market effects have been used to justify the planned large-scale de-
ployment of renewable energies in Algeria. Regardless of whether these extension 
plans will actually come to fruition or not, it remains doubtful whether the Algerian 
labour market can indeed profit from that to the desired extent.208 
 
 
 
                                                      
207
 To put this number into perspective: Germany, the world’s biggest employment market for renewa-
ble energies both due to local demand and strong exports, currently employs a work force of 340.000 
(Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, 2010, p. 18). 
208
 See also Section  6.5.1 for further reflections on Algerian technology transfer, as well as science and 
industry policy. 
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Section conclusion 
Similar to the Gulf States, the theoretical job potential in Algeria is high. As Algeria 
does not host a large expatriate work force, it does not have similar issues with regards 
to of locals’ or expats’ access to the labour market. Although high hopes are pinned on 
the incoming renewable energy programme, independent studies expect the yield for 
the domestic labour market to be substantially smaller. 
 
6.4.4. Policy regime 
6.4.4.1. Renewable energy targets and actual performance 
Is there a (binding) strategic document, such as an energy roadmap/blueprint or at 
least a non-binding planning scheme? If so, how does this integrate renewable elec-
tricity? 
As has been shown, the 2004 renewable energies act did not yield the desired results. 
Acknowledging these setbacks, decision-makers announced a further funding instru-
ment towards the end of 2009 (Interview no. 4 – Public stakeholder, Algeria). Moreo-
ver, President Bouteflika established a renewable energy fund209 in the 2010 financial 
law, which was designed as an interim period during which a full-scale review of the 
current renewable energies act could be carried out. The fund is designed to receive 
0.5% of the fiscalité petriolière, a tax paid by the foreign hydrocarbon companies work-
ing in Algeria. Depending on the extent of this important, but fluctuating government 
revenue210 it will provide renewable energy businesses with approximately 40€m per 
annum. Compared with the subsidies spent on renewable energy technologies in Eu-
rope, this appears rather modest. Moreover, it remains unclear which ministry or gov-
ernment agency will actually administer the fund (Interview no. 2 – Public stakeholder, 
Algeria). Still, this can be regarded as a first step to counterbalance the flawed 2004 
law. Generally speaking, there is a difference between Algeria’s binding renewable 
                                                      
209
 Le président Bouteflika signe la loi de finances 2010 (République Algérienne Démocratique et Popu-
laire: Portail du Premier Ministre, 2009). 
210
 In 2009, this tax accounting for 62% of all government revenues dropped by almost 50% in compari-
son to 2008 (El Watan, 2010). 
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energy system and its de facto ineffectiveness. While the incoming minister Yousfi’s 
new renewable energy programme (Algerian Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM), 
2011) is even more ambitious than that of his predecessor’s, in light of the poor record 
of previous promotion programmes it remains to be seen how many of the 65 projects 
(Portail Algérien des Énergies Renouvelables, 2011c) will in fact be realized and how 
long this will take. As one interviewee stated: 
Let’s not forget that there have been many readjustments of former goals through the 
backdoor without anyone noticing. The renewable energy quotas were always pushed 
back. That’s why I am very critical about the seriousness of these new plans. I think, we 
should read them as declarations of intent rather than as rock-solid, detailed capacity 
extension plans. (Interview no. 18 – R&D, Algeria) 
This interviewee alludes to the fact that the CREG’s former programme indicatif 
(Commission de Régulation de l'Electricité et du Gaz (CREG), 2008) used to display very 
different figures and time lines for renewable electricity capacity extensions from the 
latest version of this official planning document (Commission de Régulation de l'Elec-
tricité et du Gaz (CREG), 2010). Also, as the same interviewee highlighted that Algeria 
originally had published the plan for 5 per cent RE by 2010, which was later pushed to 
2015, which again appears to be ambitious given the less than 1 per cent quota at the 
current moment.  
As has been shown before, the MEM attempts to integrate renewable energies mainly 
through a government-funded action plan. Although the FIT system is dysfunctional 
and the power prices for end consumers are kept artificially low well below market 
prices, this is also the only possible way to integrate RE into the Algeria energy system 
at all. 
 
Section conclusion 
As demonstrated, Algeria has a published set of renewable energy policy documents, 
government policies and a renewable energy law. This puts it into a unique position 
among the hydrocarbons-wealthy Arab states. However, it remains debatable how 
credible the currently advertised large-scale capacity extensions as many goals had 
been tacitly readjusted in the past because of the difficulty in realising them on sched-
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ule. Thus, while the set of renewable energy regulation appears well-constructed and 
solid, its performance has largely been characterized by ineffectiveness. This asym-
metry between ambitious political targets and the actual performance on the ground 
has to be appreciated for policy design as it exposes the little value of adapting foreign 
laws without the intent of the relevant actors to actually change the energy govern-
ance system on the ground. 
 
6.4.4.2. Regional infrastructure and electricity governance bodies 
Do the regional electricity governance bodies promote political or infrastructure pro-
jects that enhance the role of renewable electricity in the target country? Is external 
demand a pull factor in that respect? 
On the whole, the regional electricity governance bodies in the Maghreb are very ac-
tive compared to the Gulf. This is due to the fact that Algeria is not only part of the 
inter-Maghreb/North Africa governance bodies such as COMELEC, but also part of the 
often EU-funded trans-Mediterranean groups such as MEDREG/MED-EMIP (Euro-
Mediterranean Energy Market Integration Project (MED-EMIP), 2010c) operating with 
the goal of creating a trans-Mediterranean grid network that allows power flows 
around and across the Mediterranean.  
Regional initiatives are regularly well-supported. In 2010, the new energy minister 
Yousfi signed an agreement with his Moroccan and Tunisian counterparts regarding 
the successive electricity market integration and the eventual merge of its energy mar-
ket with the EU (Equilibres - La Lettre de la Commission de la Régulation de l'Electricité 
et du Gaz (CREG), 2010). While a full market merger appears to be rather far-fetched 
for the time being due to the large differences in market prices, the intra-Maghreb grid 
interconnections are continually upgraded thereby allowing power flows in demand 
peak situations. The Pan-Arab council of energy ministers has also worked towards this 
aim (Portail Algérien des Énergies Renouvelables, 2011e).  
However, these cooperation agreements do not have a specific focus on renewable 
energy. The aim of these initiatives is merely to strengthen the regional grid network. 
This could also help stabilize the grid through a more diversified load management 
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system thus allowing for more intermittent renewable electricity in the system. How-
ever, such purposes have not been made explicit so far. While the prospect of renewa-
ble power floating through these networks might appear attractive, many stakeholders 
might actually have other plans in mind while extending these grids. As one interview-
ee put it 
I am concerned that we will rather see France selling its nuclear power to Africa than 
African green power being sold to France. (Interview no. 31 – public stakeholder, EU) 
In a nutshell, in the current state of affairs, it is uncertain whether a larger Mediterra-
nean power ring will indeed become a reality and – if this was to happen – it is unclear 
what kind of power would be sold to whom. In line with the interviewee, the only cur-
rent example of a EU-North African grid connection (Spain-Morocco) clearly shows a 
flow towards North Africa, and not vice versa (see Figure 22). 
Yet, despite all that criticism, the existence of the renewable energy markets in the 27 
EU member states and their 2020 climate change mitigation targets has a tangible ef-
fect on Algerian renewable energy policy. The massive amount of 10 GW renewable 
power generation capacity that are scheduled to be built in the Algerian electricity 
network by 2030 according to the recent renewable energy strategy are indicative of 
that (Algerian Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM), 2011). It is, therefore, evident that 
the extraterritorial politics of a regionally important power can cause domestic policy 
change in this area as it can be assumed that the existence of such a large market at 
Algeria’s doorsteps and the on-going, early efforts regarding trans-Mediterranean re-
newable energy projects (see Subchapter  6.7) has impelled Algerian decision-makers 
to launch this large-scale programme both for domestic consumption and international 
export. Furthermore, this programme indicates the notion that Algeria is motivated to 
remain in the energy (exporting) business. Also, it is likely that Algeria intends to fund 
its domestic renewable capacity extensions, which incur heavy costs due to electricity 
price subsidies, by using its export revenues of its renewable power to Europe (Inter-
view no. 40 – R&D, Europe). 
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Section conclusion 
The intra-Arab electricity grid connections as well as the grid across the Mediterranean 
reveal that regionalism is on the rise. While the increased system stability of such sys-
tems could also allow for more renewable energy in the system, this might merely be a 
side-effect as the inter-Arab electricity cooperation does not actively promote it. On 
the other hand, European renewable energy policies have a substantial impact on do-
mestic plans. As the example of scheduled massive export capacities shows, these 
landscape-level developments have a strong influence on the Algerian policy regime. 
However, even if such a trans-Mediterranean power market was to be established, it 
still remains likely that most of the power transports in both directions would either be 
based on coal (North Africa to Europe) or on nuclear energy (Europe to North Africa). 
 
6.5. Niche-level developments 
6.5.1. Science regime: R&D and industry structures, technology transfer strat-
egies 
Is there an attempt to create a domestic knowledge hub for RETs and is there an in-
dustry structure that supports the spread of technologies into mainstream society? 
The limited maturity of the renewable energies markets in the Maghreb is also reflect-
ed by a lack of specialized educational programmes both on the professional and the 
university level. Although the number of scientific publications in all Maghreb states is 
on the rise (see Figure 46), RET-related patent registration in the region remains strik-
ingly low. While immensely underrated, Algeria has taken tangible efforts to create 
domestic knowledge hubs and a local RET industry in recent years.  
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Figure 46: Evolution of scientific publications in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia 1995-2009 
 
Source: Kumetat & Hamiane, 2011, p. 28.  
For instance, a long and solid experience has been gained over the last decades and a 
wide range of high level courses has been developed in the field of hydrocarbons. Yet, 
trainings and education in the field of renewables were often limited to researchers’ 
level rendering the currently existing RE-dedicated courses very limited. A first post-
graduate school (Ecole Doctorale en Energie Renouvelables) was launched in 2006 by 
the Algerian Centre for the Development of Renewable Energies (CDER) in cooperation 
with a number of Algerian research institutions and universities (Interview no. 15 – 
R&D, Algeria). 
However, as previously delineated, this institution has only little direct influence in the 
policy process as it falls under the supervision of the Ministry of Higher Education ra-
ther than the Ministry of Energy and Mines. Its weak or inexistent links to industry and 
energy policy have so far made its development into a technology hub an unlikely sce-
nario. In January 2011, a new institute was opened that might serve this function, the 
Algerian Institute for Renewable Energies (IAERE). Founded by executive decree no. 
11-33 ("Décret exécutif n° 11-33 du 22 Safar 1432 correspondant au 27 janvier 2011 
portant création, organisation et fonctionnement de l’institut algérien des énergies 
renouvelables.", 2011), this institute is under the tutelage of the MEM, and is located 
close to the major gas fields and Algeria’s first operating hybrid CSP-gas plant in Hassi 
R’Mel. In addition to hosting postgraduate studies and short-term trainings for compa-
nies, its goal is to closely interact with industry to generate relevant innovation in the 
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field (Le Maghreb - Le Quotidien de l'Economie, 13 March, 2011). As its current director 
stated: 
The new institute’s proximity to industry will enable us to conduct relevant research 
with good results for our domestic industry (Interview no. 17 – R&D, Algeria). 
The attempt to carry out renewable energies-related R&D in Algeria might therefore 
be crowned by success. 
Another notable project is the Ville Nouvelle Boughezoul, which was launched by the 
presidential decree no. 479 on April 1, 2004. The declared goal of this project is to 
build a large eco-city on the Algerian plateau, with original designs proposing to house 
up to 400,000 citizens and to function as a cleantech technology cluster much like the 
UAE’s Masdar project (Bilateral - Bi-monthly magazine of the German Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, Algiers, 2008). The city will host four research institutes on 
agro-ecology, renewable energy and energy efficiency, environmental technology, and 
urban planning. With an estimated size of 1.900 hectares it will retain much space for 
an extension. According to one interviewee, Boughezoul is meant to be a pilot project. 
Based on the project’s success, up to four other similar cities – most of them smaller 
and located deeper in the South – are to be built (Interview no. 5 – public stakeholders, 
Algeria). 
In order to make this city a reality, the Algerian Ministry of Environment, which is lead-
ing the project, has attempted to cooperate with international partners: in 2009, a visit 
by the then-German Minister of Environment, Sigmar Gabriel, led to the launch of an 
intergovernmental cooperation and to a feasibility study conducted by three German 
urban planning firms (Interview no. 5 – public stakeholders, Algeria). A French team of 
researchers also cooperated with the ministry (Portail des Energies Renouvelables en 
Algérie, 2012b). Boughezoul is scheduled to be completed by 2025; its overall invest-
ment volume is an estimated US$ 100bn. According to recent reports construction is 
scheduled to begin in 2013 (Abdelhadi, 2012). 
However, some stakeholders doubt this project will ever be realized. In contrast to 
Masdar, most activities have so far been only oratorical with nothing substantial taking 
place in the field. Projects like Masdar have revealed how difficult it is to build a full 
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city from scratch, and it is doubtful whether Boughezoul’s attempt would be less 
fraught with difficulties. Despite the benefits of founding new cities, which would ease 
the pressure on the coastal zone of Greater Algiers, establishing a new urban centre 
that can offer a convincing, long-term alternative to the capital is a challenging task. 
One German stakeholder criticized: 
Well, this city Boughezoul project – I don’t really see it happening. While an Algerian 
ministry official told me that Minister Gabriel had made promises during his visit that 
he hadn’t kept, we have a rather different opinion. We asked the Algerians for many 
things, deadlines, project volume and size, tangible building plans etc. – no one in Ber-
lin has ever received clear answers about these issues. (Interview no. 25 – public stake-
holder, Europe) 
 
Figure 47: Site of the Nouvelle Ville Boughezoul in October 2011 
[[This content has been removed for reasons of copyright]] 
In addition to the organisational challenges of international cooperation, a sceptical 
journalist described this project as a mixture of the outdated concept of a planned 
megacity applied to the wrong country in the wrong location (Sabatini, 2011) (for the 
current state of the site see Figure 47). The same author continues:  
The Boughezoul presentation video is quite a strange mix of 2001 Space Odyssey-like 
images, basic explanatory figures and a list of all the global urban regeneration clichés 
about green spaces, luxury, and leisure-based activities (ThinkAfricaPress, 2011). 
Many more questions regarding the city’s population, its livelihood, its water reserves 
currently remain unresolved. Also, the fact that the project does not even have its own 
website and that its staff were unavailable for research interviews raise severe doubts 
about the feasibility of this project. In conclusion, while in principle, Nouvelle Cité 
Boughezoul has the potential to become an internationally recognised eco-city, the 
rather modest success of eco- and garden-cities worldwide, as well as the project’s 
poor planning thus far raise serious doubts about the project realisation in the near or 
mid-term future. 
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In addition to what has been discussed so far, Algeria has also launched several initia-
tives to establish a diversified domestic RET industry producing for export markets (Le 
Quotidien d'Oran, 2011a). 
The first of these important projects is Sonelgaz’s planned solar module factory. In No-
vember 2009, the company announced a US$100m investment to build a solar panel 
factory in Rouiba with an annual production capacity of 50MW (Aziza, 2009). Accord-
ing to more recent sources, the factory will now be built by a German consortium un-
der the leadership of Centrotherm for around 290€m (centrotherm photovoltaics AG, 
2011). The factory is set to be completed by 2014, thus making it the first solar module 
factory on African soil (APS - Algérie Presse Service, 2011a).211 
Meanwhile, another source cites that a second panel factory is scheduled to open even 
sooner than that close to Algiers (APS - Algérie Presse Service, 2011e). According to 
this source, most material for the solar panels will be produced on Algerian soil, includ-
ing floating glass from Cevital while the solar wafers will be exported from Europe until 
Rouiba Eclairage opens its production line. 
A third and more basic innovation is the production of silicon by the Algerian business-
es. According to a ministerial statement, Sonelgaz hopes to be able to produce silicon 
by 2013 (Khalil, 2011). 
These new initiatives run parallel to several new cooperation agreements in the re-
newable energies sector.212 These attempts to establish a relevant local industry is in 
line with Algeria’s focus on the development of its own market in order to increase the 
value chain through technology transfer. As the Algerian prime minister underlined,  
                                                      
211
 Given the strong intra-Maghreb competition with regards to renewable energy projects and industry 
in both Tunisia and Morocco (optics.org - the business of photonics, 2011) this claim cannot be con-
firmed with certainty.  
More recently, the company announced that it might begin production as early as 2013 (Zineb, 2012). At 
the moment, however, it cannot be established with certainty that this date is not a mere PR manoeu-
vre.  
212
 In 2011 alone, the minister signed such agreements with Spain (APS - Algérie Presse Service, 2011b), 
France (Portail Algérien des Énergies Renouvelables, 2011b) and Italy (Portail Algérien des Énergies Re-
nouvelables, 2011a). 
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“Algeria should aim to develop new and renewable energies according to its own con-
ception, needs and export plans.” 
In the same speech before the Algerian Upper House (Conseil de la Nation) the prime 
minister stressed the following: 
“It is necessary to produce your own equipment necessary to produce renewable ener-
gies before entering into negotiations with the promoters of renewables of whatever 
project, be it Desertec or others.” (APS - Algérie Presse Service, 2011c) 
However, critics argue that it is unlikely that the factory will succeed in beginning panel 
production by 2014, since all major components produced will not be internationally 
competitive. Particularly criticised is its relatively small annual production size of 116 
MW (centrotherm photovoltaics AG, 2011). Taking into account that major Asian pro-
ducers already plan productions with GW capacities, a mere 5% of that production will 
not give Sonelgaz any particular purchasing power or leverage in supply negotiations 
(Interview no. 45 – R&D, EU). Admittedly, Algeria would be able to shield its domestic 
production from foreign competition by raising import tariffs for external panels, but 
this is yet to be seen. 
In addition to this, a project manager of one of Algeria’s CSP plants provided insights 
into the current situation: 
Of course, in principle, many items for renewable electricity plants could be produced in 
Algeria, even the mirrors and the absorbing pipes. It is the dream of this government to 
produce all such things on the ground. But I can tell you that the know-how is currently 
lacking. That’s why at the moment, we import everything, even transformers, we im-
port them from India. There, the quality of products is pretty high and the price pretty 
low, here, it’s the other way around! (Interview no. 11 – National and international 
power sector, Algeria) 
Another interviewee voiced similar doubts: 
Technology transfer only occurs by carrying out real projects, not by just talking. In 
terms of production capacities, sure, most North African countries could produce many 
parts of a CSP or PV plant, such as the steel, glass, and concrete components. But let’s 
not forget that this only makes up 10% of the added value of such a plant. This is good 
for the image of some politicians, but economically speaking, it is almost negligible. 
(Interview no. 36 – private and public investors, Europe) 
However, international investment in Algeria, which is key in generating industry and 
production innovation in Algeria, is a difficult matter. With the 2009 financial law, the 
government re-introduced the local content regime, which forces any company out-
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side the oil sector to have a 51% majority share held by an Algerian investor (Interview 
no. 21 – R&D, Algeria). While many large companies are still able to work under this 
regulation, the repatriation of profit is a reoccurring issue. As the previous interviewee 
states: 
This is all very ambivalent. Why should foreign companies invest in Algeria under such 
circumstances when they can’t even take the profits out? Additionally, there are no 
general customs agreements, so for every a new customs classification has to be nego-
tiated, which takes extremely long. Frankly, I don’t understand why they also haven’t 
introduced any free zones or special import alleviations for renewable energy technolo-
gies when they want to have them built here. (Interview no. 11 – National and interna-
tional power sector, Algeria) 
In conclusion, the criticism above reveals part of the gap between the Algerian political 
aspirations and the reality of businesses on the ground. Despite Algerian industry poli-
cy and technology transfer efforts in this sector, the actual challenges facing nascent 
business and the local industries remain constantly high. 
 
Section conclusion 
With the combined efforts of its research facilities around the new IAERE and the 
forthcoming launch of solar RET industry Algeria has a strong potential to create a suc-
cessful innovation dynamic in this technological sector. Yet in spite of its tangible feats 
thus far compared to other Arab states, experts continue to regard the likelihood of its 
international success with scepticism. 
In the same vein, while the Nouvelle Ville Boughezoul project has a strong innovative 
potential, the current project management as well as its original outlay make its suc-
cess in the medium-term unlikely. As in the case of the renewable energies act, this is 
another example of the difficulties that can occur upon attempting to apply this Euro-
pean concept of urban planning to Algeria without careful adaptation and reflection. 
 
6.5.2. Technological developments 
What is the interviewees’ opinion on technology choices and on the chance of indus-
try-use of RETs as entry points for further RETs in resource-rich Arab states? 
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In many ways, Algeria has great potential to use solar energy for industry technologies, 
particularly since its oil and gas wells are in the Sahara desert. However, as natural gas 
is abundantly available at very low costs, the incentives to experiment with CSP- or PV-
based electricity production for off-grid industrial appliances are low.  
This is also confirmed by one interviewee who states: 
Desalination with CSP won’t happen in Algeria in spite of some interesting experiments. 
It might be a different situation in Morocco or Tunisia, but Algeria has too much gas 
that this would not be worth the while (Interview no. 7 – public and private investors)  
A second possible non-electricity entry point would be solar desalination on a small, 
and potentially also on a larger scale. Some researchers have argued that there is a 
potential for this technology in rural Algeria (Bouchekima, 2002); others have dis-
cussed this technology for very similar conditions in Tunisia (Bourouni & Chaibi, 2009) 
and in other industries (S. Mekhilef, R. Saidur, & A. Safari, 2011) as well as solar cool-
ing. Yet, much like in the case of the Gulf countries, this vast potential currently lies 
dormant. 
 
 
 
Section conclusion 
While there would be several potential entry points for renewables through industry 
use, much like in the UAE, this is not actively considered by stakeholders at the mo-
ment, even in research and Algerian technology studies. Thus, the classical use of re-
newable energies to generate green electricity remains the most influential and indeed 
most promising approach. 
 
6.6. Key findings in the analysis of the Algerian energy system  
The last three subchapters have analysed various aspects of the Algerian energy sys-
tem informed by the 18 subsidiary research questions developed in Chapter  3. Beyond 
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the respective section conclusions, a summative analysis of the framework conditions 
for renewable energy policy in Algeria follows: 
As has been established in the previous analysis, the Algerian renewable energy sys 
tem is in fact more diverse than it seems at first glance. The multiple institutions and 
combination of interests in national economic diversification and the ambition to es-
tablish a local RET industry interlink well with the strong external pull factors induced 
by the Trans-Mediterranean projects. This desire is reflected in the ambitious recent 
policy doctrines. In an attempt to identify the most significant policy driver, it could be 
argued that, like in the case of the UAE, national economic diversification forms the 
“primary mover” of all efforts because first, all further efforts can be related to this key 
goal and second, because no other one would, eventually, be able to mobilize consid-
erable resources in infrastructure and technology investments. 
Identifying the most significant drivers on a personal level is much more complex, as 
on the level of personal agency, an unsatisfying picture presents itself. Indeed, the 
bunker-state character of Algeria is most obvious when attempting to trace clear deci-
sion-making and power structures through the thicket and often personalized powers 
of the Algerian political, economic and security elite: personal access is not granted 
and transparency is not a given. Based on the results of both desk research and on the 
ground research interviews, it is safe to say that opacity prevails. Thus, it cannot be 
stated with certainty that the renewable energy impasse in this country is caused by 
unwillingness within the ruling elite as no access was granted to this level of decision-
making and interviewees also could not offer insightful views in this regard. 
In addition to this personal level, further structural barriers to the spread of renewa-
bles need to be seen in the continuation of electricity subsidies and the non-existence 
of a free electricity market. In addition, the dominance of system-integrated actors like 
Sonelgaz makes it unlikely that the poor performance of the regulatory system and the 
prohibitive market structures change any time soon. In terms of industry innovation 
and the establishment of a domestic RET sector, Algeria’s hurdles for foreign invest-
ment and its difficult regulation as well as the lack of other companies in that field 
makes the successful launch of an RET industry a difficult undertaking.  
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The chapter has shown that in many areas, such as climate change, country branding 
and others, Algeria does not live up to its full potential. The PR underperformance of 
the existing programmes is a case in point. While in the UAE, only a fraction of the an-
nounced programmes reaches a world audience through professional marketing, Alge-
ria’s policies in this sector remain unknown outside the realm of expert knowledge. In 
short, the most significant roadblock for the spread of RETs is the opacity in power 
structures. Combined with low accountability and system-entrenched market opera-
tors with little interest in RETs, the complex of MEM and Sonelgaz have so far effec-
tively prevented larger RE-related developments from being realised and were able to 
stall major policy initiatives like the Algerian renewable energies act. It is not unlikely 
that the latest ambitious renewable energy extension scheme will suffer a similar fate. 
 
On the analytical level, the following subjects can be identified: 
First, when analysing the interaction between the three MLP layers (landscape, regime, 
and niche-level) it is striking that the distribution of power and its focus by regime ac-
tors is more balanced than in the UAE. While many system actors voiced their doubts 
regarding the effectiveness of certain measures, for instance with regards to technolo-
gy policy, Algeria’s overall efforts remain visible on all levels. However, actors rooted in 
the largely hydrocarbons-dominated energy regime level remain pivotal for the overall 
development of the Algerian national energy system. 
Second, Algeria’s political system differs greatly from the UAE case. While in the UAE, a 
tension between the autonomy of the individual emirates and the federal level per-
sists, in Algeria, the top-down, centralistic and presidential governance model neither 
allows such conflicts nor the regional distribution of innovation and renewables-
centred initiatives. Instead, most Algerian efforts are centred in the capital, Algiers. 
Another striking difference in the political system is the role and application of federal 
legislation. While UAE decision-makers have been cautious about announcing full-
fledged renewable energy laws or even promotion programmes, in Algeria, these have 
been announced on a regular basis, starting with the 2004 renewable energies act. 
While, at first glance, this appears promising, the laws’ and programmes’ poor perfor-
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mance and stalled application reveals the hiatus between Algerian political-legal proc-
lamations and the actual developments on the ground. In short, while the UAE system 
could be qualified as a bottom-up, project-based approach with only little codified 
regulation, the Algerian model is a strongly codified, top-down, centralistic approach, 
albeit with poor implementation. 
Third, while it has been demonstrated that Abu Dhabi’s Masdar initiative was pivotal 
for the renewable energies efforts in this Emirate – indeed, one could argue that 
Masdar is the embodiment of Abu Dhabi’s renewable energy policies – there is no 
similarly emblematic renewable energy project of that size in Algeria. This might be a 
liability in terms of public visibility. However, the positive consequence is that Algeria’s 
renewable energy efforts are more diversified, both in terms of institutions and staff. 
Fourth, the issue of governance concepts remains controversial. Parallel to the overall 
character of state organisation, Algerian decision-makers tend to favour large-scale, 
centralized programmes, as demonstrated by the most recent, ambitious renewable 
energy programme launched in 2011. Remarkably though, most interviewees re-
mained sceptical with regards to the applicability of such models for Algeria and fa-
voured a bottom-up process that – under liberalized, open market structures – would 
consist of small, decentralized and replicable structures, which would be scaled up 
gradually. While both groups agreed that a certain level of adjustment to local struc-
tures would be needed, essentially, both concepts discussed are non-local concepts 
that are imported from abroad – a transfer of governance concepts has therefore oc-
curred here in both camps. Claims for the development of local governance models are 
made frequently by Western scholars. Yet, it would appear that this is a goal Algerian 
stakeholders do not aspire to – for once, because this aim is not regarded as particular-
ly desirable, and secondly because logically there may be no third option, merely dif-
ferent blends of the two. 
In conclusion, the analysis of the Algerian system of renewable energy policy has 
shown that Algeria is active on a wide range of renewables-related issues, mostly with 
a large-scale, top-down approach that, in most cases, has so far failed to yield the de-
sired results. Bottom-up innovation systems are generally not encouraged by system 
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operators, market regulators and further entrenched regime incumbents. In short, the 
analysis of one research interview aptly describes the situation on the ground 
Renewable energies in Algeria as such face no other technological difficulties as any-
where else in the world and I think they are manageable. The real issue is that the 
problems we face are political issues – and that’s what makes them so hard to solve. 
(Interview no. 14 – National and international power sector) 
 
6.7. Case study in the case study: Trans-Mediterranean renewable energy 
initiatives 
6.7.1. Introduction 
In the present discussion about the role of renewable energies in a future European 
energy supply, certain scenarios envision tapping into the substantial North African 
solar and wind energy potentials. Due to its geographical situation, its size and the 
strategic importance of its energy sector, Algeria could play a key role in this process. 
Moreover, current developments such as the large export share (10 GW) of the 2011 
renewable energy programme and Sonelgaz’ recent MoU with Dii are indicative of the 
fact that Algerian energy stakeholders increasingly aim to sell renewable electricity to 
European markets. Thus, European electricity policy is of some importance to Algeria’s 
domestic energy policy programmes. However, this potential might be undone by a 
series of development barriers that will be analysed in the course of the chapter. 
This “case study within a case study” aims to introduce the relevant trans-
Mediterranean renewable energy projects – which are potentially linked to Algeria – as 
well as to highlight stakeholders’ views towards this matter. 
Section  6.7.2 will focus on the development and current status of the various initiatives 
for large-scale, trans-Mediterranean renewable electricity schemes, such as Dii, the 
MSP and further projects. Section  6.7.3 will focus on the Algerian view before Sec-
tion  6.7.4 will sum up the “case study within the case study” by presenting relevant 
implications to energy governance theory. 
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6.7.2. Current initiatives for large-scale, trans-Mediterranean renewable en-
ergy schemes 
6.7.2.1. The framework: European renewable energy policy and supporting reg-
ulation 
The member states of the European Union have committed themselves to cutting their 
carbon output (cf. Table 20). A central measure of this agenda is the extension of re-
newable electricity production. 
Table 20: Share of European energy from renewable sources in gross final consumption of energy 
2005 and 2020  
 
Source: European Commission, 2009. 
These efforts need to be viewed in the broader context of developing a common and 
diversified European energy supply strategy. This is facilitated by the European energy 
legislation introduced in 2009: (green) power imports into the European grid are made 
possible through the recent EU renewable energy directive (European Commission, 
2009). Article 9 stipulates that energy produced outside the EU can be financially sup-
ported through laws promoting renewable energies as long as this energy export does 
not lower the RE quota in the (non-EU-)country of origin. Also, this power can be add-
ed to the respective countries’ quotas for renewable energy power production and 
their carbon budgets. While the Directive shows a certain degree of flexibility in the 
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start-up phase,213 it does not allow swap deals or green power certificates; 214 instead, 
it demands a physical power transfer. This is a serious challenge to all parties involved. 
As one industry stakeholder stated: 
I think the main barrier in this process will clearly be the grids, not the power plants 
themselves. First, if you talk about major amounts of renewable electricity in the grid, 
there are load management issues to be overcome. What I think is even more difficult 
is the issue of obtaining planning permissions for the grid lines. Even normal grid up-
grades don’t work; I was told by a UK operator that it took him seven years to just get 
planning permission for a 20-miles upgrade of a line. Can you imagine what this means 
to get planning permissions in several member states for large-scale grid installations? 
(Interview no. 37 – Private and public investors, EU) 
Thus, interviewees agreed that in the start-up phase, most EU member states will ra-
ther use the described “joint project” option with other member states or use the two 
other options offered in the Directive, “statistical transfers” or “joint support 
schemes”. The former option enables states with surpluses of renewable energy so 
“sell” them statistically to another member state. The latter option provides the 
framework for a multinational pooling of power production and renewable energy 
support schemes. Currently, the statistical transfer option is by far the most sought 
after.215 
Thus, even three years after the Directive was set in place, it remains unclear whether 
this particular measure will become a success. A major caveat is that countries will 
need to open their national renewable energy funding schemes to renewable energy 
production abroad. In times of strained budgets, this will be a difficult message to con-
vey to voters. When the EU member states submitted their National Renewable Energy 
Action Plans (NREAP) to the Commission in June 2010, most NREAPs stressed that the 
2020 goals could be reached by domestic RE potentials, as well as some statistical 
                                                      
213
 The Directive also allows member states to agree on green certificates or swap deals as a “virtual 
electricity import” for a limited period of time as long as the physical electricity exchange is scheduled 
and an approximate commencing date can be given. This regulation enables states to proceed with 
large-scale demonstration projects in the country of origin without having to wait until the physical grid 
interconnection is actually finalized. 
214
 According to one stakeholder, the Commission had supported the introduction of green power certif-
icates, but the large member states, particularly Germany and Great Britain had argued against that 
(Interview no. 34 – Private and public investors, Europe). 
215
 Cf. European Commission DG TREN (2011a) and Interview no. 32 – public stakeholder, Europe. 
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transfers alone. Only Italy216 (Italian Ministry for Economic Development, 2010, pp. 28; 
84; 159) and Luxembourg (The Government of Luxembourg - Ministry for Economic 
Affairs and Foreign Trade, 2010) explicitly considered the import of renewable energies 
from North Africa in these communications. While this is an indicator that EU member 
states will be reluctant to give too much room for schemes like Desertec in their early 
planning stages, Dii-representatives reacted calmly stating: 
Given the time frame we are working with, the 2020 targets are too early for us any-
way – what we are looking at are the 2025 or indeed the 2030 targets, if there are to 
be any. (Interview no. 39 – national and international power sector, Europe) 
While proponents of Dii and indeed some Brussels officials around energy commis-
sioner Oettinger mentioned potential common European FITs it remains doubtful that 
such a proposal would find a majority among the member states, which continue to 
dominate European energy policy.217 It remains to be seen far this will change when 
the common European energy market is introduced in 2014. While this is primarily 
designed for conventional electricity, there are voices that claim with some right: 
We are facing a dilemma situation with the common energy market. On the one hand, 
we cannot tolerate that such huge amounts of electricity (= renewables) are not being 
traded internationally and thus taken out of the market. On the other hand, if we trade 
renewable power throughout Europe this would effectively mean a cross-subsidization 
of electricity across national borders: German electricity consumers paying FIT premi-
ums would then finance renewable power purchased by France – it remains difficult 
(Interview no. 33 – public stakeholder, EU) 
Similarly, another interviewee added:  
So far, the markets are national and nationalistic. Recently, a Dutch-Scandinavian 
group built a power line between these 2 countries while at the same time a German 
company crossed this line for an offshore wind project. So there was the idea of merg-
ing these 2 lines – but the Germans refused – this wind project is supposed to be “Ger-
                                                      
216
 One EU stakeholder stated that “Internally, we have called article 9 of the Directive the “Italian 
Clause” as they always wanted to get power in from the Balkans and Tunisia” (Interview no. 33 – public 
stakeholder, Europe). Thus, it is logical that Italy is among the first EU member states to consider this 
mechanism seriously. Also, the recent announcement of a new Tunisian CSP project that is to export 
solar power to Italy is indicative of this policy (Kraemer, 2012). 
217
 “Yes, the Dii has been lobbying for this, but in our communication from January 2011 (European 
Commission DG TREN, 2011a, DK) we say that an EU-wide scheme is not in sight, but that rather the 
member states should work more on their respective national support schemes.” (Interview no. 33 – 
public stakeholder, EU) 
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man wind” – the background of this is of course financial: the German FITs financing 
these arrays are funded by the general el. customer; politicians and utilities would have 
a very hard time explaining to the general public why the German electricity consumer 
should pay for infrastructure investments benefitting the Netherlands or other places. 
(Interview no. 37 – Private and public investors, EU) 
Thus, in the long run, a trans-national renewable energy funding scheme might indeed 
emerge. While this is not likely to happen in the near future, from an economic point 
of view substantial cost savings could be achieved by a common European electricity 
trade.218 
Lately, the trans-Mediterranean energy programmes have received support from a 
rather unexpected historical development, the Arab Spring. These developments have 
immediately caught the attention of the highest EU governing bodies. While mostly 
greeted with cautiously positive reactions, the question of how to support the systemic 
changes in a sustainable and balanced way emerged. Renewable energies have been 
identified as one key area of cooperation in that regard. In March 2011, a Joint Com-
munication was presented to the European Parliament, and has subsequently been 
discussed by EU foreign ministers during their extraordinary Foreign Affairs Council 
and by the EU heads of states and governments (European Commission & High Repre-
sentative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2011). One key feature in 
the document is the proposal of an EU-South Mediterranean Energy Community, 
which is to have a strong focus on the production of renewable energy and regulation 
of its markets with a long-term option for the North African states to join the EU’s 
common energy market. The Communication states: 
It is desirable to open a credible perspective for the integration of the Southern Medi-
terranean in the EU internal energy market based on a differentiated and gradual ap-
proach…starting from the Maghreb countries and possibly extending progressively to 
the Mashreq (European Commission & High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, 2011, p. 11). 
                                                      
218
 “Commission analysis estimates that up to 10€bn annually could be saved if Member States treated 
renewable energy as a commodity in a single European market rather than in national markets. Thus, 
the move to market integration, in particular the evolution to feed in premiums is too slow, too frag-
mented and needs to be reinforced.” (European Commission DG TREN, 2011a, p. 11) 
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Most likely, the efforts to establish such a community would be coordinated with the 
Solar Plan of the Mediterranean Union (see Section  6.7.2.2). At the time of writing, 
however, no further step into this direction has been taken. 
In conclusion, this section has shown the tremendous commercial, political and ecolog-
ical potential of these concepts as well as the major barriers ahead, of which the most 
challenging ones for the EU are the division of green power support schemes, the divi-
sion of renewable energy markets, as well as the related complexities and costs. This 
needs to be overcome in order for major grid upgrades to become a reality. Thus, 
while these projects are, technically, rather straightforward, the political, economic 
and regulatory side as well as the unique character of EU politics are what make the 
execution of these schemes a difficult undertaking. As demonstrated, the Arab Spring 
has added a new dynamic to the situation. According to interviewees, its effects can 
already be felt in North Africa energy sector.219 
 
6.7.2.2. Government: the solar plan of the Union for the Mediterranean 
As has been shown in the previous subsection, the EU currently shows a strong inter-
est in the development of a trans-Mediterranean renewable energy partnership. This 
initiative is placed in the wider context of trans-Mediterranean European policies, 
which since 2008 have been pooled through the Union for the Mediterranean (Union 
pour la Méditerranée – UfM). In total, the UfM consists of 43 members, including all 
EU member states as well as all countries bordering the Mediterranean. In order to 
guarantee a balanced system of power-sharing, the UfM is co-presided over by an EU 
and a non-EU member respectively. While it is the stated intention of its founders to 
reinvigorate the stalled Barcelona/European Neighbourhood Process, a joint perma-
nent committee in Brussels and a bureau in Barcelona will ensure the day-to-day work-
ing processes are followed up and the summits prepared (Secretariat of the Union for 
the Mediterranean - Office of the Secretary General, 2010). 
                                                      
219
 Testimonies by various interviewees went into that direction, e.g. Interview no. 45 – R&D, Europe and 
Interview no. 36 – private and public investors, Europe. 
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One of the UfM’s flagship projects is the Mediterranean Solar Plan (MSP). Financed by 
the European Neighbourhood Programme, the MSP was included in the final declara-
tion of the Paris Summit of the Union for the Mediterranean on July 13th 2008 (Paris 
Summit for the Mediterranean, 2008). It will produce a major study characterizing po-
tential sites for RE production, identifying the best possible policies incentivizing the 
deployment of renewables with a target share of 20 GW of renewable power capacity 
(see Figure 48) and 20% energy savings compared to a business as usual scenario until 
2020, when the “deployment phase” should be completed (Council of the European 
Union, 2010). Also, the first imports of solar electricity from North Africa to the EU 
should have commenced by that date and the “Mediterranean Ring” of power trans-
mission in between the various regional grid systems should be completed.220 
Figure 48: Projects proposed to the Immediate Action Plan by February 2009 
 
Source: Lorec, 2009. 
In the Algerian context, six pilot projects, to be constructed at a later stage, have been 
identified. The first four demonstration projects to be built will be in Morocco and in 
Italy (each with two projects). Concerning the overall investment costs, a total sum of 
                                                      
220
 See Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean (07 July, 2011) for a recent discussion of how to 
realize the MSP. 
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45€bn is forecast until 2020. However, only a small sum of this money has already 
been secured: the World Bank’s Clean Technology Fund (CTF) has earmarked 750€m 
for CSP technology alone; while the unilateral and multilateral European development 
banks have promised another 5€bn.  
 
While the UfM and its MSP started with ambitious goals, its actual realization has been 
riddled with difficulties. A key MSP stakeholder explained the structure and goal of the 
MSP as follows:  
Our main stakeholders are the national authorities of our member states; they register 
projects with the secretariat; we do not conduct any own projects. Thus, what we have 
here is mainly a labelling process.  
Many people have criticized that we do not apply one methodology to all the projects. 
We omitted this issue on purpose, as it would have taken years to agree on a list of 
criteria. Given the heterogeneity of the region and its projects, we need to be flexible, 
otherwise we will not succeed. I think that transparency is an absolute must, but a 
common methodology not necessarily.  
Asked about how the MSP secretariat regards itself, the same interviewee added: 
The MSP is not a goal in itself, we are merely facilitators. In an ideal world, the initia-
tives would soon only lie in the hands of the member states, which is why we welcome 
the national solar plans of Morocco and Tunisia. Only this way, we can achieve a real 
buy-in of the stakeholders, which is absolutely vital. (Interview no. 23 – public stake-
holder, Europe) 
Concluding, the Union for the Mediterranean and its flagship project, the MSP, repre-
sent important enablers for the realisation of the concepts of trans-Mediterranean 
renewable energy. While – with all given problems of the multilateral process – the 
intergovernmental nature of the UfM can work on the political and regulatory frame-
work conditions that are vital for the MSP’s success, it cannot contribute on the busi-
ness front, as the actors involved here are states that do not own renewable energy 
technologies, nor can they implement projects independently. For this, non-state ac-
tors remain vital.  
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6.7.2.3. Private sector: the Desertec Industrial Initiative and Medgrid 
In recent years, civil society and industry stakeholders have increasingly promoted the 
construction of large-scale renewable energy power plants in North Africa. One major 
driver has been the political support group TREC (Trans-Mediterranean Renewable 
Energy Corporation) that began working with the German section of the Club of Rome. 
Its plans have been part of the German political discourse for well over a decade. TREC 
contributed to the discussions by launching its “Desertec White Book” which recently 
appeared in its fourth edition (Knies, Möller, & Straub, 2009). The TREC concept was 
taken up by various individuals and a number of national groups (e.g. TREC-UK, TREC-
Méditerrané, etc.) were founded. In 2008, the group re-named itself “Desertec Foun-
dation” and registered in Berlin as an incorporated association.  
The German government promoted this topic through research support for the above-
mentioned DLR studies as well as within the European Union. Moreover, a series of 
MENAREC Conferences (Middle East and North Africa Renewable Energy Conferences) 
supported these efforts on an international level. 
These activities have recently sparked the interest of German industry: on July 13, 
2009, a group of major German and international corporations (ABB, Abengoa Solar, 
DESERTEC Foundation, Deutsche Bank, E.ON, HSH Nordbank, MAN Solar Millennium, 
Munich Re, M+W Zander, RWE, SCHOTT Solar und Siemens and the Algerian company 
Cevital,221 (the only North African founding member of Dii) announced in a press con-
ference a memorandum of understanding seeking to promote the above Desertec ini-
tiative and intending to found a DESERTEC Industrial Initiative (Dii). These announce-
ments met with very different responses in Europe and North Africa. In Algeria, Chakib 
Khelil, then minister of energy and mines, said:  
“I don’t have any idea about that project and I cannot make any statement. This pro-
ject has never been presented at the ministry nor at the relevant institutions… In the 
(solar energy) field, there are clear conditions about a partnership of Algerian and for-
eign companies. It is about technology transfer in the area of engineering, equipment 
                                                      
221
 Originally an Algerian dairy and food industry conglomerate, Cevital has grown into the power sector 
by constructing several off-grid power plants to supply its own industries. Currently, Cevital is Algeria’s 
second largest company by turnover only being outperformed by Sonatrach. 
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and materials as well as contraction…If it is just about constructing solar panels on our 
soil and export the solar energy…we are not interested.”222 
Reactions in Europe largely depended on the various actors’ stance on solar and nucle-
ar power, major non-EU energy infrastructure investments and on their views vis-a-vis 
decentralized or centralized power generation. Apart from welcoming statements by 
political parties, environmental NGOs and research institutions223, there have also 
been critical voices. EUROSOLAR, for instance, a German solar energy lobby group, 
dubbed the plans “mirages in the Sahara desert” and “centralistic plans of the German 
power sector” that were designed to perpetuate the dominance of a few corporations 
in the national power sector and to stall the development of decentralized renewable 
energy production in Europe.224 Another counterargument was that this system would 
become prone to abuse by “energy extortion”, as Lacher/Kumetat maintain in a recent 
research article (2011). 
After its first months, the number of Dii shareholders and collaborating companies 
grew substantially. In addition to that, Dii opened two offices in Tunisia and Morocco. 
This was a vital step, as it had initially been criticized for being too Eurocentric to be-
come a success.225  
At the time of writing, Dii is working on a detailed implementation strategy defining a 
road map until 2020. This road map is supposed to be finalized by the end of 2012 and 
it will entail a long-term vision beyond that point (Interview no. 39 – national and in-
ternational power sector, Europe). 
Dii partners have stressed that the current Dii consortium is not intended to remain 
closed to potential partners who are willing to join, be it in the current scoping phase 
                                                      
222
 Cf. http://www.electron-economy.org/ext/http://news.fibladi.com/algerie-energie/?ida=35170 Le 
Maghreb, July 19, 2009, translation by the author.  
223
 On September 17, 2009 the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) issued a rather welcom-
ing statement of the Desertec plans; so did the European Green Parties and other institutions and politi-
cal groups. 
224
 Cf. the interview with Eurosolar founder president, the late Hermann Scheer, Member of the German 
Federal Parliament (Kaufmann, 2009) for a Desertec reply cf. Desertec Foundation (2009). 
225
 As a senior energy official put it: “To me, it was shocking how many mistakes the Dii people did in the 
first few months after its establishment. There was an absence of diplomacy, rolling over the North Afri-
ca countries German panzer style. This rightfully annoyed many North African stakeholders in the begin-
ning.” (Interview no. 26 – R&D, Europe) 
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or later in the operational business phase. However, Dii’s loose structure could prove a 
liability as well. As a stakeholder stated: 
I think, the potentially large conflicts between the power companies involved in Dii 
have so far been postponed, but I am sure they will re-emerge. Also, I am yet to be con-
vinced that the companies really mean to invest such big amounts of money. Funding a 
little project office and some feasibility studies is cheap for these corporations. The lit-
mus test will be when they will have to spend big to make their own studies become 
reality. I really think that what Dii represents is nothing more than a lobby group and a 
non-aggression pact that has the effect of mutual control, so that none of them moves 
into this field without the others noticing. Dii also said it will not develop its own pro-
jects. Otherwise, it would compete with itself/the shareholder companies of Dii. Offi-
cially, it is merely there to develop a “business case” for a reference project. (Interview 
no. 36 – private and public investors, EU) 
Meanwhile, another stakeholder offered a more critical reading of Dii: 
To me, Dii is no different from major oil and gas projects, land or strategic minerals. It 
has this negative similarity mainly because just in these cases, the Arab countries are 
used as sources of resources, and hardly profit themselves at all. Consequently, we 
have the same conceptual questions, equity issues, and the big backlash ‘environment 
versus development’. (Interview no. 30 – public stakeholder, Europe) 
Thus, while Dii is a most impressive consortium that has moved the TREC concept as 
close to realization as can be, its success is by no means a given. Undoubtedly, Dii is a 
key actor on the industry side, however, many business-related questions, as well as 
those put in the first two sections of this case study regarding political and regulatory 
aspects, remain open. 
 
Another private sector consortium in this field is the Medgrid initiative. Originally, Dii 
has always been regarded by the German government as a pure private sector initia-
tive that does not have strong political ties (BMWi - German Federal Ministry of Eco-
nomics and Technology, 2010). In France, however, Dii has been viewed as a German 
initiative developed to counteract the “French” MSP. Led by the French utility Electric-
ité de France (EDF), the consortium contains many network operators and equipment 
makers and is structured in a similar manner as Dii. With a total of eleven French com-
panies, among them heavyweights such as ABB, Alstom/Areva, Nexans, Prysmian, Cap 
Gemini or Atos Origin, RTE, France is the dominant nation involved, however, Spanish 
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and Moroccan companies have also joined, as well as fellow Dii members Siemens and 
Saint-Gobain. At first glance, Medgrid, as several stakeholders feared, appeared to be 
a competitor of Dii: 
Who knows, maybe Desertec will slip away from the Germans like IRENA did a few 
years ago. (Interview no. 32 – public stakeholder, Europe) 
However, both consortia signed a cooperation agreement in November 2011 (Desertec 
Industry Initiative (Dii) & Medgrid, 2011), which was facilitated and welcomed by the 
EU (European Commission, 2011). The agreement stipulates that Medgrid will focus on 
establishing the grid connections (with a beginning of five transcontinental intercon-
nectors) while Dii will focus on constructing and running the power plants.  
There is a chance, therefore, that the potential national competition lurking behind 
both initiatives remains dormant and does not infringe on the project performance. 
Indeed, this project might obtain a “truly European dimension” (Reuters, 2011a) that 
the EU has spotted in the cooperation of both.  
 
In conclusion, two types of initiatives were presented in this chapter, government-
backed (MSP) and private sector oriented (Dii and Medgrid) ones. While both types 
have large opportunities in their own area; they also have the potential to fail. Where-
as the MSP operates in the sometimes difficult and politically loaded framework of the 
UfM, the private sector character of the other initiatives emerges as an asset in terms 
of inter-company technological and operational synergy effects, the apolitical nature 
of the work and the speed in which decisions can be taken. This, however, could also 
turn into a development barrier, especially in the state-centred business environments 
to be found in many states of the Southern Mediterranean, and most certainly in Libya 
and Algeria. Here, a European private sector initiative might face a greater set of prob-
lems in terms of dealing with the state’s administration, than a state actor might do. 
Most recently, the cooperation agreement has been signed in Marrakech between Dii 
and the UfM which will alleviate fears of an open competition and mutual blockade 
between private and public sector initiatives (Portail des Energies Renouvelables en 
299 
 
Algérie, 2012c). Yet, such a MoU cannot gloss over all potential fault lines. For in-
stance, general competition could exist between multiple actors with overlapping in-
terests. In this case, which company or initiative will succeed and where? Who will be 
able to obtain the necessary private funds? It also remains uncertain how the working 
relationship of the companies involved in the Dii with the North African administra-
tions will evolve: as seen above technology transfer is one of the recurring issues in 
North African ministerial statements. Here, the European power sector represented 
through Dii or MedGrid might not show a great interest to move, while the MSP’s po-
litical framework might be more amenable to that. 
 
6.7.3. Trans-Mediterranean energy projects and Algeria 
As has been shown above, the initial Algerian reaction with regards to the publication 
of the TREC/Desertec plans was reserved. A number of Algerian stakeholders posed 
questions echoing Minister Khelil’s position (see Subsection  6.7.2.3): 
We asked ourselves: what kind of an initiative is this? We don’t know about it, Algerian 
nationals haven’t developed it and yet they think they can plan with land in our coun-
try? This has a bad aftertaste, a bit like eco-colonialism! (Interview no. 18 – R&D, Alge-
ria) 
As has been shown, Dii and its partner initiatives had to exert much effort to mend the 
damage done in the initial phase of the project. 
More recently, however, the Algerian stance has changed considerably. In October 
2010 the new Minister of Energy Yousfi named three conditions for cooperation with 
these initiatives: technology partnership, a sizeable Algeria-based production capacity, 
and the opening of the European power markets for potentially existing overcapacities 
(El Hadj, 2010). 
Gradually Algerian politics took a more positive stance on this matter culminating in 
the recent cooperation agreement between Sonelgaz and the Dii (Sonelgaz, 2011; 
Mokrane, 2011), as well as the sizeable renewable energy share in Algeria’s new na-
tional programme that is designated for export. In the same vein, the CEO of Sonelgaz 
has recently announced the construction of a new 1000 MW renewable energy power 
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plant in cooperation with Dii. In line with the Algerian national renewable energy 
scheme, 10% of the generated electricity would be designated for the Algerian power 
pool while 90% of its production will be sold to Europe, (Portail des Energies Re-
nouvelables en Algérie). 
Therefore, after an initially reserved reaction, Algeria would later become convinced 
and successively involved in this initiative inducing it to change its domestic policies 
into a more renewable-friendly, export-oriented system. While these production ca-
pacities are yet to be established, the mere existence of a variety of renewable energy 
initiatives has triggered a transition in many levels of externally-related Algerian ener-
gy policy. However, this does not mean that the challenges for the realisation of the 
trans-Mediterranean renewable energy projects identified in this subchapter had all 
been overcome. What has, however, transpired is a landscape-level influence. 
 
6.7.4. Conclusion: implications of renewable energy governance theory 
The last sections have presented the multitude of current, largely Euro-centric trans-
Mediterranean renewable energy efforts ( 6.7.2) and the Algerian reactions towards 
them ( 6.7.3). This section seeks to draw conclusions, which would inform theory build-
ing and serve the purpose of this “case study in the case study” in the Algeria chapter 
of this thesis. 
In terms of governance models, all options presented here work on a landscape-level 
or even attempt to create a meta-landscape through the establishment of a pan-
Mediterranean space. In terms of how the similar goals are to be realized, however, 
differences are visible. As corporate initiatives, Dii and Medgrid are very large-scale, 
top-down initiatives that remain largely controlled by European companies. As has 
been already emphasised, while local economic development and energy policy 
change in North Africa might not be the primary agenda of the cooperation between 
energy corporations, it should be acknowledged, that these initiatives have so far had 
more success than the MSP model, which follows a multi-stakeholder, international 
bottom-up model that is government-controlled and much less characterized by a 
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North-South power imbalance as is the case with the private sector initiatives. The 
politically-motivated avoidance of a methodology and of standards of the MSP might 
be a necessary tool to integrate all members of the UfM. In terms of project quality 
and feasibility, however, this appears rather ineffective. Furthermore, it has also be-
come evident that whichever model is more successful in the long run, a stable regula-
tory environment in the region is crucial for this success. Therefore, only by creating an 
open, level playing field, can initiatives succeed. Since this is currently not entirely the 
case, the probability of success of these projects remains uncertain. 
Lastly, while the power of the TREC imagery is considerable, Dii adds to it the neces-
sary credibility with regards to finances and technology ownership. Arguably, this 
combination induced Algerian officials to readdress their initially reserved policy to-
wards these trans-Mediterranean renewable electricity schemes. In conclusion, the 
trans-Mediterranean schemes presented here have turned into substantial landscape-
level variables for domestic Algerian renewable energy policy. However, it is difficult to 
discern what the effect on Algeria would be if the European regulatory-political or in-
deed the business community would abandon these project altogether. Most likely, 
this would constitute a severe blow for the entire Algerian renewable energy system 
and would not be limited to the export-oriented parts of the domestic schemes as re-
newables would lose a key export market. Moreover, the symbolic force of renewables 
failing in Europe, the frontrunner in both market regulation and technologies, should 
not be underestimated. 
 
6.8. Conclusions of the Algerian case study 
This chapter presented the second of the two case studies of Part B. As the previous 
case study, the Algerian case was analysed by means of the MLP analytical categories 
developed in Chapter  3. It has been shown that Algeria is the basis of initiatives on all 
the three MLP levels (landscape level: Subchapter  6.3; regime-level: Subchapter  6.4; 
and niche-level in Subchapter  6.5) that, compared to the UAE, are of an even more 
ambitious size while significantly less well publicised. Moreover, in contrast to the UAE, 
it is particularly the regime level, where the political elites attempt to introduce 
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changes through the regulatory re-structuring of the Algerian energy market and the 
recent renewable energy programme. As shown in the summative overview of Sub-
chapter  6.6, key features of the Algerian renewable energy policy system are: 
- its strong focus on a legal change with a poor monitoring of progress on the 
ground 
- centralized and opaque power structures with little room to manoeuvre for 
non-system-entrenched actors  
- a focus on long-term national megaprojects with a structural preference for 
centralized, top-down means of power production 
- a weak, but growing level of regionalization in the energy sector, both with-
in the Maghreb and with regards to Europe 
As the analysis of the trans-Mediterranean renewable energy efforts in Subchapter  6.7 
has shown, these initiatives have substantial impact on Algerian domestic policies. The 
strong export element in its extension plans can only be explained by this interaction. 
However, while the multitude of actors in this sector can be regarded as an innovative 
asset of this process, it has been shown that each initiative has its respective vulnera-
bilities, and that it is particularly the framework conditions set by the EU and its mem-
ber states that need to create a conducive environment for these planning schemes to 
work. 
In the following chapter, the national and transnational framework conditions identi-
fied in this case study will be applied for policy design by means of the TM model (Sub-
chapter  7.2). An ideal type application of this policy design model to Algeria will show 
the potentials and limitations of this system. 
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Part C: Comparison and Outlook 
After Part B exhaustively analysed renewable energy policies in the two case study 
countries, the following third part of this thesis aims to draw summative conclusions 
from the case studies with regards to the governance theory employed (TM) and fur-
ther elements of material energy policy (Chapter  7) as well as to contribute to a broad-
er discussion of governance theory (Chapter  8). The thesis will conclude with a summa-
tive presentation of the work’s research findings and will sketch pathways for further 
research in the relevant areas (Chapter  9). 
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7. Comparison of the results of both case studies  
In light of what has been discussed in the policy design section in Part A (Subchap-
ter  2.4), this chapter applies TM as a policy design model to the results of the UAE and 
the Algerian case studies (Chapters  5 and  6) thereby attempting to highlight the key 
governance features that determine the structures of renewable energy policy in re-
source-wealthy Arab states. 
This is performed in two different subchapters ( 7.1 and  7.2). Structured in parallel, the 
first sections ( 7.1.1 and  7.2.1) draft an ideal type energy policy informed by TM. Sub-
sequently, Sections  7.1.2 and  7.2.2 contrast these results with the findings of the case 
studies, showing the realpolitik caveats of the respective energy policy system. Lastly, 
Sections  7.1.3 and  7.2.3 analyse this sections’ results with regards to options and chal-
lenges for the application of TM to policy design in the UAE and Algeria. Subchap-
ter  7.3 then presents a brief comparative discussion of the case studies’ results identi-
fying features that are common to both types of resource-wealthy Arab state analyses 
in this thesis. 
Further questions on the travel of governance concepts and the call for de-
Westernising governance theory will be discussed in Chapter  8. 
 
7.1. Policy designs for the UAE energy system 
As has become apparent from the analysis of the UAE renewable energy policy system, 
the MLP analysis and the Masdar case study, UAE renewable energy policy is charac-
terized by a multi-speed, multi-actor system. Although particularly Abu Dhabi has 
launched elements of a significant renewable energy policy, it is yet to deliver a com-
prehensive policy document. With regards to the other emirates and the federal level, 
this is even more so the case. 
 
305 
 
7.1.1. Policy design with the Transition Management approach (ideal type) 
As Section  2.4.1 concluded, TM suggests a re-iterative policy design model that can be 
represented as a configuration of several interlinked innovation cycles that gradually 
increase in scale (see Figure 9). 
Following key transition literature such as Loorbach (2007, pp. 272; 291-292), Kemp 
(Kemp et al., 2007a&b; Kemp & Loorbach, 2006) and Grin (2008)226, the six steps of TM 
are: 
1) Problem structuring in the transition arena and formulating a vision: coordinat-
ed by government, setting up a multi-stakeholder energy council with the aim 
to develop a renewable energy vision as part of a wider national energy policy 
blueprint; 
2) Devising a concrete transition pathway and agenda: identifying key goals and 
realistic targets for mid- and long-term developments; choosing policy instru-
ments (e.g. feed-in-tariffs, tax benefit systems, legal changes in energy law or 
market restructuring); 
3) Experimental phase: putting the designed policies into action for a limited 
amount of time; 
4) Monitoring and evaluating the results: assessing the results, clearly identifying 
failures in the system, unexpected flaws and underperformances; 
5) Adaptation: attempt to find solutions to the negative outcomes/reinforce the 
successful elements of the programme; 
6) Starting again from step 1 (reiterative problem structuring) on a more ad-
vanced level. 
 
Applied to the UAE, an ideal system of policy design modelled by TM can be sketched 
as follows: 
1) Problem structuring in the transition arena and formulating a vision 
                                                      
226
 Cf. Subchapter  2.4 for a more in-depth discussion of TM. 
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- The relevant government authority – e.g. the Federal Ministry of Energy or, on 
emirate level, the power supplier and the regulator – set up a multi-
stakeholder energy council with the aim to develop a national energy vi-
sion/blueprint 
- While the government’s role is restricted to moderation, it ensures that the in-
terests of all stakeholders (power companies, CSOs, environmental and reli-
gious groups, industry) are heard and their positions integrated into a final poli-
cy document 
- In the process, the strengths and weaknesses of the energy system are openly 
assessed and potential scenarios developed to integrate renewables into the 
system 
- The council develops a policy paper through which the emirate-level or federal 
government formulate policy options 
 
 
2) Devising a concrete transition pathway and agenda 
- The council identifies tangible goals (e.g. the 7% goal) for the mid- (2020) and 
long-term perspective (2030; 2050) in the context of a national energy mix 
- The council adopts a set of renewable energy promotion instruments with reli-
able tax guarantees, renewables premiums 
- The council identifies a set of necessary changes in the regulatory set-up of the 
energy system and the power market 
 
3) Experimental phase 
- The measures are set in action on a small scale in order to test their efficiency 
and feasibility. This could take place in a free zone, or one particular 
town/neighbourhood of Abu Dhabi or Dubai 
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4) Monitoring and evaluating the results 
- The results are assessed, openly identifying systemic failures, unexpected flaws 
and underperformances 
 
5) Adaptation 
- The council takes notice of the test results and develops alternative or mitigat-
ing measures for the underperforming elements of the test 
 
6) Starting again from step 1  
- Roll-out of the plan after consultation with the energy council as a re-iterative 
project 
 
7.1.2. Realpolitik caveats of the ideal type model 
The previous section has outlined what could be regarded as an ideal policy model 
designed by TM for the integration of renewable energies in the UAE energy system. 
However, as the individual section conclusions and its overview reveal in Subchap-
ter  5.6 – both informed by the MLP analysis – there are major constraints to the un-
differentiated adoption of this policy. 
 
Table 21 re-enlists the key caveats highlighted in Section  2.4.2 extended by a column 
highlighting results of the UAE case study. 
Table 21: Critical points regarding the application of TM as model for policy design for the UAE 
Challenge  Description Findings of the UAE case study 
1 
Role of government and its self-
conception as a policy actor (“managers 
vs. rulers”) 
Government representatives have a self-
conception of “rulers” and do not regard 
themselves as managers in open government 
processes. Acute fear of a loss of power. 
2 
Role, policies (and existence of) relevant 
non-governmental stakeholders, such as 
businesses, civil society, research organi-
sations, national oil companies, other 
traditional energy governance bodies and 
international organisations (OPEC, etc.) 
Transregional and non-governmental stake-
holders are almost irrelevant to national 
renewable energy policy decisions, business 
circles are the only notable exception 
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3 
Willingness of government to codify its 
own policy in the form of a long-term 
vision and more tangible policy goals and 
instruments 
Low willingness to do so 
4 
Accountability and consistency issues: 
willingness of government to adhere to 
the course set by a national policy docu-
ment or similar announcements; ability of 
stakeholders to sue government/hold it 
accountable for sudden policy shifts 
High willingness to abide by agreed policy 
decisions, but low accountability of high-level 
decision-makers on the whole 
5 
Transparency issues in the assessment of 
renewable energy introduction schemes 
both in terms of technologies and market 
introduction 
Poor transparency 
6 
Inner-systemic adaptive capacities for ST 
regime change 
Poor capacities  
 
Combined with the ideal type TM policy design elements of the previous section, the 
following table presents those policy options that remain feasible after a realpolitik 
scrutiny.227 
Table 22: TM policy design, realpolitik caveats and remaining policy elements in the UAE 
Ideal type TM policy design for the UAE Realpolitik caveat 
Remaining policy option/ 
expected outcome 
1) Problem structuring in the transition arena and formulating a vision  
The relevant government authority – 
e.g. the Federal Ministry of Energy or, on 
emirate level, the power supplier and 
the regulator – set up a multi-
stakeholder energy council with the 
aiming to develop a national energy 
vision/blueprint 
Possible but not actively imple-
mented 
 
While the government’s role is restricted 
to moderation, it assures that interests 
of all stakeholders (power companies, 
CSOs, environmental and religious 
groups, industry) are heard and their 
positions integrated into a final policy 
document 
- Government is unlikely to ac-
cept pure management role 
- Inexistence of meaningful CSOs 
and other non-business stake-
holders  
- Unlikely a UAE government 
would invite real opposition 
members into the committee 
- Top-down approach 
favoured 
- Coalition between strong 
government and industry 
without other groups 
In the process, strengths and weakness-
es of the energy system are openly as-
sessed and potential scenarios devel-
oped to integrate renewables into the 
system  
Inexistence of meaningful CSOs 
and other non-business stake-
holders 
Assessments are likely to 
have a disproportional 
focus on business and 
technical issues with no 
balanced assessment pro-
                                                      
227
 The logical order of the following table is: “TM ideal type model” (column 1) – “Realpolitik caveat” 
(column 2) = “Remaining policy option/expected outcome” (column 3). 
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vided. Yet, they, might still 
be valuable contributions 
in the absence of other 
source material 
The council develops a policy paper on 
the basis of which the emirate-level or 
federal government decides  
Possible in theory, in practise 
unclear how much top-level 
leadership will heed the coun-
cil’s advice  
Production of a report by a 
pro-government body 
where is it uncertain 
whether the governments 
heeds its advice 
2) Devising a concrete transition pathway and agenda 
The council identifies tangible goals (e.g. 
the 7% goal) for the mid- (2020) and 
long-term perspective (2030; 2050) in 
the context of a national energy mix 
Implementable in the UAE con-
text, but so far not fully done 
except the 7% target for Abu 
Dhabi 
Implementable  
The council adopts a set of renewable 
energy promotion instruments with 
reliable tax guarantees, renewables 
premiums 
- Implementable in the UAE 
context, but so far not fully done 
- Strong favours of centralized 
measures against FITs and IPPs 
Centralized model without 
open FITs and little role for 
independent producers 
The council identifies a set of necessary 
changes in the regulatory set-up of the 
energy system and the power market 
Implementable, but so far not 
done 
 
3) Experimental phase 
The measures are implemented on a 
small scale in order to test their efficien-
cy. This could take place in a free zone, 
or one particular town/neighbourhood 
of Abu Dhabi or Dubai 
Implementable and done on a 
small scale for solar roof pro-
gramme; inclination towards 
mega-projects competes with 
this (Masdar) 
 
4) Monitor and evaluate the results 
The results are assessed, clearly identify-
ing failures in the system, unexpected 
flaws and underperformances  
Could only be implemented if 
assessment is not publicised 
Unpublished assessment 
5) Adaptation 
The council takes notice of the test re-
sults and develops alternative or mitigat-
ing measures for the underperforming 
elements of the test 
Implementable   
6) Start again from step 1  
Roll-out of the plan after a consultation 
of the energy council as a re-iterative 
project 
Implementable  
 
7.1.3. Applying TM as a policy design model in the UAE context – conclusions 
As a consequence of the assessment above, the following conclusions can be drawn 
with regards to TM-inspired energy policy design in the UAE: 
Initially, what remains from the original TM with regards to material policy design? In 
essence, the overall structure might formally appear similar to the TM setup. Thus, a 
310 
 
commission that works on the development of a national/emirate-level energy policy 
blueprint is certainly imaginable in the UAE context. However, it might differ substan-
tially from TM in its content and governance. While a multi stakeholder approach of 
TM is conceivable in the UAE setting, this chapter has indicated that it is unlikely that 
the government will integrate stakeholders from all parts of society, particularly genu-
ine opposition groups, into such a transition arena. Also, the self-conception of the 
UAE (or any emirate-level) government does not allow meaningful managerial auton-
omy in (energy) policy-making. Instead, it is likely that a high-level government official 
will claim ownership and demand control of the process. A decidedly critical dialogue 
on equal footing can hardly be expected. Furthermore, due to the autocratic govern-
ance structures in the country, it remains to be seen if a decision, once it has been tak-
en, has a binding character or whether it can be altered easily. Although the Abu Dhabi 
leadership appears to be adhering to its 7% target, in most other tangible renewable 
energy policy elements it has yet to deliver. 
Conceptually, a bottom-up niche strategy, as envisaged by TM, also does not truly 
match the UAE governance system. Certainly, a small-scale project to be rolled out at a 
later point in time is not unthinkable; yet, decision-makers have a clear preference for 
megaprojects, such as Masdar and the centralized, hierarchical power structures that 
come with it. Moreover, any system of open renewable energy promotion with a 
transparent pricing system is likely to face difficulties. Instead, stakeholders favour an 
opaque system of undisclosed prices for the renewables sector, to be negotiated be-
tween the power companies and the government. It is evident that these structures 
are beneficial to the larger power companies. Domestic power producers or similarly 
small groups could hardly profit from such arrangements. 
Lastly, this stress on central government combined with the lack of participatory ele-
ments in the political system and very few independent interest groups make an au-
thentic, publicly accessible assessment of the relevant policies a difficult undertaking. 
In a society where open government criticism is not taken for granted and government 
claims ownership for most policies, any re-iterative project, such as the introduction of 
a new energy production technology, necessarily faces systematic challenges. Innova-
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tion depends on an open, critical assessment, otherwise it cannot improve. If this is 
made impossible by stakeholders’ fear of speaking out, this creates a structural dilem-
ma in the national innovation process. The only way for a TM-inspired approach to 
circumvent this dilemma would be the launch of a fully confidential assessment in a 
closed-door meeting with the multi-stakeholder energy council. 
Finally, it has become apparent that TM as a policy model for the UAE functions only 
under severe constraints. Key elements of this model cannot be applied to the UAE’s 
political and economic system. The theoretical implications of this outcome for the 
broader discussion on the conditions of – and the need for – the transfer of govern-
ance concepts will be discussed in Chapter  8 combined with the results of the Algerian 
case study. 
 
7.2. Policy designs for the Algerian energy system 
The corresponding case study has shown that Algeria’s energy policy system remains 
dominated by the traditional oil and gas elites. While the central government still in-
troduced several renewable energy support schemes, their effects have so far not 
been palpable in terms of renewable electricity generation and RE power share. Lastly, 
it has been demonstrated that one pivotal enabling factor for intra-Algerian renewable 
energy politics are the various developments on the EU level, both from the govern-
ment and on behalf of the private sector, as they might be able to provide Algerian 
politicians with sufficient momentum and commercial interests to also foster domestic 
renewables. 
 
7.2.1. Policy design with the Transition Management approach (ideal type) 
Having presented the six steps of an ideal type, TM-inspired renewable energy policy 
in Sections  2.4.1 and  7.1.1, their application to the Algerian case could be sketched as 
follows: 
1) Problem structuring in the transition arena and formulating a vision 
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- The Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM), in combination with the CREG, 
Sonelgaz and further non-governmental groups establish an energy council and 
further develop the already existing national energy policy documents and laws 
- While the government’s role is restricted to management, it assures that the 
interests of all stakeholders (power companies, CSOs, environmental and reli-
gious groups, industry) are heard and their positions integrated into a final poli-
cy document 
- The strengths and weaknesses of the Algerian energy system are openly as-
sessed and potential scenarios to integrate renewables into the system devel-
oped 
- The council develops an updated version of the existing national policy docu-
ments 
 
2) Devising a concrete transition pathway and agenda 
- The council identifies tangible goals (e.g. the 7% goal) for the mid- (2020) and 
long-term perspective (2030; 2050) in the context of a national energy mix. It 
might critically reassess the numbers that have been previously published 
- The council analyses the regulatory renewable energy promotion instruments 
that are in place (RE law, market liberalisation) and critically assesses their ef-
fectiveness 
- The council identifies a set of necessary changes in the regulatory set-up of the 
energy system, its subsidy structure and the power market 
 
3) Experimental phase 
- The new programme is tested on a regional scale (i.e. several wila-
yas/administrational districts) in order to test their efficiency and feasibility. 
Given that Algeria has already introduced a (defunct) national renewable elec-
tricity programme, this step might not be necessary 
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4) Monitoring and evaluating the results 
- The results of the test cases and of the previous phases of the national renew-
able energy programme are critically assessed, with a particular focus on regu-
latory flaws and underperformances 
 
5) Adaptation 
- The council takes notice of the test results and develops alternative or mitigat-
ing measures for the underperforming elements in the programme 
 
6) Starting again from step 1  
- Roll-out of the plan after a consultation of the energy council as a re-iterative 
project 
 
7.2.2. Realpolitik caveats of the ideal type model 
The previous section has sketched what a TM-guided policy model might yield as a 
result in terms of renewable energy policy design for Algeria. However, as the section 
conclusions and the MLP-inspired overview in Subchapter  6.6 argue, a series of caveats 
prevents the unquestioned application of this model to the Algerian case. 
 
Table 23 re-enlists the key caveats highlighted in Section  2.4.2 extended by a column 
highlighting results of the Algerian case study.  
Table 23: Critical points regarding the application of TM as model for policy design for Algeria title 
Challenge  Description Findings of the Algerian case study 
1 
Role of government and its self-
conception as a policy actor (“managers 
vs. rulers”) 
Government representatives have a self-
conception of “rulers” and do not regard 
themselves as managers in open government 
processes. Acute fear of a loss of power; 
centralized, top-down governance structures 
persist 
2 
Role, policies (and existence of) relevant 
non-governmental stakeholders, such as 
businesses, civil society, research organi-
sations, national oil companies, other 
State-directed oil and gas business retain 
pivotal influence; few large private compa-
nies are influential; NGOs, int. energy bodies 
etc. remain insignificant 
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traditional energy governance bodies and 
international organisations (OPEC, etc.) 
3 
Willingness of government to codify its 
own policy in the form of a long-term 
vision and more tangible policy goals and 
instruments 
High willingness as documented by several 
official national energy policy programmes in 
recent years 
4 
Accountability and consistency issues: 
willingness of government to adhere to 
the course set by a national policy docu-
ment or similar announcements; ability of 
stakeholders to sue government/hold it 
accountable for sudden policy shifts 
Low accountability, re-adjustment of num-
bers, very poor performance of current regu-
latory and market regime 
5 
Transparency issues in the assessment of 
renewable energy introduction schemes 
both in terms of technologies and market 
introduction 
Theoretical capacity exists, but poor trans-
parency to actually perform this task 
6 
Inner-systemic adaptive capacities for ST 
regime change 
Poor capacities  
 
Combined with the ideal type TM policy design elements of the previous section, the 
following situation emerges: 
Table 24: TM policy design, realpolitik caveats and remaining policy elements in Algeria 
Ideal type TM policy design for Algeria Realpolitik caveat Remaining policy option/ 
expected outcome 
1) Problem structuring in the transition arena and formulating a vision  
The Ministry of Energy and Mines 
(MEM), in combination with the CREG, 
Sonelgaz and further non-governmental 
groups establish an energy council to 
develop further the already existing 
national energy policy documents and 
laws 
None   
While the government’s role is restricted 
to moderation, it assures the interests of 
all stakeholders (power companies, 
CSOs, environmental and religious 
groups, industry) are heard and their 
positions integrated into a final policy 
document 
- Government is not likely to 
accept pure management role 
- Absence of meaningful CSOs 
and other non-business stake-
holders  
- The coalition of MEM and the 
oil and gas conglomerates re-
main the most powerful interest 
group and will attempt to un-
dermine any challenge of their 
hegemony 
Top-down approach fa-
voured 
Coalition between strong 
government and state-run 
hydrocarbons industry 
with few private business-
es under the exclusion of 
other groups 
Strengths and weaknesses of the Algeri-
an energy system are openly assessed 
and potential scenarios developed to 
integrate renewables into the system 
Lack of transparency; unlikely 
that of such information would 
be published 
Documents are likely to 
have a disproportional 
focus on business and 
technical issues with brief 
mention of governance 
and regulation 
Council develops an updated version of Possible, however uncertain Re-assessment of current 
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the existing national policy documents whether this version would 
mention and remove all neces-
sary barriers  
programme is likely to be 
issued as a “new launch” 
without serious assess-
ment of failures of former 
RE programmes 
2) Devising a concrete transition pathway and agenda 
Council identifies tangible goals (e.g. the 
7% goal) for the mid- (2020) and long-
term perspective (2030; 2050) in the 
context of a national energy mix. It 
might critically reassess the numbers 
that have been previously published 
Implementable, goals exist al-
ready, their feasibility needs to 
be re-examined 
 Implementable 
Council analyses the regulatory renewa-
ble energy promotion instruments that 
are in place (RE law, market liberalisa-
tion) and critically assesses their effec-
tiveness 
- Implementable, however, mar-
ket structures & price subsidies 
(main barriers) are unlikely to be 
tackled  
- Strong favours of centralized 
measures against FITs and IPPs 
Centralized model without 
open FITs and little role for 
independent producers 
 
Council identifies a set of necessary 
changes in the regulatory set-up of the 
energy system, its subsidy structure and 
the power market 
Unlikely to be implemented; 
market structure is unlikely to 
change 
Closed market conditions 
might remain, only the 
integration of RE into the 
national subsidy theme 
remains as realistic option 
3) Experimental phase 
New programme is tested on a regional 
scale (i.e. several wilayas) in order to 
test their efficiency. Given that Algeria 
has already introduced a (defunct) na-
tional renewable electricity programme, 
this step might not be necessary 
Implementable, might not be 
necessary for Algeria 
 
4) Monitor and evaluate the results 
Results of the test cases and of the pre-
vious phases of the national renewable 
energy programme are critically as-
sessed, with a particular focus on regula-
tory flaws and underperformances 
Could only be implemented if 
assessment is not publicised 
Unpublished assessment 
5) Adaptation 
Council takes notice of the test results 
and develops alternative or mitigating 
measures for the underperforming ele-
ments of the test 
Implementable   
6) Start again from step 1  
Roll-out of the plan after a consultation 
of the energy council as a re-iterative 
project 
Conflict with already existing 
schemes might arise 
Altered re-launch of al-
ready existing pro-
grammes is the most likely 
option  
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7.2.3. Applying TM as a policy design model in the Algerian context – conclu-
sions 
Following the caveats presented in the previous section, the following conclusions can 
be drawn: 
As in the UAE case, the Algerian system of energy policy already features some ele-
ments that are taken up by TM, such as long-term national planning documents that 
are developed in close cooperation between the MEM, CREG and Sonelgaz. Yet, this 
already highlights one key caveat: Algerian energy policy decision-makers are by and 
large system-entrenched actors that will neither allow any form of open government 
nor genuinely multi-stakeholder approaches. It has been demonstrated that the ab-
sence of substantial civil-society groups in the field and the weakness of RET compa-
nies make their integration unlikely. This is also the case for the managerial concept of 
government, which does not appeal to the current Algerian political elite. Further, the 
vast gap between the de jure legal situation and the de facto performance on the 
ground do not appear open to an independent assessment of test results. 
Furthermore, the engrained Algerian centralism, the partially-open market regime and 
the state-centeredness of business cast doubts about the efficiency and innovatory 
power of the socio-technical niches that the government is attempting to create and 
that, in principle, would align well with TM. 
In conclusion, the highlighted elements make successful, TM-inspired policy planning 
unlikely. The realpolitik caveats show that a large number of essential TM features are 
unlikely to succeed under the present circumstances in Algeria. 
Meanwhile, the main tenets of TM, such as the concepts of bottom-up strategy and its 
reiterative processing based on transparent assessments of the achievements and 
shortcomings of the test programmes do not fall on fruitful ground in Algeria. Instead, 
through a continued centralization and the support of mega-projects, the country’s 
most powerful institutions cling to power and remain in control. Additionally, TM is 
designed for an open market with transparent price structures and subsidy schemes. 
Needless to say, this is not present in Algeria and it is likely to remain as such for the 
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time being. As a result, this reinforces the power of the entrenched companies as only 
they have sufficient negotiating channels, contacts and insider information to reach an 
agreement with state institutions. Others, such as small-scale, decentralised and/or 
foreign agents are thus unlikely to be given preference at all.  
In a nutshell, TM as a policy design model for Algerian energy policy is unlikely to yield 
the desired results as core elements of this model are diametrically opposed to the 
structures of Algerian energy policy. 
 
7.3. Results of the case studies compared 
Both case studies have shown how the energy policy systems in the respective Arab 
state categories228 present themselves under a multi-level perspective. Informed by 
the country case study analyses, the previous sections have identified which realpolitik 
caveats European innovation policy model are likely to face in both countries. Howev-
er, it also became evident that in spite of their vastly different socio-economic indica-
tors, systems of government and population structures, overall energy policy functions 
along the similar lines in both states. More specifically, this is the case for renewable 
energy policy, which supports the conclusion that the framework conditions for re-
newable energy policy in hydrocarbons-wealthy Arab states are, after all, similar due 
to the pivotal role of resource exports and the rentier character of societies. The struc-
ture of the electricity markets, the opacity and centralisation of governance structures, 
                                                      
228
 See the definitions in the Introduction (Chapter 1): 
“The resource-rich Arab states…fall into two sub-categories: on the one hand, there are the small city 
states of the Gulf region, such as Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Economically, 
they are characterized by a large non-native work force and a high GDP-per capita-ratio. On the political 
level, these states have been most active in reforming their traditionally weak governance structures by 
an on-going (albeit at times symbolic) reform process. Due to the small national populations hydrocar-
bon rents can be generously distributed, which results in high human development indices. 
The other subcategory of hydrocarbons-wealthy states is constituted by the territorial states of Iraq, 
Libya and Algeria and Saudi Arabia. In spite of their major oil and gas reserves, the wealth needs to be 
distributed among much larger numbers of nationals on a major national territory making these states 
upper or even lower middle income states. These factors, as well as the at times turbulent interior dy-
namics of these states, have generated entirely different governance structures than in the Gulf sheikh-
doms, resulting only in “medium human development” values alongside many other non-resource-rich 
Arab states.” 
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the lack of climate policy awareness and the other aspects shown in the MLP analysis 
of Part B also support this argumentation. 
In addition to this, the previous sections have elaborated that although TM can gener-
ate innovative concepts for renewable energy policies on paper; its practical implica-
tion remains a daunting task. This is owed to the fact that in both cases, the markets 
are not open to all participants and electricity prices are not free-floating. Instead, any 
energy policy that intends to be implemented will have to acknowledge the fact that it 
must set incentives in systems characterised by closed-off markets and fixed prices. 
Furthermore, the prevalent opaque and authoritarian governance structures, the per-
sisting power of the oil and gas elites and the absence of substantial, adequately em-
powered civil society groups form political framework conditions that cannot be ig-
nored. A crucial consequence of this is that the states analysed show little sign of mov-
ing to more participative, distributed and bottom-up forms of political process. This 
goes parallel with the rulers’ fascination for megaprojects, such as Masdar in the UAE 
or Desertec and the new renewable energy policy scheme in Algeria – a fact that any 
actually implementable innovation policy has to take into account.229 
As had been established above, the actual differences between the respective political 
elites are in fact smaller than originally envisaged. While the oil-wealthy royal families 
in the Gulf (in our case: the UAE) enjoy a quasi-absolute rulership that is characterized 
by limitations on free expression, the political-military complex in Algeria gives itself a 
more democratic appearance but is, in fact even more sclerotic and sceptical towards 
change than most Gulf rulers. While both countries are in theory ruled by a constitu-
tion, the more personalised form of government in these de facto absolute monarchies 
allows rulers in the Gulf States much room for manoeuvre. However, the difference 
between the de jure and de facto regime in Algeria is so substantial that effectively, 
rulers enjoy a similarly large range of instruments of power and are equally little bound 
to previous rules, laws or official announcements they have made. 
                                                      
229
 While regional energy experts are aware of the fact that projects like Masdar do not produce much 
knowledge that can actually be used in actual market situations (Interview no. 88 – R&D, UAE), in pyram-
idal power structures as are given here, rulers’ predilections have to be factored in to a certain extent. 
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The conditions, enablers and uncertainties for renewable energy policy in resource-
wealthy Arab states have therefore been delineated thereby revealing that despite the 
multitude of differences at first glance, the underlying structures remain strikingly 
similar. The significant underperformance of the Arab rentier states with respect to the 
spread of renewables, one of the research questions posed in the introduction to this 
thesis can be explained by the political intricacies and legal and economic inconsisten-
cies.  
In line with the initial research aims, it is not the goal of this chapter to develop a fully-
fledged national energy policy for one country. This requires more technical work on 
issues such as electricity pricing structures, law reform, technology options and the 
other problems discussed in Part B and would constitute the work of governmental 
policy planning or energy consulting. Instead, the goal of this section was to highlight 
the key governance features that any material energy policy has to take into account. 
The exercise of drafting energy policy by means of TM has identified which governance 
structures present realpolitik caveats to an overly quick application of such approaches 
and– coupled with the MLP analysis of the national energy systems – has laid open the 
fundamental governance structures that form the pivotal conditions of success of ma-
terial energy policy in resource-wealthy Arab states. 
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8. Outcomes for theory development 
After Chapter  7 discussed the results of both case studies with regards to the applica-
bility of TM and the similarities and differences between the country types analysed by 
the MLP method, this chapter aims to further discuss a series of wide-ranging ques-
tions, on two different layers. Policy design models and potential substitutes for the 
TM model for material energy policy design will be discussed in Subchapter  8.1 while 
Subchapter  8.2 will focus on the implications of socio-technical governance concepts 
and the interaction of the results with a broader call for a de-westernisation and in-
digenisation of governance theory. 
 
8.1. Transition Management and substitute policy design strategies 
Informed by the MLP-based analysis of the two case studies (Chapters  5 and  6) the 
previous Chapter  7 has demonstrated that designing renewable energy policy with TM-
inspired policy models in these cases – and by proxy in this group of countries230 – has 
only somewhat limited chances of success. In short, TM’s critics that it is essentially 
reflecting and made for a Dutch liberal consensus type of polity have indeed highlight-
ed a serious shortcoming. In more detail, it was shown that this problem is rooted in 
TM’s strong reliance on elements of open government, transparency and liberal mar-
ket systems. In opposition to Kern (2009) who argues that TM does not reflect national 
politics and power relations enough and thus becomes overly functionalistic, the au-
thor would contend that TM – in principle – takes these variables into account on the 
theory level as it integrates governments, non-governmental agents and further stake-
holders and movers in society and is thus open and flexible to work with different 
modes of governance. However, for a TM-inspired policy design model to succeed, 
those variables cannot be filled with the factual content they would get in the two case 
                                                      
230
 It is one of the key methodological tenets of case study research that the results produced by a thor-
ough analysis of the case studies are representative to the type of state as a whole. However, context-
related contingencies always make the transferability of results provisional; a transfer can never take 
place without a critical analysis and context-adaption of the results. 
321 
 
studies since the way these structures work would undermine the very structure of TM 
policy design. Most bottom-up policy design elements face strong resistance in the 
region; the government’s aim to retain their role as sole actors in the process that are 
both hardly accountable and beyond criticism. As a consequence, hopes for the suc-
cess of niche-based innovation models are empirically unfounded for the target region. 
This also applies to the “islands of efficiency” concept that has been discussed earlier. 
Gulf rulers take a particular liking in the notion of these niches and other lighthouse 
projects that have had a certifiable success in other industry sectors. However, at the 
current moment, system-transforming innovations cannot be expected from such ap-
proaches in the field of large-scale renewable electricity production.  
Thus, how could a policy design model that is alternative to TM and that reflects the 
experience from the case studies be adequately characterized? The following rough list 
of seven realpolitik phenomena, renewable energy incentives and barriers has to be 
taken into account: 
First, the model needs to work under a top-down system of government that is less 
open, more autocratic and more erratic than a TM ideal type government. It must also 
incorporate the insufficient legal guarantees that exist for already extant scheduled 
projects and initiatives. 
Second, such a model must factor in only a minimal role of civil society intervention 
and cannot focus much on transparency towards third parties. Thus, what is needed is 
a system that enables the strongly intertwined oil and gas business and the political 
elites to find a formula that offers them sufficient incentives to move ahead with real 
change in the renewables sector. 
Third, this model requires a pricing system that heavily subsidizes electricity prices for 
the end users. Its only chance is to be integrated in the existing subsidy scheme. 
Fourth, mega-structures appear to appeal to leaders in this group of countries. Decen-
tralised, bottom-up structures might therefore be desirable for the various reasons 
discussed, yet, they are unlikely to succeed. Ideally, these structures will become “is-
322 
 
lands of efficiency” in their respective field. Yet, considering the uncertain future of 
Masdar, this is not a given. 
Fifth, renewables can garner potential support by the ever-growing electricity demand 
in the countries analysed thereby resulting in an eventual drop in the fossil reserves 
bound for the world market. While environmental and climate change concerns play 
only a minor role here, long-term economic growth scenarios take renewables into 
account. 
Sixth, these states currently perform poorly on the science and technology indicators. 
However, while technological leadership on behalf of this group of states is unlikely 
any time soon, there is an industrial potential in the mid-term perspective. In this re-
gard, particularly the sizable funds of the SWFs could stimulate growth. 
Seventh, key movers for public awareness on the local level could be well-designed 
campaigns using secular references to environmental ethics thus transcending reli-
gious boundaries and cross-referencing education in schools and universities with the 
global environmental discourse. 
 
The Chinese model, with its strikingly similar features, offers inspiration for a renewa-
ble energy policy design model, which operates successfully under similar conditions. 
Most elements described are arguably similar to the Chinese model. Features such as 
political authoritarianism and government opacity, a predilection for long-term plans 
and mega-projects, poor innovation indicators, inexistence of civil society, subsidized 
electricity pricing can be found in both settings. Remarkably though, in spite of the 
intricacies highlighted, the People’s Republic has succeeded in launching a highly suc-
cessful renewable energy programme during the last decade. Large investments sup-
ported the spread of renewable power capacities in the country, with the Chinese so-
lar module producers, in particular, experiencing unprecedented growth. 
While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to present a full account of Chinese re-
newable energy policies it is remarkable how many parallels appear between the Chi-
nese model and the energy policy system of resource-rich Arab countries. It would be a 
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worthwhile undertaking to develop a policy design model for these countries on the 
basis of the Chinese energy policy. Developed on the basis of a realistic best-practise 
assessment of Chinese renewable energy policies, such a policy design model could 
indeed be instrumental for resource-wealthy Arab states.231 
In conclusion, the MLP has emerged as a regionally neutral methodology capable of 
analysing and explaining the core structures of energy policy in any given country. The 
policy design model of TM, in contrast, proved to be too value-laden, too normatively-
based on European concepts rendering it unfit for an application in a fundamentally 
different policy setting. As it is unlikely that social, political and economic framework 
conditions similar to those envisioned by TM will evolve in the Arab world any time 
soon, an empirically grounded policy design model based on Chinese energy policy has 
been suggested as a potential thread for further research. 
 
8.2. Indigenisation and de-westernisation? Implications for socio-technical 
governance concepts 
This thesis has shown that the application of TM as a somewhat typical “Western” re-
newable energy governance approach to the context of resource-wealthy Arab states 
had severe shortcomings. While this is an important conclusion in and of itself, finding 
potential alternatives for this policy design model triggers a more in-depth reflection. 
Given that an MLP-inspired analysis revealed the structures of a national energy sys-
tem, would we merely need a more Middle East-applicable policy model than TM? On 
a purely managerial, policy design level, and as suggested in the previous subchapter, 
this is the obvious conclusion. Yet, on a more fundamental level, the question remains, 
as it is likely that eventually, other policy design models empirically grounded on a dif-
ferent body politique would generate a criticism similar to the one levelled at TM. 
Would that, in turn, entail that any policy design model to be applied to another region 
needs to be genuinely autochthonous in order for it to have a real impact? It is indeed 
                                                      
231
 One expert interviewee with expertise in the field of Chinese politics confirmed this notion (Interview 
no. 46 – R&D, Europe). 
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evident that the effectiveness of policy design elements needs to be critically assessed 
when applied to different regions. A FIT system, for instance, cannot be introduced in a 
similar manner into societies that have an entirely different socio-economic fabric. This 
rings true in this case to the extent that it is almost a truism. However, on a more fun-
damental level, the matter is more complex as governance theory is confronted with 
the irreconcilable difference between cultural relativists and logical essentialists.232 
On one end of the spectrum, the outcome of this conundrum would be a call for the 
indigenisation of governance concepts. Claiming that all political concepts essentially 
reflect the society in which they were developed, such a transfer could not but be 
flawed. Thus, supporters of this school of thought would assert that this is not related 
to questions of merely identifying which policy element works best in which context in 
a legal-technocratic manner. Instead, the underlying differences between indigenous 
cultures run too deep to be glossed over by such managerial issues. Such a cultural 
relativist model would argue that cultures even develop different logical systems that 
cannot be bridged. The way that “Western” concepts of statehood such as “democra-
cy” and “capitalism” appear to have succeeded to enter governance systems on a 
global scale is a merely temporary phenomenon that overlooks the vast difference 
how the apparently identical concepts are in fact employed and defined around the 
globe. On a more political level, this could be interpreted as the attempt of “the West” 
to force a hegemonic discourse, a system of governance and economy on other world 
regions thereby securing its supremacy on most levels. Followers of this argument 
would consequently call for a deep de-colonization and de-Westernisation of all gov-
ernance sectors to undo “provincializing Europe” (Chakrabarty, 2008). In the same 
vein, Badie traces the modern concept of “the State” back to post-enlightenment Eu-
rope and its violent European export by means of colonialism forcing most other socie-
ties to adopt a non-native governance model for their own social organization. While 
this process also had repercussions on the original European model, these arguably 
were less significant than the “failed universalization” process, which has affected and 
                                                      
232
 The issue of global energy governance has recently been the subject of research literature; cf. for 
instance Lesage et al. (2010). 
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continues to affect many non-European governance systems in a major way (Badie, 
2000). Meanwhile, Badie and Birnbaum argue that most national governance struc-
tures are essentially based on a system reflecting the particular historic socio-political 
and economic circumstances in colonial Europe, essentially built on the principles of 
Westphalian sovereignty. While this concept has diffused and differentiated over the 
course of the last two centuries in the (post-)colonial states, it remains the basic organ-
isational structure until today (Badie & Birnbaum, 1991). 
Renewable energy governance is a case in point. European energy governance models 
in terms of market organisation, technology choice and legal regulation have spread 
around the globe with hardly any conceptual alternative. Yet, it is evidently not a given 
that a German FIT-system or liberal market pricing models are a cure to under-priced 
and outdated electricity systems as well as the ever-growing electricity demand in the 
MENA region. 
 
On the other hand, the variation of concepts in this subject area is remarkably limited; 
in fact, genuinely local governance patterns for large-scale energy systems hardly exist. 
This noteworthy phenomenon feeds well into arguments of the opposing, logical-
essentialist position, which Buisson describes as “universalistic and teleological” (Bu-
isson, 2007, p. 118). In response and in opposition to Badie and Birnbaum, Bayart con-
tends that while state structures in Africa and Asia are often regarded as conceptual 
imports, the main principle of historical state formation is “conflictual, unintentional, 
generally unconscious and, as a result, often paradoxical” (Bayart, 1996). Bayart con-
tinues by stating that while, undoubtedly, there are some European roots in modern 
non-European statehood, the days of only copying European governance structures 
are long gone. Instead, drawing on Homi Bhaba’s “mimicry” (Bhabha, 2003), these in-
stitutions have by now “acquired their own social roots and have become culturally 
appropriated” (Bayart, 1996), or “hybrid”, as Bhaba puts in. Contrary to Bhaba, how-
ever, Bayart severely attacks the “invention” of postcolonial studies and largely rejects 
the significance of the colonial area for today’ globalized world (Bayart, 2011). 
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With respect to renewable energy matters, proponents of this argumentation might 
concede that many mistakes can be made (and avoided) on the managerial level by 
choosing a best-practise model for the governance situation in a certain country. Yet, it 
appears untenable that every region or state would need to develop its very own, au-
tochthonous regulatory structure. It is questionable whether there are conceivable 
logical alternatives, for instance, to a quota system and a FIT model. Similarly, the un-
derperformance, opacity, corruption and authoritarianism that dominate some their 
political systems (and by proxy their energy markets, energy regulation and govern-
ance structures) cannot be seen as outflows of a governance model that is fundamen-
tally different from a Western one. Only then could we assume that such a system op-
erates according to a different (sound, not criminal) logic that needs to be protected 
and respected on a theoretical as well as on a practical level. In short, the existence of 
a tertium between the often binary logic of socio-technical regime governance appears 
to stand on a poor empirical ground. 
The cultural-relativist model can also be criticised for how it identifies the units that 
are allegedly the indivisible cultural core around which an energy governance system 
could to be constructed “organically”. Obviously, state borders do not qualify as they 
are far too volatile and often artificially constructed; major religions also appear as 
unsatisfactory as languages. Indeed, no unit, which fits these descriptions and could 
withstand a well-structured criticism of logical essentialists, comes to mind. 
Far from claiming to resolve this deep academic dispute, it appears that the call for 
indigenisation with a de-colonializing agenda in the field of energy governance is ra-
ther detached from the socio-political realities. The following research findings of this 
thesis should, therefore, be underlined: 
- Western energy governance models cannot and should not claim a conceptual 
monopoly for energy policy guidelines in other world regions in and of them-
selves. While most governance models in the renewable energy sector world-
wide have their origin in the West, these models are not expected to perfectly 
“fit” in the Arab world. Although Europe can claim to have developed a world-
leading renewable energy related performance, Arab leaders might find energy 
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policy design models in other parts of the world, which match the local policy 
landscape, more appropriate. One example is China, but also other states, such 
as Brazil or India might be valuable partners for South-South cooperation in the 
field of renewable energy governance. 
- In turn, governance concepts cannot merely be rejected because they originate 
from a non-OAPEC world region or lack explicit regional connections. However, 
governance theory needs to take the local socio-political situation into account 
and highlight constraints that influence the energy sector. 
- The claim of governance theory in the renewable energy sector is always 
transregional. It is uncertain to what extent the technicalities of the organisa-
tion of energy sectors could be indigenised both on a theoretical as well as on a 
practical level. 
- While a naïve copy-and-paste post-colonialist model obviously does not exist in 
the case study countries, a colonial legacy remains tangible in terms of state 
organisation and regulation. Algeria’s political system is closely modelled on 
that of France. Its centralised structure and law-oriented reform approach in 
the renewable energy sector also resemble France’s approach. In the UAE, on 
the other hand, the legal and constitutional system is far less developed. In-
stead, the renewable energies initiatives are more project-based and decentral-
ised, which is probably influenced by the continued Anglo-American presence 
in the Gulf (Onley, 2009). 
- In the corresponding country case studies, the local energy governance debates 
are led were those between centralists and proponents of a decentralised ap-
proach; between market liberals and supporters of subsidized, closed markets, 
those rejecting Western concepts as eco-colonialism and those embracing 
them. In the two cases analysed, however, no local energy governance theory 
has emerged, neither as a fully-fledged theory nor as latent ideologemes that 
reach beyond a rejection or embrace of Western governance elements. Thus, 
all the options discussed in Algeria and the UAE must be considered as non-
native theory imports, and the call for the appreciation of local governance 
concepts in the renewable energy sector stands on a somewhat shaky empirical 
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ground. One might argue that it is precisely this local element of theory that is 
missing in both states in order to help renewables off the ground. This is, how-
ever, only a weak argument that is not empirically grounded, and the opposite 
could equally find support. 
 
This chapter has delineated the thesis’ results on energy governance theory in light of 
the larger, controversial debate on post-colonial legacies in the areas of governance 
and state formation. While it is easy to concede that a badly performed transfer of 
policy design models to different world regions stands little chance of success without 
a deep conceptual root in the country to which it is transferred, postcolonial theory 
further complicates matters. Whereas a call for a de-Europeanization and a stronger 
development (and factoring in) of indigenous theory elements is easy to sound, as 
shown in the case studies, no indigenous governance models for the renewable energy 
sector have actually been developed, much less custom-made, for resource-rich Arab 
states. 
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9. Final conclusions and recommendations for further research  
This thesis set out to address a wide range of issues related to renewable energy poli-
cies in resource-rich Arab countries. The final chapter sets out to present the thesis’ 
key results in a summative overview recalling the essence of each chapter (Sec-
tion  9.1.1) and highlighting key findings of this work (Section  9.1.2). Finally, Subchap-
ter  9.2 will present an outlook for further research pathways with regards to renewa-
ble energy and innovation policy studies in the Middle East. 
 
9.1. Conclusions 
9.1.1. Summative overview 
The thesis displayed the following structure: 
Part A introduced the main elements necessary to conduct a case study analysis in Part 
B. Chapter  1 introduced the main themes of the study, presenting the increased global 
willingness to extent global renewable energy production facilities and contrasted this 
with the significant underperformance of these efforts in Arab world as a whole, and 
among the resource-rich Arab states in particular. Despite their affluence, their steadi-
ly growing demand for energy and a resource-economic incentive to export as much 
hydrocarbon resources as possible, these states have so far missed out on the global 
renewable energy boom. After defining two sub-categories (small city states vs. terri-
torial states) two states (Algeria and the UAE) were identified as suitable representa-
tives of the respective categories to analyse the issue in greater detail. 
Meanwhile, Chapter  2 reviewed key strands of research literature (Subchapter  2.2). 
The chapter argued that since the nature of this study is interdisciplinary, the work has 
to interact with three strands of literature simultaneously: the broader field of Middle 
Eastern Studies (Section  2.2.1), the area of material energy studies (Section  2.2.2), and 
the field of governance theory and concepts of socio-technical change (Section  2.2.3). 
In spite of the wealth of specialized literature on various aspects of the topic, it has 
been shown that there is a lack of comprehensive research literature focusing on ener-
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gy transitions within resource-rich Arab states. By integrating elements from all three 
areas of research into the country case studies of Part B, this thesis aims to contribute 
to research at the crossroads of these areas. Following a discussion on the main areas 
of research literature, the chapter then developed the analytical framework for the 
case studies, the multi-level perspective (MLP, Subchapter  2.3). Its tripartite structure 
allows the researcher to analyse trends and interdependencies on each and between 
the three levels respectively. Having discussed the shortcomings of MLP as well, this 
subsection developed analytical dimensions of renewable energy policy in hydrocar-
bons-rich Arab states that served as a guideline for the case study analyses (see Table 
3). While the MLP analysis was introduced to serve as a tool to guide the analytical 
section of the thesis, i.e. the country case studies, Subchapter  2.4 introduced the policy 
design theory for this thesis, the Transition Management model. This model has been 
used to trigger governance processes in the renewable energy sector in various west-
ern European countries. After critically presenting both its advantageous and problem-
atic characteristics in Section  2.4.1, Section  2.4.2 discussed how to transfer governance 
concepts through space and what the experiences of such transfers have revealed thus 
far in areas such as regulation and market structures. This section sets the stage for 
Part C, which later sets out to examine the transferability of governance concepts in 
different regions of the world. Table 4 concludes this section enumerating critical is-
sues relating to the application of TM as a policy design model in Arab oil and gas 
wealthy countries. This overview is taken up again and developed further in the two 
sections discussing realpolitik caveats of the application of TM (Sections  7.1.2 
and  7.2.2). 
After interacting with the research literature and establishing the analytical and policy 
design frameworks in Chapter  2, Chapter  3 presented the material policy context for 
renewable energy policies in resource-rich Arab states on the three levels defined by 
MLP: landscape- regime- and niche level. In its three subchapters it discusses material 
renewable energy policy issues, which determine whether a country makes significant 
progress with the renewable energy strategies it has developed or whether these, at 
times, ambitious strategies take no actual effect in the country. Each section or subsec-
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tion concluded with a corresponding research question, which formulated the key re-
search interest for the overall purpose of the thesis and informed the development of 
the 18 questions in the research questionnaire presented in Subchapter  3.5. 
Chapter  4 marks the end of Part A. This chapter discussed questions of research meth-
odology with a particular emphasis on the five aspects the thesis covers: a qualitative, 
elite research approach (1) using expert interviews for data collection (2); a compara-
tive case study approach including “case studies within the case study” (3); structuring 
and analysing the interview and case study results with the help of the MLP method 
(4), whose results will be used to draft renewable energy policy models with TM (5). 
Meanwhile, Part B represents the empirical core of the thesis. In two extensive case 
studies, the energy systems of the UAE (Chapter  5) and Algeria (Chapter  6), have been 
analysed using by the analytical structure and theories developed in Part A. Both case 
studies begin with an account of the data collection phase followed by three main ana-
lytical subchapters, the landscape- regime- and niche-level analyses of the respective 
energy system. 
The individual sections concluded with two country analyses (Subchapters  5.6 and  6.6) 
where key findings were presented in a summative overview of the individual section 
conclusions, which were in turn guided by the research questions developed in Chap-
ter  3. In order to enhance the legibility and comparability of the data, both case stud-
ies were structured in a parallel manner. In addition to the answers to the research 
questions, these sections also contained the main analytical points of these case stud-
ies. For instance, both cases reveal that in spite of promising renewable energy initia-
tives, a success is by no means a given. These realpolitik caveats of renewable energy 
policies have also been used to inform the discussion in Chapter  7. 
In addition to the MLP analysis of both case study countries, the energy systems of 
Algeria and the UAE have encountered/launched initiatives that are of a potentially 
pivotal importance for the overall success of the countries’ renewable energy efforts. 
However, due to their size and complexity it appeared reasonable to present these 
structures and analyse their role in the national energy systems as well as conditions of 
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their success, hence the addition of the Masdar Initiative and the trans-Mediterranean 
renewable energy policy subchapters (Subchapters  5.7 and  6.7 respectively). 
The final Part C aimed to draw conclusions from both case studies both with regards to 
material energy policy as well as energy governance and innovation theory. Chapter  7 
applied the TM policy design model to the results of the case studies. After presenting 
a standard TM-inspired policy design, an ideal type model was drafted and subse-
quently applied to the case study results in Sections  7.1.2 and  7.2.2. However, the gap 
between the outcomes and reality showed the difficulty of using TM – or any similar 
Western-oriented policy design model – to draft renewable energy policy for resource-
rich Arab states. In spite of the differences in the political systems of the two country 
types analysed, the barriers to the application of TM persisted. 
Following this assessment, Chapter  8 discussed these results and their consequences 
with regards to the applicability of TM to different world regions (Subchapter  8.1). It 
emphasised that while applying open government approach such as TM had severe 
caveats, drafting policy design models inspired by a different political setting, such as 
China, might be a rewarding future research path. Subchapter  8.2 concluded by feed-
ing into the broader discussions on governance theory and the notion of indigeniza-
tion. Stressing the shortcomings of applying a European model to the specific policy 
context of Arab OPEC states, this section argued that while the post-colonialist call for 
indigenisation is often swiftly sounded, empirical findings for such attempts in re-
source-wealthy Arab states remain poor. 
 
9.1.2. Key contributions to research and methodology 
As mentioned in both case studies, the author experienced difficulties gaining access 
to some of the key stakeholders in both Algeria and the UAE. This is owed partially to 
the fact of being a non-resident foreigner in both countries, but mostly due to the ex-
tremely hierarchical and often blurred decision-making structures present in both cas-
es. The level that might have been able to clarify unanswered issues would have been, 
in the case of the UAE, a member of the ruling family in the rank of a minister; and a 
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similarly high public or military official in Algeria. The likelihood of obtaining an on-the-
record research interview allowing critical questions for such a project is indeed small. 
However, this does not mean that the data collected was less valid as it is the aim of 
this comprehensive approach to lay bare the structures of (renewable) energy policy 
and conditions for its innovation under the circumstances of a resource-rich Arab 
country. This energy system analysis, as well as the gathering of stakeholders’ opinions 
about the transferability and the potential for home-grown energy governance models 
could still be conducted as the multiple interviewees and the different sources con-
sulted helped procure a valid, multi-dimensional picture of the subject matter.  
The following section will present a list of the thesis’ key findings. In addition to the 
three subject areas mentioned above, it will also discuss methodological findings as 
well as integrated results reflecting the interdisciplinary character of the study. The 
section represents the abridged and combined results of both cases highlighting only 
the findings of both case studies. 
 
I) Findings in the field of Middle Eastern studies  
1. The traditional oil and gas elites continue to exercise control over the respec-
tive energy sector in its entirety; renewable energies do not form an exception. 
So far, renewable energy institutions have remained weak and have failed to 
gain substantial political clout independent of third parties, agencies or person-
alities that protect them for larger political or economic shifts. On the political 
level, the power struggles between the old energy elites and the promoters of 
clean energy often produce a lock-in of renewable energy developments. 
2. In the highly personalised governance structures of the Gulf States, support for 
renewables must eventually be located within the ruling family. If this is not a 
given, success rates will remain poor. While governance structures often re-
main weak, key political agency remains in the hands of the “globalized mon-
archs” and their immediate kin. Aiming to pressure them into certain policy 
agendas or side-lining them through the institutional structures of the country 
is unlikely to succeed. 
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3. In states characterized by “bunker state” structures such as Algeria, political 
power is less personalized due to the absence of hereditary political power. It is 
replaced by seemingly untouchable institutions of the civil (ministry of energy, 
presidency, oil majors) or security-related (military, military intelligence, policy) 
branches of government. While not necessarily anti-renewable energies, these 
institutions have the power to block any innovation in the energy field. Their in-
terests must thus be integrated into successful policy design. 
4. As references to religion are rarely used in sustainability awareness campaigns 
and official publications, promoting renewable energy and sustainability poli-
cies on a local level is arguably more successful with referential framework of 
secular environmental ethics creating links to the global environmental dis-
course. 
5. Independent energy or environment NGOs or other non-governmental agen-
cies are either inexistent or do not play a role in energy policies in resource-
wealthy Arab states. This produces a strong focus of all RE-related initiatives, 
research and further activities on the governments and the national energy in-
cumbents. As an effect, they occupy unhealthily large roles in these steering 
processes and, simultaneously, stifle critical assessment of government poli-
cies. 
6. While there is a multitude of national and regional energy governance bodies, 
their actual effectiveness remains limited and their advice, often, not heeded. 
This is an effect of the phenomenon of personalized power or power in essen-
tially unaccountable institutions on a nation state level. 
7. Despite the numerous laws and renewable energy promotional programmes in 
the region, their impact on the ground remains hardly visible. The lack of trans-
parent and critical assessment further blurs the actual performance of these 
programmes. A low accountability on the policy level makes it difficult for in-
vestors to rely on the actual continuation of announced programmes, as shifts 
may occur with only little or no prior notice or subsequent compensation. 
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8. Attempts to create domestic renewable energy technology industry and pro-
duction have so far failed due to often poor industrial structures, a lack of 
trained staff and the domestic RET market’s miniscule absorption potential.  
 
II) Findings in the field of energy policy studies 
9. Contrary to general opinion, resource-wealthy Arab countries have been work-
ing in the field of renewable energy policy and technology for many years. Yet, 
while there is an abundance of ambitious RE promotion schemes and legisla-
tion, the implementation of these projects falls back behind the publicly made 
pledges. 
10. With their long-term strategies, national economic diversification programmes 
and SWFs can be regarded as key agents for renewable energy R&D in this 
group of states. These secure funds could develop into a major strategic asset 
in the mid-term future if used for long-term investment in this field. The re-
source-rich Arab states therefore have the immense advantage of available 
funds for lighthouse projects, which may develop into international technology 
and innovation leaders in that field. If not used with such purposes, success 
might not set in. 
11. Unlike in other regions in the world such as the EU, climate policies cannot be 
regarded as movers of renewable energy policies in resource-wealthy Arab 
states. Climate change policy has kept a low profile in the target states. One 
reason for this is their registration as developing countries without binding 
emissions targets. 
12. Strongly subsidized electricity prices and closed-off market conditions form the 
main barricades for renewable energies. As a liberal price reform is unlikely in 
the foreseeable future because of rulers’ fear of political unrest and the strong 
entrenched power of incumbent regime players with the power to block all ma-
jor initiatives, renewables would need to be integrated into the subsidy 
schemes in order to make large-scale and meaningful progress. 
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13. While some elements of the political elites in resource-wealthy Arab countries 
are strong supporters of very large-scale showcase projects, these have not 
triggered a renewables boom in their countries. This is partially due to the case 
that most of those few interested top-level supporters of RE are not whole-
hearted, committed sponsors to the idea and still derive substantial part of 
their financial resources from hydrocarbons. 
 
III) Findings in the field of governance theory and socio-technical transitions  
14. Niche-based, bottom-up innovation models have so far not had empirically 
documented larger successes in the renewable energy sector of the target 
countries. The latter assessment includes the popular “economic city” devel-
opment model in the Gulf (Masdar). 
15. Applying a typical Western European policy design model (transition manage-
ment) to draft renewable energy policies in resource-wealthy Arab states has 
had only limited success due to the large societal, economic and political differ-
ences between these two world regions and their respective body politique. 
One key reason is that the main focus of the model is structural and consensu-
al, personalized agency and power relations between those figures and public 
office or government are, after all, insufficiently explored. The application of 
Western governance structures in a Middle Eastern energy policy context thus 
remains very limited. 
16. In search of a successful governance model that closely matches the model in 
the target states, a more top-down, government-centred and closed-off energy 
market model like the Chinese system could also be applied to this region with 
greater success.  
17. The transferability of governance concepts to other world regions continues to 
offer a theoretical and practical challenge. While the broad postcolonial call for 
a de-Europeanization of (in this case) Arab governance regimes is valid, it must 
be emphasised that there is a dearth of genuinely local governance models in 
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the region itself. This paradox necessitates the import of regulatory models in 
the renewables sector – at least in the mid-term. 
 
IV) Methodological findings 
18. The multi-level perspective (MLP) turned out to be an adequate model for an 
in-depth, interdisciplinary analysis of an energy system. Its broad applicability 
enabled the research to combine questions relating to various aspects of Mid-
dle Eastern energy system and to combine their results in order to obtain an 
unbiased, comprehensive picture of the case study analysed. As initially dis-
cussed, the analytical focus of MLP tends to be on structures, omitting personal 
agency and personal power that are important explanatory elements in this 
group of states. Its integrative approach, however, is able to partially balance 
this out. It could be argued that this problem is indicative of the generally 
opaque and centralized decision-making structures that characterize this group 
of states. A tracking of and access to key decision-makers in both “bunker 
states” as well as “globalizing monarchies” remains a formidable challenge. This 
lack of access is also reflected by the dearth of other research literature in that 
regard. 
19. While offering a broad, tripartite analysis, the MLP tends to overstress the role 
of the regime level removing attention from the niches and landscapes. Re-
searchers’ criticism in that regard is valid. This phenomenon might be caused 
by the fact that this level is easiest to document and arguably key for a social 
sciences inspired study, as both other layers might be too technology- or sci-
ence-oriented (niches) or have very long impact periods (e.g. climate change) 
or are essentially not predictable (wars) (all landscape level). 
20. Expert elite interviews, the method of data collection, produced ample qualita-
tive data on mid-level stakeholders’ views, offering a broad analysis of the vari-
ous aspects of the local and regional energy systems. Indeed, the research in-
terviews constituted a vital data source for the analytical narrative of the thesis 
in light of a situation of flux due to the on-going developments in this field, a 
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climate of government secrecy towards researchers and a dearth of energy 
transitions literature on the region. While the difficulty in gaining access to 
some stakeholders has already been highlighted, a pure desk study could not 
have contributed this amount of in-depth analysis, critical views and original 
data. Furthermore, as discussed in the methodology chapter, a quantitative ap-
proach could not have been the method of choice for an interdisciplinary ener-
gy system analysis that conducts a multi-factor analysis of energy systems. 
Thus, a qualitative research working with stakeholder interviews constituted 
the logical and most productive option. 
21. The case study approach has proven to be a viable method for comprehensive, 
multi-level energy system analysis. Another option would have been, for in-
stance, a multiple-country, subject-based analysis of individual aspects such as 
energy market, pricing regimes or RE industry structures. While this might have 
led to more in-depth results with regards to a select number of features, it 
would not have been able to address the goal of the thesis, which sought a 
comprehensive analysis of individual national energy systems in an attempt to 
explain why renewables perform so poorly. Also, the likelihood of the isolated 
explanation of phenomena discounting the wider political context would have 
been higher. While case study approaches always have to tackle the issue of 
transferability of data to other countries, it has emerged that the drivers and 
barriers of renewable energy governance in both types of resource-wealthy Ar-
ab states analysed are extremely similar. With all the necessary caution, this 
supports the validity of the data for other cases as well. 
22. The “case study in the case study” element was featured in both cases. While 
naturally standing out of the MLP-inspired three-dimensional system of analy-
sis, it was instrumental to shed light on one project of particular relevance to 
the country. Through this approach, particular energy policy elements and de-
velopments vital for the country could be presented in greater detail. Integrat-
ing them in the MLP analysis would have led to an imbalanced focus on one 
phenomenon alone. 
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V) Integrated contributions to knowledge 
23. This study has chosen an interdisciplinary approach. By integrating theories and 
data from the three very different research areas mentioned it has demon-
strated its explanatory strength. It is evident that neither a purely Middle East-
ern Studies focus nor a transitions theory nor a material energy study would 
have been able to integrate the broad range of drivers, actors and explanatory 
elements that, in sum, are able to paint a comprehensive picture of the energy 
systems in the case study countries. Guided by principal research questions, a 
comprehensive energy systems analysis is bound to employ such a method, 
which is key in the advancement of our understanding of renewable energy 
policy transitions in the Arab world. Since this approach runs through the entire 
work it would defy the inner logic of this thesis to identify one isolated finding 
in this subsection. Instead, the original, integrated contribution of this thesis to 
this field is its approach, and thus, the very concept of the thesis itself. 
 
Concluding, it has not been the goal of this section to give a minute account of the 
more detailed results of both case studies and the policy design part of the thesis. In-
stead, the 23 points mentioned seek to present an overview of the main results of 
both case studies highlighting key messages as well as significant insights that can also 
be regarded as relevant to future research.  
 
9.2. Recommendations for further research 
The thesis concludes with the following suggestions for rewarding future research.233 
Depending on the particular research interest, several research pathways appear 
promising. As in the preceding pages, the discussion will be divided in contributions to 
                                                      
233
 The author has refrained from giving extensive further references in this subchapter as this is a 
presentation of future research pathways that are yet to be fully explored. 
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three major fields of knowledge (Middle Eastern studies, energy policy and governance 
theory) as well as to methodological issues. 
In the field of Middle Eastern Studies and renewable energy policy, it could be a re-
warding undertaking to compare renewable energy policies of a resource-poor state 
with these of one of the OPEC-members. Building on the work done here, the research 
could identify which policy patterns are characteristic to resource-rich Arab states 
(e.g., the strong role of oil and gas elites, subsidized electricity pricing, etc.) and which 
elements crystalize as pan-Arab policy denominators. In addition to such intra-regional 
comparisons, an inter-regional comparison of (renewable) energy policies of further, 
non-Arab OPEC-members, for example Venezuela, Iran or Nigeria could be a promising 
venture. Assuming somewhat similar macroeconomic structures and priorities, again, 
could further elucidate the characteristic regional structures. 
Another related area that remains under-researched in the broader field of Middle 
Eastern Studies is the issue of the interaction between the global discourse of sustain-
ability and local environmental and renewable energy policy. How can these two be 
interconnected and which institutions, social activities and curricula would be the most 
appropriate to do so? A particularly important corollary of this discussion is the ques-
tion of how far can environmental education and action on the ground be matched. 
This could either lead to a series of localized case studies or to a more philosophical 
work with a partially parallel research agenda as this one: discussing the transferral of 
governance models with a supposed global claim to different world regions. Owing to 
the aim of producing a comprehensive energy system analysis of the two cases at hand 
it remained impossible to further explore this very relevant ethical question in this 
work. However, this is a potentially very rewarding research area for further interdisci-
plinary studies. 
The final Middle Eastern Studies related research topic to be suggested here is related 
to new social movements and regime change. In many ways, the Arab Spring has 
changed politics in expanse of the Arab arena, and not exclusively in those states, 
which are going through a transformation or conflict. It would therefore be a reward-
ing endeavour to explore what effects the changed regional dynamics have on the area 
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of energy policies, and to what extent these new (or old) social and religious move-
ments are carriers of innovation able to break traditional power structures in the ener-
gy sector. 
 
The second core area of research suggested related to material energy policy studies 
regarding to the MENA region, which lacks depth in its current form. As described 
above, there are plenty of regional overviews (usually drafted by commercial consult-
ants). However, in-depth analyses exclusively focusing on a single country remain rare. 
While these studies could all be carried out with a similar analytical research outline 
(MLP, case studies focusing on countries as basic units of analysis), it would also be 
rewarding to devote an entire study to one individual level or indeed one single aspect 
of the energy system. Therefore, the entire analysis can aim to identify the routes bot-
tom-up innovation ought to take or to trace in detail how an international climate 
agreement (or other landscape-level events, such as oil prices, real changes in the na-
tional governance structures, etc.) have an effect on national energy policies. More 
limited scopes of research could focus on only one layer, which , for instance, could be 
subjects like renewable energy laws, electricity pricing (and RE support) models, or the 
energy market structure all of which represent topics that are sufficiently complex to 
warrant entire studies focusing on these aspects. This would no doubt be a rewarding 
undertaking. The downside of this exclusive focus on one aspect, however, would be 
the dearth of comprehensive information on a given country or market region. Yet, 
this trade-off can hardly be overcome.  
 
The third research area this thesis sought to contribute to is the field of renewable 
energy governance theory, as well as theories of socio-technical change and innova-
tion. This thesis attempted to apply one Western policy design theory to this world 
region. The brief discussion on the Chinese model has shown that an analysis of this 
model and an attempt to apply this to resource-rich Arab states might be a fruitful un-
dertaking. In the field of innovation theory, it is important to address and readdress 
the question which seeks to identify the institutions that can currently trigger change 
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and innovation in the Arab oil and gas states. This thesis has shown that the “islands of 
efficiency” development model that is popular among elite circles in the Gulf States 
has not benefitted the renewable energies sector thus far. Indeed, other models could 
be identified that better fit those states. Also, the field of indigenisation of governance 
theory warrants exhaustive studies. How can the tension between the over-simplistic 
imports of foreign governance concepts in a copy-and-paste-mode and the naïve call 
for indigenous theory development in areas where pure logic dictates a certain path-
way (and forbids all others) be reconciled? Under which conditions does the travel of 
governance concepts not constitute an attempted Westernisation, an export of West-
ern concepts of statehood, but a logically stringent application of concepts respectful 
of local contents? It is evident that this debate remains a rich one. It is never merely 
l’art pour l’art inasmuch as it adds a philosophically-grounded social and regional sci-
ence dimension to energy policy research that is missing all too frequently. Studies 
where this is the case are usually characterized by an exclusive focus on a technical 
and managerial level while failing to take into account the multitude of social, political 
and at times religious aspects, which ought to be considered if the policies proposed 
are to have lasting effects. 
 
Finally, other methodological models are, of course, also viable. This thesis has adopt-
ed a qualitative model of elite interviews, a multi-level perspective and a case study 
model. However, a few other options have already been highlighted. While research 
interviews might not be advisable in a study focusing exclusively on individual aspects 
(in these cases, data collection in the field might altogether be abandoned), a re-
searcher could opt for opinion research and focus on the views and knowledge of envi-
ronment and RET-related aspects within a representative population. Despite the ob-
stacles opinion research in the states covered by this thesis might face, it remains a 
rewarding subject. Evidently, other, even more comprehensive studies of the region 
such as multi case-study projects, which analyse several countries, could be fruitful, 
yet, the sheer volume of such works might prove to be an issue. Naturally, researchers 
could also opt for purely quantitative studies. These research methods appear to be 
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most useful for large-number comparisons and analysis of energy systems. A solely 
quantitative approach to a comprehensive country energy system studies such as this 
thesis, would have left many aspects uncovered. 
 
In conclusion, there cannot be any doubt that renewable energy policy in the Arab 
region remains one of the most rewarding, relevant, dynamic and still-uncharted fields 
of research this discipline has to offer. The present thesis has not been but an attempt 
to fill one of the many research gaps in that area. Much more remains to be done in 
the years to come. 
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Annex 
I. Interview guideline 
Landscape-level 
Political system 
Research questions for the political system 
1. How far do the political system and the non-existence of independent CSOs allow for 
system innovations in the energy sector, particularly bottom-up innovations? 
Research questions with regards to personal patronage networks: 
2. To what extent are the official decision-making processes the actual decision-making 
structures? 
Research questions regarding long-term effects of renewables on the political system 
3. What do interviewees regard as the key governance effects of renewable energy pro-
duction? 
Key transregional energy governance bodies 
4. Which role do transregional energy governance bodies such as OPEC, OAPEC or IRENA 
play in the promotion or stalling of national renewable energy policy in the respective 
target country? 
Climate Change 
5. Is the climate change agenda actively considered in the political decision-making on 
renewable energy developments? 
Long-term national economic diversification 
6. Are the renewable energy-related efforts connected to the national economic visions 
or national SWF activities in the respective country? 
Country branding 
7. Is country branding a catalyst in the spread of renewable energies? 
 
Regime-level 
Technological regime  
Questions regarding the national power sectors 
8. To what extent are renewable energies employed to reduce pressure on the domestic 
conventional power plant park? 
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9. Is the nuclear option seen as a competitor in resources or as a mutually exclusive form 
of power production?  
User and market regime 
Market conditions 
10. Is there any system of renewable energy promotion in place? 
11. Do stakeholders believe that the transfer of European renewable energy policy design 
models is a viable method for the spread of renewable electricity capacities in the re-
gion or would indigenous policy models work better?  
System of double subsidies 
12. Are strategies developed to create a level playing field for all types of energy carriers 
by either removing subsidies for conventional power or by integrating renewable elec-
tricity into the existing subsidy schemes? 
Socio-cultural regime 
Social awareness and the role of religion or environmental ethics 
13. How widespread is the knowledge of renewable energies in the target countries? Does 
religion play a role in legitimizing this energy technology? 
Research questions in terms of labour markets: 
14. Is the job creation potential actually employed by promoters of renewable electricity 
in the country? 
Policy regime 
Questions on renewable energy targets and actual performance: 
15. Is there a (binding) strategic document, such as an energy roadmap/blueprint or at 
least a non-binding planning scheme? If so, how does this integrate renewable elec-
tricity? 
Questions regarding regional infrastructure and governance bodies: 
16. Do the regional electricity governance bodies promote political or infrastructure pro-
jects that enhance the role of renewable electricity in the target country? Is external 
demand a pull factor in that respect? 
 
Niche-level 
Science regime and technology transfer 
17. Is there an attempt to create a domestic knowledge hub for RETs and is there an in-
dustry structure that supports the spread of technologies into mainstream society? 
Technological developments 
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18. What is the interviewees’ opinion on technology choices and on the chance of indus-
try-use of RETs as entry points for further RETs in resource-rich Arab states? 
 
II. List of interviewees234 
II.1. Algeria 
Nr. 
Stakeholder 
category 
Name of Interviewee Institution 
Date and 
Location of 
Interview 
1 
Public stake-
holders 
Alexander Knipperts Director of the Friedrich Naumann Foun-dation, Project Maghreb 
Algiers, 
05/10/2010 
2 Sarida Bendjeddou 
Division of energy, environment and 
sustainable development, French Em-
bassy Algiers 
Algiers, 
02/02/2010 
3 Mohamed Aminour Climate Security and Energy Affairs Officer, British Embassy Algiers 
Algiers, 
31/01/2010 
4 Alex Dhina 
Deputy Director & Head of Economic 
Services; German-Algerian Chamber of 
Commerce 
Algiers, 
01/02/2010 and 
11/10/2010 
5 Dounia Guerfa Project Manager Environment, German-Algerian Chamber of Commerce 
Algiers, 
04/02/2010 
6 
Private and 
public inves-
tors (non-
operative 
business) 
Dr Toufiq Hasni Former general director of New Energy Algeria (NEAL); energy consultant 
Algiers, 
11/10/2010 
7 Dr Boukhalfa Yaici Renewable Energies Project Manager, CEVITAL 
Algiers, 
27/01/2010 and 
06/10/2010 
8 Dr Mustapha Mekeideche Former SONATRACH official, member of the Algerian national economic council 
Berlin, 
12/11/2010 
9 
National and 
international 
power sector 
Driss Derradji CEO, New Energy Algeria (NEAL) Algiers, 27/06/2009 
                                                      
234
 This list represents the professional positions of the interviewees at the time of the research inter-
views. 
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10 
(operative 
business) Abdelkrim Benghanem Former CEO, Sonelgaz Algiers, 20/11/2010 
11 Francisco Gomez Director General, Solar Power Plant 1, Abengoa-Abener 
Algiers, 
24/06/2009 
12 Youcef Himri Engineer, Sonelgaz, Béchar Branch Oran, 25/01/2010 
13 
Research and 
development 
Robert Parks Center for Maghrebine Studies (CEMA), Oran 
Oran, 
25/01/2010 
14 Dr. Sifeddine Labed Director, General Direction for Scientific Research & Technological Development 
Algiers, 
28/01/2010 
15 
Dr. Belhamel, Dr. Abdelkrim 
Chennak 
Director General & Chef of Division, 
Centre for Renewable Energy Develop-
ment & Research (CDER) 
Algiers, 
23/06/2009 
16 Mr. Rezoug 
Director General Assistant; 
Research & Development Centre of 
Power and Gas (CREDEG) 
Algiers, 
24/06/2009 
17 Aicha Adamou Spokesperson, international cooperation, New Energy Algeria (NEAL) 
Algiers, 
04/02/2010 
18 
Prof Amine Boudghene  
Stambouli 
Université des Sciences et de la Techno-
logie d'Oran, Department of Electrical 
Engineering 
Oran, 
25/01/2010 
19 
Dr Abderrahmane Abedou, 
Mohamed Y. Ferfera, Nacer 
Eddine Hammouda 
Centre de Recherche en Economie 
Appliquée pour le Développement 
(CREAD) 
Algiers/ Bou-
zaréah, 
10/10/2010 
20 Kamel Mostefa-Kara General Director, Agence Nationale des Changements Climatiques (ANCC) 
Algiers, 
10/10/2010 
21 Tim Willis Control Risks Algeria Algiers, 31/01/2010 
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II.2. Europe 
Nr. 
Stakeholder 
category 
Name of Interviewee Institutional Affiliation 
Date and 
Location of 
Interview 
22 
Public 
stakehold-
ers 
Simone Rave Head of Energy and Climate Change Sector, EU DG EuropeAid 
Brussels, 
14/07/2010 
23 Philippe Lorec French Ministry of Environment and Innovation 
Paris, 
13/07/2010 
24 Neil Quilliam MENA Energy Team, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
London, 
10/04/2010 
25 
 
Christina Wittek German Federal Ministry of Economics 
and Technology 
Berlin, 
19/03/2010 
26 Paolo Frankl, Cédric Philibert, Samantha Ölz 
International Energy Agency, Renewable 
Energy Division 
Paris, 
02/07/2010 
27 St. John Hoskyns 
International Energy and Technology 
Division, UK Department of Energy & 
Climate Change (DECC) 
London, 
17/02/2011 
28 Tom Meredith 
Renewable and Alternative Energy 
Division, Department of Energy & Cli-
mate Change (DECC) 
London, 
02/03/2011 
29 Kilian Baelz 
General Director, Regional Center for 
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficien-
cy (RECREEE), Cairo 
London, 
17/10/2009 
30 Mark Radka, Myriem Touhami UNEP Energy Branch Paris Paris, 02/07/2010 
31 Roderick Kefferputz Heinrich Böll Foundation, Brussels Office 
Brussels, 
14/07/2010 
32 Janis Folkmanis Principal Administrator, EU DG TREN, Brussels 
Tunis, 
10/11/2010 
33 Tom Howes Deputy Head of EU renewable energy policy EU DG TREN, Brussels 
Phone inter-
view, 
11/03/2011 
34 
Private and 
public inves-
tors (non-
operative 
business) 
Frauke Thies EU Energy Campaigner, Greenpeace Brussels Office 
Phone inter-
view, 
07/09/2010 
35 Roxanne Torfeh MENA Team, Deutsche Bank London 
Phone inter-
view, 
09/09/2010 
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36 Dr Till Stenzel COO, Nur Energie Ltd. London, 10/09/2010 
37 John Scowcroft 
Head of Unit, Environment & Sustaina-
ble Development Policy, Eurelectric, the 
Union of the Electricity Industry, Brus-
sels 
Phone inter-
view, 
18/02/2011 
38 
National 
and interna-
tional pow-
er sector 
(operative 
business) 
Sarah Bryce Global Wind Energy Council Brussels, 14/07/2010 
39 Dr Angelika Denk Dii, Director of working group “Markets”, Dii Strategy Division, Munich 
Abu Dhabi & 
phone interview, 
07/02/2011 
40 Dr Nikolaus Supersberger Senior Business Developer, GIZ, Esch-born, Germany 
Berlin, 
10/09/2010 
41 
Research 
and devel-
opment 
Paola Mazzucchelli 
General Secretary, European Renewa-
ble Energy Research Centres Agency 
(EUREC) 
Brussels, 
14/07/2010 
42 Dr Jean-Yves Moisseron Institut de recherché pour le developpe-
ment 
Amman, 
05/11/2010 
43 Dr I. Werenfels & Wolfram Lacher 
German Institute for International and 
Security Affairs (SWP) 
Berlin, 
10/07/2009 
44 
Prof Manfred Fischedick, 
Dr Peter Viebahn, Dr Daniel 
Vallentin 
Interim director and research fellows, 
Energy research group, Wuppertal 
Institute for Climate, Energy and Envi-
ronment 
Wuppertal, 
10/04/2009 
45 Bernhard Brand Institute of Energy Economics, University of Cologne 
Cologne, 
15/08/2009 
46 Dr Paul Suding GIZ Office Washington (former head of REN 21, Paris) 
Phone Inter-
view, 
28/02/2011 
47 Dr Francis Ghiles Barcelona Center for International Affairs (CIDOB) 
Barcelona, 
21/07/2010 
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II.3. UAE/Gulf region  
Nr. 
Stakeholder 
category 
Name of Interviewee(s) Institutional Affiliation 
Date and 
Location of 
Interview 
48 
Public stake-
holders 
Dr N. Janardhan UAE Ministry of State for Federal Na-tional Council Affairs 
Dubai, 
29/09/2010 
49 Kirsten Staab Hamburg Representative, German Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
Dubai, 
29/09/2010 
50 Dr Martin Böll Resident Expert, Germany Trade and Invest 
Dubai, 
29/09/2010 
51 Dr David Scott CEO, Executive Affairs Agency of Abu Dhabi 
Abu Dhabi, 
30/09/2010 
52 Matthias von Pohlenz Counsellor, Economic Affairs, German Embassy Abu Dhabi 
Abu Dhabi, 
30/09/2010 
53 Thomas Birringer 
Regional Representative to the Gulf 
States, Konrad Adenauer Foundation 
Abu Dhabi 
Abu Dhabi, 
20/01/2011 
54 Hugo Lucas Director, Outreach and capacity building, IRENA 
Abu Dhabi, 
26/01/2011 
55 Mustapha Taoumi Project Officer, Knowledge Management Regional (MENA), IRENA 
Abu Dhabi, 
26/01/2011 
56 H.H. Sheikh Dr. Abdul Aziz bin Ali bin Rashid Alnuaimi 
Member of ruling family of the Emirate of 
Ajman, “The Green Sheikh” 
Sharjah, 
29/01/2011 
57 Dr Samir Alkareish Director of Technical Affairs, OAPEC Kuwait City, 31/01/2011 
58 Dr Adnan Shihab-Eldin 
Director, Kuwait Foundation for the 
Advancement of Sciences (formerly: 
acting general secretary of OPEC)  
Kuwait City, 
15/03/2011 
59 Mike Wood Kuwaiti Ministry of Energy and Water Kuwait City, 01/02/2011 
60 
Private and 
public inves-
tors (non-
operative 
business) 
Chee Lee Regulation and Supervision Bureau, Abu Dhabi 
Phone inter-
view, 
06/02/2011 
61 Hamidullah Siddiqui Operation and Despatch Manager, Transco Abu Dhabi 
Abu Dhabi, 
19/01/2011 
62 Tushita Ranchan Advisor, Project & Corporate Finance, Mubadala 
Abu Dhabi, 
28/09/2010 
63 Matthias Gerhardt 
Head of Project Development & Project 
Management; AIC Projects GmbH 
Chemnitz (Abu Dhabi Office) 
Abu Dhabi, 
18/01/2011 
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64 Vahid Fotuhi Director, BP Solar Middle East, Dubai Dubai, 24/01/2011 
65 Mohamed Al Attas 
Solar Roof Programme Manager, Abu 
Dhabi Water and Electricity Authority 
(Adwea) 
Abu Dhabi, 
27/01/2011 
66 Khaled Awad Director, Grenea Dubai, 29/01/2011 
67 
National and 
international 
power sector 
(operative 
business) 
Alexander Bergfeld Business Development Manager,  EnviTech 
Abu Dhabi, 
26/01/2011 
68 Suresh Bhaskar Head of Strategy, GDF Suez Energy MENA 
Dubai, 
24/01/2011 
69 Hendrik R. Bohne, Hatem Hamam 
Director of Sales and Regional Sales 
Manager, Middle East 
Abu Dhabi, 
18/01/2011 
70 Bashar G. Muhtadi General Manager, Millennium Energy Industries 
Abu Dhabi, 
20/01/2011 
71 Ravi Ivaturi General Manager International Market-ing & Sales; Microsol International 
Abu Dhabi, 
20/01/2011 
72 Andy Wang Senior Accountant Manager, Yingli Solar Abu Dhabi, 19/01/2011 
73 Frank Wouters CEO, Masdar Power Abu Dhabi, 03/10/2010 
74 Georgine Roodenrys Manager Policy and Communications, Middle East, BP Hydrogen Power 
Abu Dhabi, 
22/09/2010 
75 Dr Peschke COO Masdar PV Germany Ichtershausen, 13/08/2010 
76 Romain Sautrau, Sascha Menzendorf Masdar Power 
Abu Dhabi, 
28/09/2010 
77 Dr Soughata Nandi Tecom Holding Dubai, 29/09/2010 
78 Grant Little Business Development – Carbon Pro-jects, Masdar Carbon 
Abu Dhabi, 
26/01/2011 
79 Walker Frost Communications Manager, Suntech Power Holdings Co. 
Abu Dhabi, 
19/01/2011 
80 
Research and 
development 
Dr Karen Young American University of Sharjah Dubai, 29/09/2010 
81 Dr Mohamed Raouf Gulf Research Center Dubai, 21/09/2010 
82 Marie Bos Control Risks UAE Dubai, 21/09/2010 
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83 Hannes Reinisch Deloitte Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi, 26/01/2011 
84 Dr Salem Elhajraf, D. Mamun Absi-Halabi 
Renewable energy section, Kuwait 
Institute for Scientific Research 
Kuwait City, 
31/01/2011 
85 Rob Sherwin Regester Larkin UAE Abu Dhabi, 22/09/2010 
86 Chris Stanton Energy journalist, The National Abu Dhabi, 30/09/2010 
87 Prof Georgeta Vidican, Dr Yasser al-Saleh Masdar Institute of Technology 
Abu Dhabi, 
03/10/2010 
88 Dr Hamid Kayal CEO, CSEM-UAE, UAE Emirate of Ras 
el Khaimah 
Ras el 
Khaimah, 
04/10/2010 
89 Ammar M. Munir 
Research Team Leader, Renewable 
Energy Department, National Energy & 
Water Research Center 
Abu Dhabi, 
20/01/2011 
90 Robin Mills Petroleum Economics Manager, Emir-
ates National Oil Company Ltd. (ENOC) 
Dubai, 
25/01/2011 
91 Dr Lisa Lamont, Dr Lana Chaar Moumneh 
Assistant Professors, Electrical Engi-
neering Program, Petroleum Institute 
Abu Dhabi, 
26/01/2011 
92 Jim Krane Journalist, author, energy expert, Cam-bridge University 
Cambridge, 
04/02/2010 
93 Dr Valerie Marcel 
Associate Fellow, Chatham House 
Energy, Environment and Development 
Programme, London 
Dubai, 
27/01/2011 
94 Heinz Krier Chairman,Fraunhofer-Masdar Steering Committee, Abu Dhabi 
Abu Dhabi, 
03/10/2010 
 
